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Abstract 
This research investigates the responsiveness of companies in the Australian packaging 
supply chain to stakeholder concerns about the environmental impacts of packaging. 
Packaging has been identified as an environmental policy issue in Australia since non-
refillable beverage containers were introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A 
national approach to the ‘co-regulation’ of packaging—the National Packaging Covenant 
(NPC)—was introduced in 1999. This is based on the principle of shared responsibility for 
the ‘life cycle’ environmental impacts of packaging, which is commonly referred to as 
‘product stewardship’ (PS). 
The primary focus of the thesis is corporate environmental policies and practices, but 
within a broader institutional framework. The institutionalisation of PS as a relatively new 
framework for corporate behaviour is occurring within an ‘organisational field’ at several 
levels. At the broadest (macro) level it is being institutionalised through the interaction of 
the state, industry associations and environmental non-government organisations 
(ENGOs) in policy processes. Within the packaging supply chain (meso level) it is being 
institutionalised through changes to corporate policy and practice within different sectors 
of the packaging supply chain, including raw material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, 
product manufacturers (brand owners) and retailers. Within individual firms (micro level) 
PS is being institutionalised through the interaction of functional groups with different 
interests, allegiances and stakeholders. 
Four aspects of PS are considered at each of these levels: 
• the role of interest groups, both internal and external to the firm; 
• the discourses invoked by interest groups to promote their policy beliefs; 
• policies and policy processes;  
• the influence of company characteristics such as industry sector, size, ownership 
and head office location on corporate responsiveness. 
The research begins with an analysis of the social and political factors that have shaped 
Australian public policies and expectations about corporate social responsibility for 
packaging. In contrast to Europe, where the emphasis has been on ‘extended producer 
responsibility’ (EPR) for waste, most jurisdictions in Australia have chosen to work 
cooperatively with industry associations through voluntary agreements. This approach was 
formalised in the 1990s with the introduction of the NPC, which focuses on the ‘life cycle’ 
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environmental impacts of packaging rather than just waste management. This occurred 
despite continuing campaigns by ENGOs for the introduction of container deposit 
legislation or some form of EPR regulation. The institutionalisation of PS as the solution 
to the perceived ‘packaging problem’ is linked to the relative power of the industry 
coalition in policy negotiations and the deregulatory approach to policy making within 
federal and state governments.   
Within this environment, companies have sought to maintain or enhance organisational 
legitimacy by developing policies and practices that institutionalise PS at a corporate 
level, i.e. in the way they do business. The responsiveness of companies in different 
industry sectors is evaluated by examining the PS policies and practices of 30 large 
companies in the Australian packaging supply chain. Information for the evaluation is 
gathered from corporate reports and web sites, supported by interviews with company 
representatives to gain a deeper understanding of corporate motivations and decision-
making processes. 
The results show that companies in every part of the supply chain are acting to reduce the 
environmental impacts of packaging, but most are only doing the minimum required to 
meet public expectations. The research also found a significant gap between the 
performance of the beverage and packaging manufacturers and retailers. This reflects, at 
least in part, the fact that beverage and packaging manufacturers have a longer history of 
exposure to interest group pressure on this issue. Decision-making within individual 
companies is also driven by corporate policies on environmental and social responsibility, 
which in turn appear to be linked to industry sector, company size and country of origin.  
Most companies are focusing on strategies which achieve both environmental and 
financial savings, such as the ‘lightweighting’ of packaging, rather than litter reduction 
programs or ‘design for recycling’. This reflects the competitive nature of the industry and 
the pressure being imposed on companies, by their customers, to reduce supply chain 
costs. It is also consistent with the voluntary and flexible nature of the NPC, which allows 
individual companies to choose strategies that support other business objectives. However, 
while this approach is likely to achieve incremental improvements, it may not meet the 
expectations of some government agencies and ENGOs for more rapid and substantial 
reductions in packaging waste. Companies in the packaging supply chain face a 
continuing challenge to maintain their legitimacy in the face of ongoing stakeholder 
concerns about their products.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Packaging is barely perceptible as a commodity; its limited use-life 
and its pre-determined fate as waste have become acceptable on a 
cultural level. Yet it contains natural resources and human labor—
and produces profit—like any other manufactured good (Rogers, 
2007, p. 116). 
Packaging as a social ‘problem’ 
Packaging may be ‘barely perceptible’ as a commodity but it has become highly visible as 
an environmental problem in Australia. This has prompted extended and often contentious 
debates about the nature of the problem, its underlying causes and corporate responsibility 
for addressing it. Similar debates have occurred about the social impacts of business 
activity in areas as diverse as product safety, industrial pollution, treatment of suppliers 
and employment conditions. Packaging is therefore just one of many issues being 
addressed by companies and policy makers under the general rubric of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).  
Debates about the social responsibilities of business began in many developed countries 
during the first half of the twentieth century in response to public concerns about the 
increasing size and power of corporations. They became more intense in the 1960s when 
the emergence of powerful social movements appeared to threaten the very foundations of 
capitalism. These movements were informed by influential writers on consumerism, 
product safety and the environment, including John Kenneth Galbraith (1958), Ralph 
Nader (1965) and Rachel Carson (1962) respectively. Vance Packard’s book The Waste 
Makers (1960) focused on the negative impacts of ‘disposable’ and short-life products, a 
theme picked up ten years later by Alvin Toffler (1970) when he coined the term ‘throw-
away society’.  
It is now generally recognised that companies bear some responsibility for their 
environmental impacts, but the specific issues of concern have changed over time. While 
concerns about pesticide pollution were prominent in the 1960s, resource depletion 
dominated environmental discourses in the early 1970s (Hajer, 1995b). This was 
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prompted in part by the gloomy predictions of the Club of Rome in their book Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). One of the industries targeted by environmental non-
government organisations (ENGOs) during this period was the packaging industry, which 
was experiencing a period of rapid technological change. A particular concern was the 
replacement of refillable beverage bottles with single-use bottles in the 1970s, making 
them a highly visible component of household waste and litter (Ackerman, 1997). In many 
jurisdictions around the world governments responded by introducing ‘bottle bills’ or 
‘container deposit legislation’ (CDL), which requires beverage manufacturers to charge a 
redeemable deposit on bottles. South Australia (SA) was the only Australian jurisdiction 
to introduce CDL, in 1975.  
In 1971 Australians consumed around 1.5 million tonnes of packaging per year (AEC, 
1979) but by 2007 this had increased to 4.3 million tonnes (NPCC, 2008c). On a per 
capita basis this is equivalent to an increase of around 70%, from 118 kilograms per 
person to 201 kilograms per person each year1. Refillable bottles for milk, beer and soft 
drinks have all but disappeared and a number of economic, social and cultural changes 
have contributed to increased packaging in other areas. These include the development of 
new packaging technologies, the growth of large, self-service retail stores (particularly 
supermarkets) at the expense of smaller stores, higher incomes, increased participation of 
women in the workforce, smaller households, a trend to more casual dining patterns and a 
perception that time is scarce, all of which have increased demand for convenient, pre-
packaged foods (Godbey et al., 1998; Holmes and Poore, 1993; Lox, 1992; Mander, 
2000). Lox (1992, p. 15) has claimed that ‘our way of living, marketing and distribution 
systems could not exist without packaging’, while the Packaging Council of Australia has 
declared it to be ‘essential in contemporary Australian society’ (Frost, 2005). Its benefits 
include protecting the product from damage, spoilage and loss during distribution, 
attracting attention and communicating the features of a product to consumers, and 
providing convenient handling and storage for both suppliers and consumers (Prendergast 
and Pitt, 1996). However, ENGOs remain concerned about its contribution to increasing 
levels of consumption, design for ‘disposability’ rather than reuse, the consequent increase 
in the amount of packaging being disposed of in household waste, and the high visibility 
of packaging in the litter stream. It has been estimated that 56% of packaging is recycled 
                                                     
1 Based on population statistics from ABS (2008).  
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after use (NPCC, 2008b), but many ENGOs believe that companies in the packaging 
supply chain should do much more to reduce its environmental impacts.  
During the 1980s governments in many developed countries, including Australia, started 
to take a new approach to environmental management which emphasised anticipatory 
action to address environmental impacts at source, for example through ‘cleaner 
production’ and ‘design for environment’ (DFE) programs. Increasingly, companies were 
being encouraged to integrate environmental concerns in business decision-making 
processes (Hajer, 1995b).  Germany was the first country to make producers legally 
responsible for the recovery of used consumer packaging—a concept known as ‘extended 
producer responsibility’ (EPR)—and other European countries followed their lead. In 
contrast, Australia chose to pursue a voluntary approach based on ‘product stewardship’ 
(PS). This is the principle that manufacturers have a responsibility to minimise the ‘life 
cycle’ environmental impacts of their products, a responsibility shared with their supply-
chain partners and government. This principle is embodied in the National Packaging 
Covenant (NPC), a voluntary agreement between companies in the packaging supply 
chain and all levels of government. The first Covenant (‘NPC Mark I’) was signed on 2 
July 1999 for a five-year period (1999–2004), and was underpinned by a regulatory 
framework, the National Environment Protection Measure (NEPM) for Used Packaging 
Materials. The NEPM was designed to regulate brand owners who do not sign the NPC or 
who fail to meet its minimum requirements. In 2005 the NPC was renegotiated and 
extended for another five years to 2010. The new Covenant (‘NPC Mark II’) included, for 
the first time, overarching and material-specific recovery targets; a detailed list of 
performance indicators; and more stringent reporting requirements (NPCC, 2005). These 
changes were introduced in response to research that found that industry commitment to 
the NPC was highly variable and that a lack of performance data made any evaluation of 
environmental outcomes almost impossible (Meinhardt, 2004; Nolan-ITU, 2004; White et 
al., 2004). Some local government organisations and ENGOs have continued to argue that 
the NPC is not delivering significant environmental benefits and should be replaced by a 
more regulated approach such as CDL, advance disposal fees or mandatory recycling rates 
(e.g. Angel, 2004; Boomerang Alliance, 2006a; Environment Victoria, 2007b; LGSA, 
2006). 
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NPC Mark II included a requirement for a comprehensive and independent mid-term 
review by December 2008. It also stated that unless the review found evidence of 
significant progress towards the NPC’s overarching targets, then alternative policy options 
might be considered to replace the NPC after it expires in 2010 (NPCC, 2005). The mid-
term review in 2008 concluded that, while significant progress has been made towards the 
achievement of the NPC’s waste reduction and recycling targets, it is difficult to know 
how much of this progress has been driven by changes to corporate policy and practice 
(Lewis, 2008). Other factors, such as the strong demand for recyclable materials in export 
markets, have also been influential in driving up recycling rates (Hyder Consulting, 
2008a). Falling export demand in early 2009, resulting in stockpiles of some packaging 
materials in Australia, suggests that future progress will need to rely more on the efforts of 
companies and other stakeholders in Australia to reduce waste and increased local demand 
for recyclable materials.  
Research undertaken for the mid-term review concluded that corporate responsiveness to 
the NPC has been mixed (Verghese et al., 2008), but did not provide any possible 
explanation for compliance and ‘beyond compliance’ behaviour. More research is needed 
to provide a deeper understanding of current PS strategies within the packaging supply 
chain, and how public policy can be used more effectively to improve the environmental 
sustainability of packaging through changes in corporate behaviour. 
Research questions 
This thesis aims to explore the responsiveness of companies in the Australian packaging 
supply chain to PS within the context of broader socio-political processes that define the 
economic, legal and social responsibilities of companies. The primary research question 
is:  
How, and to what extent, has product stewardship been institutionalised within the 
Australian packaging supply chain? 
This is explored by addressing three secondary questions: 
1. How have discursive and public policy processes shaped expectations about 
corporate environmental responsibilities for packaging, as well as corporate 
responsiveness?  
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2. How and to what extent is product stewardship being institutionalised by companies 
in different sectors of the packaging supply chain, particularly raw material 
suppliers, packaging manufacturers, brand owners and retailers? 
3. How and why are individual companies implementing product stewardship? 
The results of the research responding to these questions will have implications for the 
development of public policy to manage the environmental impacts of packaging and 
other products. In particular, it will contribute to a greater understanding of environmental 
responsiveness by extending policy considerations more explicitly to the importance of 
institutional frameworks and drivers. 
Methodological considerations 
Theoretical perspectives 
The thesis draws insights from different theoretical perspectives within an institutional 
framework. An institutional approach considers corporate behaviour in the context of the 
economic, legal and social systems within which companies operate. 
There has been little empirical or theoretical investigation of PS. Most of the research has 
focused on guidelines for development of EPR programs (e.g. OECD, 2001; 2005) and 
evaluation of specific PS and EPR policies (e.g. Bailey, 2003; Sinclair, 2000). There has 
been only limited analysis of voluntary corporate initiatives related to packaging. There 
has been some research, based on a corporate social performance (CSP) framework, on 
corporate responsiveness to environmental issues in the packaging industry in Canada 
(Labatt, 1997). According to the CSP perspective, PS could potentially be understood by 
examining the relevant social issue (in this case the ‘packaging problem’), corporate 
responsibilities and corporate responsiveness (e.g. Carroll, 1979; Labatt, 1991; Wood, 
1991). Responsiveness can be measured by examining corporate policies and programs as 
well as their social outcomes (Wood, 1991).  
However, the conventional CSP approach has important limitations. It provides little 
insight into decision-making processes within firms which influence corporate 
responsiveness. Labatt (1997, p. 88) has suggested that the CSP framework could be 
usefully combined with stakeholder theory and organisational theory, because knowing 
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more about how and why companies comply with voluntary initiatives is ‘essential to the 
formulation of effective public policies’.  
CSP models developed within a managerialist paradigm also fail to explain how a ‘social 
issue’ emerges and becomes a corporate responsibility. This problem has been partly 
addressed by research on stakeholder theory, which asserts that companies respond to the 
expectations of organisations which can affect, or are affected by, corporate activities, 
rather than vague ideas of corporate responsibility (e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Jones, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). However, stakeholder theory 
does not account for interaction between stakeholders and their relative power and 
influence at a socio-political level. This is where social problems are defined and where 
public policies, which help to shape stakeholder expectations about corporate behaviour, 
are developed. Different views on the packaging problem and policy solutions in Australia 
have evolved in response to the claims of competing policy coalitions. An ‘argumentative’ 
or discursive approach to policy analysis (Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 1993) can be used to 
highlight the role of policy coalitions and discourse in the construction and maintenance 
of a new institution. In trying to reach a negotiated outcome, interest groups within policy 
coalitions engage in a process of ‘discursive struggle’ involving competing narratives 
about packaging, waste, litter and corporate responsibility to support their interests and 
policy beliefs. 
The thesis therefore takes a social constructivist approach by assuming that ‘multiple 
realities are constructed in social action through the organising properties of 
communicating and particularly through the agency of language’ (Aggestam and Keenan, 
2007, p. 432). The analytical framework, which is based on an institutional approach, 
recognises the importance of social structures, relationships and dominant discourses in 
guiding organisational behaviour. ‘New institutional theory’ asserts that organisational 
behaviour is guided by rules, customs and other institutions which become ‘taken-for-
granted’ and are important in protecting organisational legitimacy (e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991b; Meyer and Rowan, 1992).  
From this perspective, PS can be regarded as a new framework for action which has 
evolved in response to changing social values and expectations about the environmental 
management of products. It is therefore important to approach the primary research 
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question at several levels of abstraction by considering the ‘messy practices of everyday 
life’ within a larger institutional context (Hudson, 2004, p. 452). While the main focus of 
the research is on the behaviour of companies (‘corporate responsiveness’), attention is 
also paid to the way that this behaviour is shaped by the social construction of a ‘policy 
problem’ and perceptions of ‘corporate social responsibility’ for this problem (Figure 1). 
Companies change their behaviour in response to policy problems that are perceived to be 
a corporate responsibility, and over time this behaviour becomes institutionalised through 
discourses, policies and practices at several levels.   
Figure 1: The institutionalisation of a corporate social responsibility 
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expectations about corporate environmental responsibilities for packaging as well as 
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particularly raw material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, brand owners and 
retailers?’, focuses attention on the industry (meso) level where PS is being 
institutionalised through changes to corporate policy and practice. 
• The third question, ‘How and why are individual companies implementing product 
stewardship?’, focuses attention on the company (micro) level where competing 
interests and objectives for products are resolved by institutionalising PS in business 
control systems. 
Each question is answered by examining four interrelated themes relevant to the PS 
institution: 
• interest groups involved in shaping or implementing PS; 
• discourses about the packaging problem and corporate responsibility; 
• policies and policy processes that are putting PS into practice;  
• company characteristics that influence corporate responsiveness to institutional 
pressure.    
Scope 
Three points can be made about the scope of the thesis. The first and perhaps most critical 
of these concerns the definition of corporate responsibilities for packaging. This is highly 
contested and is explored in some detail in Chapter 4. The definition used as the basis of 
the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 takes PS at face value, i.e. as a framework for the 
environmental management of packaging over its entire life cycle and not just when it 
becomes a ‘waste’ product. The life cycle metaphor is generally used to refer to impacts 
during the extraction or harvesting of raw materials, manufacturing, transport, 
consumption and disposal or recycling of packaging (Figure 2), although the literature on 
PS is often vague about the specific responsibilities implied by a life cycle approach. An 
alternative definition of corporate responsibility, which is based on the principle of 
‘extended producer responsibility’ and tries to intervene through more targeted waste 
management policies, is advocated by ENGOs and some local government associations. 
However, PS underpins the NPC and is therefore considered an appropriate starting point 
for the analysis of corporate performance.  
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Figure 2: The packaging life cycle 
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The research investigates the ‘packaging problem’ and its implications for corporate 
responsibility by drawing on written documents as well as the views and recollections of 
people involved in historical policy debates about packaging and the environment. 
Documents which have been reviewed include government reports, policy statements, 
internal memoranda and media releases; and statements by stakeholder groups in 
newsletters, trade journals, newspapers and other media. These provide a record of policy 
processes and policy outcomes at particular points in time which allow an historical 
account to be developed. Documents were also ‘deconstructed’ (Forbes, 2000) in order to 
identify the narratives or ‘story-lines’ employed by different groups and the underlying 
beliefs on which these were based.  
Interviews are also useful for studying past events (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998) and the 
documentary analysis was therefore supported by semi-structured interviews with people 
who had previously worked, or currently work, on packaging policy for industry 
associations, companies, government agencies or ENGOs. Open-ended interview 
questions were used to encourage participants to describe and explain their professional 
experiences in detail. Participants not only reveal their own views but act as ‘informants’ 
by describing what happened and how others viewed it (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998, p. 89). 
Interviews were conducted on the basis that their identity and organisation would not be 
revealed, so individuals are identified throughout the thesis by the type of organisation 
they work for (a full list is provided in Appendix 1).  
The evaluation of corporate policies and practices and their implementation within 
individual firms also relied on documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. 
Thirty companies were selected to investigate the responsiveness of the companies in the 
Australian packaging supply chain to PS. A full list is provided in Appendix 2. A case 
study approach focuses on individual examples rather than a broad spectrum of the 
subjects (Jones, 2006). The largest companies in each sector of the packaging supply 
chain were included for two reasons. First, they are likely to provide the best insights into 
packaging stewardship in Australia because of their size and market power—the largest 
thirty companies account for almost 90% of turnover in the packaging supply chain2. 
                                                     
2 They had combined annual sales of $132.9 billion in 2005 (Appendix 2), compared to the 
estimated sales of all NPC signatories in 2003 of $150 billion (Nolan-ITU, 2004). 
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From a normative perspective, a number of writers have also argued that corporate social 
responsibility is linked to size and power3. 
Some companies, while not necessarily among the largest, were added to deepen the 
analysis by providing a cross-section of companies by sector, location of head office and 
ownership. The case studies include companies from the four broad sectors that make up 
the supply chain (raw material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, brand owners and 
retailers), with a particularly high representation from brand owners. Brand owners ‘fill’ 
packaging with product and not only make up the majority of companies in the supply 
chain, but also tend to make the marketing decisions which drive packaging design. 
Around 65–70% of packaging in Australia is used in the manufacture of food and 
beverages (Frost, 2005) so most of the case studies in the brand owner category were 
selected from these sectors. However, a few brandowners were also selected from other 
sectors: building products (Dulux), appliances (Fisher & Paykel) and consumer electronics 
(IBM). Some companies were selected to represent particular head office locations. For 
example, while Huhtamaki’s sales revenue in Australia is relatively small, it is the largest 
packaging manufacturer in Europe. Others were chosen to represent different forms of 
ownership, and the sample includes public corporations, family-owned companies, joint 
ventures and a cooperative. 
The implementation of PS within industry sectors and individual companies was analysed 
by focusing on governance systems (policies and practices) required to implement PS 
rather than the environmental outcomes of these policies and practices4. A PS 
responsiveness framework was developed by: 
• identifying seventeen indicators of PS policy and practice; 
• grouping these indicators into broad functional areas within the firm (Figure 3);  
                                                     
3 For example, Davis (1960) argued that the social responsibilities of a business are commensurate 
with their power. In a similar vein, Windsor (2001, p. 49) proposed that ‘[t]he more powerful and 
wealthy the firm, the greater that firm’s responsibilities to neighbours and the community must be’.  
4 Environmental outcomes ideally would be included in a company’s sustainability report using 
indicators such as ‘significant environmental impacts of principal products and services’ and 
‘percentage of the weight of products sold that is reclaimable at the end of the products’ useful life 
and the percentage that is actually reclaimed’ (GRI, 2002, p. 50). 
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• developing a scoring system which rates corporate performance against each 
indicator on a scale of 0 to 3, from ‘defensive’ to ‘proactive’ (Table 1)5.  
Figure 3: Evaluation framework for PS policy and practice 
 
 
Table 1: A guide to responsiveness scores 
Score Description 
0 Defensive: do nothing or be in denial 
1 Compliant: do the minimum required to maintain a good public image 
2 Progressive: approach issues with a desire to improve social conditions 
3 Proactive: anticipate; be a leader in advancing social conditions 
                                                     
5 The first version of the framework was published in Lewis (2006). 
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Labatt’s (1991) classification of ‘appeasement’ (the minimum required to maintain a good 
public image) is referred to here as ‘compliant’ and is linked to either the minimum 
requirements of NPC Mark I or another recognised environmental management standard. 
The score for ‘proactive’ performance is intended to reflect industry ‘best practice’, i.e. it 
is only being implemented by a few industry leaders. Guidelines were developed to assist 
with the evaluation of corporate reports.  
Documents used for this part of the evaluation were published between 1999 and 2005, 
including all NPC action plans and reports6, corporate annual reports, environmental or 
sustainability reports and environmental statements on company web sites. These were 
used to identify the presence or absence of particular policies and practices and the extent 
to which they have been implemented. For companies that are subsidiaries of global 
companies based overseas, emphasis was placed on documents published by the 
Australian subsidiary. Some corporate-level publications were also reviewed where these 
apply to global operations, including CSR or sustainability reports, environmental policies 
and relevant sections of corporate web sites. However, the analysis focused on the policies 
and practices being implemented within Australian-based operations.  
This analysis of published documents was supported by interviews with current and 
previous employees of the case study companies, with interviewees selected to represent a 
range of sectors and functional roles within their respective organisations. Interviewees 
were drawn from a smaller sample than the one used for the meso-level analysis (i.e. 
fourteen companies from the total sample of thirty) because the purpose of the interviews 
was to investigate drivers and relationships within individual firms. The selective sample 
was considered to be appropriate and adequate for this purpose. A decision was also taken 
to use direct quotes from interviewees to illustrate key points—allowing people to speak 
in their own words—rather than trying to interpret the data through an extension of the 
evaluation framework. Direct quotes provide rich insights that complement and build on 
the quantitative evaluation of corporate reports.   
                                                     
6 Under NPC Mark I all signatories were required to prepare action plans and to report to the NPC 
Council annually on performance. 
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These research methods have both strengths and weaknesses. The case study approach 
restricted the number of companies that could be evaluated, but allowed for more 
exploratory investigation through the two research methods (content analysis and semi-
structured interviews). The main criticism of the case study approach is that it limits the 
ability to generalise the results (Jones, 2006). However, the aim here is not to use the case 
studies to draw definitive conclusions about the packaging supply chain as a whole, but 
rather ‘to develop rich contextual data from which generalisation to theory becomes 
possible’ (Bryman and Burgess, 1999, p. xiv, emphasis in original; also see Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1994). The selection of cases was based on ‘replication logic’. Each case 
(company) was selected because it either ‘predicts similar results (a literal replication) or 
produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)’ (Yin, 
1994, p. 46, emphasis in original). Most of the case studies were deliberately selected 
because of their relatively large size by turnover, and are therefore not representative of all 
companies in the supply chain. However, collectively they account for the majority of 
packaging manufactured and consumed in Australia and include companies from all of the 
key sectors. It is therefore legitimate to reach conclusions, based on these case studies, 
about the institutionalisation of PS within the packaging supply chain. 
A broader industry survey, for example through the use of a self-administered written 
questionnaire, might have generated more representative, quantitative results, but the 
complexities and ambiguities involved in the PS institution would have limited its value. 
By focusing on a relatively small number of examples, the case study approach allows the 
researcher to ‘deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations’, to 
examine relationships and social processes in a more holistic way, and to use a variety of 
research methods (Jones, 2006, p. 317). Case studies are particularly useful in the early 
stages of research or where existing theory seems inadequate (Eisenhardt, 1989). Very 
little academic research has been undertaken on PS, or on links between PS and broader 
CSR theory. The thesis therefore combines theory-testing with theory-building.  
Semi-structured interviews were used because they are flexible and dynamic, allowing the 
researcher to understand the ideas, thoughts and experiences of interviewees as expressed 
in their own words (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998; Reinharz and Davidman, 1992). The 
interviews included some open-ended questions which allowed for free interaction 
between the researcher and the interviewee, providing opportunities for clarification and 
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discussion. They were particularly useful in revealing personal and organisational 
motivations and actions generally excluded from official accounts in public documents.  
The analysis of corporate reports provided useful data on the policies and practices of 
individual firms, but has both benefits and limitations. The main benefit is that most 
reports are readily available on the internet and provide a substantial amount of 
information on corporate policies and practices. Other researchers have used content 
analysis of annual reports to examine management strategies (e.g. Bowman, 1984) and the 
relationship between disclosures about CSR and actual performance (Pava and Krausz, 
1995). Bowman found that annual reports provide a reasonable surrogate for reality, 
particularly given that chief executive officers tend to play a major role in the design of 
content and final editing. He noted that because they are written primarily for 
shareholders, ‘one should not expect unusual puffery on issues like corporate social 
responsibility’ (p. 63). Pava and Krausz (1995) concluded that there is a positive 
correlation between actual performance and disclosure of CSR activities in annual reports. 
However, it should be noted that these findings relate to corporate annual reports and may 
not apply to the same extent to other publications such as web sites and NPC reports. An 
important limitation of published documents used for this research is that they may not 
contain information on all relevant policies and practices, and the information may not be 
entirely accurate (for example claims about PS activities may be exaggerated). Finally, the 
rating system developed for each PS indicator was based on an understanding of NPC 
requirements and stakeholder expectations and a review of the environmental management 
literature, but is inherently subjective.  
Ethical issues 
The quantitative analysis of corporate performance and the discussion of corporate 
framing techniques in Chapter 5 refer to company names. The ethical implications of 
disclosure were considered, in particular the potential for disclosure to cause harm to the 
companies involved. The risk of harm is considered to be minimal for the following 
reasons: 
• the quantitative analysis of performance is based entirely on documents which are 
already in the public domain; 
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• all of the documents were published by the companies themselves to promote 
their environmental and/or PS initiatives, and it is therefore reasonable to use 
these to evaluate corporate performance against existing community standards; 
and 
• while the ‘non-compliant’ rating given to some individual companies may pose a 
very small risk to corporate reputation, the companies are all signatories to the 
NPC and are therefore accountable to governments and ENGOs for their 
performance. Disclosure of poor performance is considered to be reasonable 
within this context.    
The individuals who were interviewed for the qualitative analysis of corporate policies 
and practice were not named in order to protect their privacy and commercial 
confidentiality. Care has been taken in Chapters 5 and 6 to ensure that quotes from the 
interviews cannot be attributed to companies or individuals. 
Outline  
Chapter 2 reviews what is already known about product-related environmental policies, 
including PS and EPR, and their influence on corporate behaviour. The literature on 
product responsibility, CSR, DFE and voluntary environmental agreements is reviewed to 
identify alternative approaches to the evaluation of corporate social performance from 
managerial liberal, neo-liberal and institutionalist perspectives.      
Chapter 3 builds on this review to develop an analytical framework for the thesis. It 
outlines an approach to the evaluation of PS in the Australian packaging industry which 
combines insights and research methods from new institutional organisational theory, the 
corporate social performance perspective, stakeholder theory and policy network analysis. 
The empirical results are provided in the subsequent three chapters. Chapter 4 examines 
the role of discursive and public policy processes in defining the packaging problem and 
corporate responsibility in Australia between 1970 and 2005, and in influencing corporate 
responsiveness. Industry associations and individual companies have played either 
proactive or reactive roles, depending on their interests and policy beliefs, in both 
constructing and implementing PS as the framework underpinning packaging policy.  
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Chapter 5 then develops the product stewardship responsiveness framework, based on 
indicators and guidelines for the evaluation of corporate performance. This is used to 
analyse the implementation of PS policies and practices within companies in different 
sectors of the Australian packaging supply chain. The results of this semi-quantitative 
evaluation of responsiveness, based on what companies claim to be doing to implement 
PS in their public statements, are presented and analysed to identify areas of common 
practice as well as important differences within and between industry sectors.  
Chapter 6 extends this analysis by exploring within individual companies the 
organisational drivers, structures and cultural features which are shaping responsiveness. 
These issues are critical to the evaluation of the NPC and the potential development of 
new policy instruments that aim to influence managerial decision making. 
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the research findings and the extent to which they answer the 
research questions. It also identifies the implications of the research for CSR theory, 
public policy and corporate practice, and identifies some promising areas for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Understanding corporate responsibility for products 
This chapter aims to review what is already known globally about product-related 
environmental policies and their influence on corporate behaviour. It addresses three 
questions: How is corporate product responsibility defined and what are its implications 
for corporate policy and practice? How effective have product responsibility policies such 
as the NPC been in driving changes in corporate behaviour to reduce the environmental 
impacts of packaging? And how have other researchers investigated the implementation of 
product and other social responsibilities? In order to do this, the first part of the chapter 
describes the dominant two approaches to product-related environmental management, i.e. 
product stewardship and extended producer responsibility. This is followed by a review of 
the literature on CSR, DFE and voluntary environmental agreements (VEAs) to identify 
alternative approaches to the evaluation of corporate social performance from managerial 
liberal, neo-liberal and institutional perspectives. The chapter concludes that managerial 
liberal frameworks can usefully be combined with an institutionalist approach which 
considers corporate responsiveness in the context of social, economic, political and 
cultural institutions that influence corporate behaviour.  
Product stewardship and packaging 
Many terms are used to refer to the responsibility that companies have for the 
environmental management of products, including product stewardship, extended 
producer responsibility, extended product responsibility (US EPA, 1998) and product 
chain responsibility (Meinders and Mueffels, 2001), but there are important differences in 
how these terms are interpreted in practice. This section aims to unravel the different 
interpretations of product responsibility and their implications for environmental 
management and policy. 
Why products? 
By the late 1980s and 1990s it had become clear that environmental problems were 
continuing to increase despite the fact that many countries had reduced emissions from 
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industrial sources. This was certainly true in Australia, where in the mid–1980s the 
Victorian Environment Protection Authority (EPA) turned its attention away from 
industrial pollution to the environmental impacts of everyday life, including solid waste 
(Unglick, 1996). According to Lindhqvist (1992b), a new approach to environmental 
management was needed because the environmental impacts of products were becoming 
more visible. Solid waste had become a higher priority in Western European and other 
industrialised countries because of declining landfill space, increasing costs of disposal 
and opposition to new landfills. Those who were actively involved in recycling and waste 
management realised that the solution needed to go beyond the expansion of recycling 
systems run by local authorities. Particularly in Western Europe, the result was the 
development, of ‘product-oriented environmental policies’ (Heiskanen, 2000, p. 34). The 
European Commission (EC) promoted the concept of ‘integrated product policy’, which 
‘...focuses on those decision points which strongly influence the life cycle environmental 
impacts of products and which offer potential for improvement’ such as design for 
environment (DFE) and environmental labelling’ (European Commission, 2003, p. 5).  
According to Heiskanen (2000, p. 64), another factor which influenced the identification 
of ‘products as problems’ was the increasing use of life cycle assessment (LCA) as a 
method for the quantification of environmental impacts throughout a product’s life cycle. 
Interest in LCA began in the 1970s within the context of the energy crisis and concerns 
about resource depletion, and the first LCA-like study was on packaging7. The shift to 
product-oriented environmental policy and the increasing use of LCA by the business 
community helped to institutionalise a ‘life cycle approach’ in policy and business. 
Heiskanen (2000, p. 3) has defined the life cycle approach as ‘...discourses, practices and 
techniques that relate products to environmental impacts in their physical life cycle’.  
                                                     
7 The terminology used at the time included ‘eco-balance’ and ‘resource and environmental profile 
studies’ but LCA is now widely recognised through international standards (e.g. ISO, 1997). The 
first LCA was conducted for the Coca Cola company on the environmental impacts of different soft 
drink containers (Heiskanen, 2000, p. 28). 
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Product responsibility: product stewardship and extended producer 
responsibility  
These trends in environmental policy and practice prompted calls for increased corporate 
responsibility for the life cycle impacts of products. However, there are very different 
views on the nature and purpose of this responsibility, for example whether it should focus 
on post-consumer waste or the entire product life cycle; the extent to which responsibility 
should be shared with suppliers, retailers, consumers and government; and the extent to 
which it should be regulated by the state. These differences are explored below by 
comparing EPR and PS. 
Extended producer responsibility 
EPR focuses on waste management, places most of the responsibility for product 
management on the producer (or brand owner) and emphasises the need for this 
responsibility to be regulated by the state. It proposes a reallocation of responsibility for 
product waste management between industry, consumers and governments: 
EPR extends the traditional environmental responsibilities that producers 
and importers have previously been assigned (i.e. worker safety, 
prevention and treatment of environmental releases from production, 
financial and legal responsibility for the sound management of production 
wastes) to include the management of products at their post-consumer 
stage (OECD, 2001, p. 10, emphasis in original).  
EPR programs recognise that the environmental costs of waste management are not 
reflected in product prices (Anders, 1995) and that these costs should be internalised. 
However, while the focus of EPR is on post-consumer waste management, there are other 
benefits. Fishbein (2000, p. 62) noted that ‘the post-consumer stage is simply an 
intervention point ... A producer that responds to EPR by making a less wasteful and more 
recyclable product will reduce the huge environmental impacts of raw materials extraction 
… as well as the impacts of materials and energy use associated with materials’ 
processing and the manufacture of new products’. This supports Lindhqvist’s view that a 
fundamental objective of EPR is to influence product design. He argued that while the 
manufacturer, distributor, user, recycler and final disposer can all influence the 
environmental impacts of a product, primary responsibility rests with manufacturers 
because they are in a unique position to influence product design (Lindhqvist, 1992a).  
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While some writers have interpreted EPR quite broadly to include voluntary agreements 
(e.g. Anders, 1995; OECD, 2001), EPR is generally understood as a form of legal duty, 
authorised and enforced by government (Ehrenfeld, 2000). This ‘duty’ can take a number 
of forms, including financial and/or physical responsibility for product recovery 
(Lindhqvist, 1992a). 
Product stewardship 
In the United States (US), legally enforceable EPR generally has been avoided in favour 
of voluntary approaches, reflected in the use of terminology such as PS or extended 
product responsibility. According to Fishbein (2000), a failed attempt was made in 1992 
to include an EPR provision in the reauthorisation Bill for the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, thus ‘ending efforts to enact EPR at the federal level’. EPR was introduced 
by public interest research group INFORM to the President’s Council on Sustainable 
Development (PCSD), a multi-stakeholder group created by President Clinton: 
The subject of EPR was introduced to the PCSD by INFORM and 
immediately sparked heated debate, with industry representatives strongly 
objecting to the idea of ‘producer’ responsibility. Ultimately, the PCSD 
recommended a policy of ‘extended product responsibility’, which differs 
from extended producer responsibility in the following aspects: 
1. Responsibility is for the environmental impacts of products over 
their entire life cycle, with no focus on the post-consumer stage. 
2. Responsibility is shared by consumers, government, and all industry 
actors in the product chain, with no targeting of specific producers 
such as manufacturers or retailers. 
3. Responsibility is not required to be physical or financial; for 
example, it may simply mean providing consumer education. 
4. Responsibility is voluntary, not mandatory (Fishbein, 2000, p. 74). 
INFORM argued that ‘making everyone responsible for everything means no one is 
responsible for anything’; but the ‘product responsibility’ definition prevailed (Fishbein, 
2000, p. 75).  
Since that time the term ‘extended product responsibility’ has largely been replaced by 
‘product stewardship’ in the US. The concept and language of PS has its origins in earlier 
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calls for businesses to practise ‘environmental stewardship’8 and in the development of a 
PS code of practice by the Canadian Chemical Producers Association (CCPA). A project 
entitled ‘Responsible Care/Product Stewardship’ was originally developed within Dow 
Chemical (Canada) and presented to the CCPA Board in 1981 (O'Connor, n.d.). The 
guiding principles were formalised in 1983 but, following the chemical accident in 
Bhopal, India in November 1984, the Board decided that Responsible Care would be 
developed into a proactive safety audit process ‘...with particular emphasis on product 
stewardship’ (O'Connor, n.d., p. 5). Responsible Care is now in place in at least 40 
countries and includes six codes, including one on PS. The Australian version of the 
voluntary code emphasises the role of PS in risk management in the chemical industry, 
stating that ‘[t]he purpose of product stewardship and of this code is for a company to 
actively engage in the identification and management of risks associated with its products, 
to the extent consistent with its degree of influence at each stage of the product life cycle’ 
(PACIA, 2006, p. 2). The importance of PS for risk management has become increasingly 
important because companies may be held legally liable for environmental damage which 
is caused during the transport or use of their products, even if it is not a direct 
consequence of their actions (Snir, 2001). Within this context, PS has been defined as 
‘...the set of practices related to reducing risks from chemical and process hazards in a 
company’s supply chain’ (Snir, 2001, p. 190).  
The US EPA’s website (2006) defines PS as ‘a product-centered approach to 
environmental protection’ that ‘calls on those in the product life cycle—manufacturers, 
retailers, users and disposers—to share responsibility for reducing the environmental 
impacts of products’. They also acknowledge, however, that ‘in most cases, manufacturers 
have the greatest ability, and therefore the greatest responsibility, to reduce the 
environmental impacts of their products’. In Australia the meaning of PS is closely 
                                                     
8 The term ‘stewardship’ was used in some of the earliest statements about the social 
responsibilities of business, for example Bowen (1953) argued in The social responsibilities of the 
businessman that ‘[h]is role is that of steward and he is justified in retaining his social position only 
if the interests of society, on balance, are best serviced thereby’ (Bowen, 1953, pp. 39-40). 
According to Harré et al. (1999, p. 40), the religious interpretation of the term stewardship, which 
assumes that the world is made for human beings, has been an important influence on 
environmental discourse. ‘Environmental stewardship’ is now widely used as a metaphor for 
environmental responsibility and is one of the most common phrases found in corporate 
environmental policy statements (UNCTAD, 1993).  
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aligned to the US interpretation, emphasising shared responsibility and minimal (or no) 
regulation. According to the Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC, 2004a, 
p. 2)9, PS is ‘[A]n approach that recognises that manufacturers, importers, governments 
and consumers have a shared responsibility for the environmental impacts of a product 
throughout its full life cycle’. The EPHC (2004a, p. 4) has suggested that PS programs 
should ideally be industry-initiated and controlled: ‘As businesses understand their own 
sector and products best, they are best placed to develop the most appropriate product 
stewardship schemes for their sector’.  
PS promotes (or implies) a series of environmental management practices which will 
achieve this objective, but these practices vary and are rarely identified in any detail. For 
example, Hart (1995) has defined it as a strategy to minimise the life cycle environmental 
costs of a company’s products by exiting hazardous businesses, redesigning product 
systems to reduce liabilities and developing new products with lower life cycle 
environmental costs. A summary of practices which are promoted in the literature as PS 
initiatives is provided in Table 2. This illustrates that, while there are regular references in 
the literature to ‘life cycle management’ and to a wide range of practices, particular 
emphasis is placed on the role of design. Two organisations (PACIA, 2006; PSI, 2002) 
refer to the impacts of products on both human health and the natural environment.  
Comparing PS and EPR 
The previous section highlighted two important areas of difference in the way that product 
responsibility is interpreted as an environmental policy tool: 
• the way in which it is regulated, for example through voluntary industry 
initiatives, voluntary agreements, co-regulatory approaches and fully regulated 
schemes (EPHC, 2004a);  
• the way in which responsibility is allocated, for example by making producers 
physically or financially responsible for products at end-of-life or by promoting 
‘shared responsibility’ with other actors in the product chain. 
                                                     
9 The EPHC has responsibility for national coordination of environmental policy in Australia. Its 
members include ministers from participating jurisdictions, i.e. the Australian Government, state 
and territory governments, the New Zealand Government, and the Papua New Guinea Government.  
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Approaches to product responsibility are located along a spectrum in both dimensions 
(Figure 4). The terms ‘product stewardship’ and ‘extended producer responsibility’ are 
often used interchangeably, but while they do overlap there are important differences 
between them. PS is normally used to refer to voluntary or quasi-voluntary initiatives 
which assume that producers have responsibility for the life cycle environmental impacts 
of their products, but this responsibility is shared with companies in the supply chain as 
well as governments. PS therefore can be regarded as a form of CSR because it reflects a 
preference for voluntary corporate initiatives to meet changing social or stakeholder 
expectations. In contrast, EPR normally involves some form of regulation which makes 
producers responsible for management of their products at the post-consumer stage. It 
tends to be opposed by businesses, who regard consumers as the ‘polluter’ and see waste 
management as the responsibility of governments (Anders, 1995).  
Table 2: The implications of PS for corporate policy and practice  
Description and 
source 
Practices 
Product stewardship 
(PACIA, 2006, p. 8) 
• Design products to reduce health, safety and environmental (HSE) 
impacts 
• Select suppliers and contractors who implement proper HSE and 
PS practices 
• Encourage customers to follow recommended use and HSE 
practices involving the company’s products 
Extended product 
responsibility 
(US EPA, 1998) 
• Design for environment 
• Implement supply chain and industry partnerships 
• Develop lease arrangements between suppliers and customers 
• Product take-back 
Product chain 
responsibility 
(Meinders and 
Mueffels, 2001) 
• Design for environment within an ISO 14001 framework 
(continuous improvement) 
• Ensure suppliers/contractors meet environmental requirements 
• Educate customers through marketing communication 
Product oriented 
environmental 
management 
 (Brezet and Rocha, 
2001) 
• Product oriented environmental policy 
• Environmental profile of products 
• Design for environment 
• Cleaner production 
• Eco-marketing 
Integrated product 
policy 
 (European 
• Employee education on life cycle thinking 
• Promote ecodesign and LCA 
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Figure 4: Key differences between EPR and PS 
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Another important difference between PS and EPR relates to the implications for 
corporate practice. While both concepts involve increased responsibility for the life cycle 
impacts of products, PS is more complex because it implies more extensive changes 
(Table 3).  
Commission, 2003) • Using EMS including the product dimension 
• Green purchasing 
• Support eco-labels 
• Follow guidelines on green claims 
• Customer and supplier training on life cycle thinking 
• Support pilot projects  
• Information sharing with other companies and stakeholders 
EPR 
PS 
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Table 3: Implications of PS and EPR for corporate policy and practice 
 Policies and procedures to implement responsibilities 
PS Product-oriented policy 
Product assessment 
Design for environment (DFE) 
Cleaner production 
Environmental purchasing 
Education of employees and customers 
EPR DFE 
Financial or physical support for post-consumer waste management 
Packaging stewardship policies 
PS in the packaging industry, which is often referred to as ‘packaging stewardship’ (e.g. 
AFGC, 2007; Sinclair, 2000) dates back to the early 1970s. Concerns about the impact of 
single-use beverage bottles resulted in CDL, or ‘bottle bills’, being introduced in a number 
of Canadian and US states as well as South Australia, to encourage the use of reusable 
bottles10. CDL requires manufacturers to charge consumers a deposit on every container 
sold, and to repay this deposit on return of the container to a collection point. The 
Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste 1991 (the ‘German Packaging 
Ordinance’) was the first regulated EPR scheme to be introduced. At that time packaging 
was regarded by governments as a priority for waste management policy because of its 
contribution to landfill by weight and volume; the fact that landfills and incineration 
plants were becoming more difficult to site for political reasons; and increasing 
environmental standards for waste management facilities which were making waste 
disposal more costly (Goeke and Chalot, 1995). The German regulation made 
manufacturers and sellers responsible for the take-back and recovery of used packaging. 
                                                     
10 The first ‘bottle bill’, which banned non-refillable containers and required deposits, was 
introduced in Vermont in 1953 but was not renewed after it expired in 1957 (Ackerman, 1997, p. 
126).  The Oregon Beverage Container Act 1971 imposed mandatory deposits on all beverage 
containers, but a higher deposit on non-refillables. It also banned metal cans with detachable parts. 
The legislation was highly contentious and was challenged unsuccessfully in the courts by the 
beverage industry (Parliament of Australia, 1974).  CDL has progressively been introduced in 
British Columbia, Canada (1970), Vermont, US (1972), South Australia (1975), Connecticut, US 
(1978), Delaware, US (1982), Sweden (1982), Switzerland (1990), Denmark (1989), Austria 
(1990), California, US (1991), Michigan, US (1988), Iowa, Massachusetts, New York and Oregon, 
US (1990), Maine, US (1991) and Hawaii, US (2002). 
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In response, the packaging industry established a nationwide program to collect packaging 
(called the Duales System Deutschland or DSD) which charges a fee on each package to 
cover the costs of collection and reprocessing. With other countries preparing to follow 
suit, the European Commission was forced to develop a common policy approach through 
its Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (1994) (the ‘Packaging Waste Directive’)11. 
This required member states to introduce policy mechanisms which would achieve a 
minimum recovery target for packaging of 50% by July 200112.  
Packaging policies designed to meet these requirements have since been established in 
other European Union (EU) countries although there are significant differences, for 
example in the allocation of financial responsibility for waste management within the 
packaging supply chain, and between industry and local government. Austria, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden have all made producers responsible for ensuring the 
collection and recycling of packaging to meet the targets13. The Netherlands originally 
introduced voluntary agreements between industry and government to meet the EU 
requirements but these were later replaced by mandatory EPR regulations14. The United 
Kingdom (UK) has an EPR system which is different to those in Germany and other 
European countries because recycling obligations are allocated not just to producers, but 
to each sector of the packaging industry according to their responsibility for packaging 
production and their ability to reclaim materials (Bailey, 2003)15. In France financial 
                                                     
11 According to Bailey (2003), the European Commission was concerned that the German 
regulation would act as a barrier to trade within the European Union, particularly the provisions for 
a mandatory deposit-refund system to be imposed if the reuse target for bottles and cans was not 
met in any one year. Other countries were considering legislation to address packaging waste, and 
France pre-empted the move to establish a European directive by establishing its own ordinance on 
used packaging from households in 1992 (Bailey, 2003). 
12 This was amended in 2004 to 55% by 2008. 
13 These requirements are established in the following laws or regulations: Austria (Packaging 
Ordinance 1992), Ireland (Waste Management (Packaging) Regulations 1997), Italy (Legislative 
Decree 1997), Netherlands (Decree on the Management of Packaging Paper and Board 2005), 
Sweden (Ordinance on Producers’ Responsibility for Packaging 1997). 
14 The first voluntary packaging covenant in the Netherlands between the government and industry 
was introduced in 1991 and renegotiated in 1997 and 2001. Local government retained 
responsibility for collection and incineration of waste, while industry was responsible for delivering 
collected materials to reprocessors.    
15 Responsibility is apportioned to raw material suppliers (6%), converters (9%), packer-fillers 
(37%) and retailers (48%). Tradeable recycling permits (‘Packaging Recovery Notes’) are used by 
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responsibility is shared between industry and municipal governments with local 
government responsible for collection of packaging and industry for reprocessing. Japan 
and South Korea have also both introduced mandatory take-back (EPR) schemes for 
packaging16.  
In contrast to Europe, the US, Canada, New Zealand (NZ) and Australia all promote PS 
rather than EPR; although the US is the only country within this group not to have 
introduced a national packaging policy. The Canadian Government developed a voluntary 
agreement with the packaging industry and a number of provincial governments have 
introduced their own waste reduction programs17. NZ has a voluntary Packaging Accord 
between the national government, local government, packaging manufacturers, brand 
owners and fillers, retailers and recyclers18.  
A summary of the different approaches to product responsibility internationally is 
provided in Figure 5. It should be noted that PS and EPR are not the only approaches 
being used globally to control the environmental impacts of packaging. CDL has already 
been discussed, but other policy approaches include differential packaging taxes designed 
to influence design in favour of lower impact or recyclable materials; mandated recycling 
rates, packaging levies and product bans19. These programs do not necessarily promote a 
                                                                                                                                                  
the government to monitor recycling rates, and by producers to provide evidence of compliance 
(Bailey, 2003). 
16 In Japan the Packaging Source Separation and Recycling Law 1995 promotes industry 
obligations for recovery of certain types of packaging. Municipalities retain responsibility for 
collection and separation of materials (Holmes, 1999, p. 87). EPR is required in Korea under the 
Promotion of Saving and Recycling Resources Act 1992. 
17 In 1990 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) endorsed the ‘National 
Packaging Protocol’ (NAPP), a voluntary agreement with industry to reduce packaging waste. The 
agreement concluded in 2000. It aimed to reduce the amount of packaging waste disposed by 35% 
by the end of 1996 and 50% by the year 2000, compared to 1988 levels. Guiding Principles for 
Packaging Stewardship were developed to provide a general framework for how industry could 
meet these targets in practice (CCME, 1996). In Manitoba the government has introduced a levy on 
beverage packaging which is used to subsidise local kerbside collection programs (Sinclair, 2000). 
18 The Accord was signed in July 2004 and forms part of the NZ Waste Strategy (Ministry for the 
Environment et al., 2004). Agreements have been signed by government ministers and associations 
rather than individual companies. It followed the earlier Accord on a Strategy to Minimise 
Packaging Waste signed by the Packaging Industry Advisory Council (1996–2001). The new 
Accord will run for 5 years. 
19 For example, packaging taxes exist in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
Latvia and Norway. A 25% mandatory recycling rate for beverage containers has been imposed in 
California, Oregon and Wisconsin in the US. The Irish government introduced a levy on single-use 
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‘life cycle approach’ to the management of packaging as they only focus on one point in 
the life cycle, for example the selection of materials or recycling at end-of-life. 
Figure 5: Examples of producer responsibility schemes for packaging 
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Evaluation of packaging stewardship policies 
Limited research has been undertaken on the effectiveness of packaging policies in 
changing corporate policy and practice. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the 
implications of this work, largely evaluation studies, for this research. This is done by 
examining research undertaken on the NPC and other packaging stewardship policies. 
The National Packaging Covenant 
James (2002) studied the environmental management practices of companies in the 
Australian packaging and food industries (Table 4). While corporate behaviour was not 
                                                                                                                                                  
plastic bags in 2001 to encourage the use of reusable bags. The Chinese Government issued an 
order in 1999 which required all large and medium sized cities to ban the sale of polystyrene foam 
dishware by the end of 2000. The manufacture and use of plastic bags was banned in Mumbai, 
India in 2000 to alleviate blocking of stormwater drains, which caused flooding. 
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explored in any detail, an attempt was made to link environmental responsiveness to 
industry sector and ownership structure. The study found that public companies were 
more likely to have an environmental policy, an environmental section in their annual 
report, an environmental report and an environmental management system (EMS). Drivers 
which were identified included due diligence and legal compliance for implementation of 
an EMS and corporate citizenship/corporate governance for environmental reporting. At 
the time James conducted her interviews (2000) only a small number of the surveyed 
companies had signed the NPC. The main reason given for doing so was to avoid the 
NEPM or alternative regulation. It was too early to evaluate changes resulting from the 
NPC, but most of the respondents expected that it would result in a number of changes to 
decision-making processes, partnerships, business management and competition. While 
this research contributes to our understanding of environmental management in the food 
and packaging sectors, it did not investigate important PS practices such as DFE and 
environmental procurement, nor did it explore reasons for corporate responsiveness in any 
detail.  
Table 4: Environmental practices in the food and packaging industries 
Companies stating that they have adopted each 
policy or practice (N=27) 
Policy / practice 
Number of respondents Percentage of respondents 
Environmental policy  19  
 
70% 
 
Environmental section in annual report 10 37% 
 
Stand-alone environment report 9 33% 
 
Environmental management system  14 52% 
 
Voluntary environmental initiatives* 20 74% 
Signatory to Greenhouse Challenge** 9 33% 
 
Use of LCA methodology 6 22% 
Use of life cycle costing  6 22% 
 
Environmental accounting*** 0 0% 
Source: derived from James (2002) 
* Including education, community initiatives, sponsorship of non-government 
organisations, restoration of natural resources and recycling. 
** A voluntary federal government greenhouse gas reduction program. 
*** Companies in the sample did not calculate environmental costs separately from other 
business costs.  
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A mid-term review of NPC Mark I (GHD, 2002) used a semi-quantitative scoring 
methodology to evaluate company compliance on the basis of action plans and annual 
reports submitted to the National Packaging Covenant Council (NPCC)20. The study found 
many gaps in awareness, planning and implementation of action plans but, like the 
previous study, it was too early to make any realistic assessment of corporate behaviour 
change. Another three evaluations were conducted immediately before the negotiation of 
NPC Mark II for different NPC stakeholders, including the NPCC, local government and 
the Nature Conservation Council of NSW (NCC). Their objectives and methodology 
varied. The report to the NPCC (Nolan-ITU, 2004) examined the effectiveness of the NPC 
in achieving its stated objectives21 and evaluated action plans and annual reports using a 
semi-quantitative scoring method similar to the one developed earlier by GHD (2002). 
Signatories and other stakeholders (such as environmental groups) were also interviewed 
to obtain their views on the program’s effectiveness. The report found that while the NPC 
had a high level of participation (560 companies were signatories at the time) there was 
little evidence of any real outcomes achieved such as lower environmental impacts or 
resolution of packaging waste issues. It investigated the ‘depth of signatory commitment’ 
by examining the content of action plans and annual reports and found significant 
variations in the responsiveness of firms (Nolan-ITU, 2004), but the emphasis was on 
compliance rather than corporate responsiveness to PS in general. 
                                                     
20 For each of the suggested actions in the NPC (e.g. design, production, distribution, disposal and 
research etc.) companies were given a score between 1 and 5, with a score of 1 given if they 
indicated a commitment to implement an action and additional points awarded for higher levels of 
commitment. To avoid penalising companies which were new to the NPC, the scores were then 
weighted in favour of the lower levels of commitment when calculating the total scores. A score of 
either 0 or 1 was assigned for the following intentions (GHD, 2002, p. 5): a general intent to 
comply with the issue (weighting of 1.5); detailed actions addressing the issue (weighting of 1.5); 
setting measurable (numerical) targets (weighting of 0.75); providing a system for collecting data 
to monitor progress (weighting of 0.75) and assigning resources/responsibility to addressing the 
issue (weighting of 0.5). 
21 These were: ‘(1) Establish a framework based on the principle of shared responsibility for the 
effective life cycle management of packaging and paper products including their recovery and 
utilisation; (2) Establish a collaborative approach to ensure that the management of packaging and 
paper throughout its life cycle and the implementation of collection systems including kerbside 
recycling schemes, produces real and sustainable environmental outcomes in a cost effective 
manner; (3) Establish a forum for regular consultation and discussion of issues and problems 
affecting the recovery, utilisation and disposal of used packaging and paper, including costs 
(ANZECC, 1999, p. 3). 
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The report to local government associations (Meinhardt, 2004) was based on a survey of 
local government representatives to ascertain their views on the effectiveness of the NPC. 
Most respondents believed that industry had failed to achieve significant change in the 
management of packaging waste and that action plans were often broad statements of 
intent without any real commitments, and as a result they argued that the NPC should be 
replaced with a stronger EPR framework. This study was based on stakeholder 
perceptions of corporate performance rather than a first-hand review of responsiveness 
and performance, and is therefore of only limited relevance here. However, it is important 
in demonstrating that NPC Mark I lacked the support of an important stakeholder group—
local government—an issue which is explored more fully in Chapter 4. 
The third evaluation, which was conducted for the NCC (White et al., 2004) had a wider 
brief. This was to evaluate the NPC’s effectiveness in achieving its stated objectives as 
well as broader social and environmental outcomes. To assist in this process, the authors 
developed a set of criteria for a best practice packaging waste policy22. The methodology 
included a literature review, interviews with stakeholders and a review of a limited 
number of company action plans to determine whether they made reference to 15 
suggested actions for signatories23. It found no evidence that the NPC had resulted in a 
reduction in packaging waste and concluded that shared responsibility had not been 
achieved. The report argued that, while local government continued to subsidise kerbside 
recycling services, many of the packaging design initiatives associated with the NPC, such 
as lightweighting or waste reduction, provided financial benefit to companies. The study 
used a small number of case studies to evaluate corporate commitment to the NPC and, 
once again, relied on NPC action plans and annual reports. However, like the other 
                                                     
22 Reduction in generation of packaging waste, compliance, measurability, transparency, clear 
objectives, shared responsibility, cost-effectiveness, consultation and participation, education and 
communication and administrative simplicity (White et al., 2004, p. 111). 
23 The suggested actions were: establish measurable performance objectives; commit to 
improvement of environment and waste minimisation; develop material specifications for use of 
recycled materials; support kerbside collection; implement best practice collection; contribute to 
R&D into product design; support the development of markets for recycled materials; provide 
labels and information for the community; undertake education and community awareness; 
cooperate in collection of relevant data; alter logistics systems to reduce environmental impacts; 
mention product stewardship; clearly address roles and undertakings; mention the environmental 
code of practice; mention contributions to the Transitional Fund (White et al., 2004, pp. 48–49). 
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evaluations it did not consider corporate commitment, responsiveness or performance in 
any detail.  
These three evaluations were all conducted for particular interest groups. A doctoral thesis 
which looked at the application of the NPC to the fruit and vegetable industry in Western 
Australia (Arbuckle, 2005) was equally negative, concluding that the NPC ‘had had little 
impact, had failed to engage the majority of stakeholders and is characterised by a general 
lack of commitment by dominant firms within the industry’ (p. iii). Another study 
evaluated the NPC against a framework for the effective design of voluntary agreements 
and highlighted significant problems with the NPC, including a lack of positive incentives 
for companies to participate and inadequate enforcement of the regulatory safety net 
(Burritt et al., 2005). A more critical analysis (Sommer, 2006) argued that the NPC had 
failed for a number of reasons, including regulatory capture by packaging industry 
interests, inadequate enforcement of regulatory sanctions, and the flawed nature of PS as a 
conceptual framework for policy. In Sommer’s view, PS puts too much responsibility on 
to consumers and local government and provides companies with insufficient incentive to 
change their packaging.  
The Australian Productivity Commission (2006) considered the NPC very briefly as part 
of its review of waste management and resource efficiency policies in 2006. In their view 
the NPC is likely to have a net social cost because of the high costs of compliance and the 
relatively low environmental impacts of packaging, and recommended that the planned 
review of the NPC in 2008 consider the costs and benefits of other approaches including 
‘doing nothing’ (p. XLII). Their preference is to control environmental impacts directly 
through regulation or market based instruments (MBIs) at the point in the product life 
cycle where they occur, rather than through product responsibility schemes (Productivity 
Commission, 2006). 
Research for the mid-term review of the NPC was completed in late 2008. This concluded 
that the infrastructure for recycling has improved significantly and that recycling targets 
for 2010 are likely to be achieved (Covec, 2008; Hyder Consulting, 2008a). However, due 
to the poor quality of reporting it was difficult to determine the extent to which companies 
are reducing the environmental impacts of packaging (Lewis, 2008; Verghese et al., 
2008). 
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Other product responsibility policies 
Evaluations of other product responsibility policies have concluded that their effects on 
the implementation of DFE are linked to the amount of responsibility given to firms. For 
example, an evaluation of 25 EPR programs found evidence that they were influencing 
DFE within firms, and concluded that DFE effects were closely related to features of EPR 
policies which resulted in higher levels of producer responsibility (Lura Consulting et al., 
2002; cited in OECD, 2005, pp. 42–43). These results were supported by another report on 
the effectiveness of EPR policies in driving environmental design and innovation (van 
Rossem et al., 2006). This found considerable evidence that EPR policies provided 
incentives for companies to redesign their products, often well ahead of legislative 
deadlines.  
Evaluations of the German Packaging Ordinance have used product case studies (DSD, 
1992) and consumption and recycling data (DSD, 1992; Michaelis, 1995; OECD, 2001) to 
evaluate its effectiveness in changing packaging practices. All of these concluded that the 
policy had resulted in significant changes in design to reduce packaging and to make it 
more recyclable. However, there has been some criticism that many of the packaging 
changes in Germany could not be attributed to the Packaging Ordinance. Rather, they 
were the result of continuous improvements in design which had been occurring 
throughout the global packaging industry (Sinclair, 2000). EPR packaging policies in 
France and Germany have been found to generate other positive outcomes such as 
collective learning, generation and diffusion of information and consensus-building 
(Börkey et al., 1998).  
An evaluation of the Manitoba Product Stewardship Program in Canada, which imposes a 
levy on containers to fund recycling, concluded that it has not provided companies with 
sufficient incentive to reduce or redesign their packaging (Holmes, 1999). The author 
found little evidence of packaging reduction and an ‘apparent unwillingness of industry to 
fully grasp program objectives and goals in the current climate of non-obligated 
responsibility’ (p. iii). In contrast, EPR-style packaging legislation in British Columbia 
which requires companies to establish collection programs for packaging under a deposit-
refund system, appears to be more effective in providing an incentive for product redesign 
(McKerlie et al., 2006). 
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Other studies have examined the macro-level impacts of packaging policy. For example, 
Walls (2006) evaluated the impacts of the UK packaging waste policy by comparing 
growth in packaging at a national level with Gross Domestic Product (GDP). She 
hypothesised that the tradeable recycling permit system established under the policy 
would not provide companies with an incentive to make their packaging more recyclable 
because this would incur a cost, while the benefit of the change would be shared across 
the market. However, she suggested that it would provide an incentive for ‘downsizing’ 
(using less material) because this would reduce the cost to the company of recycling 
permits. While noting that ‘one does not know what packaging would have done in the 
absence of regulations’ (p. 29), she did observe that growth in packaging between 1998 
and 2004 was well below growth in GDP. This was supported by anecdotal evidence that 
there had been some changes in packaging in response to the system. Another evaluation 
of EPR packaging policies in five EU countries (EEA, 2005) found that packaging waste 
generation fell in only two of the five countries studied between 1997 and 2001 (Austria 
and the UK).  
Conclusions on product stewardship and packaging  
PS is a discourse which is based on the principle that producers have some responsibility 
for the environmental impacts of their products, although the extent of this responsibility 
is not clearly defined. Unlike EPR, it tends to focus broadly on the ‘product life cycle’ 
rather than post-consumer waste management, and the term ‘stewardship’ deflects 
attention from the producer and towards the notion of ‘shared responsibility’ with other 
organisations in the product chain. The implications of PS for management practice within 
individual companies are often not spelled out, although the discourse is associated with 
various environmental management practices such as environmental purchasing and DFE.  
Within the Australian packaging industry PS responsibilities are defined through general 
statements of principle and a range of optional management practices suggested in the 
NPC. Several studies have found that NPC Mark I achieved a high level of participation 
but limited environmental outcomes and did not meet the expectations of some key 
stakeholders for significant changes to the way that packaging is managed. For example, 
the evaluation of the NPC which was undertaken for an ENGO (White et al., 2004) 
included packaging waste reduction as an evaluation criterion despite the fact that this was 
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not an explicit goal of the NPC. None of the previous evaluations of the NPC explored the 
responsiveness and performance of companies in any detail. For example, there was no 
attempt to understand corporate behaviour beyond a superficial review of compliance.  
Other studies from Europe and Canada suggest that EPR policies are likely to be more 
effective than voluntary programs such as PS in promoting product responsibility, 
particularly DFE, because they provide companies with a financial incentive to change 
their behaviour.  
Corporate social responsibility and behaviour 
This section discusses PS within the broader context of CSR in order to gain a better 
understanding of corporate responsibility and behaviour. This is done by examining 
research from a broad range of disciplines including business management (corporate 
social responsibility), environmental policy (voluntary agreements and product 
responsibility), and design (DFE).  
CSR is a broad concept with many different interpretations. It is often applied as a 
normative concept, i.e. that companies have obligations to society which go beyond their 
direct economic or technical interest (Davis, 1960). Some definitions encompass a wide 
range of environmental and social issues (e.g. Holme and Watts, 2000), while others focus 
on social, ethical and citizenship obligations (e.g. Welford, 2004)24.  
Attempts have been made to categorise the literature from a political economy 
perspective. For example Danley (1994, p. 3) identified two positions which he referred to 
as ‘classical liberalism’ and ‘managerial liberalism’. The classical view is that the main 
responsibility of corporations is to increase profits for shareholders in an environment of 
limited government. The managerial view, which dominates the ‘business in society’, 
corporate citizenship and business ethics fields, is that corporations have responsibilities 
to a wider range of stakeholders whose interests must be considered in making any 
decision (Danley, 1994)25.  
                                                     
24 Welford interprets CSR as a concept which runs parallel to corporate environmental 
management, including responsibilities in the workplace, supply chains and local communities. 
25 The ‘business in society’, corporate citizenship and business ethics fields are related, but have 
different geographic and disciplinary origins. The academic study of ‘business in society’ had its 
origins in the formation of the Social Issues in Management Division of the US Academy of 
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A much broader analysis was undertaken by Mintzberg (1983). He identified eight 
perspectives on who should control the corporation and how it should be made more 
responsive to stakeholders. These range from the politically radical (companies should be 
nationalised or democratised) to the politically conservative (companies should only 
pursue economic goals). 
For the purpose of this review, three categories will be used to show that analysis of 
corporate responsibility and the PS institution involves some consideration of underlying 
assumptions and normative orientation (these categories are of course generalisations, and 
the writers may not classify themselves in these terms):  
• Neo-liberalism: Sometimes referred to in the Australian context as economic 
rationalism, this perspective is based on a belief that the free reign of market forces 
will produce more efficient economic outcomes than a regulated economy, and its 
stated goal is therefore the reinvigoration of free-enterprise capitalism (Stilwell, 
2002). This approach is championed by some of the critics of CSR and is evident in 
the neo-classical economics literature on waste and packaging policy. 
• Managerial liberalism: This approach, like that of the neo-liberals, is based on 
traditional liberal values of market freedom and minimal government intervention in 
business affairs. However, unlike neo-liberals, managerial liberals support ethics-
based or stakeholder-based notions of CSR and accept a more active role for the state 
in controlling business activities. They identify and promote the potential benefits of 
CSR for companies, and therefore regard self-regulation driven by competition as 
more effective than legislation (Danley, 1994). A similar perspective can be found in 
                                                                                                                                                  
Management in the early 1970s. While not rooted in traditional disciplines, academics in the field 
became progressively more interested in defining the field as one of its own rather than a sub-
discipline of management or strategy. It became more formalised with the establishment of the 
International Association for Business and Society in the 1980s, and its adoption of the existing 
Business & Society as its official journal (Paul, 2004). The term ‘corporate citizenship’ is used in a 
variety of ways. In its narrowest sense it is used to refer to corporate philanthropy but it is also used 
as an equivalent term to CSR (Matten and Crane, 2003). Writers who take the ‘equivalent view’ 
include Reilly and Kyj (1994), Marsden (2000) and Zadek (2001). Some writers on corporate 
citizenship have focused on the political idea of ‘citizenship’, for example companies are viewed as 
independent legal entities with rights and responsibilities, in effect as ‘citizens’ of the states in 
which they operate (Andriof and Waddock, 2002, p. 26). Moon (1995, p. 7) argued that the notion 
of citizenship is a good way of expressing the social responsibilities of business because it 
emphasises the fact that companies have a stake in society (not just the market) which brings with it 
the concepts of duty and participation.    
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most of the literature on PS and packaging, voluntary environmental agreements and 
DFE26. 
• Institutionalism: Institutionalists approach CSR by placing the firm within a larger 
context, which includes the rules and norms that constrain the willingness and ability 
of organisational actors to pursue social objectives. Institutionalists are more likely to 
criticise CSR on the basis that managerial discretion to pursue social goals is limited 
by economic institutions which favour short term financial gain over long term 
sustainability. Institutionalists argue that there are circumstances in which self-
regulation is not the most effective form of social control and that the state needs to 
play a stronger role in regulating business activities. 
Research on CSR, product responsibility, VEA and DFE from these three perspectives is 
summarised in Table 5 (neo-liberalism), Table 6 (managerial liberalism) and Table 7 
(institutionalism). The aim is to provide an overview of the approach taken by researchers 
within each category to corporate responsibility, the regulation of corporate social 
impacts, corporate social responsiveness and corporate social performance. Much of the 
research has been undertaken within the managerial liberal paradigm and tends to focus on 
micro-issues within the firm without any critical analysis of the role that political, cultural, 
legal and economic institutions play in influencing corporate social responsiveness. 
Institutionalists take a broader political economy perspective and are more likely to 
support increased government regulation. Some writers within this group, for example 
those using critical theory, have a more radical perspective and focus on the way that CSR 
is used to support existing distributions of power.  
                                                     
26 Writers in this group could also be described as ‘functionalists’, a term used in sociology to 
describe writers who seek to explain the status quo and to understand mechanisms for solidarity 
and stability; who are ‘...highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned to understand society in a way 
which generates knowledge which can be put to use’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 26). According 
to Burrell and Morgan, most research on organisational behaviour has been narrowly focused 
within a functionalist paradigm (pp. 25–26).  
 39 
Table 5: Neo-liberal perspectives on corporate responsibility  
Research focus and 
exemplar authors 
Corporate social 
responsibilities 
Regulating corporate social 
impacts 
Corporate social 
responsiveness 
Corporate social 
performance 
Corporate social 
responsibility  
Friedman (1962), Johns 
(2003), Henderson (2001), 
Monks and Minow (2004), 
Block and Barnett (2005) 
The primary social 
responsibility of business is to 
maximise profits for 
shareholders/owners within 
the constraints of the law.  
Companies should be able to 
operate free of government 
interference because the 
market effectively regulates 
social impacts. Where 
necessary (based on cost- 
benefit analysis) governments 
should implement market 
based instruments (MBIs) to 
correct externalities. 
CSR is pursued by companies 
when it can be justified in 
conventional cost-benefit 
terms. 
 
Some neo-liberals use 
company case studies to 
illustrate why or how 
companies implement CSR 
(e.g. Monks and Minow, 
2004) or why measures of 
corporate social performance 
are not valid (e.g. Johns, 
2003). 
 
Product responsibility and 
packaging 
Porter (2002; 2004), 
Productivity Commission 
(2006) 
 
The emphasis is on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
the market in controlling 
social impacts rather than 
ethical or normative questions 
about responsibility. 
Neo-classical economists 
accept the need for regulation 
to correct ‘market failures’ 
such as negative externalities 
generated by packaging 
waste. MBIs are believed to 
be more efficient and 
effective than PS or 
mandatory take-back 
schemes.  
 
Neo-classical economics does 
not explain the behaviour of 
companies and individuals 
beyond the pursuit of self-
interest. It assumes that 
companies will respond in a 
‘rational’ way to market 
signals.  
Most writers base their 
analysis on economic theory 
rather than empirical studies. 
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Table 6: Managerial liberal perspectives on corporate responsibility  
Research focus and 
exemplar authors 
Corporate social 
responsibilities 
Regulating corporate social 
impacts 
Corporate social 
responsiveness 
Corporate social performance 
Corporate social 
responsibility / 
corporate citizenship 
Carroll (1979), Wood 
(1991), Mitchell et 
al. (1997), Labatt 
(1991; 1997) 
Companies should operate in 
accordance with social norms 
and values. Stakeholder theories 
make this more specific by 
claiming that companies should 
(and do) respond to the interests 
of stakeholders rather than to 
society at large. 
Most writers prefer industry 
self-regulation to state 
regulation but accept that 
governments may need to play a 
guiding role.  
Companies implement CSR for 
various reasons, e.g. to avoid 
government regulation; to 
maximise long term profitability 
(‘enlightened self-interest’); in 
response to stakeholder 
expectations or because it is the 
‘right thing to do’ (the ethical 
argument).  
Performance should be 
evaluated by looking at relevant 
social issues, responsibilities 
(economic, legal, ethical, 
discretionary) and the 
‘responsiveness’ of companies – 
their adoption of certain policies 
and programs in response to 
social demands.  
Product 
responsibility and 
packaging 
European 
Environment Agency 
(EEA, 2005), OECD 
(1998; 2001; 2005)  
Companies have a responsibility 
to manage the life cycle 
environmental impacts of their 
products, although this 
responsibility is shared with 
others in the product chain. 
Products are an appropriate 
intervention point for 
environmental policy. 
Governments should design 
policies which are effective, 
efficient and transparent. 
Corporate responsiveness is 
linked to the design of 
government policies and the 
incentives they provide 
companies to change their 
behaviour. 
Performance tends to be 
evaluated by looking at the 
implementation of DFE within 
firms and macro-level 
indicators, e.g. packaging 
consumption and recycling 
rates.   
Voluntary 
environmental codes 
and agreements 
Paton (2001; 2002), 
Cabugueira (2001), 
Börkey et al.  (1998) 
The emphasis is on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
voluntary codes and agreements 
rather than ethical or normative 
questions about responsibility. 
Voluntary agreements between 
industry and government 
agencies should be used to 
achieve environmental policy 
objectives without the need for 
legislation because they are 
more efficient and effective. 
Companies participate in VEAs 
to avoid more onerous 
legislation, but in doing so can 
achieve other benefits such as 
cost savings, increased 
knowledge and technology 
diffusion.  
Evaluation frameworks examine 
environmental effectiveness as 
well as ‘soft effects’ such as 
information-sharing, 
organisational learning and 
innovation. 
Design for 
environment  
Brezet and van 
Hemel (1997), Brezet 
and Rocha (2001)  
Corporate responsibilities are 
not explicitly addressed 
although there is an implicit 
assumption that companies have 
a responsibility to reduce the 
life cycle environmental impacts 
of their products.  
‘Self-regulation’ and market 
based instruments such as eco-
labels are assumed to be more 
effective at promoting DFE than 
command-and-control 
regulations.  
DFE is driven by internal and 
external stimuli such as market 
opportunities, customer 
demands and regulation.  
Corporate performance is 
evaluated by examining which 
DFE strategies have been 
implemented (e.g. van Hemel 
and Cramer, 2002) and the 
extent to which DFE is 
integrated within management 
systems (Brezet and Rocha, 
2001). 
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Table 7: Institutionalist perspectives on corporate responsibility  
Research focus and 
exemplar authors 
Corporate social 
responsibilities 
Regulating corporate social 
impacts 
Corporate social 
responsiveness 
Corporate social performance 
Corporate social 
responsibility  
Bakan (2004), Mitchell 
(1989), Danley (1994), 
Korten (1995), Burchell 
and Cook  (2006), 
Jones (1999), Delmas 
and Toffel (2004), 
Welford (1997) 
Companies have social 
responsibilities but are often 
unable to exercise them 
voluntarily due to institutional 
constraints. The CSR discourse 
has been strongly influenced by 
business interests to protect 
their power and legitimacy and 
because it avoids the need for 
radical change. 
The state needs to play a 
stronger role in regulating the 
social impacts of corporations 
because self-regulation only 
achieves limited outcomes. 
 
Corporate responsiveness 
depends on factors which are 
both external and internal to the 
firm. Critical theorists argue 
that managerial discretion to 
implement CSR is extremely 
limited because of the nature of 
capitalism, which emphasises 
profit and growth. 
Company case studies have 
been used to explain CSR and 
to illustrate the inherent 
contradictions within the CSR 
literature. Corporate behaviour 
needs to be investigated within 
the context of broader social, 
economic and political systems. 
 
Product responsibility 
and packaging 
Bailey (1999; 2003), 
Ackerman (1997), 
Sinclair (2000), 
Lindhqvist (1999), 
Fishbein (2000) 
Product manufacturers (brand 
owners) are in the best position 
to influence design and 
therefore should be forced to 
take responsibility for the full 
life cycle costs of their 
products. This would provide 
them with a financial incentive 
to take action. 
Companies cannot be relied 
upon to implement product 
responsibility because in most 
cases it is not in their 
commercial interests to do so. 
Regulation is required, although 
powerful business interests will 
often shape the policy agenda. 
PS responsiveness within the 
packaging industry is limited by 
financial disincentives, such as 
the low value of packaging in 
the recycling stream, and the 
high priority given to product 
protection and integrity. 
Performance has been 
evaluated by looking at the 
implementation of certain waste 
management practices within 
firms (Bailey, 2003) as well as 
macro trends in consumption 
and recycling.  
Voluntary 
environmental codes 
and agreements 
Sullivan (2005), 
Gunningham and Rees 
(1997), Gunningham 
and Sinclair (2002)  
The emphasis is on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
voluntary codes and agreements 
rather than ethical or normative 
questions about responsibility. 
Voluntary agreements are not 
always the best approach to 
environmental policy, 
depending on the specific 
institutional environment within 
which firms operate. 
Companies and industry 
associations support voluntary 
agreements to avoid more 
stringent regulations. The 
challenge is to differentiate 
genuine responses from 
‘business as usual’. 
Evaluation frameworks include 
environmental effectiveness, 
‘soft effects’ and innovation, 
but policy processes and 
outcomes also need to be 
transparent and acceptable to 
stakeholders.  
Design for environment 
Boons (2002), 
Baumann et al. (2002) 
Corporate responsibilities are 
not explicitly addressed, 
although there is an implicit 
assumption that companies 
have a responsibility to reduce 
the life cycle environmental 
impacts of their products.  
The state is acknowledged as an 
important actor in driving DFE 
within firms. 
Responsiveness is linked to 
factors internal to the firm, 
product chain relationships and 
social/political factors. 
Some empirical research has 
been undertaken, using case 
studies to test the validity of a 
product chain conceptual 
framework (Boons, 2002). 
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Corporate social responsibility 
Within the managerial liberal paradigm, writers on business in society, corporate 
citizenship, stakeholder theory and business ethics argue that corporations have 
obligations to society which go beyond profit maximisation. Carroll (1979) distinguished 
between four types of responsibilities: legal, economic, ethical and discretionary, although 
most writers focus on responsibilities which go beyond a company’s conventional 
economic interests. They acknowledge that societal obligations are constantly changing27 
and therefore businesses need to implement strategies which make them responsive to 
societal demands (e.g. Sethi, 1979). Issues change over time and differ between industry 
sectors. For example, a manufacturer is likely to be more interested in recycling than a 
bank. Companies need to respond when there is an ‘expectational gap’, i.e. a gap between 
stakeholder expectations and the actual or perceived performance of the corporation 
(Preston and Post, 1981; Wartick and Mahon, 1994). This view is linked to what has 
become known as ‘legitimacy theory’, the idea that in order to operate successfully, 
corporations have to work within the bounds of socially acceptable behaviour 
(O'Donovan, 2002).  
Public policy, defined as legislation, norms and standards, provides companies with a 
useful guide to their social responsibilities (Preston and Post, 1975). CSR is particularly 
important during the ‘zone of discretion’—the period during which something is neither 
required by law nor entirely voluntary (Ackerman, 1973). Swanson and Niehoff (2001, pp. 
107-8) provide a strong cautionary note about society’s expectations of business, stating 
that ‘[w]hat is required, expected or desired of business will depend on the issue at hand 
and whether economic and ecological responsibilities are seen as mutually reinforcing or 
conflicting’ and ‘[g]roups in society often disagree on what constitutes required, expected 
or desired corporate conduct’.  
                                                     
27 Ackerman and Bauer (1976) observed that by the mid-1970s corporate responsibilities had 
shifted from social issues which are external to the corporation, such as poverty, to those which are 
directly linked to a business’s operation, such as pollution.  Many of the issues which were 
voluntary or discretionary ‘social responsibilities’ in the 1960s and 1970s have been 
institutionalised in legislation and have therefore become a normal part of doing business. The 
1990s saw the emergence of activist pressure around issues related to globalisation and 
outsourcing, including human rights abuses, labour rights, corruption and environmental 
degradation (Waddock, 2004). 
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Stakeholder theorists have attempted to clarify social responsibilities by arguing that 
managers have an obligation to meet the needs and expectations of diverse ‘stakeholders’ 
rather than society at large (e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Langtry, 
1994). Stakeholders are defined as groups or individuals who can influence, or are 
influenced by, a company’s operation (Freeman, 1984). Supporters of stakeholder theory 
oppose the traditional neo-liberal view of the firm as a discrete organisation whose 
primary obligation is to make money for its owners or shareholders. They have described 
the corporation as ‘a network of relationships’ with ‘employees, customers, suppliers, 
communities, businesses and other groups who interact with and give meaning and 
definition to the corporation (Wicks et al., 1994, p. 483) and as ‘a constellation of 
cooperative and competing interests possessing intrinsic value’ (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995, pp. 66-67).  
Another guide to social responsibility is provided by writers on business ethics, who argue 
that firms cannot always rely on social control mechanisms to guide their behaviour. 
Companies need to be aware of their moral obligations or duties where social expectations 
are unclear (Swanson, 1995). This applies particularly to transnational corporations 
operating in countries which have different standards to their own (Donaldson, 1996). 
Pava and Krausz (1995, p. 111) argue that CSR programs are only legitimate under certain 
circumstances: when they are based on strong local knowledge, are designed to ameliorate 
problems for which the corporation is directly responsible, all stakeholders agree about the 
means and the ends, and the program will lead to enhanced financial performance. 
The managerial liberal perspective on CSR is opposed by both neo-liberals and 
institutionalists, though for different reasons. Neo-liberals argue that the only social 
responsibility of a corporation is to maximise profits for shareholders within the 
constraints of the law. The most famous advocate of this position is Milton Friedman, who 
argued that ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud’ (Friedman, 1962, p 133). As a result, CSR can only be justified if it 
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contributes to shareholder value and is therefore based on ‘enlightened self-interest’28. In a 
paper published for the NZ Business Roundtable, David Henderson (2001) described CSR 
as a ‘radical doctrine’ which broadens the conception of private business and the way it 
should be conducted and most likely ‘impairs enterprise performance’. However, this is 
contradicted by an increasing amount of statistical and case study evidence that CSR 
policies are linked to strong financial performance (e.g. Benn et al., 2006; Orlitzky, 2005; 
Pava and Krausz, 1995).  
Some neo-liberals also believe that a company is legally required to maximise financial 
returns to its shareholders, and that this prohibits them from taking any action that would 
sacrifice their own interests for those of others. The Australian Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (2006) responded to this argument by 
stating that the directors of a company are required to act in the best interests of the 
corporation, which might not necessarily be the same as acting in the best interests of the 
shareholder. In their view, companies can legally take action to address environmental and 
social issues when this ‘is likely to lead to the long term growth of their enterprise’ (p. 
53). 
In contrast to neo-liberals, who oppose CSR because they do not believe that companies 
have any responsibilities to society beyond profit maximisation and compliance with 
regulations (which should be minimal), many institutionalists support the basic principle 
of CSR but argue that the capitalist system and the design of the corporate institution itself 
make it extremely difficult to implement in practice (e.g. Bakan, 2004; Hawken, 1993; 
Korten, 1995).They argue that the solution is not self-regulation, but rather a redesign of 
corporation laws and/or increased regulation of business activities.  
Product responsibility 
There are some references to product responsibility in the mainstream (managerial liberal) 
CSR literature. For example, ‘product safety’ is one of the six social issues mentioned in 
Carroll’s (1979) corporate social performance (CSP) framework and PS is one of the 
‘product impact’ indicators listed in a report published by the World Business Council for 
                                                     
28 In Bakan’s (2004) words, Friedman only tolerates CSR when it is insincere: ‘The executive who 
treats social and environmental values as means to maximise shareholders’ wealth—not as ends in 
themselves—commits no wrong’ (p. 34).  
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Sustainable Development (Holme and Watts, 2000). PS was also one of the seven priority 
issues identified in a survey of the corporate citizenship practices of Australia’s top 500 
companies (Glazebrook, 2001). This survey examined the annual reports, CEO statements 
and other publications of these companies to identify which companies describe 
themselves as corporate citizens and how they put this commitment into practice. 
Most writers on PS and EPR assume that companies have a responsibility to address the 
environmental impacts of their products. However, this responsibility is not justified, as it 
is in the CSR literature, on the basis of ethical, legitimacy or stakeholder arguments. 
Instead, product responsibility is promoted as a policy tool to address environmental 
externalities.  
Product responsibility is opposed by neo-liberals on the basis of neo-classical economic 
theory29. Normative or ethical questions (such as corporate social responsibility) are not 
addressed within economic theory because the orthodox view is that the firm is only 
motivated to maximise shareholder wealth and ‘it is futile to expect more ethical or 
responsible behaviour from businesses’ (Tomer, 1994, p. 127). This perspective is evident 
in the work of the Australian Productivity Commission (e.g. 2006) which regards product-
related environmental impacts as a form of ‘market failure’ that should be tackled by 
policies which ‘internalise’ social costs in market prices (discussed further below). 
According to neo-classical environmental economists, waste reduction and recycling 
should be ‘optimised’, with a clear understanding of marginal costs and benefits, rather 
than pursued as objectives in themselves (Porter, 2002).  
                                                     
29 There is an extensive literature on the theory and application of neo-classical economics to 
environmental problems (see for example Baumol and Oates, 1975; Common, 1996; Markandya 
and Richardson, 1992; Pearce, 1976; Tietenberg, 2004). Environmental economists are concerned 
that prices should reflect ‘true economic costs’, including all the costs of resources used and any 
associated externalities such as pollution or greenhouse gas emissions (Productivity Commission, 
2005, p. 46). It follows that the solutions to environmental problems lie in correcting market 
failures through economic (or market-based) instruments that are designed to achieve an 
environmental objective by changing relative costs. Market-based instruments which are used as a 
waste policy tool include landfill taxes, household waste disposal and recycling charges, advance 
disposal fees, deposit-refund schemes and recycling subsidies (Fullerton and Raub, 2004; Porter, 
2002; Porter, 2004). 
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Regulating corporate social impacts 
Regulatory options 
Managerial liberals, neo-liberals and institutionalists have very different perspectives on 
the regulation of corporate social impacts. Managerial liberals largely support self-
regulation, albeit with a ‘guiding’ role for governments; neo-liberals believe in regulation 
by the market; and institutionalists tend to support more government regulation.  
Managerial liberals assume that companies have both the ability and the willingness to 
implement voluntary social initiatives and therefore prefer self-regulation. CSR is viewed 
as ‘a form of control of businesses, an alternative to the control by markets or 
government’ (Tomer, 1994, p. 128). However, governments may be required to play a 
supporting or guiding role, for example through participation in voluntary agreements 
with industry. These are widely used to promote social and environmental goals such as 
energy efficiency, waste reduction or reduced greenhouse gas emissions by facilitating 
information exchange and organisational learning (Burritt, 2002; Cabugueira, 2001; Paton, 
2002; Sullivan, 2005). Porter and van de Linde (1995b; 1995a) argue that properly 
designed environmental regulation promotes innovation and therefore is good for 
business. For example, packaging wastes resources and adds cost, but well designed 
regulations can alert and educate companies to inefficiencies and potential areas for 
improvement (Porter and van de Linde, 1995a).  
In contrast, neo-liberals believe that the market will regulate business activities as long as 
prices paid by producers and consumers reflect all private and social costs such as 
environmental degradation. Drawing on neo-classical economic theory, they argue that 
markets operate more efficiently with minimal government intervention but, if necessary, 
favour MBIs rather than voluntary measures to address environmental externalities. Neo-
classical economists argue that waste policies which rely on voluntary responsibility, such 
as PS, are unlikely to achieve optimal levels of waste reduction because they do not 
provide companies with sufficient incentive to change their practices, so that any 
environmental improvements are likely to be positive, but minimal (Palmer and Walls, 
2002; Porter, 2004). They believe that priority should be given to MBIs such as volume-
based charging for household wastes or advance disposal fees (ADFs) because in theory at 
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least, they are more efficient and effective30. However, implementation problems have 
meant that they are rarely used in practice31.  
Neo-liberals also oppose CSR because they believe that social issues are a matter for 
government, not managers. Their argument is that:  
Managers, acting in their professional capacity, ought not to concern 
themselves with the public good: they are not competent to do it, they 
lack the democratic credentials for it, and their day jobs should leave 
them no time even to think about it ... The proper guardians of the 
public interest are governments, which are accountable to all citizens 
(‘The ethics of business’, The Economist, 22 January 2005, p. 18.). 
Institutionalists support more government regulation because they believe that the nature 
of the capitalist system constrains the ability of companies to implement CSR. For 
example, Bakan (2004, p. 73) argued that the corporation is both ‘deliberately 
programmed’ and ‘legally compelled’ to externalise costs without considering the impacts 
that these costs might have on people, communities or the natural environment. Self-
regulation will only be effective in specific circumstances, for example when strong 
standards of ‘industry morality’ can be developed and institutionalised in corporate 
decision-making (Gunningham and Rees, 1997, p. 406). A genuine threat of state 
regulation is also considered to be important for self-regulation to work. In their analysis 
of the failure of a co-regulatory packaging policy to be established in Ontario, Canada, in 
the mid-1990s, Chang et al. (1998) argued that the soft drink industry walked away from 
                                                     
30 Porter (2004) has suggested that market failures that affect recycling are on the supply side, i.e. 
householders supply too much waste because municipal waste disposal services are effectively free, 
and companies provide too much packaging and hard-to-recycle packaging because they do not 
have to pay for disposal or recycling. He advocates volume-based charging for household waste 
disposal at rates which would reflect the full social costs of disposal; this would provide 
householders with a financial incentive to buy recyclable products and to separate them for 
recycling after use (Porter, 2002). The ‘social cost’ of waste is different to the ‘private cost’, which 
is the amount paid by the waste generator to dispose of it; the social cost is the total cost of disposal 
including hidden subsidies and externalities. ADFs which reflect the marginal social costs of 
disposal should also be introduced because they provide manufacturers with an incentive to reduce 
packaging waste (Porter, 2002). 
31 There are a number of possible reasons for this. Efforts to use MBIs to reduce waste and increase 
recycling have not been particularly effective, and governments have been sensitive to the political 
impacts of new taxes (Ackerman, 1997). Other barriers include the complexities involved in 
designing MBIs and potential conflicts with other economic and social policy objectives (Arnold, 
1995). In Australia there has been some interest in MBIs, particularly for environmental policy, but 
all of the environment protection agencies had ‘firmly rejected’ this approach, largely because  
implementation would have been impractical with the available regulatory resources (Grabosky and 
Braithwaite, 1986). 
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the proposal when they realised that the new provincial government was intent on 
environmental deregulation. The industry originally proposed a voluntary recycling 
program, supported by back-up legislation to catch free-riders, as an alternative to more 
expensive options, such as mandatory use of refillable containers or a German-style take-
back program. However, when it was clear that the government was unlikely to impose 
any such regulation, the industry had no incentive to pursue the co-regulatory proposal.  
Policy evaluation 
There are also significant differences in the way that the three groups evaluate public 
policy. Neo-liberals tend to evaluate the effectiveness of policies in correcting market 
failure and their efficiency in cost-benefit terms. For example, Porter (2002, pp. 31–33) 
has argued that policies such as the German Packaging Ordinance are inefficient because 
collection programs run by manufacturers duplicate municipal programs and provide no 
incentive for householders to recycle. Glachant (2004) took a slightly different view: he 
suggested that ADFs which are introduced as part of an EPR scheme (as they were in 
Germany) can influence manufacturers to design more lightweight and recyclable 
packaging, but these charges must fully internalise waste disposal costs and must be 
linked to each producer’s waste collection and processing costs.   
Writers on product responsibility from a managerial liberal perspective have focused on 
effective public policy design and evaluation (e.g. Börkey et al., 1998; Holmes, 1999; 
OECD, 1998; OECD, 2001; OECD, 2005). For example, Walls (2006) argued that 
product responsibility policies tend to be poorly designed because they often have 
multiple environmental objectives, such as waste reduction, reduction in hazardous 
components of waste, reduced pollution during manufacture, reduced material 
consumption and promotion of DFE. Economic theory suggests that one policy instrument 
cannot be used to efficiently accomplish all of these objectives. Walls also suggested that 
PS objectives are often too vague because they call on companies throughout the supply 
chain to share responsibility for the environmental impacts of products: ‘The problem here 
is the broad range of “environmental impacts” of products and the lack of clarity in 
exactly what shared responsibility means’ (Walls, 2006, p. 6). The emphasis of many 
studies is on the overall costs and benefits of a policy, for example comparing operational 
costs with environmental benefits achieved, with little attention paid to corporate 
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responsiveness or the role of public policy in driving changes in corporate policy and 
behaviour. However, several studies address the effectiveness of policies in stimulating 
DFE impacts (e.g. Lura Consulting et al., 2002; OECD, 2005).  
The literature on voluntary environmental agreements, mostly within a managerial liberal 
paradigm, suggests many different criteria for policy evaluation including environmental 
effectiveness, economic efficiency, administration and compliance costs, dynamic 
efficiency and innovation, flexibility and equity (for a comprehensive review see Sullivan, 
2005). Sullivan takes a broader institutional perspective by proposing several criteria 
which are rarely mentioned by other writers, particularly those in the economics field: the 
acceptability of the policy to different stakeholders, inclusiveness and public participation, 
and public policy issues such as implications for the democratic process. Börkey and 
Lévêque (2000, p. 52) have noted that the ‘biggest political threat to voluntary approaches 
arises when they lack credibility in the eyes of the public and non-governmental 
organisations’. 
An issue of critical importance to this thesis is the impact of voluntary agreements on 
corporate policy and practice, and the business outcomes of any change in behaviour. 
There is some evidence of commercial benefits to participating firms, such as cost 
savings, technology transfer and ‘learning by doing’. This contradicts conventional 
economic theory, which assumes that, by definition, firms must be perfectly efficient 
(Paton, 2002). Drawing on economic theory and organisational research, Paton (2001; 
2002) has argued that voluntary agreements can help to overcome the widespread 
existence of knowledge, coordination and technological barriers to change within firms, 
which limit their capacity to adopt environmental practices despite the potential for 
efficiency gains. Ramesohl and Kristof (2002, p. 347) have argued that voluntary 
agreements are not likely to create tangible, short-term benefits, but may contribute to 
mid-to-long-term improvements in efficiency by supporting organisational learning and 
information sharing between firms. However, empirical research on the impact of a 
voluntary agreement in the Norwegian plastic packaging industry (Røine and Lee, 2006) 
concluded that the scheme had had relatively little impact on environmental innovation. 
While 60% of survey respondents had reduced the amount of material used in packaging 
and 36% had replaced hazardous substances, the biggest single driver for change was cost 
reduction.  
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Many institutionalists take a different approach to policy analysis by focusing on public 
policy-making processes. The European Packaging Waste Directive was used as a case 
study to examine the use of MBIs and voluntary agreements in the European Union 
(Bailey, 2003). By examining the ways the European Directive has been transposed into 
national policies, Bailey highlighted the importance of institutional and political factors in 
shaping packaging policies. He observed that, in designing MBIs and voluntary 
agreements, governments have ‘been informed by a combination of scientific evidence, 
persuasive policy networks (including epistemic communities), political and economic 
ideology, and practical exigencies (Bailey, 2003, p. 41). Comparing packaging policies in 
Germany and the UK, he concluded that ‘the German government placed primary 
emphasis on stringent environmental protection, whereas the British government has 
prioritised the mitigation of economic impacts arising from the EU environmental policy’ 
(Bailey, 2003, p. 85).  
The development of packaging policy in the UK has been analysed by examining dynamic 
policy networks. As pressure mounted on the government to develop a response to the 
European Directive, non-packaging industry interests were excluded from negotiations 
and conflicts emerged within the packaging chain between sectors with different 
objectives and interests (Eden, 1997; Nunan, 1999). A study of municipal waste policy in 
the UK also examined the institutions and actors involved in policy making, but 
highlighted the importance of an even broader analytical framework: 
[The policy-making process] takes shape in a political, social and 
cultural context in which the range of options for policy is already 
circumscribed by existing commitments, policy priorities, 
assumptions and relations of power that extend well beyond 
government, not only into the economic interests of business but also 
into the power of the collective expectations and values of wider 
society (Bulkeley et al., 2005, p. 1). 
The self-regulatory PS scheme negotiated between industry and government in Ontario 
has been explained in terms of the relative power and influence of business interests as 
well as effective cooperation between industry lobbyists; concerns within local 
government that producer responsibility would threaten municipal jobs; and a lack of 
political power and waste management expertise within environmental groups 
(Gaynutdinova, 2001).  
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Corporate social responsiveness 
How and why do firms implement CSR? 
The concept of ‘corporate social responsiveness’ refers to the strategic approach 
implemented by companies in response to social issues (Ackerman and Bauer, 1976; 
Frederick, 1994; Näsi et al., 1997; Sethi, 1979; Wartick and Cochran, 1985). It is the 
‘action phase of management responding in the social sphere’ (Carroll, 1979, p. 502). The 
European Commission (2001, p. 17) has observed that, while companies increasingly 
recognise social responsibilities, ‘many of them are yet to adopt management practices 
that reflect it’, and argued that values need to be translated into day-to-day strategies and 
actions across the organisation (European Commission, 2001). In Lyster’s view (2007, p. 
314), companies are expected to ‘assess their environmental and social impacts; put in 
place policies and management systems … to deal with these impacts; set improvement 
targets; engage in stakeholder engagement; and report on their impacts and activities’. 
Ackerman (1973) identified a number of barriers to the implementation of CSR in large 
companies, including the divisional structure that gives operational autonomy to divisional 
managers and management systems that measure and reward financial rather than social 
outcomes. He concluded that companies cannot rely on a specialist to implement a 
particular social policy because that person’s powers of persuasion, corporate policy and 
external threats are often insufficient to convince line managers to change. Rather, it needs 
to be institutionalised by committing appropriate resources and modifying procedures to 
ensure that all managers have an incentive to be more responsive. 
From a neo-liberal perspective, CSR can be regarded as a strategy used to cloak actions 
which can be justified entirely in terms of company self-interest (Friedman, 1962). In a 
similar vein, a representative of conservative think tank, the Institute of Public Affairs 
(Johns, 2003; 2005), has argued that CSR has little to do with public policies such as 
environmental sustainability or human rights—companies pursue non-commercial aspects 
of performance in order to achieve a competitive advantage. This is the view that 
companies do not have any social goals at all but simply implement social programs in 
order to achieve economic goals, i.e. ‘it pays to be good’ (Mintzberg, 1983).  
Managerial liberals link corporate responsiveness to the expectations of a diverse range of 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, investors, non-government organisations 
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and governments, not just shareholders. In a major Canadian study, Clarkson (1995) and 
his research team found that managers understand social responsibilities in terms of the 
processes of production, marketing, finance, accounting and human resources, and their 
obligations and responsibilities to particular constituencies such as customers, 
shareholders and employees. According to stakeholder theory, managerial decision 
making should (and does) take into account the interests of a wide range of ‘stakeholders’.  
Instrumental stakeholder theory examines the connections, if any, between the practice of 
stakeholder management and the achievement of corporate goals (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). Theoretical studies have linked stakeholder engagement to risk management 
(Andriof and Waddock, 2002) and the protection of critical resources (Hill and Jones, 
1992). Empirical research by Fayers (2005) concluded that corporate environmental 
reporting is a strategic response by organisations to protect their reputations by responding 
to the demands of external environmental stakeholders. According to Jones (1995, p. 430), 
‘[c]ertain types of corporate social performance are manifestations of attempts to establish 
trusting, cooperative firm/stakeholder relationships and should be positively linked to a 
company’s financial performance’. There is certainly evidence of a positive correlation 
between CSR and financial performance, which appears to be due to improved corporate 
reputation (Orlitzky, 2005). However, social responsiveness only appears to improve 
reputation when the company is responding to a relevant issue, i.e. one which is related to 
their core business (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). Another possible explanation for the 
impact on financial performance is that companies only choose to pursue social goals 
which are consistent with financial goals and are therefore likely to out-perform non-
socially responsive firms in the long term (Pava and Krausz, 1995). A study of German 
corporations concluded that their responsiveness in adopting environmental policies is 
linked to two variables: environmental risks inherent in their operations, assumed to 
correlate with the level of regulatory and public scrutiny, and market benefits that the 
company can achieve from environmental innovation (Steger, 1993; cited in Gunningham 
et al., 2003, p. 30). 
Tomer (1994) has argued that stakeholder theory is not inconsistent with commercial self-
interest. Companies that take a longer-term view are willing to sacrifice some short-term 
profit to minimise ‘legitimacy costs’ which they might incur if they fail to meet 
stakeholder expectations. These could include the higher costs of meeting regulatory 
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requirements if governments decide they have to legislate, or damage to corporate 
reputation which might result from external pressure on the organisation (Tomer, 1994).  
Another perspective is provided by research on environmental compliance and 
participation in voluntary agreements. Cabugueira (2001) found that companies participate 
in voluntary agreements because of a credible threat of regulation, commercial pressures 
linked to the environmental demands of stakeholders, and the possibility of efficiency 
gains. Participants may also be motivated by an interest in appealing to consumers who 
demand green products, and the possibility of gaining an edge over competitors (Videras 
and Alberini, 2000).  
Institutionalists link responsiveness to both internal and external factors. While companies 
may be subject to similar pressures from external stakeholders, their responsiveness will 
vary according to institutional drivers at a socio-cultural, national, industry, firm and intra-
firm level (Jones, 1999). Gunningham et al. (2005) also concluded that corporate 
compliance with environmental regulations is driven by a range of factors. These include 
the fear of prosecution, protection of their social licence to operate because it is seen as 
‘the right thing to do’, supply chain pressure, management attitudes and to save money. 
However, important differences were noted between companies, and these were attributed 
to both industry sector and company size. Large chemical manufacturers, for example, 
were more likely than electroplaters to go beyond compliance for reasons relating to risk 
management and the need to maintain the trust of local communities. The authors 
attributed this sensitivity to their greater visibility and sophistication, as well as their 
history of well-publicised environmental disasters. Large chemical companies were also 
more likely to be influenced by management attitudes and corporate culture than small-to-
medium sized companies in the same industry (Gunningham et al., 2005). In an earlier 
study of environmental policies and practice in the pulp and paper industry, Gunningham 
et al. (2003) concluded that companies are driven or constrained by stakeholders who 
influence their economic, legal and social ‘licence to operate’. However, the influence of 
these stakeholders depends on an ‘intervening variable’—the attitudes of managers.  
Writers with a more critical perspective suggest that CSR is used for political purposes to 
support the power and legitimacy of corporations, often to the detriment of weaker groups 
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in society (Banerjee, 2005; Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Mitchell, 1989) or to deflect 
public and government attention from more socially damaging activities (Beder, 2000).   
Implementing product responsibility 
Most of the policy literature on PS assumes that companies have the ability and the 
willingness to control the environmental impacts of their products voluntarily. According 
to this view, PS is an element of ‘proactive environmental management’ which can make 
companies more efficient and competitive (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998).  
A number of writers have discussed strategies for the management of DFE (e.g. Brezet 
and Rocha, 2001; Charter, 2001) such as integration of DFE within environmental 
management systems and product development processes. Barriers to implementation 
which have been identified include a lack of resources, poor communication, 
organisational structures and a culture which favour ‘business as usual’, individual inertia, 
lack of expertise in and understanding of environmental issues, and the perceived costs of 
change (Charter, 2001). Success factors which have been identified include management 
commitment and support, accessing the technical and environmental expertise of 
suppliers, environmental education and training of product development personnel, the 
presence of an environmental champion, the use of cross-functional product development 
teams, integration of DFE in the company’s standard product development process, and 
implementation of company-specific DFE rules and guidelines (Johansson, 2002). A 
survey of DFE in British manufacturing companies (Pujari et al., 2003) concluded that the 
‘eco-performance’ of DFE (i.e. the extent to which DFE results in products with lower 
environmental impact) is linked positively to senior management support, the involvement 
of an environment manager in design projects, supplier involvement, effective 
groundwork and the use of environmental impact databases. Van Hemel and Cramer 
(2002) investigated the implementation of DFE strategies within small-to-medium-size 
firms involved in a Dutch DFE program and concluded that they were influenced by a 
range of internal and external stimuli and barriers. Internal stimuli such as opportunities 
for innovation, an expected increase in product quality, and potential market opportunities, 
were found to be a stronger driver of change than external stimuli. The most influential 
external drivers were customer demand, government legislation and industry sector 
initiatives. Barriers which were identified included the perception that either it was not the 
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company’s responsibility, there was no clear environmental benefit, or no alternative 
solution was available (van Hemel and Cramer, 2002). 
Within an institutional framework the use of specific DFE strategies can be understood as 
the result of rational decisions which are influenced by power and dependency relations in 
the product chain and take into account the costs and benefits of implementation (Boons, 
2002). The packaging industry has some specific characteristics which can make DFE 
both difficult and costly. A survey of Canadian manufacturers (Quinn and Sinclair, 2006) 
found that most had no plans to implement DFE, citing reasons such as the need to meet 
health and safety regulations which make reuse and recycling difficult, lack of choice in 
materials and products, the need to follow industry ‘norms’ to avoid losing market share, 
and the ‘top priority’ given to packaging functionality in order to protect the integrity of 
the product. The authors of this study concluded that a regulated EPR program must be 
introduced to provide companies with an incentive to assume more responsibility for the 
packaging they put into the market-place.  
A review of the DFE literature by Baumann et al.(2002) found that most writers have a 
narrow disciplinary focus and fail to examine links between company processes, the 
supply chain and broader policy issues (Baumann et al., 2002). They suggested (p. 22) 
that researchers should use a more systemic perspective: 
In such a perspective, the internal process of product development is 
related to other processes within the firm, as well as to processes of 
competition and cooperation with the economic actors in the product 
chain. In addition, a systemic perspective calls for linking these 
processes to the formulation of governmental policy programmes. 
This is important because such programmes can provide important 
stimuli (and barriers) to the development of green products. 
Evaluating corporate social performance 
Corporate social performance 
‘Corporate social performance’ (CSP) models have been developed from a managerial 
perspective to both explain corporate social behaviour and provide a framework for 
evaluation (Carroll, 1979; Sethi, 1975; Wartick and Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991). 
Carroll’s (1979) model included three elements: social issues, corporate responsibilities 
and corporate responsiveness. Carroll rated responsiveness strategies using a four-point 
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scale from ‘reaction’ through to ‘defence’, ‘accommodation’ and ‘proaction’. Labatt 
(1991) revised Carroll’s terminology and definitions for different levels of responsiveness 
and adapted his four-point scale to classify responsiveness. In order to test her framework 
Labatt focused on discretionary environmental management, and developed nine 
indicators32 and a measurement scale for each indicator. A number of companies were 
studied to test the framework, using quantitative scores to measure responsiveness against 
each indicator. 
However, CSP models have been criticised for ignoring the integral responsibilities of 
companies that are associated with impacts on stakeholders (Waddock, 2004) and for 
using language such as ‘social responsibilities’ and ‘social responsiveness’, which have 
been generated within academia but are not related to the way that managers actually think 
and work (Clarkson, 1995). Carroll (1994) observed that while CSP had emerged as the 
dominant paradigm within the ‘business in society’ field, it needs to be embedded in a 
‘systems’ and stakeholder framework to encompass the totality of interactions between the 
organisation and its stakeholder environment. 
Wood (1991) developed another CSP model in order to provide a more ‘coherent, 
integrative framework for business and society research’ (p. 691). She argued that in order 
to assess a company’s social performance it was necessary to examine ‘…the degree to 
which principles of social responsibility motivate actions taken on behalf of the company, 
the degree to which the firm makes use of socially responsive processes, the existence and 
nature of policies and programs designed to manage the firm’s societal relationships, and 
the social impacts (i.e. observable outcomes) of the firm’s actions, programs and policies’ 
(p. 693). Wood’s model integrated stakeholder theory with other research on CSR 
because, in her view, this was important in clarifying to whom a business is responsible 
and in reducing the abstract idea of ‘society’ to the stakeholders who are related to the 
firm’s interests, operations and actions. This view was supported by a study of Finnish and 
Canadian forestry companies, which concluded that issues are not ‘floating about, 
agitating for change, but are connected to stakeholder groups that apply pressure’ (Näsi et 
al., 1997, p. 317) 
                                                     
32 These indicators were the board of directors, the environmental affairs function, internal 
recycling, product waste recycling, energy conservation, philanthropic donations to environmental 
causes, community support, environmental impacts of a company’s products or services and 
environmental statements or sections in the annual report (Labatt, 1991). 
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In a major Canadian study, Clarkson (1995) concluded that stakeholder theory was more 
useful for the evaluation of CSP than the various frameworks developed within the 
‘business in society’ field. He argued that the four dimensions of CSR (economic, legal, 
ethical and discretionary) did not provide a useful basis for measuring social responsibility 
with reasonably accessible corporate data, and that definitions of corporate social 
responsibility were ‘elusive constructs’ which did not provide a framework for the 
systematic collection, organisation and analysis of corporate data (p. 92) . He concluded 
that CSP can be analysed more effectively by using a framework which links corporate 
issues to relationships with specific stakeholders, and that it was important to distinguish 
between different levels of analysis. For example, policy makers determine whether or not 
something is a ‘social issue’ which justifies legislation or regulations at an institutional 
level. Managers in corporations make decisions at an organisational or an individual level 
about the extent to which they implement policies or programs in response to stakeholder 
expectations. Performance should be analysed by looking at what companies are actually 
doing—their policies and practices—rather than their motivation for doing it, which is 
irrelevant.  
The evaluation of corporate social performance from an institutional perspective includes 
consideration of the political and cultural factors which influence behaviour. For example, 
the performance of firms has been linked to the economic, social and political context 
within which they operate, including the relative power of non-government organisations 
(NGOs), which influences both the issues that companies choose to respond to and the 
practices they implement (Baughn et al., 2007; Doh and Guay, 2006). Näsi et al. (1997) 
have explained the emergence of corporate issues and responsiveness in terms of 
stakeholder theory, but they argue that a more nuanced approach is needed because, while 
companies do respond to their most powerful stakeholders, this is linked to resource 
dependencies as well as reputational effects, media dynamics and government–business 
relations. In their view, a useful framework for analysis needs to build on theories of inter-
organisational power. They also argue that research on CSR has failed to explain how 
issues and stakeholder groups ‘emerge from the interaction and negotiation of actors’ (pp. 
318–19). This requires an understanding of institutional processes that influence issue life 
cycles (Näsi et al., 1997). In a similar vein, Hoffman (2001) has argued that because 
stakeholder theory focuses on the influence of individual groups, it fails to acknowledge 
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the ways that multiple stakeholders interact to influence corporate practices within an 
‘organisational field’33. This gap is starting to be addressed by a new focus on the politics 
of stakeholder influence34. For example, King (2008) has suggested that the influence of 
secondary stakeholders (those without a direct contract with the firm, such as NGOs) 
originates in the collective action of potential stakeholders. 
Product responsibility performance 
Some evaluations of PS and EPR programs for packaging are consistent with a managerial 
liberal approach, but most pay little attention to corporate policies and performance. While 
guidelines have been provided on evaluating the costs and benefits of EPR policy (OECD, 
2005) these include only limited advice on the evaluation of corporate performance. One 
of the criteria in the guidelines is the extent to which EPR programs have encouraged DFE 
initiatives, and the extent to which these initiatives have reduced waste management costs. 
However, one problem with this type of evaluation is that a judgment would need to be 
made on innovations that would have taken place in the absence of the EPR policy 
(OECD, 2005). Glachant (2004, p. 184) has argued that products change continuously 
regardless of policy interventions, and the aim of policy is not to initiate product change, 
but to ‘modify the pattern of business-as-usual product change in order to position goods 
into less waste-intensive innovation trajectories’. Labatt (1997) evaluated the 
responsiveness of the Canadian packaging industry to a voluntary PS program, the 
National Packaging Protocol, by developing a scale to measure changes to packaging for 
each company’s top five products, and then by using this framework to survey companies 
about their changes to packaging. The study correlated packaging waste reduction 
initiatives to specific company characteristics such as size and product orientation, but 
Labatt acknowledged that further research was needed to explain how and why decisions 
about environmental issues are made. She suggested that in order to do this it might be 
useful draw on complementarities between CSR and organisational theory, and that ‘such 
knowledge is essential for the formulation of effective public policies (Labatt, 1997, p. 
88).  
                                                     
33 The concept of an organisational field is from new institutional organisational theory, and is 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
34 The politics of stakeholder influence was the theme of a special issue of Business & Society, 
edited by Frank de Bakker and Frank den Hond in March 2008 (47(1)). 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the existing literature on product responsibility 
within the context of broader debates about corporate social responsibility, responsiveness 
and performance and the role of the state in regulating corporate social impacts. In doing 
so, it sought to understand different theoretical approaches to the study of CSR which 
could be used to study the institutional development of PS within the Australian 
packaging industry.  
The first question which was identified—How is corporate product responsibility defined 
and what are the implications for corporate policy and practice?—has been partly 
answered by distinguishing between PS and EPR. PS is generally interpreted as an 
environmental management principle which acknowledges that companies are 
responsible, at least in part, for the environmental impacts of their products. It is 
implemented as a form of industry self-regulation, often through voluntary agreements 
with government, in contrast to more regulated and targeted EPR approaches. However, 
only limited guidance is provided on the specific implications of PS for corporate policy 
and practice.  
The second question—How effective have product responsibility policies such as the NPC 
been in driving changes in corporate behaviour which reduce the environmental impacts 
of packaging?—has also been partly answered. Previous evaluations of the NPC have 
focused on compliance and have identified significant differences in the responsiveness of 
companies. However, they have failed to explore in any detail how and why companies 
are implementing (or not implementing) PS policies and practices. Research on other 
product responsibility policies in Europe and Canada indicate that regulated schemes are 
likely to be more effective than voluntary PS schemes because they provide firms with a 
greater incentive to change their behaviour. However, Labatt (1997) suggested that in 
order to design an effective packaging policy we need a much better understanding of how 
and why companies respond to measures which are largely voluntary. 
The third question—How have other researchers investigated the implementation of 
product and other social responsibilities?—was answered by differentiating between neo-
liberal, managerial liberal and institutional analyses. Neo-liberal approaches to product 
responsibility and behaviour are inadequate for several reasons. First, they provide no 
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explanation for the fact that some companies have been more responsive to PS than 
others. Conventional economic theory assumes that all companies behave in a similar way 
to maximise profit, but this is clearly not the case. Second, they cannot explain why 
governments around the world, including those in Australia, have chosen to promote 
voluntary PS schemes rather than the supposedly more efficient MBIs; and why they also 
continue to advocate high levels of recycling rather than ‘optimal’ levels which are, at 
least in theory, determined through market forces. Neo-liberal approaches therefore fail to 
explain the behaviour of companies and governments in addressing product waste and 
packaging issues. 
The managerial liberal literature can contribute to the thesis in several ways. First, it 
suggests a number of ways that corporate responsibilities can be identified, for example by 
examining public policy requirements, the expectations of stakeholders and ‘legitimacy 
gaps’. Second, it suggests reasons why companies might participate in voluntary 
environmental activities, for example to avoid regulation, to protect their reputation, 
achieve commercial benefits or to meet the expectations of stakeholders such as investors 
and customers. Finally, it provides some useful conceptual tools for analysing PS 
performance. The CSP framework can be used to evaluate corporate policies and 
practices, while stakeholder theory may help to explain corporate responsiveness.  
However, the managerial liberal perspective has limitations. It provides little insight into 
the way that social issues evolve and how they become institutionalised as a corporate 
responsibility. It starts to explain why companies behave in certain ways, for example 
through reference to stakeholders, but does not examine in any detail the role of 
institutional drivers or internal dynamics in the decision-making process. It also focuses 
on individual companies and does not acknowledge the role of product chain relationships 
in driving or constraining corporate responsiveness. PS is based on a life cycle perspective 
which requires companies to consider the needs of, and possibly collaborate with, other 
actors involved in production, distribution, consumption and disposal. As Labatt (1997) 
and Näsi et al. (1997) have suggested, CSR could usefully be combined with 
organisational theory to provide a richer theoretical framework. 
Institutionalists have highlighted the importance of a systemic approach to the study of 
producer responsibility and behaviour for two reasons. First, because corporate social 
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issues are defined through the interaction of stakeholders at a socio-political level, and 
these can be analysed by looking in detail at the actors and the processes involved in 
policy development. For example, packaging policy in Europe has been analysed using 
policy network analysis as a conceptual tool. Second, corporate responsiveness has been 
linked to a wide range of external and internal factors, including stakeholder expectations, 
the distribution of costs and benefits along the product chain, the operation of financial 
markets, internal dynamics of power and leadership and the preferences of individual 
managers.  
In conclusion, the neo-liberal literature was found to be of limited value for the thesis 
because it fails to explain either policy development or corporate behaviour. The 
managerial liberal literature is more applicable because it provides two conceptual tools 
for the analysis of PS within firms: the corporate social performance framework and 
stakeholder theory.  However, it fails to consider the broader institutional and structural 
factors which influence corporate behaviour. There is therefore an opportunity to develop 
a new analytical framework for the evaluation of PS performance which builds on both 
managerial and institutional approaches to CSR.  
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Chapter 3 
‘Product stewardship’ as an institution: a framework 
for analysis 
Chapter 2 reviewed what is known about PS in general and packaging stewardship in 
particular, and placed PS within the broader context of debates about CSR, voluntary 
environmental agreements and DFE. It concluded that, while the CSP perspective and 
stakeholder theory provide a useful starting point for the evaluation of PS policy and 
practice, broader institutional drivers and barriers also need to be considered.  
This chapter develops an analytical framework which will be used to answer the primary 
research question: How, and to what extent, has product stewardship been 
institutionalised within the Australian packaging supply chain? This framework focuses 
on the normative environment that shapes, and is shaped by, corporate behaviour. PS 
represents a new ‘norm’ or standard of behaviour in the packaging supply chain which is 
in the process of being institutionalised through public and corporate policy. It reflects the 
view of many ENGOs, consumers, government agencies and other social or political 
stakeholders, that companies should take more responsibility for the environmental 
impacts of packaging throughout its life cycle. However, corporate behaviour is also 
constrained by other institutions linked to the expectations of government regulators, 
customers, suppliers, shareholders, market analysts and financial institutions. 
The analytical framework, which is summarised in Figure 6, has a number of elements. 
First, it is argued that the research question can only be adequately addressed by 
distinguishing between three levels of analysis—the macro (socio-political networks), the 
meso (companies within industry sectors) and the micro (inside companies). Second, it is 
argued that four themes need to be considered at each level of analysis:  
• interest groups with an influence on the institutionalising process;  
• packaging and PS discourses invoked by these groups to support their interests 
and policy beliefs;  
• policies and policy processes that translate these discourses into ‘techniques of 
control’ (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000);   
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• company characteristics that mediate corporate responsiveness.  
Figure 6: Summary of the analytical framework 
 
The next section provides a brief introduction to institutional theory and its application to 
the research. This is followed by a discussion about the role of interest groups, discourses, 
policies and policy processes, and company characteristics in institutionalising PS in the 
packaging supply chain. 
An institutional approach to product stewardship 
Institutionalism understands that individuals do not necessarily act rationally in ways that 
maximise personal or organisational benefits. Rather, it assumes that rules, norms and 
other frameworks influence behaviour because they are seen as the ‘right thing to do’ or 
because they become ‘taken for granted’. Institutions are customs or rules that exist within 
local environments bounded by industries, professions or countries and these 
environments have a subtle influence: ‘they penetrate the organisation, creating the lenses 
through which actors view the world’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 13). Institutions 
include shared meanings, which ‘define social relationships, help define who occupies 
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what position in those relationships, and guide interaction by giving actors cognitive 
frames or sets of meaning to interpret the behaviour of others’ (Fligstein, 2001, p. 108). 
This is an appropriate approach to the study of PS, which represents a new (and contested) 
framework for the environmental management of packaging. PS is based on the principle 
that companies are responsible—to some extent—for the environmental impacts of 
packaging over its total life cycle. As will be shown in Chapter 4, PS is increasingly taken 
for granted as an appropriate basis for action within the packaging supply chain. However, 
corporate responsiveness to packaging issues is influenced by other institutions, such as 
food safety standards and market expectations of increased profit.   
An institutional approach is implicit in much of the literature on CSR and environmental 
management. For example, while many writers talk about ‘drivers’ of socially responsible 
behaviour, Gunningham et al. (2003, p. 35) have recognised the complexity of ambiguous 
and interacting drivers:  
[I]n the course of our field research, we came to regard the concept of 
‘drivers’ as somewhat impoverished. It implies the existence of 
independent, unidirectional, and unambiguous pressures, whether 
from regulation, communities, or markets, which impact upon 
corporations with sufficient force that they react to them. Yet we 
found that these external factors, rather than being independent, often 
gain their force through mutual interaction; that far from being 
unambiguous, the responses they demand are often unclear; and hence 
that they do not operate unidirectionally, for their thrust and content 
often are determined by the way regulated enterprises interpret, 
confront and counter them. 
The authors of this study developed an integrative model based on the view that 
companies are simultaneously motivated and constrained by a multifaceted ‘licence to 
operate’. They divided the external pressures that drive companies to improve their 
environmental performance into three broad categories—economic, legal and social—
which classify the expectations of different stakeholders (Gunningham et al., 2003, pp. 
37–38):  
• economic stakeholders include shareholders (including institutional investors), 
banks and customers; 
• legal stakeholders include regulators, legislators and citizens (including ENGOs) 
who try to enforce regulations;  
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• social stakeholders include the local community, ENGOs and the general voting 
public. 
Other writers have made a distinction between the economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary responsibilities of companies (Carroll, 1979), or between pragmatic and 
social legitimacy (Puncheva, 2008). ‘Pragmatic legitimacy’ is based on the perception of 
stakeholders about the direct value of the firm’s outputs to that constituency (Suchman, 
1995). The search for pragmatic legitimacy may constrain how far companies can go in 
response to social demands for improved environmental performance. Within a capitalist 
economy, the focus of capital markets on short-term profit maximisation shapes business 
behaviour. Hawken (1993) has argued that companies face two contradictory drivers: the 
market driver to achieve the lowest price possible in order to survive, and increasingly 
urgent social demands to internalise the costs of environmental damage. Korten (1995, p. 
214) regards CSR as a fundamentally flawed principle because a ‘rogue financial system’ 
is ‘rendering responsible management ever more difficult’ in the name of economic 
efficiency. From this perspective, the responsiveness of companies in the packaging 
supply chain to government and ENGO demands for increased PS (social legitimacy) is 
likely to be constrained by the expectations of economic stakeholders such as customers 
and shareholders (pragmatic legitimacy).  
The analytical framework developed here draws on ‘new institutionalism’ in 
organisational theory35. This perspective ‘emphasises the way in which action is structured 
and order made possible by shared systems of rules’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a, p. 11). 
Organisations are regarded as ‘social entities, embedded in complex networks of beliefs, 
cultural systems and conventions that shape their goals and practices’ (Hasselbladh and 
Kallinikos, 2000, p. 698). Institutions such as these play an important social role in 
helping to align individual and collective interests (Holm, 1995). Organisations adopt new 
structures, policies and procedures that comply with institutional standards in order to 
increase their legitimacy with stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1992). While the 
managerial approach to CSR recognises the dynamic interaction between social issues, 
                                                     
35 Institutional theories have a long history, but there has been a renewal of interest and theoretical 
development in political science, sociology, economics and organisational theory since the 1970s 
under the title of ‘new institutionalism’. Researchers have sought to understand how social 
institutions come into existence, remain stable and are transformed (Fligstein, 2001). The literature 
reviewed in this chapter is mainly from a sociological perspective. 
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corporate social responsibilities and corporate social responsiveness (e.g. Wood, 1991), 
writers within this field tend to focus on the role of public policy and stakeholders’ 
expectations in defining expectations. Both of these are important in explaining corporate 
behaviour, but new institutionalism provides a more nuanced approach to the complex 
interactions between organisations and their social environment.    
Within institutional theory an important distinction can be made between ‘action guided 
by institutions’ and actions taken to ‘explicitly manipulate institutional parameters’ 
(Holm, 1995, p. 400). Holm describes this as a ‘nested systems’ perspective, which 
involves action at two levels: the ‘practical’ and the ‘political’. At the political level an 
institution is created or changed through the interaction of interests and ideas: 
On the one hand, ideas are formed by interests. Replacing one 
institution with another means that income, power and status will be 
redistributed. To succeed, an institutional entrepreneur must mobilise 
external and internal constituents behind his or her project. One 
instrument for doing that will be the construction of accounts that 
make sense of the proposed institutional project and discredit the 
alternatives. On the other hand, interests are formed by ideas ... New 
ideas can make actors see the situation and their place in it from a new 
angle. In this way, ideas constitute interests (Holm, 1995, p. 402). 
This is a dynamic process which involves institutional change at both levels (Figure 7). 
Holm (1995, p. 399) argued that ‘[t]his perspective makes it possible to retain the insight 
that institutions are products of action and therefore constructed for some purpose, without 
giving up the notion that institutions are frameworks for action, and therefore taken for 
granted’. While this is an important analytical distinction, in practice the two levels are 
interconnected through feedback processes. A similar approach was also advocated by 
Clarkson (1995) when he argued that CSP had to be studied at two levels: the construction 
of a social issue by policy-makers; and the implementation of policies and programs 
within corporations in response to stakeholder expectations. 
This research focuses on the institutionalisation of PS through corporate policy and 
practice in the packaging supply chain. However, it is recognised that institutionalising 
processes occur through the interaction of companies with a range of stakeholders. These 
include organisations directly involved in the economic supply chain—particularly 
suppliers and customers— as well as broader stakeholders such as government agencies, 
ENGOs, local communities and financial markets. Managerial attitudes and attributes of 
 67 
power and leadership also influence the way the companies in similar environments 
interpret stakeholder expectations (e.g. Gunningham et al., 2003; Prakash, 2000a).  
Figure 7: The nested systems perspective on institutions 
 
Source: Based on Holm (1995) 
New institutional theory seeks to explain the homogeneity of organisational forms and 
practices within an ‘organisational field’, defined as organisations that ‘constitute a 
recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b, pp. 64–65). According to Fligstein (2001, p. 108), fields 
are situations where ‘organised groups of actors gather and frame their actions vis-à-vis 
one another’. Meyer and Scott (1992) refer to ‘sectors’ rather than fields, while 
economists are more likely to refer to ‘industry sectors’. Fields or sectors of analysis have 
been defined by some writers to include organisations involved in direct exchange or 
competition, whereas others have examined political and social processes at a national or 
even international level (Meyer and Scott, 1992). ‘Fields’ or ‘sectors’ provide a useful 
framework for the analysis of homogenous behaviour within a certain domain of activity. 
They become ‘institutionally defined’ through processes of increasing interaction and 
collaboration, and the development of a mutual awareness that organisations have 
common interests (DiMaggio, 1983; cited in DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b, p. 65). After 
organisations have been structured into a field, they adopt strategies or practices that make 
them more like one another (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b).  
Level two actions are designed to reshape a higher 
level institution 
Level one actions are guided by a higher level 
institution 
An institution constitutes a framework for action 
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The field of study for this research is divided into three levels (Figure 8): 
? the macro (socio-political) level, where PS is being institutionalised through the 
interaction of the state, industry associations and ENGOs in policy processes; 
? the meso (industry sector) level, where PS is being institutionalised through 
changes to corporate policy and practice; and 
? the micro (company) level, where competing interests and objectives for products 
within the firm are resolved by institutionalising PS in business control systems. 
  Figure 8: Three levels of analysis 
 
 
    
Industry sectors at the meso level have been identified on the basis of their role in the 
packaging supply chain. The ‘packaging supply chain’ is a useful construct in trying to 
understand packaging stewardship, because by definition it applies to all companies 
involved in the physical life cycle of packaging36. However, it is not reflected in industry 
                                                     
36 NPC Mark I allocated responsibility to all participants in the ‘packaging chain’—‘raw material 
suppliers, designers, packaging manufacturers, packaging users, retailers, consumers, all spheres of 
government, collection agencies’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 4). However, industry responsibilities under 
the NPC are discussed under the heading ‘packaging supply chain’.  
Macro level: Socio-political networks 
Meso level: Industry sectors 
Product stewardship as a framework for action  
Micro level: Companies 
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statistics, which have a different classification system37. As will be shown in Chapter 4, 
the packaging supply chain was defined through public policy and discursive processes for 
a political purpose—to identify all of the industry sectors with an influence on, and 
responsibility for, the environmental impacts of packaging. The industry sectors that have 
been specifically mentioned in the NPC include raw material suppliers, packaging 
manufacturers, packaging ‘fillers’ or ‘brand owners’38, and retailers. Brand owners can be 
further divided into more conventional economic categories, such as food and beverage 
manufacturers or electrical and electronic product suppliers. Each sector, and their role in 
the packaging supply chain, is described in more detail in Chapter 5.   
The analytical framework  
In this section it is proposed that the research question can best be answered by analysing 
four inter-related themes: interest groups involved in the construction of PS as a new 
institutional framework; discourses on the packaging problem and corporate responsibility 
that these groups invoke to support their interests and policy beliefs; policies and policy 
processes that help to embed the new institution in everyday practice; and company 
characteristics that mediate corporate responsiveness to institutional change.  
Interest groups 
While institutional approaches to the study of organisations have traditionally focused on 
explaining organisational similarities based on institutional conditions, there is a new 
emphasis on ‘understanding the role of actors in effecting, transforming and maintaining 
institutions and fields’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Institutional change is a 
                                                     
37 The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) collects industry data using the Australian and New 
Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). This allocates companies to a Division (the 
broadest level), Subdivision, Group and Class (the finest level). Packaging manufacturers and 
packaging users are located within the manufacturing division but in different subdivisions 
depending on the materials and processing methods that they use. For example, paper packaging 
manufacturers are located in Subdivision 23 – ‘Wood and paper product manufacturing’. Plastic 
packaging manufacturers are located in Subdivision 25 – ‘Petroleum, coal, chemical and associated 
product manufacturing’ (ABS, 1993). 
38 The term ‘brand owner’ is used to refer to a company that sells a packaged product under their 
own brand, including most product manufacturers and retailers who sell ‘own brand’ products. The 
Australian NEPM for Used Packaging defines a brand owner as the Australian owner of the trade 
mark under which a product is sold, the first person to sell an imported product, or the supplier of 
packaging used in-store (e.g. for plastic bags) (NEPC, 1999). 
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political process because it often involves competing interests and a redistribution of 
income, power and status (Holm, 1995). Fligstein (2001) discussed the role that agency, or 
‘social skill’, plays in institutionalising processes. By this he meant the ability of actors to 
cooperate in the promotion, stabilisation or transformation of an institutional arrangement. 
These institutional ‘entrepreneurs’ encourage cooperation by putting themselves into the 
position of others and by creating shared meanings. They need to work with two relevant 
groups: those within a group or organisation (insiders) and those in other organisations. 
‘The people who act as leaders in groups must stabilise their relations to their own group 
members to get them to act collectively and must frame their more general strategic moves 
towards other organisations in their field or domain’ (Fligstein, 2001, p. 107). Institutional 
change often occurs in response to some sort of ‘crisis’, such as an economic or political 
upheaval. Initially dominant groups react by trying to defend the status quo, but if this 
doesn’t work they look for ways to transform the field through strategic action (Fligstein, 
2001). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) have used the term ‘institutional work’ rather than 
social skill, although there is some overlap between the two concepts. Institutional work 
practices include: advocacy; the creation of ‘normative networks’ which provide a peer 
group for compliance, monitoring and evaluation; and education of actors to provide them 
with the skills and knowledge to support the new institution (Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006).  
This thesis categorises actors as ‘interest groups’ because it focuses on the interests and 
policy beliefs of groups involved in the institutionalisation of PS. At a macro level, the 
evolution of PS can be studied by identifying groups that have helped to institutionalise 
PS through discursive and policy processes, including government agencies, industry 
associations and ENGOs. Sometimes a project, such as the creation of a new legal 
framework, will result in the creation of a new political actor. This actor then becomes 
part of the ‘feedback processes’ that influence policy outcomes (Holm, 1995, p. 409). The 
historical policy analysis in Chapter 4 identifies a number of new groups that were 
established to promote PS to government and industry stakeholders. At the second level of 
analysis—the packaging supply chain—the focus is on companies within industry sectors, 
and their industry associations. At a company level, the aim is to identify functional 
groups within the firm with an interest in packaging and a potential influence on PS policy 
and practice.  
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The role of specific interest groups in creating or maintaining an institution can be 
analysed by identifying the groups engaged in ‘institutional work’ practices and the 
relationships between them. ‘Organisational maps’, which are sometimes used to 
understand the role of different actors and interests in policy-making processes (Dalton et 
al., 1996), will be used in this thesis to identify groups involved in the institutionalisation 
of PS at all three levels of analysis. A general map of interest groups is provided in Table 
8, and more detailed maps are included within the relevant chapters. 
Table 8: An organisational map of interest groups 
Level of 
analysis 
Type of interest group 
Macro 
(groups in 
socio-
political 
networks) 
Industry 
associations 
ENGOs State and 
federal 
government 
agencies 
Local 
government 
associations 
Trade unions 
Meso 
(companies 
within 
sectors) 
Industry 
associations 
Companies – raw material suppliers, packaging 
manufacturers, brand owners and retailers 
Micro 
(functional 
groups 
within 
companies) 
Management Marketing Operations Product 
development/ 
procurement 
Corporate 
affairs/ 
environment 
 
At a macro level, where PS is being institutionalised through public discourses and policy 
processes, the main interest groups have been industry associations, ENGOs, trade unions 
and government agencies.  
Industry associations tend to play an important role in mediating between government 
agencies and companies on a range of policy issues, and have been important institutional 
entrepreneurs in promoting PS in Australia. They can be an important ‘mediating 
institution’ in self-regulation because of their potential to establish a normative framework 
for their members (Gunningham and Rees, 1997, p. 372). Industry associations tend to 
have divergent views on environmental issues, as they do on many other policy issues. 
McEachern (1991) has identified three broad positions taken by the Australian business 
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community on environmental issues, from ‘rejectionists’ through to ‘environmentalists’39. 
However, he noted that peak industry associations, and many of the companies they 
represent, have developed a broad consensus position on environmental issues 
(McEachern, 1991, p. 116): 
For most businesses there is a loose, central proposition concerning 
the need to maintain sustainable economic development, to allow 
business to live and prosper in the midst of rising environmental 
concern. Enough must be done for the environment to contain 
criticism but not to limit the scope for economic development. 
Non-government organisations (NGOs) have also played an important role in packaging 
policy at different times. The emergence of the environmental movement in the 1960s in 
many developed countries was associated with the establishment of a number of 
influential ENGOs40. Their increasing electoral support has allowed them to influence 
political parties through the power of ‘green’ votes (McEachern, 1991; Walker, 1992). 
Trade unions have also been actively involved in some environmental policy debates in 
Australia. On most occasions, particularly where employment is at risk, they have tended 
to side with growth and development rather than environmental interests (Walker, 1992). 
Within Australia there are three tiers of government with an interest in PS and packaging: 
federal, state and local. The most important of these is state government41, which has 
responsibility under the Australian Constitution for environmental protection and natural 
resource management. This includes overall responsibility for waste management policy, 
although local government has responsibility for the collection and disposal of household 
                                                     
39 According to McEachern (1991), ‘rejectionists’ do not acknowledge that economic activities 
cause environmental harm. ‘Accommodationists’ try to accommodate environmental concerns, for 
example by introducing environmentally improved products or by defending the environmental 
credentials of their products; and ‘environmentalists’ work to introduce products or services that 
help the environment. 
40 The first wave of environmentalism saw a number of environmental non-government 
organisations established in Australia, including the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) in 
1966, the Total Environment Centre (TEC) in 1972, Friends of the Earth (FOE) Australia in 1974 
and Greenpeace Australia in 1977. 
41 There are six states in Australia (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, 
South Australia and Tasmania) and two territories (the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory). The powers of the states are protected in the Australian constitution, whereas 
territories are subject to greater federal government control. 
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waste42. The role of local government in waste management has expanded over the past 
few decades to include the collection and recovery of household packaging and paper. The 
environmental responsibilities of the federal government, which were clarified in the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 1992, include ‘facilitating the co-
operative development of national environmental standards and guidelines’ (cited in 
Productivity Commission, 2006, p. 46). Environment ministers meet regularly to discuss 
national issues and regulatory approaches through the Environment Protection and 
Heritage Council (EPHC). At federal and state government levels there are also various 
agencies engaged in policy development and implementation. For example, while the 
federal government’s involvement in national waste management policy is currently 
managed by the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, the 
Productivity Commission conducted a broad-ranging inquiry into waste management in 
2006. 
This federal system limits the ability of the state to take a strong coordinated approach to 
policy development (Bell, 1992, p. 110): ‘The fragmentation in government further limits 
the degree of state autonomy from important economic interests and undermines the 
state’s capacity to implement state-inspired policy initiatives’. The existence of different 
environmental legislation in each state requires extensive intergovernmental coordination 
and cooperation (OECD, 2007). As will be shown in Chapter 4, the federal system has 
provided a challenge for government agencies and other interest groups trying to influence 
packaging policy at a national level. 
The interaction of government agencies, ENGOs and industry associations in the 
construction of PS discourses can be analysed by identifying the ‘policy beliefs’ that 
shape institutional work practices. The concept of policy beliefs is fundamental to the 
‘advocacy coalition’ approach to policy analysis (Sabatier, 1991), which is used in 
Chapter 4 to investigate PS from an historical perspective. According to Sabatier, 
advocacy coalitions in policy processes are organised around ‘core beliefs’ that they hold 
in common. These core beliefs may include (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 221): 
• the identification of groups or entities whose welfare is of greatest concern; 
                                                     
42 Local government powers are established within the relevant legislation of each state 
government. 
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• the proper distribution of authority between government and the market; 
• the overall seriousness of the problem;  
• the priority given to various policy instruments, such as regulation or education. 
Sabatier has argued that core beliefs remain fairly stable for decades and this helps to 
explain the relative stability of policy coalitions. However, while the core beliefs of 
‘purposive groups’ such as ENGOs will change very little over time, ‘material groups’ 
such as businesses and trade organisations may be more likely to change their position on 
some core policy beliefs if this is necessary to protect their material self-interest (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Actors within an advocacy coalition tend to exhibit substantial 
consensus on core policy issues but may have less agreement on ‘secondary aspects’. 
These change over time in response to experience and policy-oriented learning, and 
include issues such as: 
• the perceived seriousness of specific aspects of the problem in specific locations; 
• administrative rules such as budgetary allocations and statutory interpretation; 
• information on the performance of specific programs or institutions (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 221). 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) have proposed that the most appropriate method for 
identifying beliefs is discourse analysis, i.e. examining the language and ideas in public 
hearings, other government documents and interest group publications. Documents will be 
reviewed in Chapter 4 to identify some of the ‘core’ and ‘secondary’ policy beliefs of 
interest groups in socio-political networks, which have helped to construct PS as the 
normative framework for packaging policy and corporate strategy in Australia (Table 9).  
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Table 9: Policy beliefs relevant to PS and packaging 
Type of 
belief 
Characteristics Generic examples Examples in packaging 
policy discourse 
Social control of business Extent to which packaging 
should be regulated by the 
state 
Interests that should be 
given priority 
Industry, local 
communities or the natural 
environment  
Core policy 
beliefs 
Stable over time—
linked to personal 
values and philosophy 
Corporate responsibility The responsibility of 
manufacturers for 
packaging waste 
The policy issue 
 
Nature and seriousness of 
the ‘packaging problem’ 
Policy goals 
 
Waste, litter or ‘life cycle 
management’ 
Secondary 
aspects 
Change over time in 
response to experience 
and policy-oriented 
learning 
Preferred policies CDL, EPR or voluntary 
agreements 
Source: Based on the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1991; 1993) 
There are also interest groups with varying levels of power and influence within the 
packaging supply chain (meso level), including companies in distinct industry sectors and 
the associations that represent them. Companies can be classified according to their 
primary economic activity, for example the manufacture of packaging, the ‘filling’ of 
packaging with food or beverages, or retail sale of packaged products. These constitute 
organisational fields with defined networks, interests, codes of conduct and legislative 
requirements. Within the context of the current research, each of these sectors is also part 
of a larger organisational field defined by the NPC, which is referred to here as the 
‘packaging supply chain’.  
PS focuses on the product life cycle and by its very nature requires action by many 
different actors with different commercial interests. Boons (2002) established a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of ‘product chain management’ strategies, which in his view 
helps to explain why certain actions are taken or not taken, based on costs and benefits to 
each player43. He used this framework to analyse different options for product chain 
management, such as material reduction, material substitution, material recycling, product 
substitution and product recycling, and argued that it helps to explain, for example, why 
                                                     
43 Boons’s framework (2002) was based on two assumptions about corporate behaviour: resource 
dependency (companies act to reduce their dependence on other organisations) and utility 
maximisation (companies choose actions which bring about the desired outcome at minimum cost). 
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material reduction is relatively common, but product recycling is not. A producer can 
undertake material reduction alone, and while there may be development costs it also 
results in lower raw material costs. Product recycling, on the other hand, requires greater 
coordination costs and may result in lower sales (Boons, 2002). 
According to this view, the PS strategies of firms can be explained, at least in part, by 
looking at the costs and benefits of implementation. These in turn are linked to a 
company’s position in the supply chain (Boons, 2002, p. 503, emphasis in original): 
Thus it is possible to explain why reusable packaging is not introduced 
to substitute disposable packaging of food products. With the 
increasing power of retail organisations in [the] product chain of a 
large number of food products, these actors are in a position to 
determine the choice made by actors in the supply chain. Based on the 
relative costs and benefits of different types of product chain 
management for themselves, they choose to coordinate the elimination 
of a product rather than the establishment of a recycling scheme.  
A similar approach was taken by Verghese and Lewis (2007), who highlighted the fact 
that organisations at different points in the packaging supply chain do not necessarily have 
the same financial incentives to reduce packaging waste.  
At a micro level, the responsiveness of companies to institutional pressure can also be 
explained by looking at interest groups within the firm and their relations with external 
stakeholders. Stakeholder theory tends to assume that organisations act in a consistent and 
rational way in response to stakeholder expectations. However, companies should be 
conceptualised not as unified and rational actors, but rather as ‘loci of multivalent powers 
... contested terrains rather than total institutions’ (Clegg, 1989, p. 200). Mintzberg (1983) 
distinguished between internal and external ‘influencers’ who make up the ‘cast of 
players’ in and around a firm who use their power to control decisions and actions. If 
external influencers have different goals they may try to ‘pull the organisation in different 
directions, forcing it to pursue conflicting goals’ (p. 103). Despite being in a hierarchical 
structure, many units within an organisation work directly with external influencers and 
come to represent their interests internally. According to Mintzberg, this helps to politicise 
internal groups, who rely on their power within the organisation to achieve control. Power 
is based on expertise and whether or not a particular function is considered critical to the 
organisation. For example, manufacturing operations are normally considered to be more 
critical than public relations or accounting (Mintzberg, 1983). It is important therefore to 
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understand the internal dynamics of power and leadership within each company (Prakash, 
2000a). 
Functional groups within a company interpret institutional pressure in different ways 
according to their functional routines and ‘cultural frame’ and often speak different 
languages. For example, environmental managers might talk about ecological metrics such 
as life cycle assessment while business managers are interested in costs and the financial 
return on investment (Hoffman, 2001). Clegg (1990, p. 104) refers to diverse ‘modes of 
rationality’ linked to occupational identities and the broader institutional environment. 
Jones (1999) hypothesised that functional groups in the ‘hard’ technical core of a 
company, for example in production or in research and development, will be less 
concerned with social responsibility than those in ‘soft’ boundary-spanning functions such 
as public relations and marketing. These differences often act as barriers to environmental 
responsiveness: ‘Beyond structural limitations to free flows of information, the language, 
rhetoric, objectives and external constituency of the various departments limit the 
identification of important environmental actions (Hoffman, 2001, p. 147). Policy 
coordination through cross-functional management will improve a firm’s ability to 
develop and implement PS solutions (de Bakker et al., 2002; Hart, 1995).  
The responsiveness of functional groups within a company to PS is likely to be influenced 
by not only the expectations of powerful supply chain partners and perceptions of 
organisational costs and benefits, but also other external stakeholders such as government 
agencies, ENGOs, industry associations, consumers and the media. Some writers on 
stakeholder theory have attempted to categorise stakeholders according to their salience to 
the firm. For example, it has been suggested that companies are likely to give priority to 
stakeholders that provide critical resources and are therefore important to the survival of 
the company (Hill and Jones, 1992). Clarkson (1995) distinguished between ‘primary 
stakeholders’—those who are involved in transactions with the corporation including 
employees, shareholders and customers—and ‘secondary stakeholders’—those who can 
influence, or are influenced by, a corporation but are not engaged in transactions with it. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) argued that the attention paid by a corporate manager to the 
demands of a stakeholder group will depend on how that manager perceives the 
legitimacy and power of the group as well as the urgency of their claim. Stakeholder 
salience will be low if only one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present, 
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and high if all three are present. The authors have suggested that the most legitimate, 
powerful and urgent corporate stakeholders are those who are critical to the commercial 
success of the organisation, including suppliers and customers (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
According to Fineman and Clark (1996), stakeholder salience on environmental issues 
varies between industry sectors, based on factors such as an industry’s history of public 
scrutiny and regulation. Their multi-sectoral study in the UK concluded that government 
regulators and campaigners (ENGOs) are regarded by companies as the most important 
environmental stakeholders, while others are either marginalised or rejected (Fineman and 
Clarke, 1996). The influence of non-human actors on policy also needs to be recognised 
(Bulkeley et al., 2005), for example packaging technology and the infrastructure for waste 
management and recycling. Stakeholder theory will be applied in Chapter 6 by linking PS 
responsiveness to the perceived legitimacy and power of corporate stakeholders. 
Discourses 
Discourse analysis is useful for the study of institutional work because ‘it helps to 
illuminate the processes through which actors are able to fashion, communicate and 
embed stories that support the creating, maintaining or disrupting of institutions’ 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 241). These ‘stories’ provide a rationale or social 
account of an institution’s existence and purpose (Jepperson, 1991). Hasselbladh and 
Kallinikos (2000, p. 707) argued that ‘[a] deeper appreciation of rationalisation and 
institutionalisation in organisational settings must include a comprehensive analysis of 
discourse’.  
A discourse is a ‘shared way of apprehending the world’, which is embedded in language 
(Dryzek, 1997, p. 8). While the origins of discourse analysis lie in Michel Foucault’s work 
on the role of power, discourse and knowledge in shaping social issues such as sexuality, 
punishment and insanity (Mills, 2003), it has been used more broadly in policy studies. 
Contrary to the view of empiricists, policy problems are not simply ‘out there’ waiting to 
be discovered (Bessant et al., 2006). Rather, they are constructed through discursive 
processes involving competing interests and values: 
Establishing how language is used in policy-making is helpful because 
it serves to remind us how naming, labelling and ascribing particular 
meanings or identities are deeply political acts ... thinking about the 
 79 
role of talk (especially metaphors) can heighten awareness that 
knowledge of the social world is constituted and shaped through talk 
about ‘it’ (Bessant et al., 2006, p. 305). 
According to Hajer (1995b), any environmental conflict involves a continuous struggle 
over the definition and meaning of the environmental problem. Policy change is strongly 
linked to discursive struggle between competing groups: ‘If a discourse is successful—
that is to say, if many people use it to conceptualize the world—it will solidify into an 
institution’ (Hajer, 1993, p. 46). Dryzek (1997, p. 9) has argued that ‘language matters ... 
the way we construct, interpret, discuss, and analyse environmental problems has all kinds 
of consequences’. In his view, environmental problems are complex and there are usually 
many plausible perspectives on their cause and possible solution. Environmental politics 
can therefore be understood by examining the discourses used by actors as well as their 
interests and power.   
Recent environmental policy debates in many developed countries, including Australia, 
have been strongly influenced by discourses of ‘ecological modernisation’ (Christoff, 
2002; Hajer, 1995b; Dryzek, 1997) or ‘new corporate environmentalism’ (Jermier et al., 
2006). This is the concept that the economy can be restructured to respond to the problems 
of environmental degradation but without any fundamental changes to the socio-economic 
system. Industry will cooperate with governments in this process because environmental 
improvement is good for business. For example, companies can save money by reducing 
pollution and waste. However, Christoff (2002) distinguished between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
interpretations of ecological modernisation. In his view, weak ecological modernisation 
has a narrow focus on technological improvement within the existing institutional 
framework, while strong ecological modernisation involves broader changes to systems of 
production and consumption, civil society and government institutions. Critics of weak 
conceptions of ecological modernisation argue that powerful business interests have 
hijacked debates about environmentalism and sustainable development to ensure minimal 
change from ‘business as usual’ and they call for a more open and critical debate about 
environmental policy (Springett, 2003; Welford, 1997).  
‘Narrative strategies’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006), ‘frames’ (Derry and Waiker, 2008) 
or ‘story-lines’ (Hajer, 1995b) have been invoked by actors in the discursive struggle to 
define the packaging problem and corporate responsibility for packaging in Australia. 
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Framing is ‘a process of generating shared meaning and purpose through the creation of 
overarching messages’ (Derry and Waiker, 2008, p. 102). Its purpose is to ‘enhance 
legitimating of the group in the eyes of normative stakeholders (i.e., by influencing the 
normative stakeholders to adopt the activist group’s frame as its own)’ (pp. 106–7). It is 
therefore critical to institutionalising processes. Framing often involves the use of 
metaphors (Bessant et al., 2006). For example, in PS debates inanimate objects such as 
products and packaging are often referred to as having a ‘life cycle’ that needs to be 
managed.  
Corporate environmental practice is translated through the frames used by different groups. 
For example, insurance companies promote environmental management through the frame 
of ‘risk management’ while buyers might talk about ‘operational efficiency’ (Hoffman, 
2001, pp. 142-6). King (2008) has argued that stakeholders are more likely to influence a 
corporation if they frame their demands in the ‘dominant logic’ of efficiency. Hajer 
(1995b, p. 62) has used the term ‘story-lines’ to refer to a similar process, defining them as 
‘narratives on social reality’ which ‘provide actors with a set of symbolic references that 
suggest a common understanding’. Story-lines tend to be simple narratives that conceal the 
complexity of the social, political or scientific discourses on which they draw (Hajer, 
1993). 
The discursive struggle to define the packaging problem and corporate responsibility in 
Australia has helped to institutionalise PS in public and corporate policy, a process which 
is explored in Chapter 4. At a socio-political level, discourses are critical in public policy 
debates because they direct attention to some aspects of a situation at the expense of 
others and represent a situation in such a way that it becomes taken for granted (van 
Herzele, 2006). There is an extensive record of contributions to packaging policy debates 
in Australia by interest groups including industry associations, ENGOs and local 
government associations, and the resulting discourses provide important insights into the 
struggle over ideas about waste, litter and corporate responsibility. A preliminary 
stakeholder survey undertaken for this thesis (Lewis, 2005) highlighted some important 
areas of difference in the way that interest groups speak about the environmental impacts 
of packaging. For example, while government and ENGO respondents tended to focus on 
impacts at end-of-life, such as waste and litter, industry respondents were more likely to 
mention the need for a ‘life cycle’ approach.  
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The discursive strategies used by interest groups in policy debates are also important. 
According to Eden (1999), industry associations invoke discourses based on 
‘technological rationalism’ to claim legitimacy and to marginalise others, for example 
they promote scientific knowledge, expertise and ‘real world’ experience as the only valid 
forms of understanding. While ENGOs are sometimes regarded as an important moral 
influence, business interests seek to exclude them from policy processes because they are 
seen as ‘uninformed’ and ‘irrational’ (Eden, 1999).  
The language used by companies and associations in different industry sectors to describe 
their commitment to PS is explored in Chapter 5. Individual companies draw on 
environmental narratives as they try to construct a socially responsible identity in public 
statements, and often do so in a way which implies that corporate greening is 
uncontroversial and what the organisation has always been about (Coupland, 2003). This 
is consistent with institutional theory, which suggests that organisations adopt accepted 
vocabulary to describe structures or policies in order to conform to institutional 
environments and maintain organisational legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1992, p. 31).  
Discursive strategies are also used by actors within firms to institutionalise new corporate 
responsibilities, such as PS, in everyday practice. The framing of PS in business terms is 
discussed in Chapter 6. PS can be expected to become more institutionalised the more it is 
integrated within everyday business language, for example by linking it to business 
efficiency or competitive advantage.  
Policies and policy processes 
Jepperson (1991) noted that something becomes more highly institutionalised when it is 
embedded in other frameworks and has become taken for granted, either because people 
are unaware of it and therefore do not question it, or because there are no alternative 
institutions or principles. One mechanism for this is the integration of a new idea or 
standard of behaviour in governance systems. An analytical distinction can be made 
between the role of discourses and ‘techniques of control’ in the institutionalising process 
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 704): 
Institutions are conceived as consisting of basic ideals that are 
developed into distinctive ways of defining and acting upon reality 
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(i.e. discourses), supported by elaborate systems of measurement and 
documentation for controlling action outcomes. 
Techniques of control include ‘the specification of the tasks, items and social roles 
involved and the delineation of their relationships’ and ‘the development of action models 
and systems of measurement and evaluation’ (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p. 707). 
A broader term—‘policy’—is used in this research to refer to techniques of control at 
macro (socio-economic), meso (industry) and micro (company) levels. The focus is on PS 
policies, the interactive processes involved in policy development, and the way that these 
policies are put into practice within companies.  
The institutionalisation of PS within the packaging supply chain can be understood by 
investigating the policies and policy processes of individual companies. However, 
institutional theory suggests that these are shaped by rules and cultural norms which are 
established outside individual organisations, including regulations, voluntary agreements 
and codes of conduct. Public policy processes have helped to institutionalise PS by 
embedding it within voluntary agreements between state agencies and industry groups. 
Companies interpret public policy requirements when formulating corporate policy, within 
the context of their other institutional drivers and barriers. Industry associations play a 
mediating role, both in influencing public policy and guiding the response of member 
companies (Gunningham and Rees, 1997; McEachern, 1991; Pulver, 2002; Streeck, 
1983). It is therefore important to explore relationships between policies and policy 
processes at socio-political, industry and company levels (Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Interactions between policies and policy processes at different levels 
 
Macro: public policy development & implementation 
(including monitoring & enforcement) 
Meso: industry association policy development & 
implementation (including advice/support to members) 
Micro: corporate policy development & implementation 
(including corporate practice, monitoring & review) 
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Public policy and policy processes 
The analysis of public policy in this research takes an historical perspective. This is 
important in trying to understand how packaging became a social problem in the first 
place, how different groups have responded to it, and how these responses have helped to 
institutionalise PS within public and corporate policy. PS as we know it today is 
inextricably linked to the past, because ‘once certain institutional and legal patterns are 
laid down, they tend to influence all subsequent policy developments’ (Bessant et al., 
2006, p. 82).  
Two aspects of public policy are examined: 
? the processes involved in negotiating PS policy, particularly the NPC;  
? the effectiveness of PS in driving change within companies. 
In terms of process, the research focuses on the role of policy coalitions in shaping 
definitions of the ‘packaging problem’ in Australia and appropriate policy responses. This 
needs to be recognised as a dynamic process involving conflict between groups. Social 
problems are defined and redefined over time, and often evolve from an ‘unrecognised 
problem’ (one which is perceived as a problem only by a small group) to a ‘current 
problem’ (one which is widely recognised and receiving societal attention) (Smigel, 
1971)44. In an attempt to provide a more precise definition that could be used for empirical 
testing, Tallman and McGee (1971) have suggested that a social problem is a situation 
which is perceived by a relatively large group of people as a source of dissatisfaction; 
members of this group are motivated to effect change; and there are certain alternatives 
that are regarded by the group as viable solutions.  
The policy process could be characterised as ‘pressure group pluralism’, in which 
governments respond to the demands of interest groups such as NGOs, trade unions and 
business groups (Bell, 1992; Streeck, 1983). This is the view of business ‘as just one force 
among many’ (McEachern, 1991, p. 11). Pressure group pluralism provides some 
explanation for environmental policy development in Australia (Walker, 1992) but is 
                                                     
44 Other categories identified by Smigel (1971, pp. xii–xiii) are a ‘recurrent problem’ (one which is 
‘long standing, persistent, visible and chronic’) a ‘refashioned problem’ (a recurrent problem which 
has been redefined) and a ‘derecognised problem’ (a problem which has been dormant but has 
gained new public awareness).  
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inadequate as a framework for the analysis of voluntary agreements, such as the NPC, 
which involve a close and mutually dependent relationship between the state and 
particular interest groups. These processes can best be described as ‘corporatism’, which 
emphasises collaboration between business interests and the state in policy development, 
while also recognising the role of trade unions (McEachern, 1991). They are typical of 
new forms of governance which involve self-organising, inter-organisational networks 
rather than traditional bureaucratic or market-based mechanisms. These networks often 
involve a significant degree of autonomy from the state, and interactions between network 
members based on trust and negotiated ‘rules of the game’ (Rhodes, 1996). The focus 
needs to be on ‘modes of governing’ rather than formal government processes because 
this recognises that ‘the ways in which problems are defined and policy made is 
constructed through discourses, networks and coalitions which traverse traditional 
boundaries of state and society’ (Bulkeley et al., 2005, p. 17).  
Policy network analysis is used in Chapter 4 to explore institutionalising processes at a 
macro level, because it focuses on interactions between government representatives and 
interest groups during policy-making processes (Nunan, 1999)45. It highlights the fact that 
groups have unequal access to government policy-making processes and that relationships 
are more institutionalised than classical pluralism would imply (Bell, 1992). Importantly, 
it acknowledges that interest groups are not completely independent from the state 
because they can become involved in both policy development and implementation. 
Policy network analysis provides a useful conceptual tool for the analysis of packaging 
policy processes in Australia that have helped to shift stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
‘packaging problem’ and expectations about corporate responsibility. 
The state plays an important role in controlling access to the policy-making process, for 
example through ‘the ways in which the state defines social interest, sponsors interest 
group formation, recognises and licenses selected groups to speak on behalf of particular 
interests, and incorporates functional groups into the formal structures of policy-making’ 
(Matthews, 1988, p. 148). Governments act as power brokers between competing interests 
                                                     
45 Policy network analysis has become the ‘dominant paradigm’ for policy analysis in the UK and 
has been used extensively elsewhere (Dowding, 1995). For example, it provided the framework for 
an analysis of packaging policy in the UK (Nunan, 1999) and business social responsibility 
programs in the UK and Australia (Moon, 2002). 
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and can actively block the access of certain groups to policy processes (Bell, 1992). 
According to Matthews (1988, p. 160), access to policy networks by interest groups 
depends on how dispensable the group is to policy implementation or success: 
This partly is a matter of the group’s structural position in the 
economy; that is, whether they are producers or providers of essential 
goods and services. It is also a question of the group’s organisational 
capacity: is it the single or most authoritative voice in its field; is it 
able to bind and control its membership; and are its leaders able (and 
willing) to cooperate with the state (and other interest) as integral 
participants in the process?  
Atkinson and Coleman (1989) distinguish between different types of policy networks 
based on the extent to which state authority is concentrated, the extent to which it is 
independent of sectional interests, and the level of mobilisation of business interests. 
Weak-state countries like Australia are unlikely to have state-directed networks and more 
likely to develop policy through pressure pluralism or corporatism (Atkinson and 
Coleman, 1989). Atkinson and Coleman define corporatism as a policy network which 
involves a low level of concentration in state decision-making, a state which is relatively 
autonomous from sectional interests, and a high mobilisation of business interests. The 
same conditions, but with low mobilisation of business interests, result in pressure 
pluralism. ‘Industry dominant pressure pluralism’ occurs when the state is more closely 
linked to sectional interests and business interests are highly organised. This is the 
political process that Bell (1992) considers the most relevant to Australia. 
Policy change can also be explained through the identification of coalitions with different 
values and policy beliefs. According to Sabatier (1991), policy change occurs through the 
interaction of competing advocacy coalitions within a policy community or sub-system 
(related to the institutional concept of a ‘field’ or ‘sector’). These coalitions consist of 
‘actors from many public and private organisations at all levels of government who share 
a set of basic beliefs ... and who seek to manipulate the rule of various governmental 
institutions to achieve these goals over time’ (pp. 152–3). Conflict between coalitions is 
mediated by independent ‘policy brokers’ who are actors with an interest in system 
stability rather than particular policy goals, for example elected officials or senior public 
servants. However, senior public servants can often act as policy advocates, particularly 
when their organisation has a clearly defined objective (Sabatier, 1993). In this respect the 
advocacy coalition framework differs from traditional pluralist theory. Coalitions not only 
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include interest groups; their members also include legislators, agency officials, 
researchers and the media (Sabatier, 1993). While there is often compromise among 
coalitions, there is normally one dominant coalition and one or more minority coalitions.  
The value of the advocacy coalition approach is that it broadens the scope of policy 
analysis to include a much larger group of actors, and it focuses on policy debate and 
argumentation (Fischer, 2003). However, it has been criticised for its inability to explain 
why and how policy change occurs (Hajer, 1995b; cited in Fischer, 2003). In Hajer’s 
view, policy coalitions are held together by narrative story-lines rather than preconceived 
policy beliefs: 
What unites these coalitions and what gives them their political power 
is the fact that actors group around specific story-lines that they employ 
while engaging in environmental politics. It can be shown that although 
these actors share a specific set of story-lines, they might nevertheless 
interpret the meaning of these story-lines rather differently and might 
each have their own particular interests (Hajer, 1995b, p. 13). 
A ‘discourse coalition’ becomes dominant if central actors accept the new discourse, and 
if policy processes are conducted according to the ideas embodied within it (‘discourse 
institutionalisation’) (Hajer, 1993). In his review of Hajer’s approach, Fischer (2003, p. 
102) has noted that this does not mean that there are no belief systems: 
Rather, it is to argue that it is not the knowledge in the belief systems 
per se that holds the members of such coalitions together, but the 
‘storylines’ that symbolically condense the facts and values basic to a 
belief system. To be sure, many professional experts in a policy 
coalition are interested in the validity of core cognitive factors, 
particularly those in the professional ‘policy networks’ relevant to the 
issue area. But the broad majority of the members of a politically 
oriented policy coalition respond to simplified storylines that 
symbolically reflect the concerns of core beliefs, rather than the beliefs 
themselves. 
Another important contribution by Hajer is his observation that policy coalitions are much 
broader and more flexible than Sabatier’s concept of an advocacy coalition. Some 
members of a discourse coalition may never meet, and their political activities may not be 
coordinated in any way, but they share common story-lines that ‘supply people with new 
ideas about their potential role and possibilities for change’ (Fischer, 2003, p. 106). Policy 
learning does not necessarily occur through the emergence of new ‘facts’, informed debate 
and information exchange (as Sabatier asserted). Fischer (2003, p. 111) has argued that the 
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views of a coalition member will not change if they do not regard the empirical evidence 
as credible, or if the data will ‘take him or her in the wrong direction, or at least down a 
road he or she is unwilling to travel’. Both Hajer and Fischer suggest that policy analysis 
needs to focus on the way that different coalitions struggle to define the policy problem 
and solutions, and this requires detailed, case-specific examples of the way that policy is 
made (Fischer, 2003).    
In this thesis, the institutionalisation of PS at a macro level is studied by analysing the 
influence of shifting policy coalitions on the institutionalisation of PS within Australian 
packaging policy. These coalitions are linked to the shared policy beliefs and story-lines 
which have been used to define the packaging problem and corporate responsibility. 
The role of industry associations in public policy 
Industry associations have played an important role in institutionalising PS through public 
and corporate policy in the packaging field. According to Eden (1999), academic research 
on environmental policy has tended to neglect the role of industry associations. These 
groups are playing an increasingly important role in the development and implementation 
of policy, which often goes well beyond lobbying state agencies on behalf of their 
members. Business interests—both corporations and industry associations—tend to 
influence policy processes because of their relative power (Walker, 1992, p. 249): 
[G]overnment reliance on private investment as the means to 
implement development grants an important veto power to business. 
Business can and frequently does threaten to withdraw investment ... 
Yet the success of the withdrawal threat is dependent both on the 
relative power of the business and on circumstances. 
The role of associations has been described as ‘sub-political’ because they are powerful 
but, unlike governments, are not accountable to the electorate (Eden, 1999). State agencies 
tend to rely on industry associations for information and technical advice on policy 
proposals (Streeck, 1983). For example, government departments in Germany actively 
discourage individual firms from contacting them on issues being dealt with by their 
association. The benefit for the state is that interest groups are encouraged to ‘speak with 
one voice’ so that they don’t have to negotiate with many divergent and often conflicting 
interests (Streeck, 1983, p. 270). During policy negotiations, associations negotiate 
consensus among member companies, which allows the business community to present a 
 88 
united position (Pulver, 2002). According to Pulver, industry associations provide a 
benefit to their members by allowing them to participate in the policy process without 
appearing to be political agents. Industry associations can also influence the social 
responsiveness of companies through the stance they take on particular social issues. For 
example, a powerful industry association that wants to maintain a common industry 
position against a new environmental standard will try to impose this view on companies 
that want take a different position, effectively bringing all members down to the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ (Harrison, 1999, p. 133). 
Associations may fend off threats of state regulation by offering some form of self-
regulation (Streeck, 1983). Voluntary codes of conduct and environmental agreements, 
often negotiated by state agencies and industry associations, are increasingly being used in 
Australia, New Zealand, Europe and North America as an environmental policy tool 
((Börkey and Lévêque, 2000; Croci, 2005; ten Brink, 2002). Very few negotiated 
agreements are truly ‘voluntary’ because they are often signed by industry ‘under duress’ 
as an alternative to regulation (Bailey and Rupp, 2006, p. 42). A number of reasons have 
been put forward for their popularity. European countries have adopted voluntary 
approaches because of the growing complexity and administrative cost of traditional 
regulatory instruments and the need to promote ‘clean technologies’ rather than end-of-
pipe technologies (Börkey and Lévêque, 2000). They have been commonly used to deal 
with waste management because of technological uncertainty at the time when waste 
issues were first addressed, and the need for industry involvement to set realistic 
objectives (Börkey and Lévêque, 2000).  
From a state perspective, self-regulation has also been promoted because of ‘regulatory 
overload’ within environmental agencies, the increasing prominence of a neo-liberal 
ideology within government which favours deregulation, and the opposition of 
multinational enterprises to regulation (Gunningham and Rees, 1997). Business regulators 
in Australia tend to take a ‘gentle’ approach to regulatory enforcement, preferring to use 
education and persuasion as their primary form of regulation (Grabosky and Braithwaite, 
1986)46. However, education and persuasion are only effective if accompanied by a 
                                                     
46 However, Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) found a diversity of approaches within 
environmental agencies. The Victorian EPA and the State Pollution Control Commission in NSW 
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credible threat of regulation if companies do not comply voluntarily. Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992) have promoted the concept of ‘responsive regulation’ based on a 
pyramid of enforcement strategies. According to this approach, the state should promote 
industry self-regulation wherever possible because it is the least costly to both taxpayers 
and industry. Goals need to be clearly communicated and companies should be given 
discretion on how best to achieve it at least cost. Because companies will be tempted to 
exploit self-regulation by producing less than optimal outcomes, the state needs to 
communicate its willingness to move up the enforcement pyramid if necessary: first to 
enforced self-regulation, then to command regulation with discretionary punishment, and 
finally to command regulation with non-discretionary punishment (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992). A credible threat of regulatory enforcement is required to ‘persuade the reluctant, 
the recalcitrant and the incompetent that other, less coercive, approaches are worth 
adopting’ (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002, p. 39). 
Voluntary agreements have been introduced in Australia by federal and state governments 
to promote diverse environmental objectives, including waste reduction, cleaner 
production and greenhouse gas reduction (Burritt, 2002; Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002; 
Osmond, 2002; Sullivan, 2005). Unlike most agreements, which are based entirely on self-
regulation, the NPC is supported by back-up legislation to ensure that companies 
participate. From an industry perspective, voluntary agreements tend to be preferred over 
state regulation because they allow for greater flexibility in the way that companies can 
work to achieve targets, and because they can be more responsive to specific conditions 
within an industry or a firm than conventional ‘command and control’ regulations 
(Stewart, 2001). However, they have been criticised by NGOs for their perceived lack of 
credibility and transparency (Sullivan, 2005). Voluntary agreements are open to a 
perception of ‘regulatory capture’ because industry groups play a central role in the policy 
process and may negotiate targets which are sub-optimal from a social perspective 
(Börkey and Lévêque, 2000). Sommer (2006) has argued that the NPC involves regulatory 
capture because for the duration of NPC Mark I its governing body, the NPCC, included 
                                                                                                                                                  
(now absorbed within the Department of Environment and Climate Change) were found to be the 
most adversarial, while other jurisdictions relied much more heavily on education or persuasion.  
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industry and government representation but no third parties47. In her view this made 
effective monitoring and enforcement impossible. However, one of the advantages of 
excluding third parties from the development and monitoring of voluntary agreements is 
the likelihood that this will speed up the regulatory process (Gunningham and Sinclair, 
2002). 
Gunningham and Rees (1997) argued that it is difficult to make generalisations about the 
effectiveness of self-regulation because it can take many different forms, ranging from 
industry self-regulation with no role for government through to jointly developed 
programs and various forms of ‘co-regulation’48. Most self-regulatory schemes involve the 
state in some way, although a distinction has been made between those which are 
‘mandated’ and those ‘non-mandated’. Mandated schemes have ‘explicit involvement of 
the state with the specification of self-regulatory schemes in statute’ (Bartle and Vass, 
2007, p. 891). Another important distinction is between agreements that involve collective 
liability for industry performance and those that involve individual liability (Börkey and 
Lévêque, 2000)49.   
According to Gunningham and Rees (1997), the success of self-regulatory regimes is also 
linked to factors such as: 
• the ability of industry associations to establish a new form of ‘industrial morality’, 
which provides companies with a set of guiding principles on a particular issue; 
• the extent to which a scheme can institutionalise responsibility through the 
development of policies and procedures which are supported by processes for 
transparency and accountability;  
                                                     
47 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, pp. 57–58) have argued that the risk of capture can be reduced 
through tripartism—a regulatory policy which gives public interest groups access to information, a 
seat at the negotiating table and the same ability to prosecute as the regulator. 
48 The term co-regulation was originally defined Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986, p. 183) as the 
negotiation of agreements with industry associations for the writing of voluntary codes of practice 
or guidelines, sometimes including provision for government monitoring of compliance.  
49 According to Börkey and Lévêque (2000), the most common model involves industry-wide 
targets and collective industry liability for implementation. There is typically no explicit sanction in 
the agreement, but a real threat of new legislation if the agreement fails. In contrast, Dutch 
agreements (‘covenants’) link agreements to the operational licences of firms. Companies have to 
draft environmental plans for each plant, and unsatisfactory performance can result in a tightening 
of the operational licence (Börkey and Lévêque, 2000).   
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• either a strong coincidence between public and private interests in self- regulation, 
or strong external pressures which convince an industry that its prosperity or 
survival will depend on an effective system of self-regulation;  
• the ability of the scheme to deal with ‘free-riders’ through industry sanctions, 
government regulation or third-party oversight (Gunningham and Rees, 1997).  
For self-regulation (‘clientele pluralism’) to work, an industry sector needs to be highly 
mobilised (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989). The characteristics of a highly mobilised sector 
include no competition for members between industry associations, a high proportion of 
companies in a given sector being a member of their association, considerable in-house 
capacity within firms and associations for technical and political information, and the 
ability of an association to bind member firms to agreements negotiated with the state 
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1989). Bell (1992) noted that industry self-regulation tends to be 
problematic in Australia because of the fragmented nature of industry associations and 
their lack of leadership on policy issues. In the UK, two attempts to develop an effective 
system of self-regulation for packaging failed because of differences of opinion between 
sectors in the supply chain and the recognition that some level of government support 
would be required. The business group that was established by the government to develop 
a voluntary program could not reach agreement on key issues, such as the need for a levy 
to fund recycling, and eventually asked the government to introduce legislation (Eden, 
1997). 
Corporate policy and policy processes 
At a meso level, companies institutionalise new social expectations by changing the way 
that they operate, i.e. by changing policies and practices50, in response to stakeholder 
pressure. Corporate policy and practice is therefore an important indicator of social 
responsiveness.  
There is an extensive managerial literature on environmental management (e.g. Sadgrove, 
1992; Schaltegger et al., 2003; Sroufe et al., 2002) but most of these texts have little if 
                                                     
50 While a clear distinction can be made in theory between a policy (a decision or principle on 
which actions should be based) and a practice (an action which has been undertaken) the two are 
intertwined. In their paper on waste policy, Bulkeley et al. (2005, p. 14) observed that ‘policy is 
continually made and remade as it is translated down to specific contexts in which policy is to be 
implemented, so that the distinction between “policy” and “practice” is false’.  
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anything to say about PS and its implications for corporate policy. However, the literature 
on PS and DFE (discussed in Chapter 2), combined with a review of stakeholder 
expectations and the specific requirements of NPC Mark I (Chapter 4) is used to develop a 
list of policies and practices that indicate that PS is being institutionalised within a 
company’s operations. The performance of companies within different industry sectors is 
evaluated in Chapter 5 using a four-point rating system similar to that proposed by Carroll 
(1979) and Labatt (1991).  
This approach can provide some insights into what companies are doing but not the 
dynamics of the decision-making process, i.e. why certain actions are taken or not taken 
by individual companies. As a result, it needs to be combined with some additional micro-
level analysis that draws insights from the CSR and organisational behaviour literature. 
Ackerman (1973) observed that companies proceed through a three-step process in 
institutionalising a new social objective. First, an issue is identified as important, normally 
by the chief executive. Second, specialists are employed to work with operational staff to 
achieve change. Finally, responsibility for the new policy shifts to operational staff 
through changes in formal control systems. A social issue reaches the end of its life cycle 
when new standards for dealing with the issue become ingrained within the normal 
operations of the company (Näsi et al., 1997).   
There are often gaps between the publicly stated goals of companies and their actual 
performance, something which Brunsson (2002) referred to as ‘organisational hypocrisy’. 
Mintzberg (1983) suggested that official goals are often promoted as a public relations 
exercise for external consumption and not intended to influence corporate behaviour, for 
example when a company states that its primary goal is to provide service to their clients 
and profit is secondary. Other writers have suggested that companies manage multiple 
goals by dealing with them sequentially—giving them a different priority at different 
times—or by directing particular actions and decisions at different audiences at the same 
time (Holzer, 2008). For example, the profitability of a company is highlighted in annual 
reports to shareholders while environmental performance is highlighted in CSR reports or 
advertisements for a general audience (Holzer, 2008). Brunsson (2002) has claimed that 
companies attempt to meet the expectations of conflicting external demands, and thereby 
maintain institutional legitimacy, by meeting some demands through talk, some by 
decisions, and others by action: 
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In traditional administrative and decision theories, management talk 
and decisions pointing in one direction are assumed to increase the 
likelihood that corresponding action will be taken. When hypocrisy 
obtains, there is still a causal relation between talk, decisions and 
actions, but the causality is the reverse’ (Brunsson, 2002, p. xiv). 
The amount of ‘window dressing’ that occurs in a company about which objectives it 
pursues at different times and how these are presented to different audiences will depend 
on the operational requirements in different markets and industries (Holzer, 2008).  
In this thesis, the institutionalisation of PS through policies and practices in the packaging 
supply chain is evaluated by rating the performance of companies by industry sector 
(Chapter 5) and by analysing policy-making processes within individual firms in more 
detail (Chapter 6). 
Company characteristics 
Organisational differences mediate the responsiveness of companies to a particular issue 
within the same organisational field (Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Hoffman, 2001). Powell 
(1991) suggested that more research is required on processes of institutionalisation and 
sources of variation in response to institutional pressures. Organisations should not be 
regarded as passive actors because they exercise strategic choice in relating to their 
institutional environments (Scott, 1991). Oliver (1991) developed a typology of strategic 
responses by organisations to institutional processes, ranging from the least to the most 
passive, which she described as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and 
manipulation. She suggested a number of factors which could predict strategic responses, 
based on the willingness and ability of organisations to conform to the institutional 
environment. Willingness to conform is limited by ‘questions about the legitimacy or 
validity of the institutional status quo, political self-interests of organisational actors that 
are at cross-roads with institutional objectives, and organisational efforts to retain control 
over processes and outputs’. The ability to conform is bounded by ‘inadequate 
organisational resources or capacity to meet the requirements for conformity, conflicting 
institutional pressures that make unilateral conformity unachievable, and lack of 
recognition or awareness of institutional expectations’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 159). 
Variations in the way that organisations respond to institutional pressure could be 
explained by differences between industries in terms of: size, products and markets, access 
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to resources, labour and capital intensity; competing demands on the organisation; 
processes of negotiation and compromise between industry and government; and 
perceptions of institutional requirements within organisations (Powell, 1991). Delmas and 
Toffel (2004) have argued that companies adopt environmental management practices in 
response to institutional pressure, but these practices vary because of differences in 
organisational structure, strategic positioning and past environmental performance51. 
Hoffman (2001, p. 150) stressed the importance of culture and practices at an 
organisational level in meditating the influence of institutions.  
Corporate social responsibilities and responsiveness are clearly linked to the nature of a 
company’s activities— the ‘primary involvement’ of a company in its social environment 
(Preston and Post, 1981)52. They depend on the nature of the industry sector within which 
a firm operates, including factors such as public visibility, degree of government scrutiny, 
competitive structure and culture (Jones, 1999). For example, safety and pollution impacts 
associated with plastics and chemical manufacture tend to have a higher priority with 
governments, ENGOs and local communities than the packaging manufactured by their 
customers. In contrast, the waste and litter impacts associated with packaging are a 
significant social issue for packaging manufacturers and their customers, such as food and 
beverage manufacturers. 
Some writers have argued that large companies are more likely to be socially responsive 
than small-to-medium size companies (e.g. Buehler and Shetty, 1975; Labatt, 1997; 
UNCTAD, 1993; Videras and Alberini, 2000) because they have more resources at their 
disposal, greater vulnerability to consumer criticism, a higher public profile, and greater 
exposure to socially responsible investment. Gunningham and Sinclair (2002, p. 95) noted 
that large companies have a greater capacity for environmental self-regulation and 
monitoring, ‘although whether they have a self-interest in developing it is another matter’. 
Small-to-medium size companies have fewer resources to apply to CSR issues and are 
                                                     
51 The model developed by Delmas and Toffel also considers organisational characteristics at a 
plant level, such as plant size, sources of information on environmental management practices and 
historical environmental performance. For this thesis, plant level characteristics are not considered, 
because PS performance is evaluated at a corporate level only. 
52 Primary involvement was defined by Preston and Post (1981, p. 57) as the ‘essential economic 
tasks of the firm—locating and establishing its fixed facilities, procuring supplies, engaging 
employees, carrying out its production functions and marketing its products’. 
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often ‘invisible’ to the community. They also tend to be family-owned and therefore don’t 
have shareholders to consider (Jenkins and Hines, 2003). However, Jones (1999) has 
argued that large companies may be less responsive than small-to-medium size companies 
because: 
• they are both more bureaucratic and less flexible than smaller firms;  
• they are more likely to be accountable to shareholders and creditors, with limited 
discretion to allocate resources to CSR programs unless they benefit the firm’s 
competitive position.  
Size may be more likely to play a role when linked to other factors such as public 
exposure and threats of regulation. Dominant firms, and particularly large firms with a 
strained relationship with key stakeholders such as regulators, are more likely to feel 
vulnerable to stakeholder pressure and therefore to play an active role in the development 
of an industry-wide voluntary code (Prakash, 2000b). Large companies with well known 
brands, such as Nike, Gap and McDonalds, are highly visible and tend to be targeted by 
NGOs in their social responsibility campaigns (Klein, 2000). They are therefore most 
likely to respond to stakeholder pressure in order to protect their reputation and brand 
image (Roberts, 2003). Companies that are closer to consumers can be expected to have a 
more progressive attitude to social responsibility (Jones, 1999) and are more likely to face 
market pressure to change their behaviour (Gunningham and Rees, 1997). Research on 
environmental practices in the Canadian packaging industry concluded that those with a 
consumer focus were more responsive to waste management issues (Labatt, 1997). 
The impact of ownership (public or private) on social responsiveness is not clear. Labatt’s 
study of the packaging industry was inconclusive on this issue, and others reached 
contradictory conclusions. A survey of US companies (Buehler and Shetty, 1975) found 
that responsiveness increased with the number of shareholders, and James’s (2002) study 
of the Australian food and packaging sectors concluded that public companies are more 
environmentally responsive than private companies. However, Jones (1999) hypothesised 
that private companies have more discretion to act than public companies and are 
therefore likely to be more responsive. 
TNCs may be more responsive to CSR because they are subject to additional pressure 
from stakeholders in foreign countries and, as a result, have to meet the laws, customs and 
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business practices in all the countries where they operate (Zyglidopoulos, 2002). Most of 
the largest companies in the Australian packaging supply chain are TNCs with their head 
office located overseas, although Australian companies such as Amcor and Visy also have 
manufacturing plants in other countries. CSR policies within individual firms tend to 
reflect issues that are important in their own countries and cultures (Welford, 2004; 2005). 
Differences in CSR practices between firms have been attributed to different national 
institutional arrangements, particularly between Europe and the US (e.g. Matten and 
Moon, 2004; Doh and Guay, 2006). In contrast to the US, CSR has gained momentum in 
Europe only in recent years. Matten and Moon (2004) have argued that this does not 
reflect a lack of interest by European firms in social responsibility, but rather the fact that 
the social consequences of business have tended to be controlled by regulation rather than 
left to the discretion of corporations. In their view this is linked to the fact that European 
countries tend to display a different attitude to public risk, as shown by their more 
extensive regulation of genetically modified organisms. Other differences include a strong 
philanthropic tradition in the US, whereas in Europe individuals and companies pay 
higher tax and expect governments to take responsibility for social programs such as 
health insurance, welfare and the arts (Matten and Moon, 2004, p. 9). Zadek (2001) has 
argued that UK-based NGOs such as Amnesty International and Oxfam have also been a 
major driver of corporate citizenship in that country.  
For this research, a range of company characteristics are examined as mediating factors in 
the study of packaging stewardship (Figure 10). They include: 
• industry sector; 
• public visibility and the extent of government and ENGO scrutiny; 
• company size; 
• type of ownership (public or private); 
• corporate culture;  
• the location of the corporate head office. 
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Figure 10: The role of company characteristics in mediating responsiveness 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented an analytical framework which is used in chapters 4 to 6 to 
investigate the institutionalisation of PS within the Australian packaging supply chain. 
First, it confirmed the need for a multi-level analysis of PS that explores interrelated 
processes at macro (socio-political), meso (industry) and micro (organisational) levels. It 
also identified four interrelated themes that need to be considered at each level: 
• interest groups involved in the institutionalisation of PS within policy and 
practice; 
• discourses about the packaging problem and corporate responsibility;  
• policies and policy processes that institutionalise PS through ‘techniques of 
control’;  
• company characteristics that mediate corporate responsiveness to institutional 
pressure.    
The next three chapters will analyse the institutionalisation of PS within policy networks 
and the packaging supply chain using this framework (Table 10).  
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Table 10: How the analytical framework is applied in the thesis 
Level of 
analysis 
(chapter) 
Interest groups Discourses Policies and 
policy processes 
Company 
characteristics 
Macro: socio-
political 
networks (Ch. 
4) 
Industry 
associations, 
government 
agencies, trade 
unions and 
ENGOs involved 
in the creation of 
PS as a new 
institution. 
The story-lines 
used by 
associations, 
governments and 
ENGOs to frame 
the packaging 
‘problem’ and 
policy solutions. 
The interaction of 
competing 
coalitions in 
public policy 
processes. 
The influence of 
economic activities 
and interests 
(linked to industry 
sector) on public 
policy processes. 
Meso:  
Companies in 
industry 
sectors (Ch. 5) 
Companies in 
industry sectors in 
the packaging 
supply chain and 
their economic 
and political 
interests.  
The language 
used by 
companies in 
different sectors 
to describe PS 
responsibilities 
and commitments. 
The implication of 
PS discourses for 
corporate policy 
and practice, and 
overall industry 
responsiveness.  
The influence of 
economic activities 
and interests 
(linked to industry 
sector) on corporate 
responsiveness. 
Micro: 
individual 
companies  
(Ch. 6) 
Functional groups 
within individual 
companies; their 
PS roles and key 
stakeholders. 
How PS is framed 
internally by 
linking it to other 
business 
objectives. 
Corporate policy 
processes and 
structural changes 
within firms that 
are helping to 
institutionalise 
PS.  
The influence of 
company size, 
public visibility, 
location, ownership 
and corporate 
culture on 
responsiveness. 
 
Chapter 4 will explore institutionalising processes at a socio-political level, through which 
dominant interest groups have helped to define the packaging problem and corporate 
responsibility. The following two chapters will examine the institutionalisation of PS in 
the industry as a whole (Chapter 5) and individual firms (Chapter 6). 
 99 
Chapter 4 
The creation of a new institution—product 
stewardship and the National Packaging Covenant 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the institutionalisation of PS at a macro level by 
asking the question: How have discursive and public policy processes shaped expectations 
about corporate social responsibilities for packaging, as well as corporate 
responsiveness? The analysis takes an historical approach by tracing the origins of PS 
back to the 1970s. The account is divided into two time periods (1970–1990 and 1991–
2005) to highlight significant shifts in institutional arrangements which occurred during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, the ‘packaging problem’, which was 
originally associated with packaging waste and litter, shifted to the ‘life cycle 
environmental impacts’ of packaging. The organisational field also expanded to include 
the entire packaging supply chain rather than just those involved in the manufacture and 
packaging of beverages. Based on the framework presented in Chapter 3, developments in 
each of these time periods are examined by considering the interest groups, discourses, 
public policy processes and company characteristics which have influenced the 
construction and institutionalisation of PS within the packaging supply chain.  
The material in this chapter is based on a literature review and interviews with 
representatives from government, industry associations, companies and ENGOs. To 
protect the confidentiality of these sources individual names are only used when quoting 
from published sources. 
The end of refillable containers: packaging debates 1970–
1990 
This period saw the emergence of a ‘packaging problem’ in Australia as ENGOs, 
supported by some government agencies, campaigned for regulations that would force 
companies to use refillable beverage containers. The discursive struggle which ensued 
over the following two decades focused on the environmental and financial costs of 
packaging waste and the value of alternative policy solutions. Beverage companies and 
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their packaging suppliers formed a powerful lobby group to fight legislative proposals and 
to implement voluntary programs and funding agreements with state governments to 
reduce litter and waste. In the process they helped to establish voluntary and shared 
responsibility as the basis for public and corporate policy. Corporate responsiveness was 
mediated by the amount of pressure being exerted by government agencies and ENGOs on 
specific industry sectors. Large companies involved in the manufacture of beverages and 
beverage packaging have the most to lose from packaging regulations and, as a result, 
acted as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ in promoting voluntary environmental stewardship. 
The next four sections discuss: 
• interest groups in the organisational field, including industry associations, ENGOs 
and government agencies; 
• discourses invoked by interest groups to support their policy beliefs;  
• policies and policy processes that defined corporate responsibility for packaging 
waste and litter;  
• company characteristics that mediated responsiveness during this period.  
Interest groups: the organisational field at a macro level 
The environmental impacts of packaging became a public policy issue in the 1970s in 
response to two trends in Australia and elsewhere: a shift from reusable to single-use 
packaging and the emergence of a vocal environmental movement. This resulted in 
conflict between the beverage industry (and their packaging suppliers) and ENGOs over 
its benefits and impacts. Other groups which were drawn into the conflict and participated 
in policy debates were local government, because of its statutory responsibility for waste 
management, and state and federal government agencies. Key interest groups in the 
organisational field at a macro level during this period are listed in Table 11.  
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Table 11: Key interest groups, 1970–1990 
National 
ministerial 
councils 
Australian Environment Council (AEC) 
Federal 
government 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and 
Conservation 
Department of Science and Environment 
Business Regulation Review Unit 
State 
government 
Victorian Parliament—Natural Resources and Environment Committee 
Environment Protection Authority  (Victoria) 
Recycling and Litter Advisory Committee  (Victoria) 
Recycling and Resource Recovery Council (Victoria) 
Department of Environment (NSW) 
NSW Recycling Committee 
Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority (NSW) 
State Pollution Control Commission (NSW) 
Environment Protection Authority (SA) 
Local 
government 
Municipal Association of Victoria 
Industry 
associations 
National Packaging Association of Australia (NPAA) 
Packaging Industry Environment Council (PIEC) 
Packaging Council of Australia (PCA)—formed in 1978 from amalgamation of 
NPAA and PIEC 
Litter Research Association (LRA) NSW 
Victorian Industry Group (later LRA) 
NGOs Australian Conservation Foundation 
Friends of the Earth (Collingwood) 
Friends of the Earth (Sydney) 
Australian Consumers Association 
Keep Australia Beautiful Council (KABC) Victoria 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
 
These groups made up the policy network which debated regulatory options in different 
jurisdictions. Over time two coalitions started to emerge, one advocating state regulation 
and the other advocating industry self-regulation. The common policy beliefs which 
underpinned the two coalitions are summarised in Table 12. Based on Sabatier’s (1991; 
1993) approach to policy analysis, a distinction is made between ‘core’ policy beliefs and 
‘secondary aspects’ relating to policy implementation. The story-lines which were used to 
promote these beliefs, and the policy processes which resulted in the institutionalisation of 
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a voluntary approach to corporate responsibility, are discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. The aim here is to introduce the key actors, their interests and their 
policy beliefs. 
Table 12: Interest groups and policy beliefs, 1970–1990 
Values and 
beliefs 
ENGOs Local 
government, 
Government of 
South Australia 
Federal / most 
state 
government 
agencies 
Industry 
associations / 
trade unions 
Policy beliefs 
Social control 
of business 
State regulation Industry self-regulation 
Interests which 
should be 
given priority 
Natural 
environment 
Local 
communities / 
natural 
environment 
Policies favoured 
industry interests 
(particularly 
conservative 
governments) 
Industry interests: 
shareholders 
/employees 
Corporate 
responsibility 
‘Producer responsibility’: product and 
packaging manufacturers should be 
responsible for the physical recovery 
of packaging waste through return or 
refill systems 
‘Shared responsibility’: responsibility 
for recycling and litter management 
should be shared between product and 
packaging manufacturers and state or 
local government 
Policy implementation (secondary aspects) 
The policy 
issue 
 
Packaging is a 
significant  
environmental 
issue in its own 
right and 
symbolic of over-
consumption 
Packaging is a 
significant 
environmental, 
financial and 
social issue  
Packaging is an 
important 
political issue due 
to high public 
profile and 
competing policy 
demands 
Packaging is an 
insignificant 
environmental 
and social issue; 
financial issues 
can be addressed 
through 
efficiency 
measures 
Policy goals Reduction in packaging waste and litter 
Preferred 
policies 
CDL and packaging taxes Voluntary 
agreements (except 
CDL in SA) 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Beverage packaging began to change dramatically in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s 
following the introduction of new forms of packaging which challenged the traditional 
monopoly of refillable glass. These included single-use glass bottles, steel and aluminium 
cans, plastic bottles and plastic-coated cartons. Before this, beer, soft drinks and milk were 
all sold in refillable glass bottles and the purchase price often included a deposit which 
was refunded by retailers when the empty container was returned. Others did not carry a 
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deposit but the bottles were returned through a wide network of professional bottle 
collectors and voluntary organisations that collected and sold them back to manufacturers.  
The new, single-use containers generated significant benefits for packaging 
manufacturers, product manufacturers and retailers. They created a larger market for 
packaging manufacturers because they were only used once and then thrown away, 
whereas refillable bottles could be reused up to forty times. The benefits to beverage 
manufacturers included higher sales because of their popularity with consumers, and 
reduced costs of collecting, sorting and washing empty bottles (Parliament of Australia, 
1974).  
Single-use containers also played an important role in the restructuring of the beverage 
industry. The refillable bottle system had imposed ‘natural limits’ on the market area 
which could be served by a bottling plant because of transport costs for the return of 
bottles, whereas single-use containers allowed larger companies to expand their market 
share at the expense of smaller bottling plants (Rogers, 2007). They therefore supported 
rapid consolidation of the beverage industry—there were around 600 soft-drink bottlers in 
Australia the 1950s (McQueen, 2000, p. 129) but today the industry is dominated by a 
small number of multinational companies. Single-use packaging was also popular with 
large grocery retailers because it avoided the costs of handling returned bottles and was 
more compatible with the supermarket approach to merchandising (AEC, 1979, p. 95). 
While single-use containers were more expensive, consumers appeared willing to pay the 
higher price in return for convenience benefits such as their lighter weight and the fact that 
metal cans were faster to chill and easier to open than glass bottles (Parliament of 
Australia, 1974). Return rates for refillable bottles fell with the introduction of single-use 
containers, making them even less profitable. By 1989 refillable bottles made up only 
10% of all glass containers in Australia in 1989, although they were still widely used in 
South Australia (IC, 1991a, p. 61)53.  
                                                     
53 In 1989, 96% of beer was packaged in refillable bottles and containers in South Australia 
compared to only 16% for Australia as a whole. The figures for soft drinks were similar at 98% in 
SA compared to 19% for Australia. This was due to the favourable treatment they received under 
deposit legislation in that state which imposed higher deposits on non-refillable containers. 
However, this distinction was removed after a decision by the High Court in 1990 which forced the 
government to change deposit levels (IC, 1991b). 
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These changes in packaging and distribution were taking place at the same time that a 
vocal environment movement was emerging in Australia, reflecting similar developments 
in Europe, the US and Canada. Increasing social concerns about environmental issues 
such as air pollution, water quality and nuclear power resulted in the introduction of 
comprehensive state-based environmental legislation in Victoria, NSW and Western 
Australia in the early 1970s54. In this context, ENGOs argued that single-use beverage 
packaging was environmentally unsustainable because of its negative impacts on resource 
consumption, pollution, waste and litter. The Australian Conservation Foundation  
published a brochure entitled The Packaging Plague (ACF, 1974) which outlined its 
concerns about packaging and called on the federal government to impose mandatory 
deposits and taxes to encourage the use of refillable containers and recyclable materials.  
Increasing volumes of household refuse were also starting to create problems for local 
government, which tended to blame the packaging industry. They reported that volumes of 
waste had increased significantly over the previous fifteen years and that there had been 
noticeable increases in paper, glass, and can components. This in turn was placing strains 
on collection and disposal facilities and adding to disposal costs. Costs continued to rise in 
the 1970s and 1980s55, prompting debates about who should be financially responsible for 
the disposal of used packaging. Local government associations and ENGOs lobbied state 
and federal governments for regulations such as CDL, which would force companies to 
use returnable bottles. The Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) argued that ‘[t]he 
financial incentive of returning containers would encourage most consumers to recycle, 
and also the collection of thrown away returnable containers for redemption. The reduced 
collection and disposal costs would accrue to local government’ (Austin, 1983, p. 200). 
                                                     
54 In Victoria Henry Bolte’s Liberal government established the Environment Protection Act 1970 
and the Environment Protection Authority following an election campaign in which they 
campaigned strongly on environmental issues. The Liberal Party had feared being swept from 
power because of a voter perception that they were indifferent to ‘quality of life’ issues such as air 
pollution, national parks and water quality (Unglick, 1996).  
55 From the late 1970s more attention was paid to the environmental impacts of waste disposal, and 
improved landfill management practices increased disposal costs. In states such as Victoria, the 
rising costs of waste disposal were more of a problem than the availability of landfill space. This 
was due to stricter planning controls and operational requirements for landfills (RALAC, 1988, p. 
21) as well as the introduction of larger ‘wheelie bins’ in some local government areas (NREC, 
1984, p. 70). 
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A number of regulatory proposals were being debated at federal and state government 
levels, and the packaging industry realised that it had to take action. As one industry 
member noted in 1972: 
The packaging industry in affluent countries has come in for more 
than its fair share of blame for the growing problems of litter and solid 
waste and it has been readily demonstrated that unless the industry 
stands up and is counted and takes a positive approach to help 
overcome the problems of litter and solid waste then it can expect that 
attempts will be made through legislative action and other means to 
limit its growth and prosperity (Pearce, 1972, p. 1). 
While noting that industry had to defend itself against ‘environmental emotionalism’, he 
also argued that the industry would not ‘win friends nor solve problems by presenting 
what appears to be logical and factual arguments’. Rather, ‘[i]t must do something and be 
seen to do something’ (Pearce, 1972, p. 5). The National Packaging Association of 
Australia (NPA) argued that community concerns were largely based on ignorance, 
‘provoking emotional and ill-informed reaction from the public and media and attracting 
political attention’, but that these concerns could be addressed through the provision of 
‘factual information’ by industry (NPA, 1972, p. 1). The Packaging Industry Environment 
Council (PIEC) was formed in 1972 to provide additional resources to the industry 
campaign, with a particular focus on ‘liaison’ with state and federal governments. Another 
important industry association established during this period was the Litter Research 
Association (LRA), formed in 1978 by beverage and packaging manufacturers in NSW to 
fund a voluntary anti-litter education program called Do the Right Thing. Similar 
associations were formed in other states and eventually combined into a national 
organisation, the Litter Research and Recycling Association (LRRA). 
Industry’s arguments against legislation stressed its potential impact on jobs. For example 
the federal government’s recommendation for a packaging tax was ‘totally rejected’ by 
PIEC (1975b, p. 1) on the basis that it would be ‘discriminatory, inflationary and will 
certainly contribute to unemployment’. During the early 1980s, the Executive Director of 
the Packaging Council of Australia (PCA) suggested that ‘refillable containers in a 
modern society are about as outmoded as the out-house and the night cart’ and that 
compulsory deposits would lead to a loss of jobs and investment in the packaging and 
beverage industries and increased costs to retailers (O'Brien, 1983, p. 202). The packaging 
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industry therefore found powerful allies in the trade union movement, particularly when 
negotiating with Labor governments.  
Packaging discourses: waste, litter and the ‘throw-away society’ 
Debates about the environmental impacts of packaging during this period involved 
competing story-lines which were used to support alternative regulatory proposals. While 
the issues were complex and individuals and groups did not always express consistent 
views, a summary of the main arguments is provided in Table 13. While governments at a 
state and federal level expressed similar views to ENGOs in the early 1970s their rhetoric 
shifted progressively over time to more closely reflect industry’s arguments. 
The first issue concerned the environmental benefits and impacts of packaging in general 
and single-use packaging in particular. For the environmental movement, single-use 
packaging symbolised the unsustainable nature of industrial production and consumption. 
In the post-war years disposability had been promoted as a positive selling point by 
manufacturers (Strasser, 1999) but widely publicised research on the ‘limits to growth’ 
(Meadows et al., 1972), the first UN Global Conference on the Human Environment held 
in Stockholm in 1972, and the ‘oil crisis’ in 1973–74 contributed to debates about the 
environmental impacts of consumption, including packaging56. Within this context, 
disposable products and ‘design for obsolescence’ were seen as symptomatic of broader 
social problems (Packard, 1960; Papanek, 1971; Toffler, 1970). ACF (1974, p. 7) claimed 
that ‘Australia’s resources are being squandered by the packaging industry to produce 
goods that are unwanted and unnecessary’. The federal government (Parliament of 
Australia, 1974, p. 7) noted that beverage containers ‘symbolise for many people the 
wasteful and despoiling aspects of our consumption-oriented society’ and argued that 
society had to decide ‘whether it is desirable, or even possible in the long term to permit 
the continued expansion of the “throw-away ethic”’. Packaging was therefore given a 
                                                     
56 For example, the federal government inquiry into beverage container deposits (Parliament of 
Australia, 1974, p. 35) noted that ‘[s]ince the Inquiry commenced in August 1973, the dependence 
of industrialised countries on energy resources has been demonstrated and has heightened 
community awareness of that dependence. The need for rational and efficient management and use 
of resources is an issue which cannot be ignored in assessing the implications of a deposit system 
on beverage containers’. 
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moral dimension by ENGOs and governments by linking disposable products to 
irresponsible and unethical behaviour.  
Table 13: Story-lines employed to support policy proposals, 1970–1990 
Issue Self-regulation coalition: industry 
associations, trade unions, federal 
government, most state governments 
State regulation coalition: ENGOs, 
Australian Consumers Association, 
local government, Government of 
South Australia  
Single-use 
packaging 
 
The social benefits of packaging 
Packaging is important to protect and 
transport products to the consumer. 
Single-use packaging is more 
convenient for beverage 
manufacturers, retailers and consumers 
than refillable bottles. It also makes an 
important economic contribution 
through investment and jobs. 
Packaging and the ‘throw-away 
society’  
Single-use packaging has been 
introduced by industry to avoid the 
costs of collecting and reusing bottles. 
This type of ‘disposable’ packaging is 
contributing to a ‘throw-away’ ethic 
and unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption. 
Packaging 
waste 
The waste challenge 
There is no waste crisis because 
Australia has enough landfill space. 
Packaging makes up a small 
percentage of the waste stream and has 
minimal environmental impacts in 
landfill. Financial and environmental 
costs can be reduced through improved 
systems for waste management. 
The waste crisis 
Packaging makes up a high percentage 
of the waste stream and causes 
environmental damage in landfill. 
Diminishing landfill space and stricter 
environmental standards are causing 
waste management costs to increase, 
thus imposing unacceptably high costs 
on local government and ratepayers.  
Litter Litter is a people problem 
Packaging makes up a small 
percentage of the litter stream and is 
caused by the irresponsible behaviour 
of people who refuse to dispose of 
packaging correctly. The economic 
and social costs can be reduced 
through education programs and the 
provision of more litter bins. 
Litter is a packaging problem 
Packaging makes up a high percentage 
of the litter stream and is caused by the 
shift from refillable to ‘throwaway’ 
containers. The economic and social 
costs can be eliminated by forcing 
industry to use refillable bottles. 
Recycling Recycling should be optimised 
Recycling programs should be 
established for packaging materials 
with a commercial value. Recycling 
generates environmental and social 
benefits and collection should be 
funded by local government, which 
has a statutory responsibility for waste. 
Reuse and recycling should be 
maximised 
All beverage packaging should be 
refillable. If this is not possible then 
recycling programs should be 
established and funded by the 
beverage and packaging industries that 
created the waste in the first place. 
Responsibility 
for managing 
packaging 
impacts 
Shared responsibility 
Recycling and litter reduction for 
packaging is a shared responsibility of 
packaging manufacturers, product 
manufacturers, consumers and local 
government.   
Industry responsibility 
Recycling and litter reduction for 
packaging is a corporate responsibility. 
Companies who benefit from its use 
should pay for any social and 
environmental costs. 
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The packaging industry countered these arguments by asserting that packaging was both 
necessary and beneficial to consumers: 
To assure [sic] that all products reach the consumer in a usable state, 
the package often protects the product against moisture, dirt, micro-
organisms, and, in some instances, light, oxygen, heat or cold; it also 
often protects against loss of ingredients, flavours and fragrances ... 
every form of packaging has a practical purpose, and ... has been very 
carefully designed to perform that function in the most efficient and 
economical way possible (PIEC, 1974a, p. 10). 
The second issue concerned the contribution of packaging to waste in landfill and the 
extent to which this represented an environmental problem. Waste volumes were 
increasing to such an extent in the 1970s that many ENGOs and local government 
associations began to talk about a ‘waste crisis’ and to identify single-use packaging as a 
major source of the problem. ACF expressed alarm at the growing volumes of waste: 
By the end of the century, our garbage will be five times the present 
weight, seven times the present volume, and will cost easily 10 times 
as much to get rid of ... Most of the increase will be due to packaging, 
as we steadily catch up with the American packaging consumption 
level (ACF, 1974, p. 6). 
In local government’s view, manufacturers had a responsibility to reduce the volume of 
waste requiring disposal and to develop new ways to reprocess it as raw materials for 
other purposes. They also suggested that a tax be imposed on the manufacture of beverage 
containers and the revenue redistributed to local government to fund the costs of disposing 
of the beverage container component of solid waste (Parliament of Australia, 1974).  
In their defence manufacturers of beverage containers argued that their products 
represented a small proportion of solid waste and their activities were being ‘unjustly 
singled out for special attention’ (Parliament of Australia, 1974, p. 7). This was attributed 
to the ‘emotional’ significance of packaging, linked to its high visibility and non-
degradability (Robson, 1972, p. 6). PIEC (1974a, pp. 10–11) tried to divert attention away 
from packaging and towards broader waste management problems:   
To state that the problems of waste disposal facing councils are all due 
to packaging shows an appalling ignorance of the subject of waste 
disposal—to say the least. Surveys conducted by Governments in 
various countries indicate that packaging accounts for between 13% 
and 15% of solid waste ... The real problems of solid waste disposal 
are the availability of landfill sites, the increasing costs of collection 
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and transport, and the lack of a modern system of State and regional 
organisation, such as that employed for sewage disposal and water 
supply (PIEC, 1974a, pp. 10–11). 
Some industry associations claimed that their packaging was actually beneficial in landfill. 
For example, a representative of the steel industry (Wright, 1972, p. 7) claimed that the 
disposal of steel cans in landfill was simply ‘giving back to the earth its iron’, while the 
Plastics Industry Association argued that plastics ‘are non-biodegradable, they do not rot 
and therefore do not give off polluting gases or contribute to soil and water contamination 
(Kettle, 1972, p. 2). 
The third issue which was discussed in packaging discourses was the role and impacts of 
packaging in litter. Unlike some of the broader environmental concerns about packaging, 
the problems associated with litter were considered to be primarily social or economic: 
clean-up costs, inconvenience for local government, negative impacts on amenity and 
safety hazards from broken glass and metal ring-pulls (e.g. ACA, 1982; AEC, 1979; AEC, 
1982; NREC, 1984; Parliament of Australia, 1974). Litter was not regarded as a 
significant environmental problem. Even ACF (1974, p. 6) only mentioned it in passing as 
‘an eyesore we can’t escape’, a hazard due to broken glass and a financial cost. PIEC and 
other industry associations tried to downplay the problem, arguing that litter formed only 
1% of solid waste (cited in Parliament of Australia, 1974, p. 22).  
The fourth issue related to the importance placed on recycling as a solution to the 
environmental impacts of packaging. The packaging industry argued that ‘...the greatest 
contribution that the packaging industry can make to problems of solid waste management 
in the future will be to encourage the installation of programs of better collection, 
segregation and recycling of waste material. To do this will require the provision of 
people, resources and finance’ (Robson, 1972, p. 7). Packaging manufacturers, either 
individually or through associations such as LRA, worked closely with local government 
to establish collection and recycling programs. The first municipal drop-off facilities were 
established in the 1970s57, and the first comprehensive kerbside collection program was 
established in Melbourne in 1984 (Sondreal, 1987). Faced with increasing waste disposal 
                                                     
57 Knox Council in Victoria launched the first program in 1975, with residents encouraged to bring 
back their bottles, papers, cans and glass to the council depot, and to leave bottles out for collection 
with their garbage. The material was sold to manufacturers for recycling. Similar schemes were 
established in Nunawading in Victoria and Belconnen in the ACT in 1978. 
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costs, local governments were looking for alternative ways to manage waste and were 
adapting systems which had already been introduced in Europe: ‘[t]he motivation for 
providing kerbside recycling was both political and economic. Councils who commenced 
kerbside services identified high levels of recognition and support from ratepayers, 
reflecting the high visibility and “retail” nature of waste management as an environmental 
issue’ (PCA, 2006, p. 18). By 1989, 61% of local governments in Australia provided some 
form of kerbside recycling service (PCA, 2006, p. 17). Governments at all levels 
promoted the benefits of recycling and encouraged the expansion of kerbside collection 
programs for waste paper and packaging. The result of these policies was a fundamental 
shift in the way that we think about rubbish: it both problematised waste and revalued it as 
a recyclable resource (Hawkins, 2006).  
The final issue concerned the distribution of responsibility between companies, consumers 
and governments for the impacts of waste and litter. ENGOs and local government groups 
argued that manufacturers were responsible and should be forced, through regulation, to 
take packaging back for reuse or recycling. For example, the Australian Consumers 
Association claimed that beverage containers made up 35% of household waste by 
volume, and the costs of disposal were being unfairly borne by councils, and ultimately 
the ratepayer, rather than industry (ACA, 1982).  Industry groups did not accept the 
argument that they were responsible for managing the waste which was generated by their 
products after use. For example, while they accepted that packaging contributed to litter, 
they argued that industry itself was not the polluter: ‘Litter is the result of actions of a 
careless few who, while prepared to enjoy the benefits of modern packaging themselves, 
consider that others should endure the residual inefficiencies’ (PIEC, 1977, p. 4). This 
view is reflected in the moral overtones of their advertising campaign, with its message to 
‘Do the Right Thing’. The beverage and packaging industries supported recycling through 
investments in reprocessing facilities and support for kerbside collection programs, but as 
the scale and costs of recycling programs increased in the 1980s they became more vocal 
in arguing for ‘shared responsibility’ with local government: 
It has often been said that the packaging industry should bear the cost 
of reducing packaging waste and litter. Industry does not accept this, 
and feels that local government, on behalf of the community, should 
assume greater responsibility for recycling (Barber, 1988, p. 5). 
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This view was supported by state governments, who largely accepted the principle of 
shared responsibility and worked collaboratively with industry groups and local councils 
to establish kerbside collection programs.   
These discourses on the ethics of disposability, the ‘waste crisis’, litter impacts, the 
recycling solution and corporate responsibility helped to create a new institutional 
environment for companies in the packaging supply chain. Packaging was now regarded 
as a social problem and both governments and industry were expected to find solutions.  
Policies and policy processes: the push for container deposit legislation 
Numerous proposals for the regulation of packaging were raised and debated over this 
period. While many of these involved some form of state regulation, the most significant 
outcome was the establishment of voluntary agreements between governments and 
industry associations in all jurisdictions outside South Australia (Table 14). These 
agreements prompted companies involved in beverage packaging—brand owners and 
packaging manufacturers, sometimes in partnership with raw material suppliers—to 
establish collection and reprocessing facilities for packaging. 
While taxes or bans were proposed in NSW and Tasmania in the early 1970s, the most 
common proposal was for mandatory redeemable deposits on beverage containers in order 
to encourage the use of refillable bottles. This policy was introduced by the South 
Australian Government in 1975 despite opposition from the local soft drink and beer 
industries and packaging manufacturers58.  
Following the announcement by the South Australian Government that it would introduce 
CDL, the AEC passed a resolution which requested that the federal government conduct a 
public inquiry into a national system of mandatory deposits. The inquiry received over 
100 submissions, mostly in favour of deposits, and recommended a tax on packaging 
which did not carry a refundable deposit and a ban on detachable ‘ring pulls’ on metal 
cans (Parliament of Australia, 1974). 
                                                     
58 Higher deposits were imposed on non-refillable containers, providing manufacturers with a 
strong incentive to retain the use of refillable bottles. SA was particularly amenable to the 
introduction of CDL because unlike the eastern states, it still had the extensive voluntary deposit 
system for the return of refillable beer and soft drink bottles which had been in operation for over 
100 years. 
 112 
Table 14: Policy processes and outcomes 1970–1990 
1972 NSW Government proposal to introduce a packaging tax (Beale, 1972). Proposal not 
implemented 
1973 Tasmanian Government proposal to include packaging taxes and bans in the Tasmanian 
Environment Protection Act 1973. These provisions were removed from the Act 
following lobbying by industry (PIEC, 1973) 
1974 Federal government inquiry into container deposits on behalf of AEC (Parliament of 
Australia, 1974) recommended a tax on any packaging without a redeemable deposit 
CDL introduced in South Australia 
1976 Recommendations of the federal government inquiry rejected by state governments 
(PIEC, 1976) 
1978 LRA NSW formed to implement the voluntary Do the Right Thing campaign in 
conjunction with the NSW Government, as a result of NSW Government interest in CDL 
1979 NT Government established the Territory Anti-Litter Committee with funding from the 
packaging industry 
A report by AEC on the management of packaging waste canvassed a wide range of 
options including voluntary initiatives and state regulation, e.g. taxes and deposits (AEC, 
1979) 
1981 AEC Resolution 215 (June 1981) supported a voluntary approach to recycling of 
packaging 
AEC invited industry, through PCA, to undertake voluntary initiatives to reduce waste 
and litter 
LRA Queensland formed to implement the Do the Right Thing campaign following 
discussion with the Queensland Government 
1982 A report by AEC into litter control (1982) recommended voluntary industry initiatives 
rather than state regulation 
The Victorian Government commenced an inquiry into CDL by the Natural Resources 
and Environment Committee (NREC) 
1984 The report of the Victorian inquiry into CDL (NREC, 1984) recommended a voluntary 
recycling and litter management program funded by the Victorian Industry Group (VIG, 
later renamed LRA) 
1985 The Recycling and Litter Advisory Group (RALAC) was established in Victoria with 
broad representation to oversee the industry-funded program 
1987 The NSW Recycling Committee established with broad representation 
1988 Report to the Tasmanian Department of Environment, Litter Control Council and 
Municipal Association of Tasmania on recycling (Balmer, 1988), with funding support 
from LRA, recommended against CDL 
1989 A report on CDL by the federal government’s Business Regulation Review Unit (BRRU, 
1989) with funding support from LRA, recommended CDL not be introduced 
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The recommendations of the inquiry were rejected by packaging manufacturers and trade 
unions on the basis that they would threaten investment and jobs. According to PIEC, they 
were also opposed by state governments. At a meeting between federal and state 
environmental agencies and PIEC in mid-1976, state government representatives are 
reported to have said that the recommendations of the committee were ‘generally 
unacceptable’ and that the onus was on industry to reduce the amount of packaging in the 
waste stream (PIEC, 1976, pp. 1–2).  
One of the issues of concern to governments was clearly the potential impact that a forced 
return to refillable containers would have on capital investment and employment in the 
glass and aluminium can industries (AEC, 1979, pp. 98–100). Their reluctance to impose 
new environmental regulations on the packaging industry was also consistent with an 
ideological shift within state and federal governments (both Labor and conservative) in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. During this period conservative think tanks such as the 
Institute for Public Affairs, with funding support from business interests, waged a 
concerted and successful campaign to promote neo-liberal policies such as deregulation 
and privatisation through public debate and policy processes (Smith and Marden, 2008)59. 
Similar campaigns were being implemented in other countries, and tendencies towards 
deregulation and privatisation were putting ‘the national environmental state’ under 
pressure after two decades of institution building (Spaargaren and Mol, 2008). 
In June 1981 the AEC passed a resolution to invite industry, through the PCA, to 
undertake a series of voluntary actions, including improvements in recycling, payment of 
‘maximum resource values’ for used materials, consumer education, design for recycling 
and consideration of ‘the possibilities of reversing the trend towards one-way beverage 
containers’ (AEC, 1982, p. xiv). They threatened that if these actions were unsuccessful 
then other measures, including CDL, would be considered.  
By this stage the beverage and packaging industries had already started to introduce 
voluntary programs as a result of negotiations with individual state governments, 
particularly NSW. The Minister for Planning and Environment had expressed an interest 
                                                     
59The influence of conservative think tanks on environmental policy continued in the following 
decades. For example, Pearse (2007) highlighted close links between John Howard’s conservative 
government and think tanks such as the Institute of Public Affairs, Centre for Independent Studies 
and the Sydney Institute on the development of climate change policy. 
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in CDL in the late 1970s following a visit to Oregon (Wacher, 1988). However, following 
discussions with the NSW Government, the Do the Right Thing litter control campaign 
had been established as a joint government–industry initiative within the State Pollution 
and Control Commission, with industry funding. The arrangement was formalised through 
a written agreement which included the statement that either party could withdraw if 
measures were introduced at a state or federal level which conflicted with its spirit or 
intent. This was interpreted by industry groups to mean that the program was conditional 
on CDL not being introduced (BRRU, 1989, p. 31). In addition to its direct funding to 
government, the industry also provided substantial funding to Keep Australia Beautiful 
(KAB) in NSW. Similar agreements were reached with other state governments in the 
1980s60, and LRA eventually became a national organisation called the Litter Research 
and Recycling Association (LRRA).  
ENGOs were opposed to voluntary agreements and continued to lobby governments, 
unsuccessfully, for greater regulation. They had opposed the original voluntary agreement 
in NSW: 
The Labor government which was elected in 1976 agreed to the 
removal of the reusable container with the deposit, and we produced a 
short paper on why we should keep container deposits. The 
government took no notice of us and instead introduced this multi-
million dollar litter control campaign, Do the Right Thing... Well we 
tried to stop that happening and we met the then Minister for the 
Environment, Paul Landa, [but] unfortunately the conveyors and the 
cleaning systems in the plant were shut down and an alternative 
manufacturing system was put in place. Of course the argument then 
became that it was all going to cost too much to reverse the capital 
                                                     
60 LRA was established in Queensland after discussions with the Premier in 1981–82 and programs 
were run independently of government and involved less government coercion than in other states 
(BRRU, 1989). In Western Australia (WA), anti-litter and recycling programs were managed by 
KAB, which in that state is a statutory authority, with funding from government and beverage 
manufacturers. Like the other states, industry members in WA had an understanding that financial 
contributions were conditional on CDL not being introduced, although this was not in any formal 
agreement (BRRU, 1989). In the Northern Territory (NT), the Territory Anti-Litter Committee was 
established in the late 1970s with representatives from government agencies, local government, 
KAB and industry. Companies in the beverage and beverage packaging industry provided funding 
to the committee to underwrite its programs (BRRU, 1989). The Victorian Industry Group, which 
was formed by the beverage industry and its packaging suppliers to fight CDL in Victoria, later 
changed its name to the Victorian Industry Litter Research Association and then LRA. In Tasmania 
an industry-funded anti-litter campaign began in February 1980 on the proviso that deposit 
legislation would not be introduced by the Tasmanian Government during that period  (AEC, 1982, 
p. 12). 
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investment, there would be jobs lost etc. (Personal communication, 
ENGO D). 
The Australian Consumers Association (ACA, 1982, p. 467) referred to the packaging 
industry as ‘that prolific producer of potential litter’ and argued that ‘the apparent concern 
for the environment indicated by the industry’s support for public education campaigns 
looks more like a smokescreen for profitable and less ecologically sound developments, 
within the industry, than any genuine attempt to solve the litter problem’. They called on 
all state and territory governments to implement legislation such as CDL to encourage a 
return to refillable containers before the system was completely dismantled (ACA, 1982).  
Most ENGOs regarded KAB and Do the Right Thing as a public relations front for 
industry rather than a genuine environmental organisation. There are different views on 
the origins of KAB61, but the packaging industry has always played a major role in its 
management and funding. It was based on a similar initiative in the United States, where 
Keep America Beautiful was formed by the American packaging industry to address the 
litter problem (Pearce, 1972; Rogers, 2007). KAB has been criticised as ‘corporate 
greenwash’ in both the US (Rogers, 2007, p. 121) and Australia. In the mid-1970s ENGOs 
claimed that KAB was ‘carrying out a misleading and dangerous policy by claiming litter 
was caused by the public when the real culprits were the packaging companies’ 
(‘Conservationist attack on grant to KABC’, The Australian, 15 January 1975, p. 5).  
Despite the decision by the AEC to encourage voluntary responsibility in preference to 
legislation, the Victorian Government initiated its own inquiry into CDL in 1982. 
Undertaken by the Natural Resources and Environment Committee (NREC) of the 
Victorian Parliament, the inquiry lasted two years and received almost 500 submissions. 
This proved to be a critical period of debate which ultimately established voluntary 
agreements as the preferred approach to packaging policy, both in Victoria and nationally. 
Liberal and National party members of the committee were opposed to CDL because they 
                                                     
61 The NPA said that they had played a significant role in establishing KAB in Victoria in 1971 
(NPA, Environment Newsletter, September 1972, p. 3), although Dame Phyllis Frost claimed that it 
was established in 1963 by the National Council of Women and that she later sought contact with 
the NPA to discuss the litter problem (reported in PIEC, 1975a, p. 3). According to another report 
the Victorian KAB organisation was established in 1967 (NREC, 1984, p. 61). By 1974 KAB had a 
national coordinating body, branches in all states except NSW, and funding from different levels of 
government, packaging manufacturers and individuals (Parliament of Australia, 1974). 
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regarded it as too costly, while Labor members were split between those who supported it 
and those who opposed it:  
That was a very bitter inquiry and was split on party lines. It even led 
to some splits in the Labor Party amongst their ranks, the merits or 
otherwise of it. In general terms it was such a divisive and bitter 
inquiry it shocked even the Committee itself ... One of the Labor 
members ... was an ex-milk bar proprietor, and he had a bent against it 
[CDL], saying that as an ex-milk bar proprietor he couldn’t put up 
with all these bottles lying around! (Personal communication, State 
Government B) 
Almost all of the groups and individuals who made submissions or presentations to NREC 
supported CDL: 
Fifty-two Victorian municipalities made submissions to the 
Committee in support of deposit legislation. One opposed deposit 
legislation. Eight community health groups, three conservation groups 
and four other community groups also supported deposit legislation as 
did many individuals either in submission or in letters to the 
Committee and its members ... The Australian Council of Local 
Government Associations and all State Local Government 
Associations support the introduction of container deposits (NREC, 
1984, p. 279). 
CDL was strongly opposed by industry groups and trade unions representing workers in 
the packaging industry. The unions lobbied members of NREC directly: 
I know at the time that one of the Labor members of the Committee 
had the glass workers trade union ... targeting him and absolutely 
harassing him at home, phoning him in the middle of the night and all 
that sort of stuff (Personal communication, State Government B). 
The opposition of at least one of the Labor members to CDL meant that the committee 
ultimately voted against CDL in favour of a voluntary approach62. They recommended 
that the government negotiate a voluntary agreement between the government and the 
                                                     
62 This decision was based on the view that a compulsory deposit system would be disruptive and 
costly for industry because Victoria, unlike SA, had largely lost the retail and bottle merchant 
system which had supported the return of refillable bottles (NREC, 1984). However, there were 
two minority reports included in the final report. One of these was submitted by the Vice Chairman 
of NREC, a Labor member, who argued that the majority report ‘desires ecological chastity, but not 
now’, and that this approach ‘is not derived from an objective assessment of the evidence before 
the committee’. He also observed that ‘[i]n a political environment where deregulation has become 
a popular catch-phrase and an ideological test of purity, consideration of beverage and drink 
container deposit legislation on its merits by a Parliamentary Committee is made more difficult’ 
(NREC, 1984, p. 313). The second minority report was submitted by two other Labor members 
who were opposed to its decision against CDL. 
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beverage industry, based on a proposal submitted by the Victorian Industry Group (later 
renamed LRA). They sought a guarantee from the government that, in return for its 
voluntary support for litter and recycling programs for a three-year period, it would not 
introduce CDL (NREC, 1984, p. 201). NREC argued that CDL should be used as a last 
resort, to be introduced only if industry failed to negotiate satisfactory agreements or if 
performance was not satisfactory.  
The Victorian Government accepted NREC’s recommendations and established the 
Recycling and Litter Advisory Committee (RALAC) in 1985 to oversee the collaborative 
program. The committee initially included two representatives of the beverage and 
beverage packaging industries, two trade union representatives (the Australian Glass 
Workers Union and the Pulp and Paper Workers Union), two local government and two 
community/ENGO representatives. The conflicting values and policy beliefs of interest 
groups continued to be evident during the years of RALAC’s operation. For example, one 
of their annual reports included ‘a dissenting view’ from one of the two ‘community’ 
representatives on the committee (unnamed), who argued that the voluntary approach had 
failed because recycling rates were inadequate and costs were being imposed unfairly on 
local government rather than industry, and that CDL should be introduced (RALAC, 
1988, pp. 26–29).  
Two relatively distinct policy coalitions therefore emerged during the period 1970–1990. 
The Australian Consumers Association, ENGOs and local government associations all 
argued for regulations which would shift the costs of waste management from local 
government back on to the packaging supply chain. However, their ability to influence 
government policy was limited. Beverage manufacturers developed a strong alliance with 
their packaging suppliers through state-based associations (LRA or similar) which were 
well-resourced and supported in policy negotiations by trade unions representing 
packaging industry workers. These associations became closely involved in policy 
development and implementation through the negotiation of voluntary agreements with 
state governments to fund anti-litter and recycling programs. The packaging industry, 
trade unions and state governments all had a common interest in protecting capital 
investment and jobs which were generated by an expansion in the production of single-use 
packaging. The government–industry partnerships which developed during this period 
became the basis for a tightly knit policy community which largely excluded ENGOs and 
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local government associations, and laid the groundwork for the ‘shared responsibility’ 
approach to packaging policy which was formalised in the late 1990s through the NPC. 
Company characteristics: industry sector and public profile  
It is clear from the above analysis that corporate responsiveness to stakeholder pressure 
during this period was linked to industry sector and, more specifically, to the nature of the 
packaging that companies were manufacturing or using. Beverage packaging, particularly 
for soft drinks and beer, became a target for environmentalists and government agencies in 
the 1970s because of the rapid shift from refillable glass bottles to single-use containers 
made from glass, aluminium and plastics. This coincided with, and contributed to, an 
increase in litter and waste disposal costs, and in the eyes of many ENGOs became 
symbolic of unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. As one government 
report noted, ‘[a] matter which started simply as a concern over the tendency for beverage 
containers to be a conspicuous part of litter has become a cause célèbre of the 
environment movement’ (AEC, 1979, p. 94, emphasis in original).  
In response to ENGO campaigns and regulatory pressure, packaging manufacturers and 
beverage brand owners joined together to develop voluntary litter education and recycling 
programs through the association (LRA) which was formed specifically for that purpose. 
Beer and soft drink manufacturers and their suppliers were the most responsive because 
these products were regulated by container deposit legislation in South Australia (milk and 
juice products were exempt at that stage). Through voluntary agreements with state 
governments, companies provided funding for Do the Right Thing education campaigns, 
litter infrastructure, recycling drop-off centres and kerbside collection programs, 
particularly for glass and aluminium cans. Collection programs for recyclable packaging 
were supplied to reprocessing facilities established by individual companies. 
However, the willingness and ability of companies to recycle their packaging was 
constrained by the market value of materials. Collection programs for used glass bottles 
and aluminium cans were established for both political and commercial reasons, because 
these materials had a financial value to manufacturers. Refillable glass bottles were sold 
back to the fillers (soft drink and beer manufacturers) and recyclable containers were sold 
to glass packaging manufacturers. The leading glass manufacturers, Australian 
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Consolidated Industries (ACI) and Australian Glass Manufacturers, began to set up drop-
off centres for glass in 1967 (PIEC, 1974b) and later supported house-to-house collections 
(Hansen, 1987)63. Aluminium cans also had a commercial value as feedstock for the 
manufacturing process, with one manufacturer claiming in 1972 that for the aluminium 
industry, ‘the reclamation and recycling of scrap has always been a process that 
strengthened its economics’ (White, 1972, p. 1). Comalco began its aluminium can 
recycling program around 1971 and Alcoa in 1977, and by the late 1980s both companies 
were involved in promotional programs and door-to-door collections.  
Steel, plastics and paper packaging did not have sufficient economic value to justify 
collection from households on a commercial basis— recycling services were only 
established in the 1990s in response to pressure from governments and ENGOs. For 
example, major suppliers of plastics packaging for beverages established reprocessing 
facilities in the late 1980s in order to avoid legislation and a potential consumer backlash 
if they were not recycled, although most were initially operating at a loss (IC, 1991b)64.  
The role of industry sector and public profile in mediating corporate responsiveness is 
illustrated in Figure 11. The most responsive companies were those in the beverage 
industry and their packaging suppliers because of the high visibility of their products in 
the waste and litter stream. However, the responsiveness of companies was also linked to 
the economic value of recycled materials.  
 
                                                     
63 Until the 1970s council garbage collectors had collected glass bottles which were left out with 
the household rubbish bin, although this practice came to an end when councils started to use 
independent garbage contractors and introduced new forms of waste collection services such as the 
240 litre mobile ‘wheelie bin’. Both of these practices resulted in more glass going to landfill. ACI 
stepped in to ensure that glass collections continued (Hansen, 1987). 
64 Brickwood Holdings, the largest manufacturer of high density polyethylene (HDPE) milk bottles, 
established a reprocessing facility in Melbourne in 1990 as a joint venture with its resin supplier, 
Kemcor. ACI Plastics Packaging established a pilot recycling plant for polyethylene terethphalate 
(PET) in Sydney in 1988 and a commercial plant in Wodonga in 1991. The other major supplier of 
PET, Smorgon Plastics, built the first mixed plastics recycling plant in Melbourne in 1989. Both 
ACI and Smorgon levied soft drink producers to fund a subsidised buy-back price for PET bottles 
which encouraged councils and collectors to add it to kerbside collections. The largest 
manufacturer of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) resin, ICI Australia, established a PVC recycling 
program in 1990.  
 120 
Figure 11: Company characteristics mediating responsiveness, 1970–1990 
 
While the term ‘product stewardship’ was not yet in common use between 1970 and 1990, 
some sectors in the packaging supply chain were already engaged in activities designed to 
reduce the environmental impacts of packaging in the waste stream. A certain amount of 
corporate social responsibility for packaging had become ‘taken-for-granted’ within the 
packaging field and companies were starting to respond.   
Negotiating the National Packaging Covenant: packaging 
debates 1991–2008 
During this second period a number of institutional shifts occurred. The organisational 
field expanded to include a wider group of industry sectors, including food manufacturers, 
non-food brand owners and retailers. There was also increased involvement from the 
federal government and national ministerial councils. External pressure on companies 
from government agencies and ENGOs was applied to the packaging supply chain as a 
whole and not just those involved in the manufacture of beverages and beverage 
packaging. At the same time packaging discourses shifted away from household waste and 
litter and increasingly focused on the ‘life cycle’ impacts of packaging. From a public 
policy perspective, there was increasing recognition that state-based agreements were 
ineffective and they were eventually replaced by the NPC. Corporate responsiveness 
continued to be mediated by the extent of government and ENGO pressure, but with an 
increasingly important strategic role played by industry associations. The industry sectors 
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which had been exposed to pressure for the longest time—beverage manufacturers and 
their packaging suppliers—were the most proactive in trying to establish a new 
institutional framework for packaging. In their role as institutional entrepreneurs they 
worked to convince companies in other sectors, as well as government agencies, that PS 
was an appropriate and effective framework for the environmental management of 
packaging. 
The next four sections discuss: 
• interest groups in the organisational field, which expanded to include all sectors in 
the packaging supply chain; 
• discourses invoked by interest groups to support their policy beliefs;  
• policies and policy processes that defined PS in its current form to include 
voluntary and shared responsibility for the ‘life cycle management’ of packaging;  
• company characteristics that mediated responsiveness during this period.  
Interest groups: an expanding policy network 
Between 1991 and 2008 there were some significant shifts in the interest groups involved 
in packaging discourses and policy processes. The organisational field widened to include 
industry associations representing companies at every stage of the packaging supply chain 
as well as recyclers, and policy coalitions became more formalised. Some of the key 
interest groups during this period are listed in Table 15, and their common policy beliefs 
are summarised in Table 16. Core policy beliefs did not change during this period, 
although some of their ‘secondary aspects’, or policy solutions, did. For example, industry 
groups shifted their focus to in-house activities such as design and procurement, which 
were designed to influence ‘life cycle impacts’ as well as packaging waste. Policy 
solutions were described in terms of ‘shared’ rather than ‘voluntary’ responsibility, in 
order to emphasise the role of local government in waste management. ENGOs and local 
government associations continued to advocate CDL, but under the broader banner of 
‘extended producer responsibility’. 
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Table 15: Key interest groups 1991–2008 
National 
ministerial 
councils 
Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC)—previously the 
National Environment Protection Council (NEPC) and some components of the 
Australian New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) 
Federal 
government 
Commonwealth Environment Protection Authority (CEPA) 
Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH) 
Productivity Commission (previously the Industry Commission) 
State 
government 
Environment Protection Authority  (Victoria) 
Recycling and Litter Advisory Committee  (Victoria) 
Recycling and Resource Recovery Council (Victoria) 
Environment Protection Authority (NSW) 
Department of Environment and Conservation (NSW) 
Environment Protection Authority (SA) 
Department of the Environment and Conservation (WA) 
Local 
government 
Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) 
Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) 
Local Government and Shires Association of NSW (LGSA) 
Industry 
associations 
Australian Chamber of Manufactures (ACM) 
Packaging Council of Australia (PCA) 
Packaging Environment Foundation of Australia (PEFA) 
Beverage Industry Environment Council (BIEC)—previously LRA 
Australian Supermarkets Institute (ASI) 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association (PACIA)—previously Plastics 
Industry Association (PIA) 
Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC)—previously Grocery 
Manufacturers Association (GMA) 
Association of Liquidpaperboard Carton Manufacturers (ALC) 
Product Stewardship Group (PSG) 
National Packaging Council Industry Association (NPCIA) 
Recyclers Association of Victoria (RAV) 
Multi-party 
organisation 
National Packaging Covenant Council (NPCC) 
NGOs Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) 
Friends of the Earth (Collingwood) 
Friends of the Earth (Sydney) 
Keep Australia Beautiful Council (KABC)  
Worldwide Home Environmentalists’ Network (WHEN) 
Nature Conservation Council, NSW (NCC)  
Total Environment Centre, NSW (TEC)  
Boomerang Alliance 
Trade unions Pulp and Paper Workers Union (PPWU)—later amalgamated into the 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) 
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Table 16: Interest groups and policy beliefs, 1991–2005 
Values and 
beliefs 
ENGOs Local 
government, 
Government 
of South 
Australia 
Recycling 
industry 
Federal / 
most state 
governments 
Industry 
associations / 
trade unions 
Policy beliefs 
Social control 
of business 
State regulation 
 
Industry self-regulation/co-regulation 
Interests 
which should 
be given 
priority 
Natural 
environment 
Local 
communities / 
natural 
environment 
Recycling 
industry 
interests— 
shareholders 
and 
employees 
Policies 
favoured 
industry 
interests 
(particularly 
conservative 
governments) 
Packaging 
industry 
interests - 
shareholders 
and 
employees 
Corporate 
responsibility 
‘Producer responsibility’: 
product and packaging 
manufacturers should be 
responsible for the financial 
costs of recycling and litter 
management for packaging 
waste  
Mixed, but 
many would 
agree that 
product and 
packaging 
manufacturers 
should 
subsidise 
recycling 
‘Shared responsibility’: 
responsibility for recycling and 
litter management should be 
shared between companies in 
the whole packaging supply 
chain, consumers and 
state/local government 
Policy implementation (secondary aspects) 
The policy 
issue 
 
Packaging is a 
significant  
environmental 
issue in its 
own right and 
symbolic of 
over-
consumption 
Packaging is a 
significant 
financial, 
environmental 
and social 
issue  
Packaging is 
an important 
environmental 
and economic 
issue (loss of 
resources) 
Packaging is 
an important 
political issue 
due to high 
public profile 
and 
competing 
policy 
demands 
Packaging is 
an 
insignificant 
environmental 
and social 
issue; 
financial 
issues can be 
resolved 
through more 
efficient waste 
management 
systems 
Policy goals Reduction in packaging waste 
and litter 
Reduction in life cycle environmental impacts of 
packaging 
Preferred 
policies 
CDL or EPR 
regulations 
CDL or EPR 
regulations 
(although 
some support 
for voluntary 
agreements) 
Most support voluntary 
agreements (NPC) but some 
have also supported more state 
regulation, e.g. CDL at certain 
times 
Voluntary 
agreements 
(NPC) 
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As Sabatier (1991; 1993) predicted, the stability of core policy beliefs meant that the 
composition of policy coalitions remained virtually unchanged, albeit with some 
additions. In the mid-1990s BIEC developed a broader alliance with other sectors of the 
packaging industry, through the newly formed Packaging Stewardship Group (PSG), to 
develop a national approach to policy. This group later evolved into the NPC Industry 
Association (NPCIA). Industry associations were concerned that state-based policies, 
particularly in Victoria and NSW, appeared to contradict the voluntary national process 
which was already under way. They found supporters within environmental agencies, 
particularly in Victoria and NSW, who realised that state-based industry agreements were 
time-consuming to negotiate and difficult to enforce. This period was also characterised 
by a ‘winding back of the regulatory state’ in many western countries as a result of 
declining political support for direct intervention in business affairs (Gunningham, 2002, 
p. 148). Industry found some supporters within local government, particularly the 
Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV), who accepted the principle of ratepayer-
funded recycling and agreed to work with industry to improve the efficiency of kerbside 
recycling. 
In the early 1990s trade unions were active in opposing Victorian legislation which would 
have imposed a tax on some packaging, but were completely absent from negotiations for 
the NPC. This may reflect the declining membership and power of the union movement at 
this time as well as the lack of any perceived threat to the interests of their members65. 
The early 1990s saw a resurgence of public concern about environmental issues and a 
renewed interest in waste and packaging issues. A number of grassroots ENGOs were 
established by people who were interested in personal action and wider campaigns to 
address environmental issues. For example, a local branch of the Worldwide Home 
Environmentalists’ Network (WHEN) was formed in Melbourne in 1990 and quickly 
expanded into a national association. The group emphasised personal responsibility for the 
environment and encouraged members to reduce household waste by purchasing products 
without packaging. They also campaigned for refillable glass milk bottles by encouraging 
members to send empty plastic bottles and cartons back to manufacturers.  
 
                                                     
65 Trade union membership fell by 26% between 1988 and 2003, and the trade union membership 
rate fell over the same period from 42% to 23% (ABS, 2004). 
 125 
ENGOs such as FOE actively campaigned for greater product responsibility and the 
introduction of CDL in Victoria and NSW (e.g. Denlay, 1997; Hopper, 1992). They were 
opposed to voluntary agreements in principle, and lobbied against the NPC in the mid-
1990s. ENGOs were deliberately excluded from the policy network which negotiated NPC 
Mark I because their values and beliefs meant that they were unlikely to support the policy 
framework which had been developed by the industry and governments (discussed further 
below under ‘policy and policy processes’). When their lobbying efforts proved to be 
ineffective, a number of ENGOs formed a coalition with the Local Government and Shires 
Association of NSW (LGSA) called the ‘Boomerang Alliance’ to influence policy 
negotiations for NPC Mark II66. By this stage local government associations had an even 
stronger interest in packaging policy because of their exposure to the increasing costs of 
kerbside collection programs. The Boomerang Alliance concentrated the groups’ 
resources and enabled them to lobby politicians and government officials throughout the 
country and to maintain a high media profile. They were also able to draw some support 
from companies in the recycling industry: 
The other thing that changed is that we now have powerful green 
recycling industry interests that have excess capacity ... That 
additional dimension of the campaign, which we are obviously 
working with as much as we can, nullifies some of that traditional 
retail and packaging industry influence (Personal communication, 
ENGO D). 
The beverage industry and its packaging suppliers continued their funding of anti-litter 
and recycling programs during this period, both directly through LRRA (later the 
Beverage Industry Environment Council, BIEC) and through government partnerships. 
However, with governments around the country starting to target packaging as a whole 
and not just beverage packaging, industry associations began to work together more 
closely on policy proposals as well as voluntary PS initiatives. Negotiations between 
government agencies and industry started to include associations such as: 
                                                     
66 In 2004 its members included the Australian Conservation Foundation, Clean Up Australia, 
Conservation Council of Western Australia, Friends of the Earth, Total Environment Centre, 
Queensland Conservation Council, Greenpeace, Tasmanian Conservation Trust, Arid Lands 
Environment Centre, Environment Victoria, Nature Conservation Council of NSW, Local 
Government Association of NSW and the Shires Association of NSW. The two local government 
groups are represented by the Local Government and Shires Association (LGSA). 
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• the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), representing food and beverage 
manufacturers, which later changed its name to the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council (AFGC);  
• the Australian Supermarket Institute (ASI), representing Coles and Woolworths; 
• the Plastics Industries Association, representing companies who supplied plastics 
to the packaging industry, which later changed its name to the Plastics and 
Chemicals Industries Association (PACIA);  
• the Association of Liquidpaperboard Carton Manufacturers (ALC), representing 
companies which manufactured paperboard cartons for beverage packaging. 
A number of companies from different sectors67 established the Packaging Environment 
Foundation of Australia (PEFA) in October 1990 with the specific objective of influencing 
corporate and government policy.  
Kerbside collection and recycling programs for packaging, which were established in the 
1980s but grew strongly in the 1990s, involved the recycling industry in packaging 
discourses and policy processes. However, there were different interest groups within this 
sector. Companies involved in the kerbside collection and sorting of packaging 
materials—services funded by local government and reprocessors—had a lot to gain from 
policies which increased recycling. The interests of reprocessors tended to be different. 
Reprocessing was done by the raw material suppliers or packaging manufacturers 
themselves, such as ACI Glass, ACI Petalite, Brickwood Holdings (plastic milk bottles) 
and Alcoa (aluminium cans). These companies were involved in recycling for both 
political and commercial reasons and, unlike ENGOs and collectors, had an interest in 
limiting recycling operations to materials which were commercially profitable to reprocess 
and reuse in packaging. This varied depending on trends in global commodity prices.  
Local government originally supported kerbside recycling programs because they 
generated some income and were regarded as a solution to the rising costs of waste 
disposal. However, this changed in the mid-1990s when prices started to collapse: 
                                                     
67 The members of PEFA included ACI Packaging, Alcoa, Coca Cola Amatil, Coles-Myer, 
Containers Packaging, Du Pont, Gadsden Rheem Packaging, Smorgon Consolidated Industries and 
Woolworths. 
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When recycling first started it was a reasonably lucrative thing to get 
involved in. [Councils] set up recycling services because there were 
good markets for the products and it saved them burying lots of waste 
which meant their landfills would last longer ... So financially it made 
sense for them to get into recycling. Unfortunately after about five 
years of recycling some would say it worked too well, because the 
market basically collapsed around 1995. Suddenly the prices that 
councils were offered for the stuff they were collecting dropped, in 
some cases overnight (Personal communication, Local Government 
B). 
Local government associations were actively involved in policy negotiations during this 
period at both state and federal levels, although they did not always have a common 
position on key policy issues. While the associations have always argued for increased 
responsibility and funding from the packaging industry, the Municipal Association of 
Victoria (MAV) was more conciliatory in negotiations for the NPC. They agreed that local 
government has primary responsibility for packaging waste management and signed the 
NPC. In contrast, the NSW Local Government and Shires Association (LGSA) lobbied 
heavily for industry subsidies to meet the ‘funding gap’, i.e. the gap between the costs of 
collecting and sorting recyclable materials and the prices received from recycling 
companies, and this became an important driver for the financial component of the NPC. 
The LGSA was influenced by the failure of the NSW Local Government Recycling 
Cooperative, which had been established to gain the best price for all recyclable materials 
collected by local governments in NSW. The cooperative had collapsed due to instability 
in the market (Sommer, 2006).  
Consumers also became active supporters of recycling during the 1990s68, reflecting 
increasing concerns about the environmental impacts of packaging. Unlike many 
environmental issues like global warming and land degradation, packaging is highly 
visible in household waste and litter and this is reflected in environmental surveys69. 
Packaging appears to be a symbol of broader concerns about the environment, and people 
                                                     
68 For example, in 2003 over 95% of Australians claimed to be recycling waste at home, compared 
to only 88% in 1996 (ABS, 2003, p. 13). 
69 In one survey undertaken for the Boomerang Alliance (Newspoll, 2004), 84% of respondents 
said they considered packaging waste to be a problem, 75% said there was too much packaging, 
and 70% said that packaging manufacturers are responsible for Australia’s packaging waste 
problem. When participants in another survey were asked about pro-environmental behaviours in 
the last twelve months, 71% said they had avoided plastic bags and 66% had avoided packaging 
(DEC, 2006, p. 60). 
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participate in kerbside recycling programs because this is one way that they can take 
personal action to alleviate environmental problems (Allison, 1998; IC, 1996). The service 
provided by consumers as ‘recyclers’, which supports the commercial interests of 
reprocessors and the packaging supply chain, has been explained by Hawkins (2006, p. 
108) in altruistic terms: 
[R]ecyclers are part of a network of relations in which used 
newspapers and empty bottles, the containers they’re put in, the trucks 
that pick them up, the companies that buy them, and the governmental 
and popular discourses that justify these actions all become vital 
elements in the performance of environmental good ... For the 
householder, the carefully sorted containers on the street are a gift to 
the environment that symbolically confers value on the person who 
placed them there. 
The strong support for kerbside recycling in the general community combined with 
continuing campaigns by ENGOs against disposable packaging help to explain the 
continuing interest of state and federal governments in packaging policy in the 1990s.  
Packaging discourses: defining corporate responsibility 
During this period ENGOs continued to attack packaging as environmentally damaging 
and often unnecessary, with grassroots organisations such as WHEN providing advice to 
members about strategies in the home to avoid packaging. In response, industry groups 
promoted the social and economic benefits of packaging through education and public 
relations campaigns. However, the story-lines which were invoked by interest groups to 
describe the ‘packaging problem’ in policy debates shifted in subtle ways, and these shifts 
significantly influenced policy outcomes (Table 17).  
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Table 17: Story-lines employed to support policy proposals, 1991–2008 
Issue Self-regulation coalition: industry 
associations, trade unions, federal 
government, most state 
governments 
State regulation coalition: ENGOs, 
local government, Government of 
South Australia 
Single-use 
packaging 
 
The social benefits of packaging 
Packaging is important to protect and 
transport products to the consumer. It 
also makes an important economic 
contribution through investment and 
jobs. 
Packaging and the ‘throw-away 
society’  
‘Disposable’ packaging is contributing 
to unsustainable patterns of production 
and consumption and is contrary to 
ecologically sustainable development 
(ESD). 
Packaging 
waste 
Efficiency of waste management 
systems 
Packaging makes up a small 
percentage of the waste stream and 
packaged food reduces waste 
compared to home cooked food. 
Waste should be considered within the 
context of the total ‘life cycle’ of 
packaging. There are more significant 
environmental impacts than post-
consumer waste. The financial and 
environmental costs of waste can be 
reduced through improved systems for 
waste management and recycling. 
The high  costs of packaging waste 
Packaging makes up a high percentage 
of the waste stream and causes 
environmental damage in landfill. 
Diminishing landfill space and stricter 
environmental standards are causing 
waste management costs to increase, 
thus imposing unacceptably high costs 
on local government and ratepayers. 
Government policy should be based on 
the waste hierarchy and ESD principles. 
Litter Litter is a people problem 
Packaging makes up a small 
percentage of the litter stream and is 
caused by the irresponsible behaviour 
of people who refuse to dispose of 
packaging correctly. The economic 
and social costs can be reduced 
through education programs and the 
provision of more litter bins. 
Litter is a packaging problem 
Packaging makes up a high percentage 
of the litter stream and is caused by the 
shift from returnable to ‘throwaway’ 
containers. The economic and social 
costs can be reduced by introducing 
CDL. 
Recycling Recycling should be optimised 
Recycling programs should only be 
established for packaging materials 
which have a commercial value to 
manufacturers. Recycling generates 
environmental and social benefits and 
kerbside collection should be funded 
by local government because it has 
statutory responsibility for waste 
management. 
Reuse and recycling should be 
maximised 
Reuse and recycling programs should 
be established and funded by industry 
because it created the waste in the first 
place.  
Responsibility 
for managing 
packaging 
impacts 
Shared responsibility (product 
stewardship) 
The impacts of packaging are a shared 
responsibility of packaging 
manufacturers, product manufacturers, 
consumers and local government.   
Extended producer responsibility 
The impacts of packaging are a 
corporate responsibility. Companies 
that benefit from its use should pay for 
any social and environmental costs. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s waste shifted from something requiring disposal to something 
which had to be ‘managed’ through strategies such as ‘minimisation’ and recycling to 
achieve greater industry efficiency and environmental care (Hawkins, 2006, p. 103). 
Packaging policy debates also began to consider waste issues within the broader context 
of ‘ecologically sustainable development (ESD)’70. For example, the NSW Waste 
Minimisation and Management Act 1995 stated that it was based on the principle of the 
‘waste hierarchy’71 because the hierarchy ‘prioritises ecologically sustainable waste 
solutions’ (NSW EPA, 1995, p. 2). The Boomerang Alliance has criticised the ‘wasteful’ 
use of non-renewable resources for packaging associated with unsustainable consumption 
(Boomerang Alliance, 2004), even claiming that ‘packaging is a perfect demonstration of 
the wasteful society’ (Angel, 2005, p. 2). Local government associations have also 
broadened their arguments in support of waste policy beyond the problems associated with 
litter and waste. For example, the LGSA argued that waste policy should be based on the 
principles of ESD, inter-generational equity and the precautionary principle (LGSA, 
2006). 
Consistent with this more systemic approach to waste policy, governments and industry 
groups began to use the ‘life cycle’ metaphor in packaging discourses. This reflected 
sustainable development discourses as well as the increasing use of life cycle assessment 
(LCA) as an environmental evaluation tool. The federal government’s National Waste 
Minimisation and Recycling Strategy (CEPA, 1992) included for the first time a 
commitment to a ‘life cycle (cradle to grave) approach to waste management which 
encompasses all aspects of resource use, waste generation, storage, transport, treatment 
and disposal’ (p. 11). This represented a significant shift in thinking: it broadened the 
policy focus from household waste and litter to the ‘life cycle impacts’ of packaging.  
Industry groups played an active role in promoting a life cycle approach, arguing that 
packaging needs to be considered within a broader supply chain context. This was based 
                                                     
70 The term ‘sustainable development’ entered the public debate after the World Commission on 
Environment and Development published their landmark report, Our Common Future, in 1987. 
Sustainable development was defined in this report as ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43).  
71 The waste hierarchy prioritises waste reduction over reuse, followed by recycling and then 
disposal as a last resort. 
 131 
in part on the argument that packaging makes up only 10% of solid waste and is therefore 
not a major contributor to the waste stream (PCA, 2006, p. 7). They also claimed that from 
a total supply chain perspective packaging reduces rather than increases the amount of 
waste generated72.  
Competing story-lines about packaging, waste, litter and recycling continued to be used to 
promote alternative approaches to corporate responsibility, but with some important 
discursive shifts. Industry associations borrowed the term ‘product stewardship’ from the 
chemical industry and the ‘shared responsibility’ policy model from the US, and promoted 
these principles as the basis of a voluntary national agreement. Advocates of shared 
responsibility claimed that the post-consumer management of packaging is largely the 
responsibility of local government and should be funded by ratepayers: 
They take the view that you best show producer responsibility where 
you can be effective, and that’s basically within your own business. 
The other half of producer responsibility—end-of-life stuff—both for 
values reasons and practical reasons a lot of [the association] members 
struggled with then and probably struggle with today (Personal 
communication, Industry association B). 
Advocates of shared responsibility during this period, including industry associations and 
state and federal government agencies, supported self-regulation with ‘back-up’ 
regulations to control the ‘free-rider’ problem. Industry no longer argued that regulations 
such as CDL would threaten jobs and investment in the packaging industry because the 
goals of the policy had shifted to recycling and litter reduction rather than the need to 
reintroduce refillable containers. Instead, they highlighted the additional costs to 
consumers in lost deposits and time taken to return bottles to collection depots, and the 
social costs of the extensive infrastructure required to implement CDL in addition to 
kerbside recycling (e.g. C4ES, 2000).  
Most government agencies regarded the NPC as a pragmatic and more effective way of 
regulating the industry: 
                                                     
72 Industry’s argument is that processed food generates waste at the factory, where it can easily be 
reused or recycled, whereas buying fresh food (with less packaging) and cooking it at home 
generates waste which is more likely to go to landfill (AFGC, 2006; Miletic, 2007; PCA, 2006).  
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What has always worried me about regulating is that if you regulate, 
industry will just toe the letter of the law. They will do what they are 
required to do, and any additional thinking goes out the window. What 
[the NPC] does is that it actually forces them to ... look at their own 
practices and look at what they can do ... (Personal communication, 
State Government C). 
At the same time ENGOs and some local government associations lobbied for regulation 
based on the principle of EPR. They agreed that producers have a responsibility to reduce 
the life cycle environmental impacts of packaging but argued that this includes taking 
physical and/or financial responsibility for the post-consumer management of packaging. 
One ENGO commented: ‘Our position on EPR is that all of that responsibility should go 
back up the chain to those who enter the marketplace to make money out of a product, so 
genuine producer responsibility as distinct from shared responsibility’ (Personal 
communication, Local Government B). According to the EPR perspective, the solution is 
to impose regulations such as bans, taxes, mandatory deposits (CDL) or advance disposal 
fees (e.g. Boomerang Alliance, 2006b). This position appears to be supported by the 
general public (Hill, 2004; Newspoll, 2004, p. 3; White, 2001c, p. 23).  
These discourses contributed to public policy processes, discussed in the next section, 
which resulted in the successful negotiation of the NPC in the mid-1990s. The ‘discursive 
struggle’ to define the packaging problem and corporate responsibility was ultimately won 
by the self-regulation coalition. Despite vocal arguments to the contrary, particularly from 
ENGOs, the problem was defined in terms of the life cycle impacts of packaging (rather 
than waste) and PS was established as the principle which underpins corporate 
responsibility for packaging.  
Policies and policy processes: a new co-regulatory approach 
Between 1991 and 2005 voluntary environmental agreements shifted from a state to a 
national level. Over this period the PS institution was also progressively defined in more 
detail, as general principles such as voluntary corporate responsibility and life cycle 
management were translated into more specific and transparent ‘techniques of control’. 
However, the institution remains under pressure from stakeholder groups frustrated by a 
perceived lack of progress towards environmental goals. Key processes and events are 
summarised in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Policy processes and outcomes 1991–2005 
Year  
1991 Policy negotiations began between jurisdictions and industry associations on national 
waste reduction agreements 
National Packaging Guidelines (ANZEC, 1991) published by the National Packaging 
Taskforce 
Negotiation of the Environment Protection (Resource Recovery) Bill in Victoria 
1992 The Commonwealth EPA published the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling 
Strategy (CEPA, 1992) 
Environment Protection (Resource Recovery) Act 1992 passed in Victoria—provided 
for voluntary Industry Waste Reduction Agreements (IWRAs) 
The voluntary Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging developed by industry 
associations (AIG et al., 1997) 
1993 Implementation of national waste reduction agreements 
1994 NSW waste policy released (NSW Government, 1994) 
1995 Renegotiation of national waste reduction agreements 
Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995 passed in NSW—included 
mandatory Industry Waste Reduction Plans (IWRPs) 
1996 - 
1998 
Negotiation of NPC Mark I  
1999 NPC Mark I signed—broader industry sector involvement, action plans and reporting 
requirements 
NPCC established 
2000 Implementation of NPC—increasing number of signatories 
2001 Report to the NSW Government recommended the introduction of CDL (White, 
2001a). The government referred the issue to EPHC for consideration as a national 
scheme 
2002 An investigation of CDL commissioned by the ACT Government (C4ES, 2002) 
recommended against it due to the high cost and potential impact on kerbside 
recycling 
2003 An investigation of CDL commissioned by the Victorian Government (Victorian 
EPA, 2003) concluded it would impose significantly higher costs on consumers 
The SA Government extended CDL to include non-carbonated soft drinks, fruit juice 
and flavoured milk under 1 litre and alcoholic beverages up to 3 litres 
2004 Evaluations of NPC Mark I recommended improvement including increased 
commitment and transparency from signatories 
Negotiation of NPC Mark II 
2005 NPC Mark II signed—introduction of targets, KPIs, and ENGO representation on 
NPCC 
2006 Report on the Productivity Commission’s inquiry into waste management published 
(Productivity Commission, 2006)—argued against PS/EPR policies in general and 
questioned the value of the NPC in cost-benefit terms  
Investigation of CDL commissioned by the Tasmanian Government (Parliament of 
Tasmania, 2006) supported CDL subject to a cost-benefit analysis 
The Minister for the Environment in WA announced CDL would be introduced 
 134 
The Victorian Government rejected CDL due to its high cost and potential to 
undermine recycling (Smart, 2006) 
2007 The WA Government investigation of CDL continued 
EPHC affirmed their commitment to phase out single-use plastic shopping bags by 
January 2009 (EPHC, 2007) 
EPHC commissioned a study into CDL and other ‘complementary mechanisms’ to 
support achievement of NPC targets (MMA and BDA, 2007)—CDL not 
recommended due to high administrative costs and equivocal information on cost-
effectiveness 
2008 The SA Government announced a ban on plastic shopping bags (commencing 2009) 
The SA Government increased the mandatory deposit on containers from 5 to 10 
cents 
Drink Container Recycling Bill 2008 introduced to the Australian Senate by Steve 
Fielding (Family First party)—included requirement for stewardship plans by 
industry to achieve 80% recycling rate. Referred to a Senate committee 
Report on the Senate inquiry into the Management of Australia’s waste streams 
(SCECA, 2008) recommended EPHC work towards a national CDL scheme 
Mid-term review of NPC noted that targets were likely to be met and recommended 
extension post-2010 with some improvements (Lewis, 2008). EPHC requested NPCC 
to prepare a framework for a further extension of the NPC beyond 2010 and other 
options (including complementary mechanisms) for consideration by EPHC (EPHC, 
2008b) 
EPHC rejected a national ban or levy on plastic bags and supported an expansion of 
voluntary programs (EPHC, 2008b) 
 
The following discussion focuses on policy processes and policy outcomes in four 
sections: the shift from state-based to national policy initiatives, the negotiation of the first 
covenant (NPC Mark I), the negotiation of the second covenant (NPC Mark II), and some 
final comments on continuing challenges to the NPC.  
The shift from state-based to national policy 
A new approach to packaging policy was developed during the 1990s. It was national; it 
involved the entire packaging supply chain; it explicitly acknowledged the principle of 
shared responsibility; and it eventually shifted the focus from waste management to life 
cycle impacts. At first the intention was to develop a national approach to recycling, 
through initiatives such as:  
• National Packaging Guidelines, which included a waste reduction target for 
packaging of 50% by the year 2000 and a series of voluntary actions by 
government and industry to promote waste reduction and recycling (ANZEC, 
1991);  
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• the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy, which aimed to reduce 
household waste by 50% and introduced voluntary industry plans and recycling 
targets for individual packaging materials (CEPA, 1992).  
Four industry associations, the Australian Chamber of Manufactures, BIEC, PCA and the 
Plastics Industry Association, also worked together to develop the voluntary 
Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (ECoPP) in 1992. The code outlined 
actions which could be taken by companies to reduce the environmental impacts of 
packaging during the design process, and was later updated and included as a schedule to 
the NPC.  
At the same time, the state Labor government in Victoria made another unsuccessful 
attempt to impose stricter regulations on the packaging industry. The Environment 
Protection (Resource Recovery) Bill 1991 proposed a system of Industry Waste Reduction 
Agreements with companies which manufactured or imported beverage containers, 
newspapers, magazines, phone books and take-away food. Agreements needed to include 
performance targets and a levy to support recycling. Companies which did not enter into a 
voluntary agreement would be taxed at a rate of one cent per item as a ‘waste creator’. The 
rationale was that the economic viability of kerbside collection programs was under threat 
and needed additional financial support73. The proposed legislation also included a $2 per 
tonne levy on waste to landfill, intended to match funding from the industry levy, and 
would have given the EPA the power to ban ‘environmentally damaging’ products (Crabb, 
1991, p. 1299).  
The Bill was supported by some ENGOs, who held a rally in May 1992 in support of the 
legislation (Humphrys, 1992), and some beverage container manufacturers: 
The pressure was from the glass and aluminium industry who were 
keen to spread the cost of maintaining the kerbside pick-up system, 
which in turn was a way of avoiding CDL (Personal communication, 
State Government F). 
                                                     
73 The market for recycled newsprint had collapsed in the previous year because of an over-supply 
in global markets, and combined with a fall in the price paid for collected aluminium, this had 
resulted in an increasing need for programs to be subsidised by local government. The Recyclers 
Association of Victoria put out a media release which claimed that ‘without guaranteed money and 
commitment from industries, recycling collection could fall over in the next four weeks’ (cited in 
van Buren, 1992, p. 975). 
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However, it was opposed by local government, most of the packaging industry and trade 
unions. Local government associations initially opposed the Bill but changed their 
position after negotiation of a significant concession74. Industry groups and trade unions 
opposed the levy, the one cent tax and the power to ban environmentally damaging 
products on the basis that these provisions would increase costs to consumers and industry 
and threaten jobs. Initially the industry groups who were opposed to the legislation were 
lobbying and negotiating with government separately. They later decided to coordinate 
their efforts and to negotiate directly with the opposition. According to one government 
negotiator, this made a big difference: 
So then we moved into the second phase. [Industry said to me], 
‘You’ve been playing us off against each other for 12 months’. So 
they actually all got together and started to ruffle us. Up till then they 
were right, we’d been playing one group off against another. We’d 
kept them all off balance and had done it reasonably successfully, 
such that the opposition to us was very divided, strong but divided ... 
[After that] industry was very organised (Personal communication, 
State Government F). 
The Pulp and Paper Workers Union (which later amalgamated with other unions to form 
the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union or CFMEU) supported the paper 
industry in their opposition to the Bill, and made direct representations to the Minister for 
the Environment. They were also directly involved in a campaign by Amcor’s ‘A-Team’ 
against the legislation75. Union members from Amcor’s Maryvale Mill were transported to 
Melbourne to participate in public meetings attended by the minister, the EPA and 
industry groups. One government representative noted that ‘the local employers were 
bussing the unionists in to heckle us, the CFMEU, these were not nice people’ (Personal 
communication, State Government F). The same person also recollected a meeting 
between the union and the then Minister for the Environment, Steve Crabb: 
                                                     
74 The $2 levy was regarded as a new tax, but local government associations supported it after EPA 
negotiators proposed a higher levy on industrial waste to landfill, which would be returned to local 
government along with the $2 levy from municipal waste. This effectively meant that they would 
receive more money than they were contributing. 
75 According to a Four Corners program on ABC television (Neighbour, 2006), the A-Team 
consisted of Amcor ‘volunteers’ who were given paid leave to support the company’s interests in 
environmental debates. They were led by a consultant who was jointly funded by Amcor and the 
Pulp and Paper Workers Union. The program claimed that ‘[t]he A-Team unashamedly pushed the 
company line. They lobbied state and federal governments to amend recycling and anti-dumping 
laws to benefit Amcor’.  
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The unions came in at one point with Crabb. There was a private 
meeting in his office which I attended—I shouldn’t have been there—
and the union, I suspect it was the CFMEU or whatever it was called 
then, threatened him. And he threatened them back, and he was 
impressive! He came out on top. He said, ‘I know where your bodies 
are, and I’ve got no compunction in dealing with you bastards, so get 
off my back!’ And they did (Personal communication, State 
Government F). 
Ultimately the opposition parties were able to use their numbers in the Upper House to 
pass a series of amendments which removed the proposed tax and the ability to ban 
products. Arguing that the original legislation would damage the economy and impose 
more ‘red tape’ on industry, the opposition supported a more voluntary approach: ‘The 
coalition ... believes the middle of a recession is not the time to consider introducing a 
new tax that disadvantages job creation industries (Birrell, 1992, p. 930). 
The final Environment Protection (Resource Recovery) Act 1992 included a provision for 
Industry Waste Reduction Agreements (IWRAs) which could be either entered into 
voluntarily by industry or required by the EPA, and which could involve contributions to 
recycling programs. While several IWRAs were eventually negotiated with industry 
groups or companies voluntarily, the process was slow and overly bureaucratic. One 
government representative suggested that ‘the EPA wasn’t pushing and wasn’t being 
particularly assertive ... and industry were putting up even less than we could accept’ 
(Personal communication, State Government F). By the mid-1990s the EPA was advised 
that the IWRA provisions in the Act could not be enforced and they initiated discussions 
with industry associations on a voluntary national approach. 
Similar policy debates were taking place in NSW. In the early 1990s the Liberal 
government supported voluntary industry plans for waste reduction, and packaging was to 
be one of the first industries to be targeted under the program (NSW Government, 1994). 
Before the new legislation could be introduced there was a change of government, and the 
new Labor government introduced the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995. 
This introduced a 60% waste reduction target by 2000 and gave the Minister for 
Environment the ability to develop mandatory Industry Waste Reduction Plans (IWRPs) 
for particular sectors. These plans were designed to allow industry some flexibility in 
developing their response to waste reduction targets, but there were also sanctions for 
companies or industry groups which did not make sufficient progress. These included 
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provisions for fines, product bans and mandatory product take-back requirements. 
However, negotiation of sector-based agreements proved to be time consuming and 
counter productive and there were no penalties in the Act for non-compliance. The NSW 
Government therefore joined forces with the Victorian Government in negotiating the 
NPC, and later strengthened its own legislation to provide it with the ability to enforce 
industry agreements if the national approach did not deliver adequate outcomes76.    
The NPC was therefore the result of several policy developments at state and federal 
levels. Government agencies in NSW and Victoria had realised that the negotiation of 
individual industry sector agreements at a state level was too time consuming, and 
industry associations argued that different approaches in each state were inefficient and 
costly to implement in a national market. Both groups became involved in the 
renegotiation of national waste reduction agreements in 1995 under the auspices of 
ANZECC77(IC, 1996). The federal Labor government, through the Commonwealth EPA 
and with the support of state government agencies, attempted to negotiate much higher 
voluntary targets for some materials, a move opposed by industry associations. In 1996, 
the Liberal–National party coalition government took office in Canberra and announced 
that it would be more sympathetic to industry’s concerns about recycling targets 
(Campbell, 1996).  
Negotiating NPC Mark I (1999–2005) 
The idea of a national packaging ‘protocol’ or covenant was originally raised by the 
Packaging Environment Foundation of Australia (PEFA) in 1992, when they 
recommended a national policy based on the Dutch Packaging Covenant78. It was first 
discussed publicly at a packaging industry-sponsored conference in 1996, and was 
                                                     
76 The Waste Avoidance and Resource Recovery Act 2001 replaced IWRPs with ‘Extended 
Producer Responsibility Schemes’, which would extend corporate responsibility to the post-
consumer stage of the product life cycle. It gives the minister the power to require EPR schemes for 
a product, group of products or an industry in NSW. 
77 ANZEC’s name changed in 1992 to the Australian and New Zealand Environment and 
Conservation Council (ANZECC). 
78 PEFA’s report on waste and packaging policy (Puplick and Nicholls, 1992) recommended a shift 
in focus from packaging to the total waste stream, an integrated approach to waste management 
which included waste reduction as well as recycling, and a national policy framework for 
packaging based on the Dutch Packaging Covenant.  
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supported in principle by ANZECC. Previous government policies had targeted beverage 
manufacturers and their packaging suppliers but, in November 1996, ANZECC directed 
officials to ‘commence negotiations, encompassing local government and all parts of the 
packaging supply chain, on a national packaging agreement based on the principle of 
shared responsibility’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 1, emphasis added). Industry associations 
representing raw material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, brand owners and retailers 
formed the Packaging Stewardship Group (PSG) to develop a coordinated approach. 
However, at that stage there was a diversity of opinion about policy objectives (or 
‘secondary’ policy beliefs, as Sabatier referred to them): 
[PSG] started out as a defensive measure. We were under pressure—if 
we don’t get our act together we’re going to get hammered—very 
cynical, very defensive. But it had a very broad membership; it had 
both pragmatists and ideologues. The pragmatists were trying to use 
the group to create a consensus to say look, we have to do something. 
The ideologues were trying to use the group to say we have to do 
something, yes—we have to fight this politically (Personal 
communication, Industry association B). 
According to this person, the ‘pragmatists’ included members and staff of BIEC and PCA 
(representing the beverage industry and most packaging sectors), while the ‘ideologues’ 
included members and staff from the Association of Liquid Cartonboard Manufacturers 
(ALC) and the ASI (representing manufacturers of liquidpaperboard cartons and retailers). 
The GMA (representing food brand owners) was not committed either way. In reality, this 
was a disagreement between companies that were already engaged in recycling and litter 
programs and those that had only recently been brought into the policy process. There 
was, however, a degree of consensus that something needed to be done to avoid 
regulation: ‘Well, the whole purpose, certainly from [our] perspective, was a blocking 
strategy. If you’ve got the covenant in there you don’t get legislation (Personal 
communication, industry association D). 
By October 1997 the draft covenant had been drawn up by a working group comprising 
packaging industry and government representatives, with significant input by PCA and the 
Victorian EPA. Government officials persuaded the GMA and the retailers to participate, 
although the ASI initially declined to attend meetings (Williams, 1997).  
The biggest obstacle to finalising negotiation of the covenant was the need to find a 
resolution to the funding issue for kerbside recycling: 
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It should be recognised that these negotiations took place at a time 
when state politicians were being told, directly by local government, 
and indirectly via the media, that kerbside recycling was ‘in crisis’ as 
a result of reduced prices being paid for collected materials (van 
Rijswijk, 2000, p. 356). 
A joint committee was set up between the PSG and local government through the 
Australian Local Government Association (ALGA), who were regarded by the packaging 
industry as the key group with whom agreement needed to be reached (van Rijswijk, 
2000). This committee, called the Australian Kerbside Recycling Alliance (AKRA), met 
for over a year to negotiate an agreement on recycling. Industry groups asserted that 
kerbside recycling should be based on ‘market prices’ rather than subsidies by the 
packaging industry which had been provided in the past, whereas local government 
representatives claimed there was a ‘gap’ or ‘shortfall’ in funding of around $100 million 
per year which needed to be met by industry. After months of negotiation AKRA reached 
agreement on the principle that local government rates were the simplest and most 
appropriate way to fund recycling programs on an ongoing basis, although agreement was 
not unanimous (van Rijswijk, 2000). In early 1998 AKRA finalised the ‘Kerbside 
Schedule’ for the covenant, and industry proposed to spend $5 million to improve the 
efficiency of collection systems. At that point, ALGA decided to suspend their association 
with AKRA because they felt that industry’s offer was well below the required funding 
and did not form the basis for meaningful negotiations (Williams, 1998). ANZECC 
ministers and officials also regarded the industry’s offer as ‘derisory’ (Williams, 1998). 
ANZECC decided to establish a ‘high level negotiating group’, with a small number of 
packaging supply chain CEOs to try to resolve the funding issue. At that stage there were 
still different views within the packaging supply chain on the proposed NPC, and product 
responsibility more generally. Companies that had been involved in recycling programs in 
the past wanted these commitments to be spread more broadly across the packaging chain, 
whereas retailers felt that their capabilities and responsibilities were limited to issues such 
as plastic bags (NEPC, 1998b). One government negotiator noted that BIEC and PCA 
were strong supporters of the covenant but other associations were less enthusiastic: 
Most of the other industry associations were extremely wary of it, 
because frankly, they hadn’t been drawn into it before. The beverage 
industry had been paying for most of it; quite a lot of funds had come 
out. So the [Australian Food Council and GMA] were very negative 
and very defensive to start off. And the retailers association just did 
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not want to know about it ... And in fact I think right to the end when 
it was concluded, the only industry associations that were keen on it 
were BIEC and PCA. The others went along because they realised that 
if they didn’t, things were going to get really tough for them (Personal 
communication, State Government D). 
A funding compromise was proposed by negotiators from several industry associations 
and government agencies, but industry-wide agreement had still not been reached on the 
proposal by the ANZECC deadline of 26 June 199879. This prompted ministers to warn 
that ‘if negotiations on the Covenant are not successfully concluded by 21 August, 
individual States and Territories will take action to impose their own regulations’ (NEPC, 
1998a). Industry representatives met on 17 August to reach agreement on a common 
industry position to be put to the higher level negotiating group on 21 August. The 
briefing note for the meeting made it clear that a ‘politically acceptable’ offer of funding 
had to be made, and that no further extension of time could be expected for further 
negotiation. At the meeting Alan Williams, then Managing Director of Coles 
Supermarkets and Chairman of ASI, announced that his company would sign the covenant 
despite the opposition of Woolworths and ASI staff to the transitional funding mechanism. 
According to one participant at the meeting, this effectively ‘broke the logjam’ and 
agreement was reached that the packaging supply chain would support the covenant and 
the funding arrangement80. 
Another strong supporter of the covenant was Raphael Geminder, Chairman of Visy 
Recycling, whose company clearly had much to gain from the NPC: 
He was always there saying, ‘You’ve got Visy’s support’. So by Visy 
going out and leading the charge ... it sort of pulled all of the other 
packaging guys along (Personal communication, Industry association 
B). 
Some industry associations and their member companies also lobbied government 
agencies, through the higher level negotiating group, for back-up legislation to prevent 
companies from ‘free-riding’. Packaging manufacturers were particularly concerned to 
                                                     
79 The original proposal for a $66 million program was rejected by industry ($33 million by 
industry and $33 by state and federal governments), who instead offered $5.2 million. The 
compromise was for a ‘Kerbside Transitional Fund’ of $34.9 million to be established with joint 
funding from government and industry, over 3 years. The fund would be used to improve the 
efficiency of kerbside collection services, but not to subsidise prices for recyclable materials. 
80 The support of the two supermarket chains—Coles and Woolworths—was considered critical to 
the success of the covenant because of their strong influence in the packaging supply chain. 
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ensure that brand owners and retailers were involved. To provide for uniform back-up 
regulations in each of the states, the National Environment Protection Measure (NEPM) 
for Used Packaging Materials was developed by a project team comprising government 
officials, ALGA and PCA81. The NEPM, if enforced, would be a regulated form of EPR. 
This also proved to be controversial because it focused on brand owners rather than the 
broader supply chain. The rationale was that brand owners constituted the point in the 
supply chain with the most freedom of choice and action, and therefore ‘product 
stewardship principles can be realistically pursued’ (NEPC, 1998b, p. 103). Brand owners 
clearly disagreed: 
Suddenly we read the draft NEPM and it has brand owners on it. The 
instinctive reaction from my members was, ‘What the hell is going 
on?’ There was anger at the packaging people that they had dobbed in 
their customers. So it took a while to work that through ... (Personal 
communication, Industry association B). 
In early 1999 ALGA advised ANZECC that they were still unhappy with the draft 
covenant. They argued that the principle of shared responsibility was flawed, and that 
industry should pay for kerbside collection costs (Williams, 1999a). They also opposed 
the covenant because of the lack of performance criteria, inadequate detail on funding, the 
absence of targets, and doubts about how action plans would be assessed (Williams, 
1999c). Despite ALGA’s assertion that they would not sign the NPC unless it was 
renegotiated to meet their concerns, ministers decided to ‘press ahead’ with finalisation of 
the covenant and the NEPM (Williams, 1999b).  
ENGOs and consumer groups were not involved in the negotiation process at all. 
Government negotiators decided to exclude ENGOs because this would have hindered 
negotiations with local government and industry and made an agreement less likely. It was 
effectively a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy: 
They were only going to be satisfied with industry paying for the lot. 
And that would have led to no chance at all of getting local 
government in because agreements with local government would have 
formed an effective block with demands of industry that industry 
would never have met ... right up to the end, there was a very good 
                                                     
81 The NEPM for Used Packaging Materials aimed to regulate brand owners who did not sign the 
NPC or who failed to meet its minimum requirements. Under the NEPM all participating 
jurisdictions were required to establish regulations which obliged brand owners to recover their 
own packaging or to demonstrate that packaging had been recovered on their behalf (NEPC, 1999). 
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chance that it wouldn’t happen, right up to the closing minutes. So if 
we’d tried to involve the green groups in it ... we wouldn’t have got 
the compromise agreement that we eventually got with the Covenant, 
imperfect though it was (Personal communication, State Government 
D). 
The NPC was established for a five-year period (1999–2004) and initially signed on 27 
August 1999 by the federal and state governments (excluding the Northern Territory), 
MAV, nine industry associations and 14 companies. It stated that the NPC ‘is based on the 
principle of product stewardship’ and that, ‘consequent on this principle, all participants in 
the packaging chain— raw material suppliers, designers, packaging manufacturers, 
packaging users, retailers, consumers, all spheres of government, collection agencies—
accept responsibility for the environmental impacts associated with their sphere of 
activity’ (ANZECC, 1999, pp. 4-5). It required signatories to submit regular action plans 
which outlined what they would do to meet NPC requirements (Table 19) and to submit 
annual reports on progress. The actions in Table 19 were presented as a ‘menu of options’ 
in the covenant (BIEC, n.d.) rather than a mandatory list of requirements. Companies were 
also required to contribute financially to the Kerbside Transitional Fund. The National 
Packaging Covenant Council (NPCC) was formed to oversee the implementation of the 
covenant, with representation from the packaging supply chain and all levels of 
government. 
By 2004 there were 608 signatories, including 569 companies, 17 industry associations, 
14 local government associations, the federal government, all state governments and the 
Australian Capital Territory Government (Nolan-ITU, 2004, p. 5). The Northern 
Territory Government was the only member of EPHC not to join the covenant, and as of 
2008 had still refused to do so. Only two of the state-based local government 
associations, from Victoria and Queensland, had signed the covenant by 2004, although 
South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmanian associations signed NPC Mark II. 
Local government associations in New South Wales remained strongly opposed to it.  
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Table 19: Corporate responsibilities under NPC Mark I  
All signatories will ‘take action as appropriate in all relevant areas’, e.g.:  
• design products with a consideration for environmental effects; 
• minimise use of material in production; 
• reduce material and energy use in distribution; 
• design for easy disposal, including reuse, recycling and other forms of recovery; 
• undertake environmental research, e.g. on new uses for secondary materials and 
reducing the amount of packaging; 
• develop new markets for secondary materials; 
• provide information to help consumers make informed choices; 
• provide accurate consumer information and labelling on packaging to encourage 
appropriate recycling or disposal; 
• collect data on packaging and waste;  
• educate the community on the value of packaging and the appropriate handling of 
waste. 
The packaging supply chain will also: 
• provide financial support to kerbside and other recycling systems;  
• encourage use of the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (ECoPP). 
Source: Based on ANZECC (1999), pp. 5–7 
ENGOs were also unhappy with the voluntary nature of the covenant and the fact that it 
was developed by industry with almost no input from other interest groups: 
It was a coup by business really. In fact I went to a presentation by the 
EPA of the National Packaging Covenant. I was absolutely astounded 
that the person who ran the whole show—on EPA property, in their 
offices, we’d all been invited by the EPA—was the Chairman of the 
Packaging Council. I immediately thought ‘Now, who’s driving this?’... 
It seemed to me that they were just captured by the packaging industry 
(Personal communication, ENGO C). 
Negotiating NPC Mark II (2005–2010) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, towards the end of the initial covenant period several 
evaluations of the NPC were conducted for particular interest groups and they all 
identified significant problems with its design or implementation (Meinhardt, 2004; 
Nolan-ITU, 2004; White et al., 2004). To allow more time for a full evaluation of the 
NPC, EPHC decided, in April 2004, to extend it until April 2005. An initial draft of a 
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strengthened covenant was released for public consultation in October 2004, but the 
Boomerang Alliance began lobbying for more substantial changes:  
Local government and environment groups put in quite substantial 
submissions calling for reforms. It became very apparent that the 
NPCC wasn’t intending to upgrade the rigour and compliance capacity 
and target content of the NPC, at which point we helped establish the 
Boomerang Alliance which had more resources and was a more 
sophisticated campaign compared to the individual environment group 
campaigns which were currently being run by part-time committees ... 
(Personal communication, ENGO D). 
The Boomerang Alliance (2004) argued that the recommendations of previous reports and 
the submissions of stakeholders had not been taken into account in drafting the revised 
NPC, and that the EPHC meeting in December 2004 was a ‘last resort’ for change 
(Boomerang Alliance, 2004). The threat was unambiguous: ‘The EPHC and NPCC 
members need to consider that if government and industry ignore our position when we 
try to work constructively, they send a clear signal that negative campaign tactics and an 
adversarial approach are still necessary for reform—surely everyone recognises the 
significant setback this will represent...’ (Boomerang Alliance, 2004 p. 8). In particular, 
they called for: waste reduction and recycling targets; the inclusion of environmental, 
consumer and ratepayer groups on the NPCC, which they argued was dominated by ‘the 
waste club’82; and the introduction of supplementary policy tools such as advance disposal 
fees. They criticised governments for being complicit in the development of a program 
which represented avoidance rather than sharing of responsibility by industry (Boomerang 
Alliance, 2004).  
The campaign by the Boomerang Alliance was effective to some extent, because in 
December 2004 EPHC demanded a number of changes consistent with the ENGO’s 
proposals. In particular, they announced their intention to incorporate targets to measure 
the achievements of a future covenant, asked officials to negotiate with ENGOs, local 
government and industry on appropriate targets, and asked the NPCC to appoint a 
community representative to the Council as a full participating member (EPHC, 2004b). 
Final targets were still being negotiated between the Boomerang Alliance and government 
agencies in the final week before the EPHC meeting (July 2005), and the alliance found 
support from some ministers and government officials: ‘We eventually got ourselves into 
                                                     
82 This term was taken from an ABC Four Corners report (Fullerton, 2003). 
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a position where we became influential stakeholders ... We started producing, I suppose, 
sophisticated economic and policy analysis, visited all the key states [and] found some 
reasonably constructive engagement (Personal communication, ENGO D). 
Compromise was reached on final targets83, which were less than originally advocated by 
ENGOs, and the revised covenant was approved by the EPHC at their July meeting 
(NPCC, 2005). In addition to targets, it included, for the first time, a detailed list of 
performance indicators and more stringent reporting requirements (NPCC, 2005). Like 
NPC Mark I, it also identified a series of practices that companies in the supply chain 
could choose to implement as part of their NPC commitments.  
Institutional uncertainty: challenges to the NPC 
Despite the negotiation of NPC Mark I and its extension for a further five years to 2010, 
several state governments continued to propose CDL as an alternative or complementary 
policy mechanism, particularly in South Australia and Western Australia. A review 
commissioned by the NSW Government (White, 2001c; 2001a; 2001b) concluded that the 
introduction of CDL would generate positive environmental benefits for NSW. The report 
noted that consumers would bear the largest cost burden, followed by the beverage 
industry and retailers, while local government and ratepayers would realise financial 
benefits due to the reduced costs of kerbside collection. The NSW Government referred 
the issue to EPHC because of constitutional issues regarding the ability of an individual 
state or territory to introduce charges such as container deposits, which could be regarded 
as an excise. This prompted the Victorian, Tasmanian, Australian Capital Territory and 
Western Australian governments to conduct their own inquiries into CDL84, and more 
                                                     
83 These included: a recycling target of 65% by 2010 (compared to a baseline of 48% in 2003); 
material specific targets of 78% for paper and cardboard, 50–60% for glass, 60–65% for steel, 70–
75% for aluminium, and 30–35% for plastics; a target of no new packaging to landfill compared to 
2003; and a recycling rate for ‘non-recyclable packaging’ of 25% by 2010 (compared to 10% in 
2003). 
84 Following the NSW Government’s referral of their CDL report to EPHC for consideration, the 
Victorian Government commissioned studies on the implications of CDL for Victoria (Victorian 
EPA, 2003). These concluded that CDL would involve substantial increases in costs to consumers 
and retailers. The Minister for the Environment publicly rejected CDL in 2006 because he claimed 
that it would undermine Victoria’s highly successful kerbside recycling program and cost 
households around $100 a year (Smart, 2006). The ACT Government also commissioned a study 
into CDL (C4ES, 2002) after a motion to support the introduction of CDL on a national level 
received in-principle support from the Legislative Assembly. The study concluded that CDL would 
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recently the South Australian Government put a proposal to EPHC for a national 
scheme85. More recently the Drink Container Recycling Bill 2008 was introduced into the 
Australian Senate by one of the smaller independent parties. It was referred to a Senate 
committee, and their inquiry recommended that EPHC move to introduce CDL nationally 
(SCECA, 2008).  
The fact that CDL has not yet been extended beyond South Australia, despite numerous 
government inquiries, can be explained by: 
• the federal system of government in Australia, which makes it difficult to 
introduce national legislation on issues under the jurisdiction of state 
governments; 
• the financial costs associated with CDL, including increased product prices and 
the need to install new infrastructure;  
• the relative power and influence of industry associations on packaging policy, 
relative to ENGOs and local government. 
However, ongoing interest in CDL reflects the dissatisfaction of key stakeholder groups 
such as local government and ENGOs with industry performance. The Local Government 
Association of NSW and the Shires Association of NSW continue to advocate an 
alternative approach which places more responsibility on the packaging supply chain 
(LGSA, 2006, p. 10). Despite signing the covenant, the MAV has also been critical, 
arguing that the packaging industry had not taken sufficient responsibility for their 
products and that more regulation is required (MAV, 2006)86. The Boomerang Alliance 
                                                                                                                                                  
cost too much to implement and would not be as effective as existing kerbside recycling and waste 
reduction programs (C4ES, 2002). An investigation by the Tasmanian Parliament (Parliament of 
Tasmania, 2006) recommended that the government introduce CDL subject to its effectiveness and 
viability being supported by a cost-benefit analysis. The Minister for the Environment in WA 
announced in November 2005 that her government planned a phased introduction of deposits on 
packaging to ‘strengthen’ the NPC (Edwards, 2005). A stakeholder advisory group has been 
established to investigate options for a deposit system in WA.  
85 In April 2008 EPHC considered a proposal from SA to introduce a national CDL scheme but 
could not reach agreement. Instead they decided to undertake further research and consider its 
merits at the same time as the results of the mid-term review of the NPC, in November 2008 
(EPHC, 2008a). 
86 MAV argued for stronger enforcement of the NEPM for Used Packaging, whereas the Local 
Government Association of SA argued for EPR legislation in preference to shared responsibility. 
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continues to argue that kerbside recycling imposes an ‘unfair’ cost burden of around $294 
million per year on local government, and that this cost should be transferred from 
ratepayers to industry and consumers through some form of EPR legislation (Boomerang 
Alliance, 2004). Their rationale is that costs need to be internalised to effectively 
influence design and consumption decisions, and its members see little benefit from the 
NPC: 
We’ve seen no real reduction in the amount of packaging coming into 
the system and we’ve seen no real increase in the sort of return rates 
we get (Personal communication, Local Government B). 
Visibly I can’t see a difference. I think the packaging situation is 
getting worse. There is a greater proliferation of packaging materials 
out there that have to be coped with ... (Personal communication, 
ENGO C). 
This is a view shared by at least one government official: 
I read with interest [the] report for the Australian Food and Grocery 
Council in terms of the companies that have made significant changes 
to packaging. But the problem is, it’s not immediately evident when 
you walk down the supermarket aisle ... I feel that the complexity of 
packaging has probably increased rather than decreased in that period 
of time... (Personal communication, State Government G) 
Despite the focus of the NPC on broad ‘life cycle management’ issues, its success or 
failure is likely to be judged on these two issues—the amount of packaging consumed and 
recycling rates. Packaging consumption has continued to grow (Figure 12), but is starting 
to fall per head of population. Data collected for the mid-term review of the NPC is likely 
to be the most accurate, and this indicates that consumption increased from 4.1 million 
tonnes in 2003 to 4.3 million tonnes in 2007 (NPCC, 2008c). In per capital terms this 
represents a fall from 204 kg to 201 kg of packaging per head of population. This has been 
linked to ongoing efforts by companies in the packaging supply chain to reduce the 
amount of packaging they use, for both environmental and commercial reasons (Lewis, 
2008).  
Recycling of packaging has increased significantly. Between 2003 and 2007 the 
percentage of households in Australia with access to a kerbside recycling service 
increased from 90% to a minimum of 93% (Hyder Consulting, 2008a). Over the same 
period the recycling rate increased from 40% to 56% (Table 20). In historical terms this 
represents a major shift in the waste management of packaging. As already discussed, 
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recycling programs began in the 1970s for glass and aluminium and were gradually 
introduced for other materials such as cardboard and plastics. They are now widely 
available for most forms of rigid packaging. 
Figure 12: Packaging consumption per capita in Australia, 1971–200787 
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Sources: Packaging consumption data for 1971 and 1976 from the AEC (1979, p. 6); 1996 from 
NEPC (1998b, p. 42); 2003 and 2007 from the NPCC (2008c); Population data used to calculate 
per capita consumption is from ABS (2008).  
Table 20: Recycling rates for packaging in Australia 1972–2007 (% of consumption) 
1972 1978 1981 1989 1996 2003 2005 2007 NPC targets 
Glass 
containers 17 - 17 24 42 28 34 46 50–60 
Paper/ 
cardboard - - - 51 71 49 57 65 70–80 
Aluminium 
cans - 18 50 62 65 63 71 70 70–75 
Steel cans - - - - 18 36 38 38 60–65 
Plastics 
packaging - - - 1 - 20 22 31 30–35 
Total - - - - - 40 46 56 65 
Sources: Glass data (1972–1981) from Industry Commission (1991b, p. 55)—do not include 
bottles which were recovered and refilled; aluminium data (1978-1981) from Industry 
Commission (1991b, p.4); all 1989 data from Industry Commission (1991a, pp. 25-26)—data 
are for different periods, both calendar and financial years and intended as a guide only; all 1996 
data from Industry Commission (1996, p. 136); 2003–2007 data from NPCC (2008b, p. 2). 
                                                     
87 Data between 1971 and 2007 are not continuous and were collected by different organisations 
using different methods. They should therefore be treated with caution. Data for 2003–2007 are 
likely to be the most accurate because they has been through a rigorous peer review process over 
several years (NPCC, 2008b). 
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The mid-term review of the NPC concluded that the waste and recycling targets for the 
covenant are all likely to be met by 2010 (Lewis, 2008, p. 3). Infrastructure projects 
funded by the NPCC, combined with strong demand for recyclable materials in export 
markets (particularly China), are forecast to increase the recycling rate to around 65%. 
The NPC target of ‘no increase in the amount of packaging disposed to landfill’ is also 
likely to be met given that packaging waste to landfill has been falling consistently since 
2003 (Lewis, 2008). 
The quality of the data on which these conclusions were based has been questioned by 
ENGOs, who have argued that they underestimate levels of consumption and significantly 
overestimate the recycling rate (Cubby, 2008). However, at their November 2008 meeting 
EPHC decided to ask the NPCC to develop a framework for continuation of the NPC 
beyond 2010, as well as other options (including complementary policy mechanisms) for 
consideration in 200988. This decision appears to contradict the recommendation of the 
Australian Senate inquiry into waste management that EPHC work towards the 
introduction of a national deposit scheme for packaging (SCECA, 2008). EPHC also 
decided not to proceed with a phase-out of plastic bags by 2009, instead supporting an 
expansion of voluntary retailer efforts to reduce consumption and waste89. 
Company characteristics: industry sector and public profile  
Corporate responsiveness to PS between 1990 and 2005 was mediated by the same issues 
which influenced responsiveness in the earlier decades, including: 
• the visibility of particular types of packaging in household waste and litter; 
• the amount of government and ENGO scrutiny that this packaging attracted;  
• the potential risks to companies of not taking action. 
                                                     
88 EPHC has not indicated what these ‘other options’ might be; the four options which were 
considered most ‘promising’ in an earlier report to EPHC (MMA and BDA, 2007) were a 
performance-based advance disposal fee (ADF), a subsidy program for recycling infrastructure, a 
recycling certificate scheme (tradable rights) and a combined ADF and subsidy program. 
89 Earlier in the year the Institute of Public Affairs had weighed into the debate, claiming that a 
voluntary retailer levy being trialled in Victoria was likely to be unconstitutional, as well as being a 
‘tax on working families’ and a ‘revenue grab’ by the Victorian Government (IPA, 2008). 
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However, the approach taken by industry associations to the regulation of packaging 
played an even stronger role in mediating responsiveness during this period. LRA was 
established in the 1970s specifically to avoid state regulation by promoting voluntary 
corporate responsibility for packaging. Under new names (LRRA, BIEC and Packaging 
Stewardship Forum) the association continued to be proactive in policy negotiations and 
in encouraging companies to support voluntary PS initiatives. Between 1991 and 2008 
industry associations with much broader roles took different approaches to corporate 
responsibility and the NPC, and this influenced the PS responsiveness of their members. 
The role of industry sector and public profile in mediating corporate responsiveness is 
illustrated in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13: Company characteristics mediating responsiveness, 1991–2008 
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suppliers voluntarily implemented PS programs designed to increase recycling and reduce 
litter and were actively supported by industry associations such as LRA/BIEC and 
PIEC/PCA. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, companies in other sectors also came under ENGO 
and government scrutiny. One reason for this was that federal and state governments had 
introduced ambitious waste reduction and recycling policies. Beer and soft drink 
manufacturers were already supporting kerbside collection programs for glass, aluminium 
and PET plastics, and government agencies were keen to expand these programs to other 
types of food and beverage packaging. Officials involved in the negotiation of ANZEC 
waste reduction plans and similar programs in NSW and Victoria started to involve new 
players, including other food and beverage sector associations and manufacturers of 
materials such as non-PET plastics, steel cans and liquidpaperboard cartons. In Victoria 
there was general agreement about the need to seek greater industry involvement and 
funding beyond the beverage industry to remove the perceived ‘discrimination’ against 
beverage containers. For example, RALAC’s (1991) fourth and final report recommended 
a general packaging levy to fund anti-litter and recycling programs. At the same time 
ENGOs, such as FOE and the Worldwide Home Environmentalists’ Network, were 
conducting high profile campaigns against products such as the plastic milk bottle and the 
plastic shopping bag, which once again broadened the debates on beer and soft drink 
packaging to include other forms of packaging.  
The focus was now on all forms of rigid packaging (i.e. excluding film products) which 
could be included in kerbside collection programs. This move was welcomed by members 
of BIEC, who were keen to see other sectors provide funding for recycling and anti-litter 
programs and made this view clear to government negotiators at state and federal levels. 
As a result, steel and plastic suppliers and a much wider group of packaging 
manufacturers and brand owners became more engaged in PS activities. Companies in 
these sectors began to contribute funding to organisations such as KAB, to invest in 
reprocessing facilities and to promote the recyclability of materials such as 
liquidpaperboard cartons and HDPE and PVC plastic bottles. The commercial viability of 
recycling was questionable for these materials, but manufacturers supported it for 
pragmatic political reasons. The involvement of individual companies, either by providing 
funding for programs or investing directly in reprocessing facilities, was driven by 
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industry associations representing these sectors, including PIA, ALC and AFGC. PIA, for 
example, developed a comprehensive environmental program for the plastics industry 
entitled Looking Ahead, managed by a committee made up of the chief executive officers 
of major companies (PIA, 1990)90. Similar initiatives were under way in the steel 
packaging industry. In 1988–89 recycling of steel cans from households was negligible 
(IC, 1991b) but a concerted promotional campaign by the industry during the 1990s91 
boosted recovery rates.  
However, with threats of CDL regulations hanging over the industry, companies in the 
beverage supply chain have always been the most responsive. BIEC members have always 
believed that there was a real risk of such regulations being introduced if the packaging 
supply chain did not take sufficient action voluntarily. Therefore they played an active 
role in policy development and their members were among the first to sign the NPC. 
AFGC, representing the broader food and beverage industry, has also become more 
supportive of PS programs and in 2006 took over BIEC’s activities under the name of the 
Packaging Stewardship Forum. As ongoing government investigations into CDL show, 
regulatory threats need to be taken seriously by the beverage industry. In 2003 the scope 
of the deposit legislation in South Australia was extended to include not only beer and soft 
drinks, but also flavoured milk and pure fruit juice, and non-carbonated, soft (non-
alcoholic) drinks such as vitamin drinks, sports drinks, iced teas, fruit drinks, and other 
soft beverages92.  
The NPC represented a particularly positive outcome for the beverage industry and its 
packaging suppliers because, for the first time, the entire packaging supply chain was 
covered by the policy. BIEC members had long argued that the focus on beverage 
                                                     
90 PIA’s activities included a research and coordination role in the establishment of kerbside 
collection and reprocessing facilities for plastic packaging. Programs were also run by interest 
groups within the plastics industry. For example, the Vinyl Bottle Group was established to 
facilitate recycling of PVC bottles (Vinyl Council of Australia, 2006). 
91 The Steel Can Recycling Plan was developed in 1991 as a result of BHP’s and the Canmakers 
Institute of Australia’s involvement in the state and federal governments’ National Kerbside 
Recycling Taskforce. The plan provided a guaranteed market for all collected cans and a floor price 
of $40 per tonne (BHP Packaging Products, 2004). In 1996 the Steel Can Recycling Council was 
established to encourage householders to recycle (http://www.cansmart.org/About/what_is.html, 
viewed 14 June 2007). 
92 Wine and plain milk remain outside the scope of the legislation, which also specifically exempts 
pure fruit juice and flavoured milk in containers with a capacity of one litre or greater. 
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containers was discriminatory and that the issue should be broadened to include all 
packaging: 
We’ve carried the weight in supporting kerbside; we made it possible 
for a lot of other non-beverage companies to make use of kerbside at 
no cost to themselves. In driving the Do the Right Thing campaign we 
significantly improved litter outcomes ... So we believe we've done 
more than pull our own weight ... (Personal communication, Company 
E). 
The interests of the beverage industry in a successful system of self-regulation meant that 
they were not as critical of the role played by ENGOs in the negotiation of NPC Mark II 
as other associations. One beverage industry representative commented that the 
Boomerang Alliance played a positive role in keeping state and federal government 
ministers focused on an issue which they regarded as relatively unimportant: 
We could see that—this is a personal view—we would enter another 
covenant ... which would probably be barely if any more effective 
than the first, and we would almost guarantee major government 
intervention, probably with a different government in Canberra, by 
2010. And that would not be in the community's interest, in my view, 
or in the government's interest ... So the beverage industry was very 
much in favour of continuous improvement ... What the Boomerang 
Alliance has done is make the process much more honest (Personal 
communication, Company E). 
Retailers have always been the least committed to PS in general and the NPC in particular. 
The Australian Supermarket Institute was initially strongly opposed to the funding 
arrangements and back-up regulations. ASI no longer exists, and other associations such 
as the Australian Retailers Association (ARA) have not signed NPC Mark II. 
This historical analysis of packaging policy debates and industry responsiveness suggests 
that PS was first institutionalised in companies with a direct interest in the manufacture of 
beer and soft drinks, including brand owners and packaging suppliers, and these 
companies both influenced policy outcomes and assumed a certain amount of 
responsibility for the life cycle impacts of packaging. The next group to become involved 
included manufacturers of other beverages such as milk and fruit juices and their 
packaging suppliers, followed by food manufacturers, other brand owners and, to a lesser 
extent, retailers. The focus had shifted from a relatively small group of companies to the 
entire packaging supply chain:  
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If I think back in history, to around 10 to 15 years ago, the whole 
focus was, ‘You’re a packaging manufacturer, you’re bad’, and there 
was no real focus on the brand owners at all. And when you think 
back to the first round of the covenant, I remember the brand owners 
kicking up a huge stink because they’d been brought into the debate. 
That’s where we’ve seen a massive shift (Personal communication, 
Company B2). 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the institutionalisation of PS at a macro (socio-political) level by 
exploring the role of interest groups, discourses, public policy processes and corporate 
characteristics in shaping stakeholder expectations and corporate responsiveness.  
The institutionalisation of PS through packaging discourses and policy processes can be 
explained by the relative power and influence of business interests and a deregulatory 
approach to environmental policy within government. Two policy coalitions—based on 
shared interests, policy beliefs and story-lines—emerged during the 1970s and have 
remained relatively stable since that time. The ‘self-regulation coalition’, led by industry 
associations, convinced most state governments in the late 1970s and 1980s to support a 
voluntary approach to corporate responsibility for packaging. Story-lines that were used to 
support this position focused on the social and economic benefits of packaging, the 
insignificance of post-consumer waste compared to other issues in the packaging life 
cycle, the need for behavioural change rather than regulation to address litter, kerbside 
recycling rather than deposits as the most effective solution to waste, and ‘shared 
responsibility’ rather than producer responsibility for waste. State-based agreements 
between government agencies and industry associations linked to the beverage industry 
were eventually replaced by a national approach, the NPC. The ‘state regulation 
coalition’, led by ENGOs and supported by some local government associations, has 
consistently argued that packaging is environmentally damaging and should be regulated 
by the state.  
While conservative governments have tended to be more sympathetic to business interests 
than Labor governments have, both sides of politics have been reluctant to impose new 
regulations on industry. A notable exception is the Labor government in South Australia, 
which broadened the scope of its deposit legislation in 2003; and in 2008 increased the 
size of the deposit and announced a ban on plastic shopping bags. In 2008 Labor 
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governments were in power nationally and in all states except Western Australia, but the 
EPHC changed its position on plastic bags to support a continuation of voluntary efforts in 
the retail industry to reduce plastic bags rather than the national phase-out (to be achieved 
through levies and bans) that previously had been announced. The EPHC also indicated 
that it was likely to support a continuation of the NPC beyond 2010, despite further 
demands from ENGOs and other stakeholders for increased regulation.  
These developments reinforce the fact that PS is increasingly taken for granted as the 
principle which underpins corporate responsibility for packaging. Its institutionalisation 
has shifted the focus of corporate responsibility away from post-consumer waste—the 
target of ENGO demands for container deposit legislation—and towards the ‘life cycle 
management’ of packaging. Under the NPC companies have considerable flexibility in 
choosing how they implement PS, which means that they can respond by addressing 
environmental impacts which are directly or indirectly under their control, such as 
production waste and supply chain impacts. Many companies, particularly in the beverage 
industry supply chain, have also been involved directly in kerbside recycling and anti-
litter programs for many decades.  
The analysis of PS at a macro level in this chapter has revealed that the responsiveness of 
companies is linked to industry sector (product visibility and the economic value of 
recycled materials) and the strategic role played by industry associations in promoting 
self-regulation. Associations representing the beverage and beverage packaging sectors 
have been more proactive than others in promoting a new form of ‘industry morality’ 
(Gunningham and Rees, 1997) in the way that companies manage the environmental 
impacts of packaging. In McEarchern’s (1991) typology they were ‘accommodationists’ 
in the sense that they attempted to accommodate the environmental concerns of ENGOs 
and other stakeholders by introducing PS policies and practices. This is because they 
wanted to manage the risks associated with the potential introduction of a national 
container deposit scheme by implementing voluntary PS programs. The most recent 
proposal for a national CDL system, by the Family First party in 2008, and the subsequent 
support that this proposal received from the Senate inquiry into waste management, 
demonstrate that the threat of legislation is unlikely to go away. ENGOs and some local 
government associations are not satisfied with the environmental outcomes of the NPC 
and continue to lobby governments for increased regulation. If one of the criteria for the 
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successful implementation of a voluntary environmental agreement is the acceptability of 
the policy to different stakeholders (Sullivan, 2005) then it has not succeeded. Similarly, if 
companies have a social obligation or an interest in meeting the expectations of key 
stakeholder groups, as CSR and stakeholder theories suggest, then it is clear that to date 
the packaging supply chain has failed to achieve this.  
Corporate responsiveness and performance at an industry level will now be examined in 
closer detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Institutionalising product stewardship in the 
packaging supply chain 
Chapter 4 concluded that product stewardship has been established as a new framework 
for the environmental management of packaging in Australia. This has occurred as a result 
of discursive and policy processes involving groups with competing interests and policy 
beliefs. The principle of PS has been institutionalised in public policy through a co-
regulatory approach which includes the ‘voluntary’ NPC and regulatory back-up provided 
by state government jurisdictions.  
This chapter aims to investigate the institutionalisation of PS at a meso level (the 
packaging supply chain) by asking the question: How and to what extent is product 
stewardship being institutionalised by companies in different sectors of the packaging 
supply chain, particularly raw material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, brand 
owners and retailers? There are two major challenges involved in doing this. First, there 
is no clear ‘blueprint for action’ which can provide the basis for such an evaluation. The 
NPC was deliberately designed to be a flexible policy tool which would allow companies 
the freedom to choose how and when they would respond. Its objectives and commitments 
were written in very general terms which make it difficult to evaluate performance. 
Second, the PS discourse which underpins the NPC has been rejected by many local 
government associations and ENGOs, who still expect companies to take greater 
responsibility for post-consumer waste management impacts.  
In an attempt to overcome these problems, a new PS evaluation framework is developed 
here and builds on models of corporate social performance and responsiveness from the 
CSR literature (particularly Carroll, 1979; Labatt, 1991; Wood, 1991). However, the 
responsiveness framework is enriched by examining the role and influence of different 
stakeholder groups and the extent to which social expectations are reflected in language as 
well as policy and practice. First, the various industry sectors which make up the 
packaging supply chain are analysed to identify their role and likely involvement in PS 
activities. The perceived influence of supply chain partners and other external 
stakeholders on corporate responsiveness is also discussed. Second, the environmental 
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rhetoric used by these companies in their public reports is examined to ascertain the extent 
to which companies have publicly adopted the language of PS and ‘shared responsibility’. 
Third, a list of corporate PS policies and practices is identified and used to evaluate the 
responsiveness of 30 companies in the packaging supply chain. This list is based on public 
policy (the NPC), the expectations of stakeholder groups and standards of industry ‘best 
practice’, which together help to define the PS institution. The evaluation is confined to 
the stated policies and practices of these 30 companies between 1999 and 2005—the 
period of operation of NPC Mark I. Finally, corporate responsiveness is compared across 
different industry sectors. 
Interest groups: the organisational field at a meso level  
The responsiveness of companies to PS is likely to be influenced by their common and 
competing interests as well as power in the packaging supply chain. Companies in the raw 
materials, packaging, product manufacturing and retail sectors operate very different 
businesses, but they have at least two common interests relevant to this research: 
• They all have an economic interest in the value that packaging delivers in the 
supply chain. 
• They all have a political interest in meeting the PS expectations of their 
stakeholders in order to avoid more restrictive regulation.   
While the case study companies are classified throughout this chapter as either raw 
material suppliers, packaging suppliers, brand owners or retailers (Figure 14), some have 
activities which cut across these categories. For example, most of the retailers are also 
brand owners because they sell products under their own brand. Similarly, Carter Holt 
Harvey, Amcor and Visy can be described as both raw material suppliers and packaging 
suppliers because they are vertically integrated companies which combine forestry and 
recycling operations with the manufacture of pulp, paper and packaging. Industry 
associations which represent companies in these sectors are also shown in Figure 14, and 
more detail is provided in Table 21. As Bell (1992) observed, industry associations in 
Australia tend to be fragmented. There is no one association which can claim to represent 
all  packaging interests because of the diversity of companies involved in its manufacture, 
use and retail sale.  
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Figure 14: Sectors and industry associations in the packaging supply chain 
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Table 21: Industry associations representing packaging supply chain companies 
Industry association Membership Activities 
Australian Industry 
Group (AIG) 
60,000 businesses in manufacturing, transport, construction etc Policy development, advocacy and education, training, 
events 
Australian Food and 
Grocery Council (AFGC) 
150 members in the consumer food, beverage and grocery 
sectors (80% of industry turnover) (AFGC, 2008b) 
Policy development, advocacy and education, hosted the 
Packaging Stewardship Forum since 2006 
Australian National 
Retailers Association 
(ANRA) 
By invitation only—Coles, Woolworths, David Jones, Bunnings, 
Best & Less, The Just Group, Harvey Norman, Franklins, 
Borders (ANRA, 2008a) 
Research and advocacy on national policy issues (from 
2005) 
Australian Retailers 
Association (ARA) 
5000 retail members from a range of sectors (ARA, 2008) Policy development, advocacy and education; training, 
awards, events 
Australian Supermarket 
Institute (ASI) 
National supermarket chains and wholesalers including Coles, 
Woolworths and independents 
Research and advocacy on national policy issues (until 
2000) 
Association of 
Liquidpaperboard Carton 
Manufacturers (ALC) 
Two packaging manufacturers—Southcorp Packaging and Tetra 
Pak 
Research and advocacy on waste and recycling issues 
(1989–2006) 
Beverage Industry 
Environment Council 
(BIEC)  
Packaging, food and beverage companies. Became a ‘forum’ 
within AFGC in 2006 (Product Stewardship Forum, PSF) 
Policy development, advocacy and education, funding of 
recycling and litter programs  
National Packaging 
Council Industry 
Association (NPCIA) 
Associations involved in the NPC: PCA, AFGC, PSF, AIG, 
ARA and PACIA 
Coordinating industry funding for the NPC, administering 
funds for NPC projects, managing the Environmental Code 
of Practice for Packaging (ECoPP) 
National Retailers 
Association (NRA) 
3,700 retail members from a range of sectors (NRA, 2009). NRA 
formed in 2005 
Policy development, advocacy and education, training; 
events; awards 
National Association of 
Retail Grocers of 
Australia (NARGA) 
Associations of independent grocery retailers in each State—
represent around 4,500 independent retailers (NARGA, 2007)  
Policy development, advocacy and education 
Packaging Council of 
Australia (PCA) 
100 members from the packaging supply chain, including 
material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, packaging users, 
and retailers (PCA, 2005, p. 5) 
Policy development, advocacy and education, industry and 
student awards; schools education program, events 
Plastics and Chemicals 
Industries Association 
(PACIA) 
Importers, raw material suppliers and chemical manufacturers, 
plastics fabricators, recyclers and service providers 
Policy development, advocacy and education, delivery of 
environmental programs, industry awards 
Steel Can Recycling 
Council 
Bluescope Steel (raw material supplier) and can manufacturers Established to promote recycling of steel cans (until 2007) 
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The break-down of NPC signatories in 2003 provides an indication of the size and 
structure of the industry. The combined signatories had an annual turnover of 
approximately $150 billion, with wholesale/retail being the biggest sector ($77 billion) 
followed by brand owners ($59 billion), packaging or paper suppliers ($12 billion) and 
raw material suppliers ($1.5 billion) (Nolan-ITU, 2004, p. 6)93. The industry is 
characterised by a small number of very large companies and a large number of small-to-
medium size companies. A comparison between the number of signatories and the 
estimated size of the industry is provided in Table 22. Given that the NEPM specifically 
targets brand owners, it is not surprising that most brand owners joined the covenant. The 
retail sector was the only one significantly underrepresented in terms of industry size, 
although all of the major retailers had joined. According to Nolan-ITU (2004), all of the 
relevant raw material suppliers were also signatories.  
Table 22: Comparison between NPC industry signatories and industry size, 2003 
Industry signatories, number and percentage (%)  
Raw 
material 
suppliers 
Packaging 
and paper 
suppliers 
Packaging 
users / brand 
owners 
Wholesaler / 
retailer 
Total 
Actual 
signatories1 
19 (3.5%) 84 (15.6%) 344 (63.8%) 93 (17.2%) 540 (100%) 
Estimate of 
industry size2 
71 (11.6%) 43 (7.0%) 366 (59.6%) 134 (21.8%) 614 (100%) 
Sources:  
1. Signatories as at October 2003 are from(cited in Nolan-ITU, 2004, p. 7).  
2. These estimates were prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers in a 1999 report entitled An 
industry funding mechanism for the transitional arrangements associated with the National 
Packaging Covenant (cited in Nolan-ITU, 2004, p. 7). 
                                                     
93 More recent data on the breakdown of signatories by turnover are not available. 
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The distribution of NPC industry signatories by sector has changed since 2003, with the 
percentage of brand owner signatories increasing from 64% in 2003 to 80% in 2008 
(Figure 15).  
Figure 15: Percentage of NPC signatories by sector, 2003 and 2008 
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Source: 2003 data based on Nolan-ITU (2004, p. 7); 2008 data based on NPCC (2008a, p. 2). 
Some of the structural and commercial issues for each industry sector, including the 
potential costs of CDL and membership of industry associations, are briefly discussed 
below. Chapter 4 identified CDL as one of the key drivers of industry responsiveness, but 
if introduced nationally its economic impacts would be higher for some sectors than for 
others.   
Packaging raw material suppliers 
Packaging raw material suppliers are companies which sell metals, plastics, paper, 
cardboard and other basic components to packaging manufacturers. There were only 19 
NPC signatories from this sector in 2003, reflecting the small size of the materials 
manufacturing sector in Australia following many years of consolidation. The largest 
liquidpaperboard, cardboard and glass packaging manufacturers are vertically integrated, 
i.e. the same companies manufacture both basic materials and finished packaging. A 
significant amount of packaging material is now imported, particularly plastics and 
tinplate steel.  
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Under the NPC, raw material suppliers have a responsibility to manage the environmental 
impacts of their supply chain, production processes and the end-of-life impacts of their 
products. While they are not directly involved in packaging design and production, many 
of the larger raw material suppliers have worked closely with customers and local 
government to establish recycling programs for their materials. In some cases this has 
been through special interest associations such as the Steel Can Recycling Council. 
Bluescope Steel was a key member until it stopped manufacturing tinplate steel in 
Australia, and the council ceased operating94. PACIA, representing suppliers of plastics to 
packaging manufacturers, has played an important role in coordinating groups to 
undertake PS projects95. 
If CDL were to be extended beyond South Australia, suppliers of raw materials for 
beverage packaging would only be affected if the handling fee, in the form of a unit fee 
per container96, was passed on to customers and resulted in a fall in demand. The deposit 
itself might also reduce demand if the customer is unwilling or unable to return the 
container and redeem the deposit and therefore pays a price premium.  
Packaging manufacturers 
There were 84 NPC signatories from this sector in 2003. However, the dominant two 
packaging suppliers, Visy Industries and Amcor Australasia, have significant market 
power in some product segments. For example, Visy and Amcor controlled 97% of the 
Australian cardboard market in 2004, and were recently investigated by the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) for cartel behaviour including price-
                                                     
94 Bluescope Steel was the only local manufacturer of tinplate steel. They ceased production and 
recycling of this material in Australia in March 2007 because of a decline in the local market for 
steel cans. 
95 Two supply chain groups were established to undertake NPC-funded projects: one to investigate 
recycling of polypropylene  (Polysearch, 2005); the other to investigate recycling of polystyrene. 
96 According to White et al. (2001b, pp. 156–57), most CDL schemes involve a handling fee, which 
is paid by beverage manufacturers to either retailers or depot operators to run the collection system. 
This fee is either absorbed by the manufacturer, resulting in less profit, or passed on to consumers. 
If it is passed on to consumers it may reduce demand for the product, which reduces the profit of 
both the manufacturer and the retailer. 
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fixing97.  While companies such as this may have significant market power to influence 
both price and design of packaging in some product categories, the design of packaging is 
undertaken as a collaborative process between the packaging manufacturer and their 
customer, i.e. the product manufacturer (Francis, 2004). Through this process they can 
provide options to reduce environmental impacts, for example by providing packaging 
which uses less material or which is more recyclable. Some of the larger packaging 
manufacturers have also worked with both raw material suppliers and brand owners to 
establish recycling and litter-control programs for their products. 
PCA is the only industry association with a specific focus on packaging, but packaging 
manufacturers are also likely to be members of other associations such as AIG and 
PACIA. In the past they have also participated in special interest groups such as ALC and 
the Steel Can Recycling Council.  
Under an extended CDL scheme, manufacturers of beverage packaging would be affected 
if unredeemed deposits and handling fees increase the price paid by consumers. 
Brand owners 
Packaging suppliers manufacture or import packaging for brand owners and ‘contract 
fillers’ who use it for food, beverages and many other products. The food and beverage 
sectors consume approximately 65–70% of packaging in Australia (Frost, 2005). The 
industry is dominated by a number of large TNCs such as Nestlé (Switzerland), George 
Weston Foods (UK) and Cadbury Schweppes (UK). In recent decades the food and 
beverage sectors have been characterised by increasing concentration as well as a shift in 
ownership from Australian to overseas interests98. Brand owners in many other industry 
sectors also use packaging to contain, distribute and market their products, including 
companies in the appliance, consumer electronics, household chemicals, furniture, and 
building products sectors.  
                                                     
97 In November 2007, Visy Board and its director and owner, Richard Pratt, were fined $36 million 
by the Federal Court for engaging in ‘price-fixing and market-sharing contraventions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 with its rival, Amcor Limited’ (ACCC, 2007). Amcor had been given immunity 
from prosecution after approaching the ACCC with information about the cartel in 2005.  
98 For example, the Australian soft-drink industry has been transformed from around 600 
unincorporated businesses in the 1950s to the current duopoly of Coca Cola Amatil and PepsiCo 
(McQueen, 2000). 
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For brand owners, packaging is an integral part of the product they sell to consumers. 
They have an interest in ensuring that it effectively contains and protects the product 
throughout the supply chain, and that it ‘sells’ the product to consumers through its strong 
shelf presence and product information. The brand owner ultimately controls the design of 
a product and its packaging through their marketing and procurement decisions, and 
therefore has a significant influence on the environmental impacts of packaging.  
A CDL scheme would impose a number of costs on beverage manufacturers. According to 
White (2001b, pp. 157-8) their profit would be reduced if they chose to absorb the costs of 
the handling fee or if the cost is passed on to consumers and this reduces sales. The 
elasticity of demand is likely to be higher for beer and soft drinks than for other beverages 
such as milk. They would also need to absorb the initial cost of changing product labels to 
advise consumers about the deposit (White, 2001b, p. 127).  This explains why beverage 
brand owners have been actively involved in associations such as BIEC, which promoted 
voluntary responsibility rather than CDL. Other brand owners in the food and beverage 
industry are now involved in PS initiatives through AFGC and PCA. 
Retailers 
While there were 93 signatories to the NPC from the retail/wholesale sector in 2003, the 
industry is dominated by a few large firms including Coles Group (previously Coles 
Myer), Woolworths, Metcash and Bunnings. Coles and Woolworths control around 77% 
of the grocery market in Australia and suppliers have to meet sales targets and keep prices 
down in order to retain shelf space (Quinn, 2004). Brand owners have often complained 
that the retailers use their power unfairly by forcing wholesale prices down and 
demanding a contribution to in-store marketing costs (Quinn, 2004). The liquor retailing 
sector has been used as an example of the ‘assertiveness’ of Woolworths and Coles in the 
market (Jones, 2005) and Woolworths was found guilty by the ACCC in 2006 of 
‘bullying’ smaller rivals in the liquor retailing sector (Carson, 2006). 
Both Coles and Woolworths are using similar supply chain strategies to minimise retail 
prices, for example by increasing their range of ‘own-brands’. This strategy has been 
described as ‘a naked attempt to transfer profit margin from manufacturers to the retailer 
while offering little or nothing in return’ (Porter, 2005, p. 4) and an example of the fact 
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that ‘the two Grocery Gods are making the rules’ (Maiden, 2005, p. 1). It may also have 
implications for the ability of local brand owners and packaging suppliers to invest in 
environmentally innovative packaging which would meet their obligations under the NPC. 
For example, retailers are demanding that brand owners reduce the number of items 
delivered in each box, a trend known as ‘down counting’, and deliver some products in 
‘shelf-ready’ packaging. Both of these trends involve more packaging material, but 
suppliers have no choice but to comply. As one interviewee noted, ‘...if you’re not willing 
to go down that track then you’re not going to be a supplier ... In a lot of ways that’s not 
the ideal in terms of what we were trying to achieve [with our NPC action plan] (Personal 
communication, Company G). Strategies such as these are designed to drive down supply 
chain costs and improve competitiveness through changes in ‘secondary’ (transport) 
packaging, but are likely to increase rather than decrease the total amount of packaging.  
The ability of retailers to influence the design of ‘primary’ (consumer) packaging depends 
on their market power and the product category. For example, the ability and willingness 
of Wal-Mart to drive down retail prices in the US through strategies such as reduced 
packaging has been well documented (Fishman, 2006)99. Retailers have total control over 
their ‘own brand’ products, which are increasing as a proportion of all products in the 
supermarket. As brand owners, retailers that do not meet the requirements of the NPC for 
these products will be regulated under the NEPM. However, their influence over 
packaging used for other branded products will depend on the balance of power in each 
product category. According to one interviewee (Company G), the retailer has limited 
ability to influence a brand owner if that supplier accounts for a high proportion of sales in 
a particular category and is unwilling to change their packaging. They potentially have a 
lot of influence if there are several different suppliers in a competitive product category. 
In the latter case, packaging is one aspect of the product that suppliers can use for 
competitive advantage, for example by developing environmentally preferred packaging 
which meets the retailer’s PS expectations.  
                                                     
99 For example, in the early 1990s Wal-Mart and other retailers decided that the paperboard box 
around roll-on deodorant was a waste of money and material. Fishman (2006, p. 1) has reported 
that ‘[w]ith the kind of quiet but irresistible force that Wal-Mart can apply, the retailer asked 
deodorant makers to eliminate the box’. More recently Wal-Mart announced a plan to reduce 
packaging by 5% by 2013, with an estimated saving of $US4.5 billion, by eliminating or reducing 
packaging components. They have developed a ‘packaging scorecard’ which it can use to assess the 
environmental performance of suppliers (Wal-Mart, 2006). 
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As shown above in Table 21, a number of associations represent the retail sector. The 
large supermarkets (Coles and Woolworths) were originally involved with the 
independent supermarkets in ASI, but have since established a new association—
ANRA—with other national retailers. ASI folded after Coles Myer decided to leave the 
association, in part due to differences of opinion about the participation of retailers in the 
NPC. 
Retailers would be affected by the introduction of CDL in a number of ways. As beverage 
brand owners and retailers they may experience reduced sales due to an increase in prices, 
but depending on the design of the scheme they may also be required to implement ‘point 
of sale’ return systems or drop-off depots in their car parks. The costs associated with 
these include labour, storage space and pest control (White, 2001b, pp. 159–161).  
Packaging discourses: industry commitments to product 
stewardship 
The language used by companies and industry associations to describe their general policy 
or approach to PS is a useful starting point for the evaluation of responsiveness, 
particularly within the context of the public discourses on packaging and corporate 
responsibility discussed in Chapter 4. The public reports of the 30 case studies were 
therefore checked for statements which indicate their approach to corporate responsibility 
for packaging (Appendix 4). The framing of PS in business terms is discussed further in 
Chapter 6, but this section reviews some of the differences between industry sectors in the 
language used to talk about corporate commitments and policies. 
None of the companies mentioned ‘extended producer responsibility’ in their public 
statements to stakeholders, confirming the conclusion in Chapter 4 that this language is 
confined to ENGOs and some local government agencies. Over two-thirds of the 
companies explicitly mention a commitment to PS or related terms such as ‘life cycle 
management’ and ‘shared responsibility’. These companies talk about the total life cycle 
of their products including waste at end-of-life, and often mention the importance of 
collaboration with suppliers, customers and other stakeholders. Their language mirrors the 
NPC’s interpretation of product responsibility, i.e. that responsibility is shared with others 
and that companies are mainly responsible for impacts within their ‘sphere of influence’. 
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A strong commitment to the NPC and the principle of PS is particularly evident in 
statements by packaging manufacturers and some of the largest beverage brand owners, 
for example: 
The Foster’s Group Action Plan report addresses those ‘upstream’ and 
internal elements of the Covenant that are under Foster’s Group’s 
direct control and influence (Foster’s Group, 2005, p. 1).  
Amcor recognises that its packaging products have an impact on the 
environment in a number of ways ... However, whilst the correct 
disposal of packaging is the responsibility of the end user, we must 
acknowledge that we can assist in minimising the impact of packaging 
waste by encouraging the recycling of our products and working with 
other stakeholders to facilitate recycling of packaging (Amcor, 2005, 
p. 18, emphasis added).   
This is consistent with the active role played by some of the industry associations 
representing packaging, food and beverage industry interests during the negotiation of the 
NPC, particularly PCA and BIEC. PCA strongly supported and promoted the NPC. For 
example, they published the action plans and reports of all signatories to NPC Mark I on 
their website until 2006. After NPC Mark I was signed, BIEC continued to fund litter and 
recycling initiatives and promote the NPC to its members: 
BIEC has consistently encouraged each member company to submit 
Action Plans for On-Site Operations in accordance with the 
Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (the Code). BIEC 
continues to actively seek wider recognition and implementation by 
member companies of the Code (BIEC, 2004, p. 1). 
When asked about the role of industry associations in managing ‘end-of-life’ 
environmental impacts of packaging, one company stressed the important role played by 
BIEC: 
I think we probably do tend to rely on the industry associations to a 
large extent on that ... BIEC was engaged with the whole Don’t Waste 
Australia and Do the Right Thing campaigns, so the industry including 
[this company] and brand owners have put a lot of resources into that, 
but not on an individual basis, it has been done on an industry level 
(Personal communication, Company B1). 
BIEC was subsumed within AFGC as the ‘Packaging Stewardship Forum’ in 2006. Before 
that, AFGC had also been involved in litter management in its own right through the 
establishment of a litter management committee. Their website describes their approach: 
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The Packaging Stewardship Forum (PSF) works with partners across 
Australia to increase the resource recovery of food and beverage post-
consumer packaging and reduce littering ... The forum continues to 
deliver a range of programs established over the past three decades by 
its predecessors, the former Beverage Industry Environment Council 
(BIEC) and the Litter Recycling and Research Association. It also 
advocates and promotes new ways of approaching the management of 
post consumer food and beverage packaging and its recovery (AFGC, 
2008a).      
AFGC’s website also promotes the Do the Right Thing anti-litter campaign and provides 
information on resource recovery projects being undertaken on behalf of PSF members 
(AFGC, 2008a).      
While most of the companies mentioned above are involved in the manufacture of 
packaging, food or beverages, another group of companies with a strong rhetorical 
commitment to PS can be identified. Two of the case study companies are in the chemical 
industry and are signatories to Responsible Care, which means that they have a 
commitment to the chemical industry’s Product Stewardship Code of Practice, which pre-
dates the NPC. Consistent with the history and purpose of the code, these companies 
emphasise risk management and product safety. Dulux, a division of chemicals 
manufacturer Orica, has a clear PS standard which forms part of their Safety, Health and 
Environment (SHE) system: 
All Orica controlled businesses shall ensure that they manage, in an 
ethical and responsible manner, all the safety, health and 
environmental aspects of a product from its initial conception to its 
ultimate use and disposal. The SH&E implications shall be taken into 
account prior to the launch of new products and in the selection and 
development of new processes. The hazards from new products and 
processes, and the consequent risks, shall be reduced so far as is 
reasonably practicable to reduce potential SH&E impacts (Orica, 
2004b). 
Another Responsible Care signatory, plastics manufacturer Qenos, stated in their first 
NPC action plan that ‘we have a longstanding commitment to product stewardship and 
demonstrated performance in environmentally responsible activities—including 
foundational involvement in HDPE milk bottle recycling in Australia’ (Qenos, 2001, p. 3) 
and ‘we embrace the principles of Product Stewardship and Shared Responsibility 
throughout the packaging chain’ (p. 5). The language in their SHE policy is more closely 
linked to Responsible Care, including commitments to ‘minimise risks associated with the 
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manufacturing, transportation, use and disposal of our products’ and to ‘efficiently use 
materials and energy, and dispose of wastes in a safe and environmentally sound way’ 
(Qenos, 2000). Like Orica, they emphasise safety and risk management. 
Orica and Qenos are both members of PACIA, which played an active role in the 
negotiation of the covenant and has continued to promote PS and the NPC to its members. 
In an industry trade journal their General Manager argued that: 
The covenant is the only approach that truly recognises the diversity 
of materials in the waste stream, the complexity of the supply chain, 
and the sharing of responsibility between industry, government and 
the community. This is why PACIA, along with many other industry 
associations representing the consumer industry supply chain, have 
worked hard to have the Covenant accepted by government (Swann, 
1999, p. 44). 
The PACIA spokesman went on to warn that ‘if the covenant is not supported by all of 
industry, it will not be a success. This is the best opportunity for industry to directly shape 
the most appropriate waste management actions for each signatory’ (Swann, 1999, p. 44). 
The association’s website continues to promote PS and the NPC, for example with the 
statement that ‘PACIA is a strong supporter of the National Packaging Covenant ... This 
model provides the opportunity to create and communicate real improvements to the total 
life cycle of consumer packaging... (PACIA, n.d.). The website also lists numerous 
projects being managed by PACIA to support the covenant, including data collection and 
a research and development project to improve the recyclability of rigid plastics 
packaging, and provides links to other resources for members. 
Some retailers have used the language of PS in their reports but with a more limited 
interpretation of its meaning. For example, Coles Myer stated that it has ‘embarked on 
responsible stewardship of all its waste streams by adopting the waste management 
hierarchy of avoidance, reuse, recycling, energy recovery and disposal’ (Coles Myer 
Limited, 2005, p. 15), but this seems to express a commitment to the stewardship of  
‘waste streams’ rather than products over their total life cycle. Woolworths went further 
by acknowledging that, while signing the NPC was a ‘significant step’ for the company, 
they accept the concept of PS: ‘Through our ongoing objective of reduction in packaging 
and plastic bag litter, Woolworths will pursue a “life cycle” approach to the management 
of packaging waste, including the reduction in the use of plastic checkout bags’ 
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(Woolworths, 2005, p. 28). However, this statement implies that the focus is on checkout 
bags rather than ‘own brand’ products or the many other packaged products in their stores. 
The emphasis on ‘in-house’ impacts rather than the total life cycle of packaging is also 
clear in the following comment by an interviewee from the retail sector: 
I think if I had a pure retailer hat on I’d say [our responsibility] starts 
at the back door and stops at the front door. Which is the attitude that 
evolved over the years: we don’t manufacture the product, and we 
don’t use the product, so our responsibility is here within our 
organisation and that’s where we have to concentrate ... The exception 
was a product we owned—house brand products. For everything else, 
the responsibility sat with the manufacturer (Personal communication, 
Company G). 
The language used by the retailers reflects the more limited interpretation of corporate 
responsibility for packaging advocated by the ASI during the negotiation of NPC Mark I. 
ASI was disbanded soon after the covenant was signed, although other associations, 
including ANRA, ARA, NRA and NARGA now represent the general interests of 
retailers. These associations have not played an active role in promoting the NPC to their 
members and there is little, if any, information provided on their websites about the NPC. 
However, they all include information on voluntary waste reduction initiatives (and 
regulatory proposals) for plastic shopping bags, which appears to be their main focus. In 
2002 ARA developed a voluntary code of practice to reduce the use of plastic shopping 
bags in supermarkets and the organisation continues to promote voluntary implementation 
of the code in preference to a regulated phase-out: 
The ARA recognises the potential harm that plastic bags can cause 
when littered. The ARA supports the reduction of unnecessary 
packaging and reusing of necessary packaging ... As representatives of 
both small and large businesses, the ARA will continue to work 
alongside other not-for-profit organisations such as Clean Up 
Australia in assisting retailers in reducing, reusing and recycling 
plastic bags through behavioural change campaigns (ARA, 2006, p. 
7).  
ANRA undertook a voluntary trial in 2008, in conjunction with the Victorian Government, 
to impose a levy on single-use bags (ANRA, 2008b). The association has also expressed 
support for the principles of life cycle management and shared responsibility for products 
and packaging, although with a preference for voluntary initiatives over regulation 
(ANRA, 2006).  
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NARGA represents the smaller independent grocery retailers. Its CEO, Ken Henrick, was 
Assistant Director of ASI during the negotiation of NPC Mark I, and originally resisted 
government and industry attempts to include supermarkets within its scope. ASI later 
opposed the NEPM for Used Packaging, and Henrick’s views on this are revealed in these 
comments from NARGA’s website: 
The NEPM for used packaging materials was drafted as a so-called 
‘safety net’ at the specific request of some large companies, mainly 
packaging manufacturers and a few grocery manufacturers, which 
claimed that if they signed up to the Covenant they might be 
disadvantaged in competition with non-signatories. How that could be 
I am not sure (Henrick, 2001b). 
Henrick commented that companies need to choose whether or not to join the covenant 
but did not explicitly encourage them to do so. He also implied that the NPC represents 
‘business-as-usual’ for most companies: 
By signing, a company commits to review its own packaging, to ask 
their suppliers to do the same, to seek continuous improvement in 
terms of minimising packaging, ensuring its recyclability and 
encouraging the development of markets for recycled packaging 
materials ... Nobody could argue with the principles behind those 
ideas.  Most companies would do it as a matter of course to ensure 
they are not wasting money in relation to their competitors’ packaging 
(Henrick, 2001b). 
NARGA is strongly opposed to environmental regulation of any kind and does not appear 
to acknowledge that packaging represents an environmental problem. This view was 
evident in NARGA’s response to the Productivity Commission’s draft report on Waste 
Management and Resource Efficiency: 
[The association] fully supports the Commission’s findings ... 
especially the recommendation relating to the need to base waste 
policy on consideration of economic efficiency as a means of 
capturing the combination of resource and capital efficiency in ways 
that optimise community benefit. Such an approach would prevent 
policy decisions being based on a single ‘excuse’ such as 
‘sustainability’ (narrowly defined), ‘the waste hierarchy’ ... and the 
wide range of simplistic justifications used for current waste 
management policy approaches (NARGA, 2006, p. 2).  
In relation to packaging policy, NARGA sought an ‘urgent review of both the plastic 
shopping bag reduction/elimination program and the KPIs and data requirements of the 
National Packaging Covenant’ (NARGA, 2006, p. 30), both of which they argued could 
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not be justified in cost-benefit terms. The association’s position on environmental issues is 
also clear in their comment on global warming: ‘Despite the bleating of the greens, there 
is no strong evidence to support greenhouse theory’ (Henrick, 2001a). 
This analysis of public statements demonstrates that most of the evaluated companies have 
made strong public commitments to implement PS. However, there are clear differences 
between sectors in the language they use to discuss PS and packaging issues, reflecting 
their historical involvement in packaging debates and the leadership role played by 
industry associations. But what are companies actually doing to implement these corporate 
commitments? Corporate policies and practices which provide evidence of a practical 
commitment to PS are investigated in the following two sections. 
Policies and policy processes: product stewardship 
performance 
The public policy and discursive processes which were analysed in Chapter 4 established 
product stewardship as a new framework for the environmental management of 
packaging. Working through their industry associations, companies were able to shape the 
policy framework (the voluntary NPC and back-up regulation through the NEPM) into 
something which, in their view, would meet stakeholder expectations without imposing 
unreasonable costs on industry.  
This section examines the institionalisation of PS within companies by evaluating 
corporate policies and practices, and by comparing responsiveness in different parts of the 
supply chain. To assist in this process, seventeen indicators of PS performance have been 
identified. These are based on the requirements of NPC Mark I, standards of industry ‘best 
practice’ and the investigation of stakeholder expectations in Chapter 4. All of these help 
to define the PS institution. The review of the CSR literature in Chapter 2 highlighted the 
importance of public policy and stakeholder expectations in defining the social 
responsibilities of companies. From an institutional perspective, best practice standards 
are also important because if successful competitors are implementing environmental 
management initiatives then this increases pressure on other companies in the same field 
to do the same (Gunningham et al., 2003). 
The indicators encompass all functional areas of a business: 
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• management – policy, resources, environmental management system, 
environmental accounting and reporting; 
• product development – environmental assessment of products, research and 
development, design for environment and procurement; 
• operations – cleaner production and recycling of commercial and industrial waste; 
• marketing – marketing strategy and product labelling; 
• corporate affairs/environment – product recovery, litter management, voluntary 
environmental programs, consultation and education. 
The indicators and the scoring system which was developed to rate corporate 
responsiveness are provided in Table 23100 (more detail on the indicators, including 
minimum industry standards and ‘best practice’ examples, is provided in Appendix 3).  
Results: implementation of product stewardship policy and practice 
The results of the evaluation are provided in Appendix 5 and summarised in the following 
sections.  The average responsiveness score for all 30 companies was 1.2, which is only 
slightly over the ‘compliant’ level. The highest individual score was for participation in 
voluntary environmental programs (1.9), largely because all of the companies are 
signatories to the NPC (Table 24). The next highest scores were for product recovery (1.7) 
and cleaner production (1.6). The lowest score was for litter management (0.6), despite the 
fact that litter is one of the issues identified in Chapter 4 as particularly important to 
stakeholders such as ENGOs and local government. Low responsiveness scores were also 
achieved for environmental marketing strategies and product labelling (both 0.9).  
                                                     
100 The first version of the guidelines was published in Lewis (2006). 
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Table 23: Product stewardship indicators and evaluation scores 
Note: scores are cumulative, i.e. a company can only receive a ‘2’ score if they have already met the requirements for ‘1’. 
Performance score Indicator 
Defensive (0) Compliant (1) Progressive (2) Proactive (3) 
Sources 
Product-
oriented 
environmental 
policy, 
objectives and 
targets 
There is no product 
stewardship policy in 
place. 
The company has a 
stated commitment to 
product stewardship. 
The environmental 
policy identifies product 
stewardship objectives. 
The company has 
policies and procedures 
with clear objectives, 
strategies and 
measurable targets for 
product stewardship. 
International EMS 
Standard (Standards 
Australia and Standards 
New Zealand, 2004). 
Environmental 
management literature, 
e.g. Sadgrove (1992), 
Gray and Bebbington 
(2001). 
Industry best practice. 
Resources There is no indication of 
any resources allocated 
to product stewardship. 
A financial contribution 
has been made to the 
NPC Transitional Fund. 
Financial and human 
resources are allocated to 
product stewardship 
activities, e.g. through 
the environment 
manager and special 
projects.  
Responsibility and 
budget for product 
stewardship is allocated 
across all aspects of the 
business.  
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
Industry best practice. 
Product-
oriented 
environment 
management 
system (EMS) 
There is no management 
system in place to 
manage product 
stewardship. 
The company has an 
EMS. 
The company has a 
certified EMS in place 
for some sites (e.g. high 
risk sites). 
Product stewardship 
policies and procedures 
are integrated within the 
company’s EMS.  
Environmental management and 
DFE literature, e.g. International 
EMS Standard (Standards 
Australia and Standards New 
Zealand, 2004), Klinkers et al. 
(1999), Rocha and Brezet 
(1999), Ammenberg and Sundin 
(2005a). 
Industry best practice.  
Product-
oriented 
environmental 
accounting 
There is no system is in 
place to measure product 
flows or performance 
against NPC objectives. 
A monitoring system is 
in place to measure 
performance against 
NPC objectives.  
A product database 
tracks material flows and 
achievements against 
NPC objectives and 
KPIs. 
The product database is 
also being used for 
strategic analysis and 
design for environment. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999). 
Environmental management 
literature, e.g. Schaltegger et al. 
(2003), IFAC (2005). 
Industry best practice. 
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Performance score Indicator 
Defensive (0) Compliant (1) Progressive (2) Proactive (3) 
Sources 
Product 
stewardship 
reporting 
There is no public 
reporting on product 
stewardship activities. 
Product stewardship 
commitments and 
achievements are 
published in annual 
reports to the NPCC.  
An environment or 
sustainability report is 
published with 
information on broader 
company impacts and 
initiatives, including 
product stewardship. 
The company publishes 
an environment or 
sustainability report 
which is externally 
verified or prepared 
according to the GRI or 
AA1000 Standard. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
Industry best practice. 
Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI, 2002). 
Environmental 
assessment of 
products 
Environmental 
assessment of products is 
not undertaken.  
Some research is being 
undertaken on the 
environmental impacts 
of products, e.g. there is 
a process to review all 
packaging over time. 
A policy and procedures 
are in place to ensure an 
environmental 
assessment is undertaken 
for all product 
development (qualitative 
or semi-quantitative) 
A policy and procedures 
are in place to ensure an 
LCA is undertaken for 
all product development. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
International LCA Standard 
(Standards Australia and 
Standards New Zealand, 1997) 
DFE literature, e.g. Pujari et al. 
(2003).  
Industry best practice. 
Research and 
development 
There is no expenditure 
on environmental R&D 
relating to products. 
There is some 
expenditure on R&D to 
achieve waste reduction 
in relation to products. 
There is some 
expenditure on R&D to 
reduce the environmental 
impacts of product life 
cycles. 
Significant R&D effort 
is focused on developing 
new technologies or 
products that would 
position the company as 
a leader in 
environmentally 
improved products.  
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
DFE literature, e.g. Rocha and 
Brezet (1999), Klinkers et al. 
(1999). 
Industry best practice. 
 
Design for 
environment 
(DFE) 
Environmental issues are 
not considered within the 
design process. 
The company uses the 
Environmental Code of 
Practice for Packaging 
(ECoPP) or equivalent in 
product development and 
there is some evidence of 
environmental 
improvement. 
The ECoPP or 
equivalent is integrated 
within the product 
development process and 
there is a number of 
reported DFE initiatives. 
DFE is included in 
written policies and 
procedures for product 
development and there is 
evidence of its 
effectiveness (i.e. 
products with reduced 
environmental impact 
which go beyond 
lightweighting). 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
DFE literature, e.g. Lewis et al. 
(2001), Pujari et al. (2003), 
Rocha and Brezet (1999), 
Ehrenfeld and Lenox (1997), 
ISO (2001). 
Industry best practice. 
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Performance score Indicator 
Defensive (0) Compliant (1) Progressive (2) Proactive (3) 
Sources 
Procurement There is no process in 
place to involve 
suppliers in product 
stewardship. 
Suppliers have started to 
be engaged in product 
stewardship, e.g. 
involved in joint projects 
or encouraged to reduce 
impacts of products. 
An environmental 
purchasing policy is in 
place and environmental 
information is collected 
from all suppliers.  
Suppliers are selected on 
the basis of their 
environmental 
performance and 
involvement in 
collaborative projects.  
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
Supply chain management and 
DFE literature, e.g. GEMI 
(2004), Verghese and Lewis 
(2007), NZBCSD (2003). 
Industry best practice. 
Cleaner 
production  
There is no evidence of 
any cleaner production 
initiatives. 
At least one cleaner 
production initiative has 
been implemented. 
There is a stated 
commitment to cleaner 
production and several 
initiatives have been 
implemented. 
The company has an 
ambitious goal for waste 
reduction (e.g. zero 
waste) and has already 
achieved significant 
waste reduction. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999). 
Cleaner production literature, 
e.g. Victorian EPA (1997), 
Dames and Moore (n.d.). 
Industry best practice. 
Recycling of 
commercial and 
industrial waste 
There is no evidence that 
solid wastes are recycled 
apart from in-house 
reprocessing of clean 
plastics. 
Some waste streams are 
recycled by external 
organisations, e.g. 
cardboard, pallets. 
More difficult waste 
streams are recycled, e.g. 
stretch film, organic 
wastes. 
The company has an 
ambitious goal for waste 
recovery and has already 
achieved high recovery 
rates.  
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
Industry best practice. 
Cleaner production literature 
(see above). 
Government programs, e.g. 
Sustainability Victoria (2008). 
Industry best practice. 
Environmental 
marketing 
strategies 
No environmental 
marketing is undertaken. 
There is some limited 
environmental 
marketing, e.g. 
environmental claims 
and labels. 
Marketing is being used 
to sell the company’s 
products as 
environmentally 
responsible. 
Marketing is being used 
to sell the company as a 
leader in product 
stewardship and CSR.  
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
DFE and environmental 
marketing literature, e.g. 
Klinkers at al. (1999), Banerjee 
(1999). 
International Standard for 
environmental claims and labels 
(Standards Australia and 
Standards New Zealand, 2000). 
Industry best practice. 
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Performance score Indicator 
Defensive (0) Compliant (1) Progressive (2) Proactive (3) 
Sources 
Product 
labelling 
The company does not 
use any environmental 
claims or labels, or 
makes meaningless or 
incorrect claims. 
A program is under way 
to include logos on 
products to promote 
recyclability, recycled 
content or responsible 
disposal. 
A program is under way 
to include clear and 
detailed statements about 
environmental impact. 
The environmental 
benefits of products are 
certified by a third-party 
organisation.  
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
International Standard for 
environmental claims and labels 
(Standards Australia and 
Standards New Zealand, 2000). 
Environmental labelling 
schemes, e.g. GECA (n.d.), FSC 
(1996). 
Industry best practice. 
Product 
recovery 
The company does not 
take any action to ensure 
products are recovered at 
end-of-life. 
The company contributes 
to the NPC Transitional 
Fund which supports 
recovery. Labelling 
promotes recyclability 
where appropriate. 
The company is actively 
involved in an industry 
program to reprocess its 
own products, or is 
undertaking R&D to 
improve product 
recovery. 
The company is directly 
involved in collection of 
at least some its own 
products for reuse or 
recycling. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
Stakeholder expectations (see 
Chapter 4). 
Industry best practice. 
Litter 
management 
The company does not 
take any action to 
minimise the impacts of 
its products in the litter 
stream. 
Products include an anti-
litter logo or advice on 
appropriate disposal.  
The company considers 
litter impacts during the 
design process and 
contributes funding to 
anti-litter programs. 
The company can 
demonstrate that it has 
redesigned its products 
to reduce impacts in the 
litter stream. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
Stakeholder expectations (see 
Chapter Four and Lewis, 2005). 
Industry best practice. 
Voluntary 
environmental 
programs 
The company is not a 
signatory to the NPC. 
The company is a 
signatory to the NPC and 
submitted at least one 
action plan and at least 
one annual report. 
The company was an 
early signatory to the 
NPC (first action plan 
published in 2001 or 
earlier) and has 
submitted all required 
action plans and annual 
reports. 
The company is also 
involved in at least one 
other voluntary 
government 
environmental program. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999).  
A previous evaluation of the 
NPC (Nolan-ITU, 2004). 
Voluntary government 
programs, e.g. Waste Wise 
(Sustainability Victoria, 2008), 
Buy Recycled Business Alliance 
(BRBA, 2008), Greenhouse 
Challenge (DEWHA, 2008). 
Industry best practice. 
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Performance score Indicator 
Defensive (0) Compliant (1) Progressive (2) Proactive (3) 
Sources 
Consultation 
and education 
The company does not 
communicate with 
stakeholders about 
product stewardship. 
Education is provided 
for employees and 
contractors (e.g. NPC 
obligations). 
Education is provided 
for suppliers and/or 
customers. 
Other stakeholders are 
consulted about product 
stewardship programs, 
e.g. community, 
government. 
NPC (ANZECC, 1999). Industry 
best practice. 
A previous evaluation of the 
NPC (Nolan-ITU, 2004). 
 
 
 
 181 
Table 24: Average product stewardship scores by policy indicator 
Product stewardship policies Average score 
Management  
Product policy and objectives 1.4 
Resource allocation 1.3 
Product-oriented EMS 1.3 
Product-based accounting 1.1 
Product stewardship reporting 1.4 
Average score— management  1.3 
Product development  
Environmental assessment of products 1.0 
Research and development 1.1 
Design for environment 1.3 
Procurement 1.3 
Average score—product development 1.2 
Operations  
Cleaner production 1.6 
Recycling of commercial and industrial waste 1.4 
Average score—operations 1.5 
Marketing  
Environmental marketing strategies 0.9 
Product labelling 0.9 
Average score—marketing 0.9 
Corporate affairs/environment  
Product recovery 1.7 
Litter management 0.6 
Voluntary environmental programs 1.9 
Consultation and communication 1.3 
Average score—corporate affairs / environment 1.4 
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
When these indicators are grouped according to the functional area in the business which 
would normally have responsibility for implementation, clear differences emerge (Figure 
16). The two areas which received the highest scores were operations (1.5) and corporate 
affairs/environment (1.4) followed by management (1.3), product development (1.2) and 
marketing (0.9). 
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Figure 16: Average product stewardship score by business function 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
Management policies and practices achieved a relatively high responsiveness score, with 
many companies building PS into existing corporate management systems. One of the 
highest scores in this category was for ‘product policy and objectives’. High scores were 
achieved by companies with a commitment to PS in their environment policy. For 
example, Amcor Australasia's (2005) environmental policy states that the company is 
'committed to product stewardship, managing its operations and designing its products in 
an environmentally responsible manner'. National Foods Limited (2002) updated their 
policy in 2002 to include a statement that they would ‘apply the principles of the National 
Packaging Covenant and waste minimisation to the development and management of 
products throughout their life cycle’. 
The lowest score within the management category was for product-based accounting (1.1), 
which is a relatively new activity for business. While most of the case study companies 
have a system for monitoring and reporting on NPC commitments, they have a very poor 
understanding of the quantities and types of packaging they use. This limits their ability to 
measure the environmental impacts of the packaging they produce or consume, for 
example by understanding the percentage which is recyclable.  
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Product development, which includes environmental assessment of products, research and 
development, design for environment and procurement, achieved the second-lowest 
average score (1.2). Design for environment achieved one of the highest scores within this 
category (1.3) but this is still relatively low given that DFE is a particularly important 
element of PS because of its influence on environmental outcomes throughout the product 
life cycle. Table 25 provides a summary of the types of DFE initiatives mentioned in 
company reports. The most common design initiatives involved the lightweighting of 
packaging or elimination of components, followed by the use of recycled materials. A 
much smaller percentage of companies have designed products to be recyclable or 
degradable, or introduced reusable packaging such as reusable shopping bags and reusable 
transport containers. Some companies have replaced a specific packaging material, 
normally polyvinyl chloride (PVC), with another which is perceived to be 
environmentally preferable101.  
Table 25: Companies mentioning DFE projects in their reports 
 Number of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
Lightweighting/elimination 26 87 
Recycled content 19 63 
Design for recycling 12 40 
Design for degradability 3 10 
Design for reuse 5 17 
Use of eco-preferable materials 7 23 
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
The relatively high score for operational policies (1.5), which include cleaner production 
and in-house recycling, is consistent with the corporate discourses on packaging and 
corporate responsibility, which emphasise actions that are under a company’s direct 
‘control and influence’. These policies have also been the focus of corporate 
environmental management programs for at least a decade and are therefore relatively 
well established within industry. Many of the case study companies have chosen to focus 
their NPC action plans on these types of activities, which in many cases were under way 
before they became signatories. While there is often an up-front cost to design and 
                                                     
101 Greenpeace International (2001) has lobbied industry and governments for many years to ban 
the use of PVC because of its perceived environmental impacts, which include emission of toxic 
materials during manufacture, use and disposal. 
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implement these types of policies, ongoing costs can be minimal. There may even be a 
cost reduction, for example if waste disposal costs are reduced. Foster’s Group (2004b) 
has a ‘Buy Recycled’ purchasing policy which requires that ‘when choosing between 
products of equivalent quality and cost, Foster’s Group must give preference to products 
which contain recycled material’. This implies that the policy is only implemented when 
there is no impact on either quality or cost. For Coca-Cola Amatil, water saving initiatives 
have resulted in a 4% reduction in water use per litre of beverage, or 95 million litres per 
year (CCA, 2005, p. 24). This would translate into an annual cost saving. 
Policies which tend to be implemented by staff in corporate affairs or environment, 
including product recovery, litter management, voluntary environment programs and 
communication also have a long history, particularly within packaging and beverage 
companies. However, there are significant differences within this category, for example 
between the average scores for product recovery (1.7) and litter management (0.6). The 
relatively high score for product recovery is primarily because all of the companies pay an 
annual fee to the Kerbside Transitional Fund—a condition of becoming an NPC 
signatory—and most of the packaging manufacturers are also directly involved in the 
collection and reprocessing of waste packaging. Amcor for instance, collect, sort and 
recycle over 740,000 tonnes of waste paper and packaging each year (Amcor, 2000, p. 
14). 
Environmental marketing is also relatively new for most companies and achieved the 
lowest responsiveness score (0.9). Very few companies, with the notable exception of 
Visy, market the environmental attributes of their products. Many companies are starting 
to put recycling logos and the Plastics Identification Code on packaging to encourage 
consumers to recycle, but provide no other information on environmental impact or 
recovery options. Dulux goes further than most by providing information on correct 
disposal of used paint and paint tins on packaging, including the steel can recycling logo 
(Dulux, 2004, p. 5)102. 
                                                     
102 The Plastics Identification Code and other logos are illustrated in Appendix 3. 
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Comparing words and actions 
For some companies the rhetoric they invoke to describe their corporate commitment to 
PS is not matched by their policies and practices. Carter Holt Harvey’s (2001) 
commitment to being ‘unrelenting’ in their search for ‘cleaner, greener products’ (p. 7), 
for example, is not matched by the policies and practices recorded in their public reports. 
In this evaluation they achieved a low overall responsiveness score (1.0) and a ‘0’ for the 
environmental assessment of products because there was no indication that they use LCA 
or any other evaluation method during product development. There was also no mention 
in the company’s reports that they were using the ECoPP in product development.  
Ten of the evaluated companies achieved a responsiveness score of less than 1.0, which 
suggests that they are doing less than the minimum that would be expected under the NPC 
and other recognised environmental management standards. This is despite the fact that 
most of the companies have expressed support for the NPC and/or the principle of PS in 
their public statements (Table 26), albeit in fairly weak or non-committal language. The 
non-compliant group in this list includes four retailers, five brand owners (four food and 
beverage manufacturers and one appliance manufacturer) and one raw material supplier.  
Table 26: Comparing words and actions of non-compliant companies 
Company Language used in public statements about packaging 
responsibility 
Responsiveness 
score 
Coles Myer 
Limited 
‘The Board and management of Coles Myer Ltd support the 
packaging Covenant principles and are committed to the 
Company achieving the objectives outlined in this plan’ (Stan 
Wallis, Chairman, cited in Coles Myer Limited, 2001, p. 1). 
0.9 
Metcash 
Trading 
Limited 
‘By using the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging and 
carrying out some corporate branded reviews we continued to 
identify ongoing commitments to Product Stewardship...’ 
(Metcash, 2005, p. 2)  
0.8 
David Jones 
Limited 
‘David Jones became a signatory of the NPC in July 2002, 
recognising its relevance and alignment with our corporate 
philosophy’ (David Jones Limited, 2002, p. 1) 
0.4 
Bunnings 
Group 
Limited 
‘We support the notion of Product Stewardship, the ethic of 
continual improvement, working with our suppliers and 
customers to achieve positive outcomes for the environment, and 
the community as a whole’ (Bunnings Warehouse, 2002, p. 3) 
0.7 
Bonlac 
Foods 
Limited 
‘In line with BFL’s track record of our commitment to the 
environment, the National Packaging Covenant will play a key 
role in continuing our commitment to best practice in 
environmental management issues’ (Bonlac Foods, 2004, p. 3) 
0.7 
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Company Language used in public statements about packaging 
responsibility 
Responsiveness 
score 
Goodman 
Fielder 
‘Goodman Fielder is committed to minimising the impacts its 
product has on the environment ... We continually seek to reduce 
packaging weight ... (Goodman Fielder, 2004, p. 8). 
0.7 
Sugar 
Australia 
‘Sugar Australia supports the principles of the National 
Packaging Covenant ... [and] ... commits to implementing the 
principles of Product Packaging Stewardship’ (Sugar Australia, 
2000, p. 4). 
0.8 
Murray 
Goulburn 
Co-
operative 
‘We see this initiative as a positive approach to managing 
packaging and resultant waste associated with it. We support the 
notion of Product Stewardship, the ethic of continuing importance 
[sic] and working with suppliers and customers. The Co-operative 
supports the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging’ 
(Murray Goulburn Co-operative, 2002, p. 1— note the similarity 
to Bunnings’ commitment above) 
0.6 
Fisher & 
Paykel 
Appliances 
‘Fisher & Paykel Appliances commitment is to uphold the 
following ... Design products and processes, particularly material 
selection and recycling programmes, that have a positive effect in 
protecting the environment’ (Fisher & Paykel, 2003, p. 14). 
0.9 
Qenos 
Holdings 
‘Qenos believes supporting and complying with the National 
Packaging Covenant is a natural extension of our Safety, Health 
and Environment Policy and our commitment to Responsible 
Care ... we embrace the principles of Product Stewardship and 
Shared Responsibility’ (Qenos, 2001, p. 5). 
0.9 
 
Company characteristics: industry sector and 
responsiveness 
Industry sector appears to be a major influence on responsiveness (Figure 17). Packaging 
manufacturers and brand owners achieved the highest overall scores of 1.4 and 1.3 
respectively, and retailers achieved the lowest score of 0.8. This puts retailers into the 
‘defensive’ range, which means that they are taking some action but less than the 
minimum required to maintain a good public image.  
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Figure 17: Average product stewardship scores by industry sector 
(The number of case studies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
The low responsiveness score for retailers may reflect the fact that they were not under 
any pressure to take responsibility for the environmental impacts of packaging until the 
mid–1990s. The industry association representing the major supermarkets, ASI, opposed 
the NPC until the last intense days of industry negotiations, when Coles Myer agreed to 
sign the covenant and in so doing helped to secure industry-wide support and get it ‘over 
the line’. This decision was initially opposed by Woolworths, which did not become a 
signatory until May 2001, almost two years after the covenant commenced in October 
1999. Bunnings, David Jones and Metcash were not involved in the NPC negotiations but 
did eventually sign NPC Mark I103.  
Most interviewees from the retail sector admitted that their environmental programs were 
relatively new and had, at least in part, been driven by their involvement in the NPC. 
Unlike many of the large packaging manufacturers and brand owners, the retailers are 
based in Australia and until recently had not made any public corporate commitment to 
sustainability or corporate social responsibility. For example, Coles Myer published its 
first CSR report in 2005 and Woolworths published its first sustainability report in 2008. 
The following comments by interviewees highlight the recent shift in the retailers’ 
                                                     
103 The first action plans for these companies were all submitted in 2002. 
 188 
approach to environmental management, driven by the NPC and other environmental 
pressures:  
[The company] have just recently taken a stronger environmental 
stance, probably because of their higher public profile. That covers 
everything from energy to supermarkets, to truck movements, to dry 
water systems for urinals, company policies for hybrid vehicles. So  ...  
they have become a signatory to the covenant, which is the first time 
they’ve joined up, so I think they are gradually collecting or mining 
what they need to do ... [to] appease all the environmental issues that 
will come in different ways (Personal communication, Company I). 
The company originally saw the National Packaging Covenant as an 
environmental approach, and basically I was the person driving the 
concept into the business. Other follow-up projects like the [plastic 
bags] campaign, the development of waste management practices has 
been through this office or this department. What has [driven us to 
implement] a sustainable environmental policy has been the recent 
development in carbon trading discussions and energy efficiency and 
water management. Those three initiatives are now being bolted onto 
those earlier environmental portfolios (Personal communication, 
Company K). 
One company which has been fairly open about the impact of the covenant on their 
environmental program is hardware retailer Bunnings. After they received a compliance 
notice from the Queensland EPA in 2002 stating that they could either sign up to the 
covenant or follow the more onerous rules established under the NEPM, Bunnings became 
a signatory and made significant changes to their policies and practices (Queensland EPA, 
2005, p. 13): 
We’d vaguely heard of the Covenant, but weren’t really looking at 
waste, litter and recycling issues at the time, and product stewardship 
was a term we certainly hadn’t heard of ... When the issue was put to 
Bunnings directors, it was well supported. Our first action plan 
signalled a commitment to packaging waste as well as other 
sustainability outcomes. We not only learnt what product stewardship 
meant, but started on a program that has changed the culture of the 
business, our suppliers, and most importantly, our customers (Mark 
Gomm, National Risk Analysis Manager, Bunnings).  
Since joining the covenant, Bunnings has established a recycling program for in-house 
packaging waste, a sustainable timber purchasing policy, a water and energy management 
program and a levy on plastic bags to discourage their use by consumers (Queensland 
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EPA, 2005)104. While Bunnings is not alone in establishing these types of programs, this 
comment is important in clearly linking their program to the influence of the NPC and the 
NEPM. In their only report to the NPCC under NPC Mark I, retailer David Jones was 
frank in acknowledging that very little had been done to implement their commitments 
because other business objectives had taken priority (David Jones Limited, 2004, p. 2): 
David Jones remains committed to the management of environmental 
issues. However, the reporting period has been a challenging period 
for the company, where it has had to focus on fixing elements of the 
company’s basic core business performance as its key priority, 
following recording a loss of $25.5m in the financial year ending 31 
July 2003 ... The turnaround in the company’s performance has now 
positioned the company well to focus on other matters, including its 
NPC Action Plan and related environmental issues. 
One of the first commitments in their 2004 report was to ‘[d]evelop a David Jones 
Environmental Policy to spearhead the company’s commitment to the NPC and encourage 
further environmental efficiencies’ (David Jones Limited, 2004, p. 2).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, many of the larger companies in these sectors have been 
actively involved in PS debates for some time, particularly those involved in the 
manufacture or packaging of beverages such as beer and soft drink. The average PS 
responsiveness score for companies who were members of BIEC during NPC Mark I, 
either as a corporate entity or through one of their divisions105, was much higher than the 
score for non-members (Table 27).  
                                                     
104 It should be noted, however, that Bunnings did not produce an action plan for NPC Mark II until 
2007, two years after it commenced (Bunnings Group Limited, 2007). 
105 During 2003–2004 BIEC had 27 members including seven of the case study companies 
examined here. They included two divisions of ACI Operations (ACI Glass Packaging and ACI 
Plastics Packaging), a division of Amcor Australasia (Amcor Beverage Cans), a division of Visy 
Industries (Visypak) as well as Foster’s Group, Cadbury Schweppes and Lion Nathan (BIEC, 2004, 
pp. 8-9).  
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Table 27: Average responsiveness scores for BIEC members 
Company Average score
BIEC members: 
Foster's Group 1.8
Lion Nathan 1.7
Cadbury Schweppes 1.7
Coca-Cola Amatil 1.4
ACI Operations 1.2
Amcor Australasia 1.8
Visy Industries 2.0
BIEC average 1.7
Average for other companies 1.1
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
The approach taken by beverage manufacturers was well established by the time the NPC 
was introduced: 
[PS has not brought about many changes] within our industry, because 
there really hasn't been any shift, because of the Container Deposit 
Legislation in 1975 or so, where the beverage industry was forced to 
take a product stewardship position before it was recognised as that, 
and before any other industry even considered it was relevant to them 
... The industry is essentially unchanged today compared to 1975, in 
terms of what it manufactures, how it manufactures it, and its 
expectations of how those containers should be handled. We've only 
used recyclable containers, and there's been no shift towards or away 
from them. So no, from the beverage industry point of view it has 
been thrust back and forth on the storms of the broader EPR debate, 
but its activities go on. They change over time. As kerbside came in, 
as littering behaviour changed because of the Do the Right Thing 
campaign the emphasis switched to kerbside, as kerbside became 
stabilised the emphasis has now shifted to away-from-home 
[recycling]. So you can see those waves of progression. But the core 
activity and core products are unchanged (Personal communication, 
Company E). 
The involvement of some packaging companies in recycling activities, both for economic 
reasons and as a result of stakeholder pressure, has also provided them with a greater 
capacity to implement PS policies in other parts of the company. For example, an 
understanding of collection and reprocessing systems is important in knowing how to 
design packaging for recyclability. This point was made by one of the interviewees: 
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It probably needs to be recorded that the recycling division as a whole 
has been the key driver for product stewardship knowledge and 
learning as well, because it provides that environmental solution, and 
in struggling to do that, it’s been able to help the company learn what 
on the input side makes the end-of-the-pipe of product stewardship 
more feasible (Personal communication, Company A). 
There were significant differences between the sectors for some of the PS indicators 
(Table 28). These tend to be consistent with overall levels of responsiveness in each 
sector, for example packaging manufacturers and brand owners tend to be more 
responsive than retailers. Some of the differences also reflect the ability of companies 
under the NPC to choose strategies which are most relevant to their business. Product 
development scores, for example, were highest for brand owners (1.4) and packaging 
manufacturers (1.2), the two sectors with most influence on packaging design (Figure 18). 
The low score for product development by the retailers is significant given that these 
companies are becoming important brand owners in their own right and therefore are 
required under the NPC to implement the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging.  
Table 28: Average responsiveness scores by sector and business function 
 Management Product 
development 
Operations Marketing Corporate 
affairs/ 
environment 
Packaging 
manufacturers 1.3 1.2 1.7 0.8 2.0 
Retailers 
0.6 0.5 1.2 0.7 1.1 
Brand owners 
1.4 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.3 
Raw material 
suppliers 1.1 0.4 1.6 0.8 1.3 
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
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Figure 18: Average responsiveness scores for product development by sector 
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
1.2
0.5
1.4
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Packaging
manufacturers (5)
Retailers (5) Brand owners
(18)
Raw material
suppliers (2)
 
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
 
The highest score for environmental marketing (Figure 19) was achieved by brand owners 
(1.0). This is consistent with the fact that brand owners are largely responsible for direct 
marketing to consumers. Packaging manufacturers are also involved, for instance by 
including material identification codes on packaging or encouraging brand owners to use 
appropriate recycling logos.  
Figure 19: Average responsiveness scores for environmental marketing by sector 
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
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The score for corporate affairs/environment was much higher for packaging manufacturers 
(2.0) than for the other sectors (between 1.1 and 1.3) (Figure 20). In all probability this 
can be attributed to the fact that until recently packaging manufacturers have been under 
more pressure from governments and ENGOs to address waste and litter issues than other 
parts of the supply chain, with the notable exception of beverage manufacturers. This only 
changed during NPC negotiations during the mid–1990s, when other sectors became 
involved.  
Figure 20: Average responsiveness scores for corporate affairs/environment by sector 
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
The responsiveness scores for operational policies and practices were relatively high and 
relatively consistent between sectors (Figure 21). Most of these companies have large 
manufacturing facilities with significant waste streams, and the opportunity to reduce 
waste management costs tends to drive initiatives such as cleaner production and in-house 
recycling. Responsiveness to cleaner production was highest among packaging 
manufacturers (1.9), raw material suppliers (1.8) and brand owners (1.6) and lowest for 
retailers (1.0). Cleaner production and in-house recycling tend to be a lower priority for 
retailers than manufacturers because their waste streams are smaller and less hazardous.   
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Figure 21: Average responsiveness scores for operations by sector 
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
 
Responsiveness scores for management indicators, including product policy and 
objectives, resource allocation, EMS, product-based accounting and PS reporting, also 
varied widely between sectors (Figure 22). Once again the retail sector was the least 
responsive (0.6). Only one retailer, Bunnings, mentioned that they had an EMS, resulting 
in a particularly low score for this indicator (0.2). This is consistent with a survey of 
Australian companies with certification to ISO 14000 (the international standard for EMS) 
which found that 43% are in the manufacturing sector and only 0.8% in the retail sector 
(Zutshi and Sohal, 2004, p.340). Manufacturing companies tend to have more significant 
environmental impacts and are subject to stricter environmental regulation on issues such 
as waste and pollution than companies in other sectors.  
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Figure 22: Average responsiveness scores for management by sector 
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the institutionalisation of PS at a meso level by asking the 
question: How and to what extent is product stewardship being institutionalised by 
companies in different sectors of the packaging supply chain, particularly raw material 
suppliers, packaging manufacturers, brand owners and retailers? The discussion 
distinguished between sectors with different roles and interests in relation to packaging; 
examined the language used by companies and industry associations to express their 
commitment to the environmental management of packaging; identified policies and 
practices which could be used to institutionalise PS within companies; and then rated the 
PS responsiveness of 30 case study companies. Finally, the implementation of policies and 
practices was compared across different industry sectors. 
The research found that PS is being institutionalised throughout the supply chain through 
corporate language, policy and practice. Most companies have incorporated the language 
of PS into their public statements and are implementing environmental policies and 
practices which aim to reduce the environmental impacts of packaging. However, most are 
only doing the minimum required to meet stakeholder expectations. In some cases there is 
a gap between the language they use in public to describe their commitment to PS, and the 
implementation of PS through policy and practice.  
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Companies are most responsive in operational areas, such as cleaner production and in-
house recycling, which have been the focus of government policy and corporate 
environmental management for many years. They are also relatively responsive in 
corporate affairs and environmental management activities that involve interaction with 
external stakeholders, such as product recovery and voluntary environmental programs. 
They are less responsive in core business areas such as product development and 
marketing, where corporate decisions about packaging design have a significant impact on 
its life cycle environmental impacts. There is also another important gap relating to 
stakeholder expectations. Litter management policies, including design, labelling and 
funding for external anti-litter initiatives, achieved a very low score despite the fact that 
litter is a key issue for stakeholders such as ENGOs and local government.  
Overall responsiveness varied between sectors. Packaging manufacturers and brand 
owners were the most responsive and, within this group, beverage manufacturers and their 
packaging suppliers were the best performers. They use terms such as ‘product 
stewardship’, ‘shared responsibility’ and ‘life cycle management’ in their public reports, 
and achieved a relatively high score for PS policy and practice. The CSR literature 
suggested that companies are more likely to be responsive if they are exposed to public or 
government scrutiny, so the higher responsiveness of brand owners and packaging 
manufacturers is not unexpected. It reflects the fact that these companies have been under 
pressure for many years to implement voluntary corporate responsibility programs in 
order to avoid CDL. Their industry associations—particularly PCA and BIEC—have 
played a leadership role in negotiating voluntary agreements, most recently the NPC. They 
have also promoted the benefits of PS and the NPC to their members. 
Retailers are at the other end of the spectrum. They were one of the last sectors to get 
involved in policy debates about the environmental impacts of packaging, and their 
industry associations—particularly ASI—have been much less supportive of voluntary 
responsibility than those representing the packaging industry and brand owners. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, final industry agreement on NPC Mark I was only reached in 1998 
after two years of negotiation, when one of the two key members of ASI decided to ignore 
the association’s advice and agreed to contribute funding to the transitional funding 
mechanism. Not surprisingly, the relatively unenthusiastic approach of retail associations 
towards voluntary responsibility for packaging is reflected in the policies and practices 
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being implemented by companies in this sector. Retailers received the lowest average 
score for PS responsiveness, which puts them in the ‘defensive’ range.  
These results suggest that corporate responsiveness to PS is strongly linked to the extent to 
which companies in different sectors have been exposed to stakeholder pressure, 
particularly from governments and ENGOs, to reduce the environmental impacts of 
packaging. It also appears to have been influenced by the leadership role played by 
industry associations in promoting PS to their members. The implementation of particular 
policies and practices was also found to vary between sectors. One of the perceived 
advantages of the NPC from an industry point of view is its flexibility, i.e. the ability of 
companies to choose how and when they respond to the broad objectives and requirements 
of the covenant. Some of the differences in the way that individual sectors have responded 
can be explained by the nature of their business activities. Product development, for 
example, is more relevant to packaging manufacturers and brand owners than to raw 
material suppliers and retailers.  
The next chapter will explore the institutionalisation of PS within companies in more 
detail. In particular, it will investigate the way that PS outcomes are negotiated internally 
and with external stakeholders, and the organisational changes which are helping to 
institutionalise PS in corporate policy and practice. 
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Chapter 6 
Institutionalising product stewardship within 
companies 
The previous chapter investigated the extent to which PS has been institutionalised in 
policies and practices at an industry level. Companies associated with the beverage 
industry (brand owners and packaging manufacturers) were found to be the most 
responsive and those in the retail industry to be least responsive. This was linked to both 
the exposure of companies in these sectors to government pressure and the role of industry 
associations in promoting PS as a legitimate and necessary strategy for companies. 
This Chapter extends the analysis to the micro level by examining institutionalising 
processes within companies. The aim is to answer the question: How and why are 
individual companies implementing product stewardship? The focus is on the dynamics of 
internal decision-making processes, including the influence of stakeholders on functional 
groups within the firm, and structural and process changes which are helping to 
institutionalise PS in everyday practice. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
15 people from the case study companies evaluated in Chapter 5. While the identity of the 
interviewees is confidential, they were selected to represent a diverse group of companies 
by sector, size and location of head office. They also have different professional roles in 
environmental management, product development, marketing and technical services 
(Table 29). Each interviewee has formal responsibility for NPC compliance, i.e. they are 
listed as one of the key contacts within their NPC action plans and reports.  
The interviews suggest that people from different functional groups within a company 
have different goals and external stakeholders which influence their approach to PS in 
general and the NPC in particular. The development and implementation of PS strategies 
is therefore a political process that aims to balance multiple, and sometimes competing, 
organisational goals. The successful institutionalisation of PS is linked to discursive 
processes that make connections between PS and other corporate objectives such as 
efficiency and brand value; the presence of a strong project ‘champion’ or project team; 
cross-functional coordination and engagement; the allocation of responsibility to all 
relevant functional groups in the organisation; and the development of business systems 
 199 
and procedures that ensure PS policy is embedded in everyday practice. The research 
found that larger, high-profile companies, particularly those based in Europe and the US, 
tend to be more responsive than smaller companies and those based in Australia and the 
Asia–Pacific region.  
Table 29: Interviewees by industry sector and functional group 
Industry sector Functional group within the 
company 
Number of 
interviews* 
Corporate affairs 1 
Environment 4 
Packaging manufacturers 
Marketing 1 
Environment 4 Brand owners 
 Packaging  2 
Environment 1 
Packaging 1 
Retailers 
 
Technical services 1 
TOTAL  15 
* Interviews were held with 15 people from 14 companies (two people from one company were 
interviewed, one from corporate affairs and one from environment). 
 
Interest groups: interaction between internal groups and 
the organisational field 
The policies and practices identified in Chapter 5 have implications for almost every area 
of a company’s business. Each functional group has a different role, for example: 
• Marketing and product development staff—including the packaging group if there 
is one—need to consider environmental impacts during the product development 
process. 
• Procurement staff need to ensure that suppliers of packaging and other products 
meet the company’s environmental guidelines.  
• Environment and corporate affairs staff need to ensure that the company meets the 
expectations of government and ENGO stakeholders, for example by preparing 
NPC action plans and reports.  
PS therefore requires a coordinated approach with input from many different groups. Of 
the 30 company case studies which have been evaluated, 16 assigned responsibility for 
coordination of NPC actions to an environmental manager and the remainder to people in 
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other functional areas (Table 30). In some cases responsibility is shared between two 
people, such as between environment and packaging, or environment and marketing. One 
manager with environmental responsibilities noted that he prepares the company’s NPC 
action plans in conjunction with the marketing manager because of her direct link to 
customers: ‘Because she’s marketing manager she deals with the customers and [our NPC 
action plan is] always going to be ... interrelated with what the customers expect of us’ 
(Personal communication, Company D).  
  
Table 30: Company case studies: responsibility for NPC coordination and reporting  
Functional group with responsibility for the NPC Number of companies 
Environment 16 
Corporate Affairs 4 
Marketing 2 
Packaging 2 
Procurement 2 
Management 1 
Operations 1 
Technical services 2 
Business Development 2 
Not specified 2 
Total 34* 
* Four companies allocated responsibility to two people from different areas.  
Source: NPC reports and interviews. 
 
PS strategies within firms are determined through a process of negotiation between 
functional groups with different objectives and levels of power within the company. These 
reflect, at least in part, the objectives and power of different external stakeholders. To use 
Mintzberg’s (1983) language, policy is determined by functional groups in the ‘internal 
coalition’, which interact with each other and with dispersed members of an ‘external 
coalition’. However, some external stakeholders have more power and influence than 
others. As Mitchell et al. (1997) argued, managers decide how to respond to stakeholder 
demands based on their perceptions about their legitimacy, power and urgency. This 
means that the challenge for companies in implementing PS policies is not just one of 
communication and coordination. It is also a process of negotiation between internal and 
external stakeholders, particularly for activities relating to product development. Each 
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functional group has regular contact with external stakeholder groups who try to influence 
the activities of the company.  
One interviewee acknowledged that the only way she had been able to convince some 
groups to implement PS internally was by referring to the expectations of a diverse range 
of stakeholders. As she tried to drive change through the organisation she found that the 
NPC alone was not sufficient to motivate people—‘eyes started rolling in the back of their 
heads’—but they did respond when she referred to their global packaging policy and the 
expectations of NGOs, customers and consumers: ‘... suddenly it’s ooh! I have a reason 
why I must think about this’ (Personal communication, Company O). 
Some of the relationships between interest groups within the company, suppliers and 
customers which have an influence on the environmental impacts of packaging (both 
positive and negative) are shown in Figure 23. As discussed in Chapter 5, retailers are 
constantly putting pressure on their suppliers to reduce costs and meet sales targets in 
order to retain shelf space in supermarkets. This influences packaging development within 
brand owners and packaging manufacturers:  
• Product development and procurement staff within a brand owner company will 
negotiate with their packaging supplier to reduce costs and/or enhance packaging 
performance. 
• The marketing team within the packaging manufacturer will then liaise with their 
product development team to ensure that they meet the brand owner’s 
requirements. 
Corporate DFE policies may or may not be taken into account depending on the relative 
power and influence of internal and external stakeholders.  
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Figure 23: Interest groups involved in packaging development 
 
Feedback from industry representatives on the role of functional groups within the 
company and their external stakeholders in driving packaging development and other 
areas of PS performance is provided in the following sections. 
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In most cases management does not appear to be a major driver of PS within companies, 
although it can be a barrier. One environmental manager claimed that his ability to 
implement the company’s NPC action plan was limited because of a lack of resources and 
opposition from the chief executive officer (CEO) and some senior managers: 
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some other issues. [His] idea was that he had to return the company to 
Product 
development / 
procurement 
Marketing 
Corporate 
affairs / 
environment 
Management 
Operations 
Product 
development / 
procurement 
Marketing 
Corporate 
affairs / 
environment 
Management 
Operations 
Product 
development / 
procurement 
Marketing 
Corporate 
affairs / 
environment 
Management 
Operations 
Procurement 
Marketing 
Corporate 
affairs / 
environment 
Management 
Operations 
ENGOs, governments, NPCC, industry associations 
Key 
 
Strong influence on PS 
Weak influence on PS 
Raw material 
supplier 
Packaging 
manufacturer 
Brand owner Retailer 
Consumer 
Recycling 
infrastructure 
 203 
profitability and the only thing that counted was sales and profit and 
shareholder return: ‘Talk to me about environment, does it do 
anything for me in those things? Show it to me.’ It was hard. (Personal 
communication, Company G). 
The lack of support from the CEO meant that the environmental manager had difficulty 
convincing senior managers in the organisation to take action. The organisation as a whole 
was not committed to implementation of the NPC action plan and the CEO provided no 
support: ‘As we worked through that we realised that we had to get the signature of each 
brand MD to go forward. Having the signature of [the CEO] was not enough’ (Personal 
communication, Company G).  
In contrast, other companies have had strong support from senior management, and this 
has been critical to the success of PS programs: 
I have to say the CEO [and I] got in sync. very early ... when I did my 
initial reviews and said there are opportunities here to save some 
money for the company, to build some standards across the company, 
he pretty much endorsed it (Personal communication, Company K). 
Then there's been a genuine commitment from the company in their 
corporate philosophy to the triple bottom line performance, even 
though we didn't call it that. For a long time [the CEO] has been very 
strongly committed to the environment and social performance 
(Personal communication, Company A). 
In the latter case, the commitment of the CEO and other senior management to 
environmental performance in general, and PS in particular, has helped to create a culture 
in which PS performance is understood and practised by most staff members: ‘I think if 
you talk to most people who have had much experience at [this company], they would be 
able to tell you what our product stewardship commitments are. I think that’s a sign that 
it’s in the culture’ (Personal communication, Company A). 
These experiences reinforce the importance of a strong corporate policy and commitment 
from senior management in driving organisational change. 
Corporate affairs and environment, and their stakeholders 
The responsibilities of corporate affairs and environment staff include legal compliance, 
public relations and reputation management, so their key stakeholders on product-related 
issues tend to be government agencies, ENGOs and industry associations. These are the 
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stakeholder groups which are driving PS at a socio-political level and therefore could be 
expected to have a strong influence on PS policy and practice within firms.  
The covenant certainly does appear to be an important driver for many companies, for 
example by raising awareness of packaging-related environmental issues at a senior 
management level in companies across the supply chain: 
The covenant has raised the level of awareness in a broader range of 
the supply chain. If not the chief executives then at least the general 
managers of the brand names are now grappling with this issue; 
acknowledging that there is a risk and there is a responsibility 
(Personal communication, Company A). 
However, companies are highly critical of the lack of commitment by state governments 
to enforcing the NEPM, which they claim is undermining the effectiveness of the 
covenant by reducing the incentive for companies to take voluntary action. The following 
comments illustrate the view which was expressed by most interviewees, but particularly 
those in environment or corporate affairs roles: 
I'd like to see greater involvement from government. That's been very 
disappointing—that companies can free-ride the system is one of the 
greatest travesties in the last five years. Even now governments are 
reluctant to take responsibility and force those companies to do 
something. It's an illogical position that they cannot maintain 
(Personal communication, Company A). 
In the last five years I don’t think there has been a lot influence or 
pressure that government has put on us or the industry ... it’s given 
[this company] and the industry some sort of comfort and security 
that, ‘ok, now we have got the covenant so we can sit back and go 
back to normal’ to some extent (Personal communication, Company 
B1). 
In contrast, there is acknowledgement that threats by some state governments to introduce 
CDL106 are a strong motivation for the beverage industry, and that the NEPM has been 
instrumental in ensuring that other brand owners participate in the covenant. This has 
helped packaging manufacturers to pursue PS strategies with the customers: 
[Companies have been more responsive as a result of the covenant], at 
least the smaller ones and major companies such as Amatil and the 
                                                     
106 State government investigations into CDL were discussed in Chapter 4. The Senate also 
undertook an inquiry into the management of Australia’s waste streams in 2008, with a specific 
reference to CDL. This was in response to the introduction of the Drink Container Recycling Bill 
2008 by independent Senator Steve Fielding. 
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breweries ... That’s helped us, whereas before they just figured that we 
would do it (Personal communication, Company D). 
These comments support research which concluded that self-regulation will be more 
effective if there is a strong external pressure, for example through the threat of regulation, 
or some way of dealing with free-riders (Gunningham and Rees, 1997).  
One interviewee commented that industry is looking for more support rather than threats 
of regulation from governments: ‘I think that corporations are probably looking for more 
assistance ... I don’t think they necessarily need to be regulated but I think they need some 
good compliance standards. The covenant needs more drive ... (Personal communication, 
Company N). 
For some companies, the covenant has simply reinforced an existing corporate 
commitment that had been driven by earlier government policies: 
 [The NPC] was the thing that made us sit down and document 
everything; actually work out what we were going to do. It was the 
key driver of that ... But it wasn’t the initiator because we’d been 
talking to governments about the Industry Waste Reduction 
Agreements and those sorts of things prior to that. Things like litter 
have been on the agenda since the first store was built ... (Personal 
communication, Company H) 
Local government was mentioned by several manufacturers as an important stakeholder 
because of their active role in establishing and promoting kerbside recycling programs: 
Our biggest stakeholder is local government, because they are the ones 
who are most impacted by our products. So we spend most of our time 
with local government trying to support them. We also fight them. We 
want the same outcomes; we just want philosophically different ways 
of achieving them (Personal communication, Company E). 
This is a reference to the fact that, as outlined in Chapter 4, local government groups have 
long argued for a regulated EPR policy which would put more of the financial cost of 
recycling on to industry. However, at a practical level some companies and industry 
associations—particularly BIEC/PSF—work collaboratively with local government to 
improve kerbside and public place collection systems. The available infrastructure for 
recovery and recycling of packaging materials, including kerbside collection systems and 
reprocessing facilities, limits the options which are available to companies either to 
recover production waste or to promote recycling of post-consumer packaging:    
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[Glass recovery rates] have been going backwards since 2002. That’s 
when we hit our peak in terms of recovery rates ... The change from 
kerbside sorting to an automatic collection system means we get more 
breakage (Personal communication, Company D). 
But the main area which has been a significant barrier which we 
haven’t been able to move past has been the waste and recycling side 
of things ... We’ve still got stores which take their rubbish to the tip in 
a trailer. In this day and age you wouldn’t even think that was where 
we were at. We’ve got a lot of stores with no access to cardboard 
recycling services (Personal communication, Company H). 
Unfortunately in Australia we don’t have an established infrastructure 
to collect and recycle plastic film efficiently ... we need to still find a 
solution somehow ... (Personal communication, Company M). 
Perhaps surprisingly, industry associations were rarely mentioned as drivers by 
interviewees beyond their participation in the NPCC. While most associations were 
heavily involved in negotiations to establish the NPC and to institutionalise PS as the 
principle which underpins packaging policy, these interviews support the conclusion that 
they have played little role since then in promoting the implementation of PS within firms.  
ENGOs were also not considered to be a major driver by interviewees, although some 
companies have developed working relationships with ENGOs to implement specific 
programs, or have used them as a source of advice. For example, one of the retailers has 
worked with Clean Up Australia and Planet Ark on waste minimisation programs. 
Another company has developed a more strategic relationship with ACF:  
The ACF has had a lot to do with [the company’s] direction and vision 
... It’s a constant reminder for everyone. You can get caught up in 
your own focus, your own business, and end up gazing at your navel. 
Those people have acted as a reality check (Personal communication, 
Company A). 
ENGOs may have had more direct influence on packaging through the DUMP awards107. 
These are discussed further in the following section. 
                                                     
107 The annual DUMP Awards are managed by Environment Victoria with the support of other 
ENGOs through the Boomerang Alliance. Their aim is to highlight positive or negative changes to 
packaging, to inform consumer choice, and to encourage manufacturers and retailers to implement 
the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (Environment Victoria, 2007b, p. 4). In 
announcing the 2007 awards, a spokesman for the Boomerang Alliance noted that ‘many 
companies using packaging were in breach of the industry’s own environmental code of practice 
and it was clear the voluntary system was failing’ (Environment Victoria, 2007a).  
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Marketing and product development, and their stakeholders 
However, while governments and ENGOs have encouraged companies to implement or 
formalise many of their PS commitments, when it comes to packaging design it is the 
customer who normally holds the upper hand. While corporate affairs and environment 
staff may have a good understanding of public policy requirements and technical 
knowledge about the environmental impacts of packaging, product design is controlled by 
marketing staff. Both environment and corporate affairs are support functions which are 
separate to a company’s core business, whereas marketing is a central activity that 
determines which products will be manufactured each year and how they will be 
manufactured, based on the perceived needs and expectations of the organisation’s 
customers. Food and packaging technologists also have a critical role in product 
development. A large packaging user, for example a food brand owner, may employ a 
number of technologists at both the corporate and the divisional level to work with 
marketing staff and packaging suppliers on the development of new products and 
packaging. Within smaller companies this role may be undertaken by marketing staff, 
which will then, by necessity, rely more heavily on suppliers for packaging development 
and design.  
Companies can improve their capability in DFE by drawing on internal expertise in the 
environment group as well as external expertise (Lenox and Ehrenfeld, 1997). This is 
starting to happen in packaging manufacturers and brand owners in Australia. However, 
there are often significant differences between marketing, packaging and environment 
groups in their values, goals and allegiances to external stakeholders. The job of marketers 
is to develop and market products that the customer wants and which generate sales and 
profit. Their external allegiance is primarily to the customer. The job of an environmental 
manager is to ensure that the company complies with environmental laws and policies 
and, to the extent that they can without compromising other corporate goals, to respond to 
the expectations of government, community and ENGO stakeholders. Their primary 
external allegiances are therefore more likely to be to these groups rather than to the 
customer. The following comments by environmental managers highlight the frustration 
they often face in trying to influence marketing groups: 
One of the things that’s really hard is that marketers traditionally are 
about selling sizzle ... they bully you because they have a 
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preconceived goal that they want and they have a preconceived way of 
getting there because they are the marketing experts. And anybody 
outside that forum is not going to be listened to (Personal 
communication, Company N). 
Well ultimately the particular package or design of a package is a 
negotiation between the company—this company as a manufacturer—
and the customer who wants it. The primary pressure is the customer 
in the end ... often the driver can be some—I’ll be blunt—some 
fruitcake marketer in the top office whose interest is in glamour and 
glitz and what looks good in a fashion magazine (Personal 
communication, Company C). 
While some individuals are responsive to PS because they agree with its objectives, 
marketing groups are particularly sensitive to any criticism of the company which could 
damage corporate reputation. ENGOs have been influential through the annual DUMP 
Awards, which highlight examples of packaging which are regarded as environmentally 
damaging. These awards and the related media coverage have the potential to damage a 
corporate reputation and have helped to motivate at least one previous award ‘winner’: 
The first DUMP award certainly had an influence. Any negative 
publicity is enough for people to take notice and it’s enough for us to 
start to make a change. This is not [the company] speaking, it’s me 
personally speaking, but it actually worked to my advantage. It helped 
me to drive change because you need to understand the risks, and if 
the risks are quite real because it actually happened, it’s much easier 
to drive a change through (Personal communication, Company O). 
Food and packaging technologists also have an important role to play in product 
development but the process is controlled by marketing staff. One interviewee commented 
that the packaging role tends to be undervalued and to a certain extent ‘hidden’ within 
corporations. However, in his view the NPC has raised the profile of packaging in many 
companies and provided technologists with a stronger voice in product development: 
It’s the marketers and the sales and the prominent functions [that get 
noticed]. Not a lot of corporate senior managers knew a lot about 
packaging. So the covenant comes along and all of a sudden the MD’s 
are forced to know and understand packaging ... to focus on 
environmental performance means you need qualified packaging 
people and if you have qualified packaging people, you are then are in 
a position to drive agendas with suppliers and drive innovation... 
(Personal communication, Company M) 
The key external stakeholder for product development is the customer—either the retailer 
for the brand owner or the brand owner for the packaging manufacturer. Packaging 
manufacturers claim that some brand owners, particularly the larger, high profile 
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companies and those with global commitments to CSR, have genuine commitments to PS 
and expect their suppliers to meet environmental requirements: ‘[Our ability to influence 
design] depends on the customer. Some of them are very open to it and just see it as part 
of good business as well as part of product stewardship and the covenant. It’s a lot to do 
with their corporate philosophy...’ (Personal communication, Company A).  
However, the perception is that while the covenant may be starting to influence brand 
owners, many remain focused on commercial issues at the expense of environmental 
performance. This limits the ability of packaging manufacturers to achieve better PS 
outcomes: 
It is not our brand on the actual product and I am not saying that as a 
cop-out, but we actually don’t control the design of the packaging. We 
can come up with a whole series of options for our customers but 
ultimately we don’t control it. We will basically make what they want 
us to make, because if we don’t then [our opposition] will make it ... 
For packaging it’s cost, cost and cost (Personal communication, 
Company B2). 
Another representative from a packaging manufacturer made a similar comment, claiming 
that if the customer wants a heavier container, despite advice about its higher 
environmental impacts, then ‘in all likelihood that’s what the customer will get ... Without 
them then you do not have a business so they dictate the terms’ (Personal communication, 
Company D). 
There are signs that some brand owners are becoming more engaged in PS, which in turn 
is encouraging marketing groups to consult environmental staff within the company about 
design issues. The environmental manager in one packaging manufacturer finds it much 
easier to influence marketing staff now that their customers—the brand owners—are 
starting to look for environmental innovation: 
When the chief executives of [our customers] start to say, ‘We’re 
interested in the environmental footprint’, all our marketing guys who 
have never heard of the concept before, suddenly say, ‘...I’ve had this 
request, what does it mean?’ ... once their customer at a senior level is 
interested, suddenly they’re all over it like a rash (Personal 
communication, Company C). 
The brand owners in turn believe that their performance is often compromised by the 
demands of retailers. They claim that until recently the major supermarkets have not been 
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serious about PS and therefore have not been driving environmental change in their supply 
chains: 
[Retailers are not a driver] on environmental matters ... Woolworths 
were playing around, asking us to fill in questionnaires about our 
product stewardship initiatives. We asked them what they did with the 
questionnaires, and they said they have a big filing cabinet somewhere 
and they are in there. It was a farce (Personal communication, 
Company E). 
A similar comment was made by another interviewee about Coles. While the retailer had 
contacted brand owners to ask them about their environmental initiatives, very little 
appeared to have changed in practice. The attitude of the retailers is perhaps not surprising 
given that their customer—the consumer—also appears to be relatively indifferent to the 
environmental performance of packaging. Almost all of the interviewees commented that 
consumers in general are not looking for more environmentally friendly packaging, and 
that those who do express an interest are generally unwilling to pay more for it: 
I was being critical of designers and marketers before, but in the end 
they probably know their customer better than I do—your average 
punter doesn’t really think about the environment too much (Personal 
communication, Company C). 
These comments are supported by other research. For example, a survey of consumers at 
the point of purchase in supermarkets (Taverner Research Company, 2004, p. 1) found 
that only 3% of respondents had considered the environmental impacts of packaging in 
their purchasing decisions. This is despite the fact that in most surveys people consistently 
express concerns about the environmental impacts of packaging and claim to use less 
packaging where possible (e.g. DEC, 2006; Newspoll, 2004; Lea and Worsley, 2008). 
However, one interviewee mentioned that interest from consumers has increased in recent 
years, albeit from a low base:  
I have been monitoring consumer complaints with regard to 
environment [and] it’s increased about 25% in the last year. Again, the 
complaint factor is very, very small, nonetheless it’s increased. 
Minimal when compared to complaining about quality, safety, 
suitability; but it has increased (Personal communication, Company 
O). 
Another group which has a stronger influence on packaging design as a result of the NPC 
is the recycling sector. Recyclers have to deal with the packaging which ends up in their 
reprocessing facilities, so it is in their interest to ensure that packaging is designed for 
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recyclability. For example, they want to minimise the amount of ‘contamination’ (non-
recyclable material) such as non-recyclable caps and labels on recyclable bottles. The 
NPC has provided them with greater legitimacy as a stakeholder: 
In the past if we had done something that was detrimental to Visy 
Recycling’s business, they wouldn’t have raised it with us, because 
we’re a major customer, and they would be concerned that it would 
damage their business relationship with us. The covenant has made it 
much easier for them to tentatively pressure us, if something we are 
doing is not the best and they would like to talk to us and see if they 
can work out some possible solutions (Personal communication, 
Company E). 
At least one company has established a formal process of review in conjunction with Visy 
Recycling to ensure that new packaging designs are screened for recyclability before 
being finalised.  
In conclusion, there are many different interests within a company that influence PS 
policy and practice. Effective leadership from senior management is critical because 
environmental managers and other staff with NPC responsibilities find it very difficult to 
drive change through the organisation without their support. The effective implementation 
of PS requires the involvement of many different functional groups within the firm. Each 
group has a different role in relation to packaging and their approach to PS will depend on 
the expectations of salient stakeholders. Environment and corporate affairs personnel tend 
to have links with government agencies, the NPCC, ENGOs and industry associations on 
PS issues, including compliance with the NPC. As a result they try to drive PS through 
their organisation by gaining the support of other groups such as marketing. However, the 
influence of the NPC on PS strategy in core parts of the business is often limited because 
there appears to be no real threat of regulatory enforcement. The most influential 
stakeholder is the customer and, while advice can be provided on the environmental 
implications of a particular decision, ultimately ‘what the customer wants, the customer 
gets’.  
The institutionalisation of PS within companies appears to depend largely on the attitudes 
and commitment of individuals in core functions, and the support that they receive from 
customers. Relationships with stakeholders involved in collection and recycling of 
packaging are also important, so some companies have developed closer links with local 
government and recyclers. 
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Packaging discourses: rationalising product stewardship  
The language used by companies in public statements to frame their responsibilities for 
packaging (summarised in Appendix 4), as well as interviews with company 
representatives, highlight some common themes in discourses about the packaging 
problem and product stewardship. Of particular relevance to this research is the way that 
PS is being institutionalised within companies by linking it to existing business objectives. 
While their public statements connect PS strategies to broader concepts such as 
environmental management, corporate social responsibility and sustainability, 
interviews with company representatives reveal a different story. While social 
responsibility and sustainability were certainly mentioned as drivers, PS is 
largely framed in terms such as efficiency, risk management, reputation, 
business opportunity and brand value (Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24: Frames used by company representatives to rationalise PS 
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This makes it much easier to ‘sell’ PS internally. As one interviewee noted, most of their 
environmental strategies, such as reducing packaging weight, improving transport 
efficiencies, water efficiency and energy efficiency, are commercially driven:  
We try and make the [NPC] action items relate specifically to business processes 
rather than doing anything over and above or outside the business process. 
Because when it’s in the business process, people have something tangible to 
focus on and work towards (Personal communication, Company J). 
PS is regarded by many as an opportunity to increase efficiencies in production and 
distribution, particularly by ‘lightweighting’, or using less material in packaging.  It is 
therefore connected to supply chain pressures to reduce costs:  
[I]f the National Packaging Covenant didn’t exist and if we didn’t 
have a corporate environmental policy and if we didn’t have a 
sustainability policy, we’d still be doing it ... We’d still be doing all of 
it because it’s really every time you do it, it’s cost savings ... if you 
reduce the weight of packaging material, it’s a cost saving ... if you 
increase recycled content ... it’s been a cost saving (Personal 
communication, Company M).  
The NPC appears to be providing companies with an incentive to look harder for 
efficiency opportunities. However, one interviewee commented that this is at the margin   
There are small things done around the edges by all the companies 
that I think they genuinely do for the ‘feel good’ factor. But 90% [of 
the] improvements are probably things that would logically happen for 
economic reasons ... To the extent that the Packaging Covenant gives 
you another motivation, [it] perhaps allows you to go that extra 10% 
(Personal communication, Company C). 
Some packaging manufacturers are directly involved in the recovery and reprocessing of 
packaging materials and this is rationalised in both economic and political terms. While 
they acknowledge the environmental benefits of recycled materials and promote these 
benefits in their public reports, it was not originally driven by environmental objectives. 
For example, recycled glass (‘cullet’) reduces energy costs and improves throughput in a 
glass manufacturing plant, and recycled paper fibre is often a cheaper source of raw 
material than virgin fibre. For some companies, it is also a reliable source of raw material: 
Plus there are community expectations in relationship to forestry. 
When paper mills first started up in Australia there weren’t plantations 
like there are now. There still aren’t eucalypt plantations in Australia, 
and it’s going to get to a certain point when the community is not 
going to accept clear felling of old growth forests. So [recycling] is 
 214 
about long term sustainability of the business and that means access to 
raw materials (Personal communication, Company B2). 
Some brand owners are also requesting more recycled material in their packaging, and this 
makes recycling a marketing issue. Commercial benefits appear to the main driver for 
packaging manufacturers involved in recycling operations—one interviewee commented, 
‘We certainly are pleased about the environmental warm fuzzies you get from being 
involved in recycling [but] if we don’t make a profit then we will not recycle (Personal 
communication, Company C). However, the NPC and political drivers such as 
government threats of CDL for beverage containers are still important drivers for these 
companies given that recycling is not always profitable. For example, glass recycling 
generates commercial benefits but is becoming more marginal as an economic activity: 
It’s been driven by two aspects: the political aspect that we have 
obligations under the Packaging Covenant to support and increase 
recycling, and the other aspect is economic. There is an economic 
benefit in some circumstances to reusing glass back again ... You can 
increase the output of a furnace by increasing cullet (Personal 
communication, Company D). 
The economic benefits of lightweighting and recycled content in packaging help to 
explain why most companies implement one or both of these strategies (Table 25 in 
Chapter 5): these initiatives reduce packaging material costs and are therefore pursued for 
commercial as well as environmental reasons. Kimberly-Clark had a global target of a 
10% reduction in packaging by weight by 2005, and in the process achieved cost savings 
of $US60–70 million per year (Kimberly-Clark, 2006, p. 27). The emphasis on 
lightweighting is also positive from an environmental perspective—LCA studies indicate 
that minimisation of packaging is the most effective action that can be taken to improve 
the environmental performance of packaging (Parker, 2008). However, lightweighting 
may be reaching its technical limits in some areas, an issue raised in a report by Coca-
Cola Amatil (CCA, 2004, p. 5): ‘After a decade of continuous improvement in this aspect 
of our packaging design, we are approaching the physical limit where further reductions 
may not be possible.’ 
A few interviewees commented that PS strategies have the potential to open up new 
market opportunities. One company had developed a new range of compostable products 
which it hopes will succeed in the market on the basis of their environmental attributes. 
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Another expects some indirect benefits linked to improved supply chain relationships and 
enhanced reputation: 
You know, you can take this stuff as a threat and say, this going to be 
a lot of extra work, an impost, we have to establish systems and stuff, 
but at the end of the day I think ... if people do this stuff seriously, 
there is an opportunity for companies to position themselves, to 
differentiate themselves if you like, with what others are doing 
(Personal communication, Company B1). 
A number of the TNCs have CSR or corporate citizenship policies but, perhaps 
surprisingly, only Cadbury Schweppes and Coca-Cola Amatil talk explicitly about their 
NPC commitments within this context in their public statements. For example:  
The National Packaging Covenant is based on the principles of shared 
responsibility and product stewardship. These same items form a part 
of our Cadbury Schweppes business principles and the wider concept 
of Corporate and Social Responsibility ... In 2004 we issued our 
second CSR report, which incorporated a full Environment, Health 
and Safety (EHS) Report. This report complements our National 
Packaging Covenant commitments... (Cadbury Schweppes, 2004, p. 
5): 
Coca-Cola Amatil talked about their NPC commitments and initiatives in the ‘corporate 
social responsibilities’ section of their Annual Report (CCA, 2005, p. 24), in which they 
emphasise responsibilities to the communities within which they operate: ‘We recognise 
that as a manufacturer of fast-moving consumer goods, we have a role to play in reducing 
the environmental impact of our packaging on the community’ (p. 24).  
Interviewees who talked about PS as a social responsibility did so in relation to either 
ethical considerations or existing corporate policies. One interviewee commented that they 
have an ‘ethical purchasing policy’ which means for example, that they can only buy 
paper sourced from sustainable forestry operations. As he put it, ‘that’s just part of what 
we do’. Another interviewee clearly linked PS to the ethical culture of the company:  
I think [this company] has always been involved in responsible 
programs that went beyond their company to looking at the welfare of 
their employees, their impact on the community and how they could 
work in the community and environment. So [product stewardship] was 
a natural progression I think … it’s almost part of the ethics and the 
behaviour of the company which is why I like working here (Personal 
communication, Company L). 
 216 
Another driver for PS which is linked to CSR and corporate citizenship is the need for 
larger companies to protect their reputation: 
[A]t the end of the day on this issue we are not talking about any 
regulatory compliance matters. We are primarily talking about 
corporate reputation, and that’s what drives the large companies to 
undertake product stewardship (Personal communication, Company 
E). 
Corporate reputation is seen as important to maintenance of the company’s ‘licence to 
operate’ and protection of brand value:  
[This company] has come to understand that product stewardship, if 
done properly ... can be part of your corporate reputation which goes 
back to your licence to operate, and that has possible outcomes 
because you might get licensing and [development] approvals more 
quickly (Personal communication, Company A). 
Sustainability was mentioned occasionally, but mainly in relation to public issues such as 
fibre supply from forest resources. These companies appear to be particularly sensitive to 
public and ENGO concerns about biodiversity and sustainability issues in forestry which 
could have an impact on their raw material supply: 
[W]e go to a lot of effort to train our people and embed [sustainability] 
in the way we do business. We have to because we’ve got products, 
you know some key products like nappies and bath tissue and facial 
tissue, which take resources from forests. So we have to have some 
very strong principles, the way we manage those aspects, the 
resources, energy, water, etc. (Personal communication, Company M). 
Several companies talked about their commitment to becoming a ‘sustainable business’ or 
to manufacture or supply ‘sustainable products’ in their public statements, although 
clearly this means different things to each business. Foster’s has a Health, Safety and 
Environment (HSE) policy which states that ‘Foster’s Group endorses the principle of 
sustainable development, making this tangible through environmental responsibility and 
product stewardship’ (Foster’s Group, 2004c). Lion Nathan’s (2005) environmental policy  
commits the company to ‘[w]orking to the principles of sustainability—in the use of our 
resources and our environmental practices’ and there is a page on their website entitled 
‘packaging sustainability’ in which they outline their NPC initiatives (Lion Nathan, 2006). 
Carter Holt Harvey (2001, p. 7) makes a more ambitious claim: 
Our goal is to be a ‘sustainable business’ in the widest possible sense 
of that phrase. Sustainability means using resources as efficiently as 
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possible, by minimising waste and being unrelenting in our search for 
cleaner, greener products and processes. 
However, this commitment is qualified by the need for products and processes to meet 
financial objectives: 
As a large fibre, vertically integrated company active at several stages 
of the packaging chain, Carter Holt Harvey is committed to the 
concept of ‘closing the loop’ in the manufacture and recycling of fibre 
packaging. Carter Holt Harvey will continue to focus strategically on 
‘closing the loop’ where such opportunities are economically viable 
(Carter Holt Harvey, 2001, p. 7). 
A number of companies use the term ‘sustainable’ in relation to products and packaging 
with little or no explanation. Amcor claims that its businesses are ‘working with other 
industry members to make packaging as sustainable as possible’ (Amcor, 2005, p. 21) 
while Bunnings is ‘working with suppliers to develop sustainable product choices for our 
customers’ (Wesfarmers, 2005, p. 9). A new ‘Sustainability Services’ division within Visy 
Industrial Packaging (VIP) works with its customers to develop and implement 
‘sustainable solutions’ to packaging problems (Geminder, 2005), but in their case 
sustainability is strongly linked to the relatively narrow objective of recyclability. This is 
consistent with Visy’s traditional focus on recycling108. An advertisement in an industry 
trade journal states that ‘... we are committed to sustainable packaging solutions. Our 
vision is to ensure that everything we make is 100 percent recyclable within five years’ 
(Packaging News, September 2004, p. 6).  
Visy’s main competitor, Amcor, has drawn on the sustainability discourse to promote a 
different approach: one which shifts the focus away from recycling. This reflects the focus 
of PS and the NPC on the life cycle impacts of packaging rather than at end-of-life:   
While momentum on recycling needs to continue, it is appropriate for 
the next phase of the Covenant to incorporate broader sustainability 
issues. Amcor considers consumer education, litter reduction 
programs, environmental management systems development and 
compliance, product redesign (minimisation) and improved inventory, 
logistics and delivery systems are all important areas to be addressed 
by the Covenant in the future (Amcor Limited, 2004a, p. 5). 
                                                     
108 Visy Recycling is one of the divisions within Visy Industries and is Australia’s largest recycling 
company. It is involved in kerbside collection, sorting and reprocessing of both paper and 
packaging. Some of this material, mainly paper and cardboard, provides feedstock for other Visy 
businesses.  
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A similar approach is evident in the statement by Unilever Australia that the company 
‘both globally and locally, is proactive in the environmental area and is particularly 
committed to sustainable development. We use a life cycle approach to assess our overall 
impact on the environment, enabling us to focus on the areas where we can bring the 
greatest benefit’ (Unilever Australia, 2003, p. 3, emphasis added). They also claim that 
their approach to environmental issues is ‘holistic’ (p. 4). 
These comments by Amcor and Unilever are consistent with the efforts of industry 
associations in the 1990s to broaden the debate about packaging beyond recycling. The 
‘life cycle approach’ gives companies greater flexibility in choosing how they will 
implement PS and takes the emphasis away from waste and litter.  
The language of sustainability is used not only by corporate signatories to the NPC. One 
Federal Government employee also regards the NPC as a sustainable development policy 
as well as a tool to promote recycling: 
And that’s the great thing about the covenant; it’s about the business 
of sustainable development. It’s about changing the culture in firms. 
Yes, it is aiming to reduce the amount of waste going to landfill and to 
increase recycling as well, but the primary philosophy of the 
Packaging Covenant is to change the whole sustainability of firms 
(Personal communication, Federal Government A). 
Many companies appear to regard the NPC and PS as a natural extension of existing 
environmental policies and practices. The following two companies imply that the NPC is 
consistent with environmental policies and commitments which were already under way, 
albeit with improved systems for monitoring and reporting of product-related impacts: 
In line with Bonlac’s track record of our commitment to the 
environment, the National Packaging Covenant will play a key role in 
continuing our commitment to best practice in environmental 
management issues. Hence, Bonlac became a National Packaging 
Covenant signatory in June 2000 (Bonlac Foods, 2003, p. 5, emphasis 
added). 
While we have practiced the philosophy of the [ECoPP] for many 
years the above provides a formal, documented reference in our 
procedures (Kimberly-Clark Australia, 2004, p. 4, emphasis added). 
These companies imply that PS is little more than ‘business-as-usual’. However, several 
interviewees noted that while the covenant was originally developed to address 
environmental impacts associated with packaging, particularly at end-of-life, it is helping 
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to facilitate environmental improvements in many other areas of business activity. The 
NPC is helping to raise internal awareness about environmental issues and encourage 
strategic thinking about environmental issues: 
One of the most interesting phenomena that I noticed was people ... 
using the covenant to drive environmental reforms in the companies 
that had nothing to do with packaging. So they convinced people in 
their own companies: ‘Oh, we’ve got to do this water-saving scheme 
because we’re a covenant signatory’ (Industry association B). 
This highlights one of the benefits of a ‘life cycle approach’ in packaging policy—it 
encourages companies to look for opportunities to reduce environmental impacts in all 
aspects of their operation. 
Legal compliance was only mentioned by one packaging manufacturer as a driver for PS, 
although this was based on a misperception that his company was covered by the NEPM 
(in fact the NEPM is only directed at brand owners): 
[The NPCC] feels like just an industry body that’s just sort of tucked 
away like a lot of other bureaucracies to do what they need to do or 
what they’ve been asked to do and with a lot of money, I mean 
they’ve got a lot of money. So its value’s unknown. Well the value’s 
just not there for us. It’s just not worthwhile. But we’re involved 
because for the most part we have to be because we get threatened 
with a big stick if we’re not (Personal communication, Company J). 
Policy processes: institutionalising product stewardship 
The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrated that the concept of PS is being institionalised in 
companies through a wide range of policies and practices. Earlier sections of this chapter 
highlighted the role of interest groups with competing objectives, and discourses on the 
perceived links between PS and other business objectives, in driving organisational 
change. This section goes a step further by examining some of the policy processes and 
structural changes that are helping to institutionalise PS within leading companies. These 
include: 
• internal ‘champions’ and cross-functional teams who drive and coordinate PS 
policy development and implementation; 
• allocation of responsibility for PS to functional groups throughout the 
organisation;  
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• business systems and procedures which ensure that PS policies are implemented 
by all staff, particularly for product development. 
Leadership, engagement and coordination 
The implementation of any organisational change or business improvement program 
requires a ‘project champion’ to drive change through the organisation. In the Australian 
packaging supply chain PS is generally being driven by the NPC contact officer with the 
support of a project team and senior management staff. The role of the project champion is 
seen as critical to successful implementation: 
It’s all right for a CEO to sign off on a document but it’s not much 
chop if that’s where it stops. That’s what happens with most 
companies. They make an executive or a board room decision to do 
something but they’re not good at driving it down or finding a 
champion. When you start something new like an agreement to change 
your approach to packaging in response to the covenant, you need to 
have an internal champion, someone who will see this as their great 
calling in their career for the next couple of years and will promote it, 
will teach people, will learn as much as they can and keep pumping 
information out there so that more and more people in the organisation 
are aware of it (Personal communication, Company N). 
Many interviewees appear to be strongly committed to the NPC and to PS in general and 
are playing a strong personal role in both establishing new systems and convincing other 
parts of the business to take action. In other cases it has been a group of committed 
individuals: 
I would think that probably there are a few key people in [the 
company] that have taken the lead in this area ... I don’t think the 
leaders necessarily come from top management. It’s come from that 
smaller group of people who have actually been involved in the 
development of the company’s action plans and reporting against 
those action plans and having the interface with government, having 
the interface with some of the NGOs. I think that is where there has 
been a bit of drive (Personal communication, Company B1). 
It’s worth pointing out that internally there have been a number of 
passionate people fulfilling the vision. That’s been a key thing. [This 
company] has attracted and kept a lot of people who are prepared to 
go above and beyond the call of duty to do this work (Personal 
communication, Company A). 
Another company already had an environmental manager to look after compliance issues, 
but created a new position to manage NPC negotiations and commitments, and this person 
 221 
was also appointed to the company’s executive committee. This has given the NPC and 
PS a higher profile within the company: 
[T]hey appointed me to this position because prior to that they did not 
have someone here in quite this role ... I think appointing me to the 
role and having that role as part of the executive has enabled me, in 
the work that I do, to raise or elevate some of the stuff at the senior 
management level across the business, and to be frank, that’s not to 
say it’s top of mind or on the top of the agenda, but it is on the agenda 
and I am raising issues and the executive is asking a lot more 
questions than they were two or three years ago ... So I think there has 
been some incremental change but you wouldn’t say that there has 
been a revolution (Personal communication, Company B1). 
As already discussed, NPC contact officers have to ensure that PS policies are 
implemented across a number of functional groups within the organisation. In some cases 
the process of engagement with these groups is relatively informal, for example one 
interviewee noted that: 
We have networks. We don’t do a lot of formal committees. I work 
across the business and talk to each part of the business, and do what I 
think is achievable. So we haven’t caucused the business and asked 
people on sites ‘what do you think?’ (Personal communication, 
Company E). 
In contrast, some companies have established more formal cross-functional teams to 
coordinate PS and NPC compliance. While the NPC contact officer within Huhtamaki is 
their corporate marketing manager, a Packaging Covenant Task Force which was 
established to coordinate the company’s response includes the general manager of each 
division along with a technical manager, sales and marketing manager, process 
development manager and corporate procurement manager (Huhtamaki, 2005). Another 
company has a formal process for engaging not only their NPC committee, but everyone 
from general managers to operational staff in the preparation of their NPC report. 
According to the corporate affairs manager this is the result of an evolutionary process: 
If you go back and look at the first year ... it was basically [the 
environmental coordinator] and me. By the second year we had a 
committee. For the past three years, [the company] has taken the 
approach that the report is not just a covenant report, but an 
environmental report as well ... So across the group you would be 
talking about 200 people contributing data into that report (Personal 
communication, Company A) 
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Cross-functional committees are also involved in the product development process, and 
increasingly these committees are addressing environmental issues as a routine practice. 
While discussing a recent case study which achieved significant environmental gains, one 
interviewee noted that: 
[F]or something like that to come off, first of all you need all of [the 
company] synchronised: marketing, packaging, the mill, the engineers 
and then you need your supplier synchronised ... underpinning all this 
is just the strong cross-functional partnership between [the 
company’s] packaging and marketing operations teams and carton 
suppliers. We have development meetings every month and we focus 
on material reduction, recycled content, carton property optimisation 
and costs savings ... recycling logos and consumer information 
(Personal communication, Company M). 
In at least one company the process of developing and implementing NPC action plans has 
promoted better internal communication, not only between environment and product 
development staff but also with engineers and operators on the factory floor: 
There is an interaction there that wasn’t there before between the 
packaging development department, which is part of R&D, and the 
guys in the factories ... They all speak gobbledygook, but they’re all 
starting to feel like they’re together. They’re interacting a lot more 
than they did (Personal communication, Company N). 
Responsibility and accountability 
Several interviewees acknowledged that PS will only be fully implemented when key 
people across the business are responsible and accountable for PS, but that this process is 
still at an early stage. In several companies the NPC is no longer just a responsibility of 
environment or corporate affairs staff; it is starting to be integrated into systems and 
responsibilities across the organisation. This makes PS a business issue rather than an 
environmental or stakeholder management issue for the company: 
We are also keen to get a bit more buy-in and engagement across the 
businesses as well. I think one of the challenges, to some extent, one 
of the risks I suppose of appointing people like me and [the 
environment manager] is that people can say, ‘Well the National 
Packaging Covenant is important but you handle that, environmental 
issues, product stewardship, yes it all sounds good but too hard for us, 
that’s what you’re employed to do’. And what I have been saying at 
the executive level, particularly in the marketing and technology 
group, is that there needs to be more buy-in from the key account 
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people, from the product design people within the businesses 
(Personal communication, Company B1). 
Most of the interviewees noted that there are significant challenges to driving change 
through large organisations because of the need to raise awareness and educate a diverse 
range of people. Even after PS has been institionalised through business systems and 
procedures (see below), there are challenges to getting people to implement them:   
You can knock up a plan but you have to get people to actually do it 
and record stuff (Personal communication, Company N). 
We have the tools available. The biggest barrier is actually getting 
everyone going through the processes (Personal communication, 
Company O). 
Business systems and procedures 
The implementation of PS often involves negotiating between groups with allegiances to 
different stakeholders, and the outcome of this process will depend on the relative power 
and influence of each group. The only way to ensure that PS is institutionalised is to 
ensure that it is embedded in everyday business systems and procedures. As one 
interviewee noted, this ensures that people are accountable for PS outcomes: 
There needs to be more explicit accountability given to people across 
the business for this sort of stuff ... at the end of the day what all this is 
about is developing systems and an approach which is integrated into 
your business process. We do it in other areas and we have to start to 
do it much more systematically around product stewardship (Personal 
communication, Company B1). 
Most companies have implemented systems to ensure that the Environmental Code of 
Practice for Packaging is followed to some extent in the new product development (NPD) 
process, although these range from a minimalist position (reporting requirements only) to 
a more formal process linked to existing procedures. For large companies with formal 
NPD procedures, the integration of PS in decision making is relatively straightforward: 
The approach that I’ve mentored through here has been to look at the 
decision framework. Do we have one? Yes, fortunately like most 
major corporations there is a very deliberate decision framework 
relating to projects and marketing and how you create a product etc. 
There are gates along the way for where key decisions are made. So 
what you need to do is use that system because it takes out the conflict 
between personalities. So we’ve done that here (Personal 
communication, Company N). 
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Another large brand owner recently established a company-wide packaging development 
process, for which the initial impetus was the need to ensure that their DFE commitments 
under the covenant were implemented. Before this packaging development was 
undertaken within each business unit; there was no standard process for design in general, 
and environmental design in particular. The Environmental Code of Practice for 
Packaging has now been formally integrated in their NPD process and all brand managers 
and technologies are required to use it to identify environmental impacts and opportunities 
for improvement. If a packaging redesign results in a negative environmental impact, for 
example if the new package is less recyclable than the previous one, the project is 
‘elevated’ for review by a senior manager: 
It’s very easy to do mandates. I know that over the years the business 
has mandated many checkpoint systems for environment, but none of 
them have succeeded. Why haven’t they succeeded? Because there 
was no system for elevation, firstly if it wasn’t done, or secondly if 
there was a negative impact (Personal communication, Company O). 
The integration of PS policies and practices within the NPD process in some companies is 
giving packaging and food technologists the confidence to speak out when a product is 
contrary to environmental requirements, or if there might be a more environmentally 
friendly option available: 
[The technologists] still have to have a bit of argy-bargy with people 
in marketing who have other aspects that they’re interested in, but 
overall they’re finding it quite simple to be able to report accurately 
and make determinations about material choice, shape and design of 
packaging, what is going to happen to it in the after-market, will it hit 
the litter stream, how will it cope in the post-consumer stream, all 
those aspects. And they’re quite excited actually, because it’s brought 
a new dimension to design for them. And they like it (Personal 
communication, Company N). 
Environment has pretty much been integrated in the decision-making 
process at every level of the company so we have many management 
teams and product development teams from the food point of view 
that don’t even think about the product unless the packaging part is 
considered with that. The packaging guys are aware of it now and are 
happy to put their hand up and say, ‘No, we can’t do that because it 
doesn’t meet these [environmental requirements]’. So that’s definitely 
a change in process (Personal communication, Company H). 
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Packaging technologists tend to be more supportive of DFE than the marketing group, as 
long as they understand what is expected of them and can draw on expert knowledge to 
help them to evaluate alternatives: 
When it comes to taking a stand, particularly on the environment, it 
can be quite difficult, which is why we desperately needed a tool like 
PIQET109 to provide data, to give it credibility, and that’s what 
technical people need in order to really understand it and make a 
comment, but we’ve actually said to them, ‘Now, you guys are the 
ambassadors so you have to push change’. The earlier you get 
involved in PIQET and the NPD process the more likely you are to 
make a difference. We keep talking about that when we 
communicate—‘you can make a difference’ (Personal communication, 
Company O). 
However, even with systems in place there is still potential for conflict between competing 
objectives. According to a number of interviewees, packaging objectives which are never 
compromised include product protection, quality and safety, but trade-offs are sometimes 
made with objectives such as speed-to-market, cost, aesthetics and supply. These are 
negotiated internally within the company and with customers: 
When we’ve wanted to introduce recycled content, we had to convince 
[marketing] that the graphics and the presentation were not going to be 
diminished ... We’ve consistently proven to marketing that we project- 
manage to their timeline and we give them print quality and leading 
edge print quality (Personal communication, Company M). 
In some cases companies will pay more. We’ve been pretty lucky 
because over the past couple of years we’ve been able to make 
decisions where we’ve sacrificed some savings to achieve an 
environmental benefit ... We’re at the point now though where that is 
going to be difficult. So if for example we want to source sustainable 
fibre, FSC [Forest Stewardship Council] certified fibre, there is going 
to be a cost impact. So it will become a timing issue—when can we do 
that so that the cost impact will be less felt by the stores, because 
that’s ultimately where it’s going to be felt (Personal communication, 
Company H). 
While lightweighting is a ‘win–win’ initiative because it saves money and environmental 
impact, more significant changes are harder to implement. One marketing manager 
commented that customers are often reluctant to change their packaging for environmental 
                                                     
109 PIQET is the Packaging Impact Quick Evolution Tool developed by the Sustainable Packaging 
Alliance in Australia (http://www.sustainablepack.org/research/subpage.aspx?PageID=10&id=9, 
viewed 8 April 2008). 
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reasons. As a result, he always tries to sell environmental innovation to them by 
highlighting the commercial benefits: 
It’s functional ... still works, but they’ve been stuck in this groove and 
they find it really hard to get out of the groove regardless of what 
benefit it has to the environment or to their own submission for the 
Packaging Covenant. We found it hard to influence, so we’ve had to 
turn it into a commercial reality as well and say, ‘If you use this then 
it’s easier to decorate, it’s lower cost in the long run to transport, it 
packs better, you get better market share’ (Personal communication, 
Company J). 
The environmental manager for a major supermarket pursued a similar strategy in trying 
to convince senior managers of the need to introduce reusable shopping bags: 
Shopping bags is an interesting one. They had political pressure, 
consumers, and in the end I think we were able to convince them that 
there was money in it for them. That then allowed them to consider 
the product stewardship issues ... Once you reduce the cost of single- 
use bags significantly, and even produce profit by selling reusables, 
there then was absolute interest, more so than environmental (Personal 
communication, Company G). 
These examples, combined with the earlier discussion of business discourses about PS, 
support the conclusion that companies are trying to reconcile competing stakeholder 
demands by searching for ‘win–win’ solutions. Most of the projects listed in NPC action 
plans and reports achieve both environmental and business objectives, such as 
lightweighting of packaging, use of recycled materials, more efficient transport, and water 
and energy efficiency programs. Environmental initiatives which require a trade-off with 
other business objectives, such as cost or quality, may be considered as a result of PS 
policies but are less likely to be supported by key groups such as marketing. 
Company characteristics: location, size and ownership 
Global businesses and location of head office 
The literature review suggested that the location of a company’s head office would 
influence corporate responsiveness because of the different approaches to CSR and 
product responsibility which are evident around the world. To investigate this for the 
current research, average PS responsiveness scores were calculated for companies in four 
regions: Australia, the Asia–Pacific region, Europe and the US (Figure 25). Companies 
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from the US were found to be the most responsive (1.7), followed by Europe (1.4), 
Australia (1.1) and the Asia–Pacific region (1.1)110. However, these results need to be 
treated with caution because of the very small sample size for regions other than Australia. 
    
Figure 25: Average responsiveness scores by location of head office111 
 (The number of case studies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
The high scores achieved by US companies are consistent with international comparisons 
in the literature. For example, Matten and Moon (2004) observed that, while European 
governments generally play a prominent role in controlling the social impacts of business, 
the institutional environment in the US favours voluntary initiatives over regulation112. 
However, Europe has a stronger tradition of CSR than Australia, where debates about 
corporate citizenship and social responsibility have been more recent. One packaging 
manufacturer commented that European companies tend to be more responsive: 
There are some large multinationals who I believe are good corporate 
citizens— Unilever, Nestlé—who have this European corporate 
                                                     
110 Three of the four companies in the Asia–Pacific region are located in New Zealand and one in 
the Philippines. 
111 Numbers have been rounded to one decimal place. Actual figures for Australia and the Asia–
Pacific region are 1.13 and 1.06 respectively. 
112 Matten and Moon did not discuss PS specifically but it falls under the general category of 
voluntary CSR initiatives. 
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culture which is flowing back with the due processes they need to 
follow. I think the [large Australasian companies] are just ignorant, 
possibly due to being parochial (Personal communication, Company 
I). 
Average PS responsiveness scores were also calculated and compared for transnational 
and local companies (Table 31). For the purpose of this analysis, TNCs are defined as 
those with operations outside Australia and New Zealand because of the similar 
institutional environments in these two countries. Of the 17 companies based in Australia, 
ten only operate in Australia and New Zealand and the remaining seven have 
manufacturing facilities in other parts of the world. The average responsiveness score for 
TNCs was 1.4 compared to 0.9 for local companies.  
Many companies that operate in a global market had adapted to the requirements of the 
European Packaging Directive and other packaging regulations before the NPC was 
introduced to Australia. As a result they already had some systems in place to measure and 
manage packaging waste: 
[This company] operates in a global market ... And they have to reach 
all global standards, particularly European standards, which are held 
as the global benchmark for food contact and the like. So, on that side 
it follows world trends very closely, including take-back legislation 
and end-of-pipe, as well as with things like toxic materials and 
pollutants (Personal communication, Company A). 
One interviewee noted that his company is trying to implement a packaging program 
which meets environmental management standards and regulations for packaging in 
different markets by ‘doing the best thing we can do’. The most straightforward approach 
for companies such as this is to develop a common approach which meets best practice 
requirements around the world: 
Getting the knowledge of how each of these [policies] works is really 
hard, so your best bet is to start at the top and say, ‘What is the best 
thing we can do?’ The best thing they can do initially is to set up 
policy and then try to drive it down into procedures and practices and 
actions, and educate as much as they can along the way (Personal 
communication, Company N). 
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Table 31: Average responsiveness scores for transnational and local companies 
(The number of case studies is shown in brackets) 
Company by type Responsiveness score 
Transnational operations (20)  
Amcor Australasia 1.8 
Coca-Cola Amatil 1.4 
Foster’s Group 1.8 
Visy Industries 2.0 
Goodman Fielder 0.7 
Qenos Pty Ltd 0.9 
Dulux 1.4 
Carter Holt Harvey 1.0 
Huhtamaki Australia Pty Ltd 1.2 
ACI Operations Pty Ltd 1.2 
Nestlé Oceania 1.9 
National Foods 1.6 
Cadbury Schweppes Limited 1.7 
Kimberly-Clark Australia 2.0 
Unilever Australia Ltd 1.0 
IBM Australia and New Zealand Limited 2.2 
George Weston Foods Limited 1.2 
McDonald’s Australia 1.4 
Fisher & Paykel Appliances Australia ltd 0.9 
Bluescope Steel  1.1 
Average— transnational operations 1.4 
Australia/NZ operations only (10)
Woolworths Limited 1.1 
Coles Myer Limited 0.9 
Metcash Trading Limited Australasia 0.8 
David Jones Limited 0.4 
Bunnings Group Limited 0.7 
Sugar Australia 0.8 
Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited 1.0 
Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co. Limited 0.6 
Bonlac Foods Limited 0.7 
Lion Nathan Australia 1.7 
Average—Australia / NZ 0.9 
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
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Subsidiaries of TNCs based in Europe and the US are able to draw on support from their 
corporate head office for initiatives being implemented in Australia. This gives them an 
advantage over locally–based companies which have had to develop all of their own 
programs to meet NPC requirements. One interviewee works for a US-based company 
which has had an environmental policy in place since 1971 and a PS policy since 1991. As 
a result, they already had good supply management programs in place and detailed 
information available on the environmental impacts of their packaging: 
Because a lot of good work is done at a global level, I’ll always be 
communicating with my corporate team leader that’s involved in 
packaging issues at a global level ... In Europe you have to report to 
government on the amount of packaging that you’re importing and 
things like that, the amount of materials. Well, that’s helped me at a 
local level because I’m able to link in to that, that good work that’s 
been done in the past and use that to report the amount of packaging in 
Australia as well. So that’s been really good. There’s a lot of work 
that’s gone on in regards to databases and providing information about 
the quantity and the types of packaging (Personal communication, 
Company L). 
The information-sharing which takes place in this company is consistent with the 
observation that TNCs are characterised by increasing mobility of firm-specific resources 
and capabilities across national boundaries (Dunning, 1997). Resources and capabilities to 
support product responsibility programs are shared within global companies and this is 
helping to institutionalise PS in Australian-based subsidiaries. 
One of the disadvantages of being a TNC based overseas is that opportunities to influence 
packaging design may be more limited than they are for Australian-based companies. 
Nevertheless, local subsidiaries have some ability to influence global packaging designs in 
order to meet NPC requirements: 
One of the things that has resulted from the covenant ... has been that 
we’ve heightened the awareness internally in Australia about what is 
going on, but we have a global corporation, so quite often they will 
say, ‘This is the product you’re going to produce and this is what its 
going to look like’. In the past it’s been a case of ‘how do we make the 
machine spit this thing out?’ Now we’re saying, ‘Hang on, it doesn’t 
meet local standards. We’ve just run our assessment system over it 
and it doesn’t meet the ECoPP. What are you going to do about it?’ So 
we pass the decision back to global ... You actually do have a chance 
to get them to change their approach (Personal communication, 
Company N). 
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Company size and profile 
The corporate case studies for this research were deliberately selected because they are 
amongst the largest companies in each sector of the packaging supply chain. It is not 
possible therefore to reach any conclusions about the PS responsiveness of small-to-
medium size companies. However, the results of the evaluation suggest that with the 
exception of the major two supermarkets, responsiveness increases with size. The largest 
and the smallest companies in the group were found to be the least responsive (Figure 26 
and Appendix 6). The increase in responsiveness between the smallest companies (with 
sales of less than $1 billion) and those with sales up to $3 billion is consistent with the 
literature on CSR, which suggests that larger companies tend to be more responsive for 
reasons which are linked to both capacity and public profile. Smaller companies generally 
have fewer resources, both human and financial, to devote to ‘non-core’ activities (e.g. 
Buehler and Shetty, 1975; Labatt, 1997). 
Figure 26: Average responsiveness scores by size  
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
While the lower scores for the largest companies (with sales of over $4 billion) appear to 
be an anomaly, this category includes four of the retailers—Woolworths, Coles Myer, 
Metcash and Bunnings. The low average score for this group could therefore be linked to 
institutional factors influencing the performance of the retail sector rather than company 
size.  
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Responsiveness also appears to be linked to the profile of large TNCs such as Nestlé and 
McDonald’s, which have been the subject of ENGO campaigns in the past. This was noted 
by several interviewees including this manufacturer: 
McDonald’s is a good example. They’ve been offered products made 
with paper from companies that don’t have a very strong 
environmental background and McDonald’s have decided that they 
won’t put themselves in that position because of their own 
environmental policies. So therefore that gives us strength in the 
relationship with McDonald’s because they know for the last 25 years 
or 30 years, we can show them that we’ve been buying paper from 
companies that have had the environmental credentials. I guess it’s 
been a subconscious thing with very large organisations like 
McDonald’s because they’ve been more exposed to public scrutiny 
than most others (Personal communication, Company J). 
Many of the interviewees framed PS as a strategy to protect their reputation because they 
believe that their size and public profile make them vulnerable to criticism if they do not 
meet government, ENGO and consumer expectations about packaging. This suggests that 
small-to-medium size companies are likely to be less responsive to the NPC. One 
interviewee noted that ‘the only problem we see right now is that ... the top 20% of the 
industry does the bulk of the work’ and is having to mentor the smaller companies: 
So the signatories, they’ve been quite receptive. We unfortunately do 
deal with a lot of smaller manufacturers who have no idea or 
understanding about this activity. Where we get into those situations, 
we're very much a helper to those smaller businesses where we may 
say, ‘Look, we're looking at this for this reason’. In most cases as a 
corporate brand controller, we may say, ‘Well we've got a relationship 
with Visy Board or Amcor or whoever, please go and talk to them 
about lightweighting’ (Personal communication, Company K). 
In this person’s view, more specific tools need to be developed for small-to-medium size 
companies to encourage them to implement the requirements of the NPC, based on the 
knowledge gained by the larger companies. 
Ownership 
Most of the larger companies in the packaging supply chain are publicly listed 
corporations, with the notable exception of Visy Industries, which is owned by the Pratt 
family. Other forms of ownership include cooperatives (Murray Goulburn and Bonlac), 
franchises (McDonald’s) and joint ventures (Qenos and Sugar Australia). Private 
 233 
companies were found to be more responsive than public corporations, scoring 1.5 and 1.3 
respectively (Figure 27 and Appendix 7). The ‘other’ group of companies achieved a 
lower average score (0.9). 
Figure 27: Average responsiveness scores by type of ownership  
(The number of companies is shown in brackets) 
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Source: Evaluation of company reports 
These results appear to contradict the findings of other research that corporate responsive 
to CSR increases with the number of shareholders (Buehler and Shetty, 1975), which 
would suggest that large public corporations should be the most responsive, followed by 
cooperatives and then private companies. However, the high level of responsiveness of 
private companies in this evaluation may be due to the very small number in the sample 
and the high individual score achieved by Visy (2.0). One manufacturer commented that, 
as a publicly listed company, they had less freedom than private companies to implement 
PS policies: 
And when you think about it, that whole profit thing and managing the 
expectations of shareholders and the market is a huge issue for a 
publicly listed company... (Personal communication, Company B2). 
As a result, no definitive conclusions can be drawn about the impact of company 
ownership structure on PS responsiveness. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to investigate the institutionalisation of PS at a micro level by asking 
the question: How and why are individual companies implementing product stewardship? 
 234 
The first step in answering this question was to identify the functional groups within the 
firm and their interests in, and influence on, PS strategy. Each of these groups has 
allegiances to external stakeholders at a meso- or macro-level that influence the 
willingness and ability of a company to implement PS. The literature on CSR and related 
concepts commonly refers to the need to achieve ‘balance’ between competing 
stakeholder interests (Schwartz and Carroll, 2008), and stakeholder salience theory 
suggests that companies are more likely to respond to stakeholders that are critical to the 
success of the firm (Clarkson, 1995; Hill and Jones, 1992; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
However, stakeholder theory is based on an assumption that companies act as a single 
decision-making body and tends to ignore the internal political processes that influence 
managerial responsiveness. These were found to be important to the approach taken by 
companies to PS for packaging. 
Product development and marketing are the most challenging aspects of PS because they 
often involve trade-offs between competing stakeholder demands, including the 
environmental requirements of the NPC and the demands of customers for innovative or 
lower cost packaging. The multiple demands of stakeholders define a company’s ‘licence 
to operate’ (Gunningham et al., 2003) and sometimes these have different implications for 
packaging strategy. One of the ways that companies are dealing with potential conflict is 
to link PS to core business objectives, such as efficiency, cost reduction, reputation 
management and the search for new business opportunities. NPC coordinators are able to 
‘sell’ PS internally by promoting solutions that achieve both environmental and 
commercial outcomes. Strategies that generate ‘win–win’ outcomes, for example 
lightweighting of packaging, have been relatively easy to implement in many companies. 
Other strategies, such as design for recycling or use of FSC-certified fibre, can involve 
trade-offs with other objectives such as cost and performance. Where conflicts such as this 
do exist, the competing expectations of stakeholders are reflected in the different positions 
taken by functional groups on PS policy issues. The relative power and influence of these 
groups in internal negotiations about packaging policy is linked to the perceived salience 
of their key stakeholders. For example, marketing tend to have the most influence over 
packaging design because their views tend to reflect the interests of their customers, one 
of the primary stakeholder groups for any business. Government agencies and the NPCC 
have some influence on PS strategy because of the legal requirement for brand owners to 
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participate in the NPC and the perception by many companies that the NPC is preferable 
to alternative policy approaches such as CDL. However, the salience of government 
agencies and the NPCC on this issue is relatively low compared to that of customers. This 
is because customers have the attributes of legitimacy, power and urgency (Mitchell et al., 
1997). Governments are regarded as legitimate, and through the NPEM have the power to 
force compliance with the PS requirements of the NPC, but according to many 
interviewees have not demonstrated any willingness to do so. As a result, their demands 
and those of the NPCC appear to be less urgent.  
Strategies which are being pursued by companies to institutionalise PS within everyday 
practice and to minimise any potential conflicts include: the appointment of a project 
champion; the establishment of a cross-functional project team; the allocation of 
responsibility for PS outcomes to all relevant functions across the organisation; and the 
integration of PS within existing business management systems. These are consistent with 
recommended strategies in the CSR literature. For example, Ackerman and Bauer (1976) 
suggested that institutionalisation requires the articulation of a policy by senior 
management, recognition of a social issue in business plans, allocation of responsibilities, 
the design and use of systems to monitor performance and the management of careers and 
incentives to shape the decision-making process. 
One of the organisational characteristics which appears to have influenced corporate 
responsiveness is company size, but this may not be due to the additional resources 
available to large companies. Other factors appear to be at play, such as location of the 
corporate head office and the link between company size and public profile. Large 
companies with well-known brands try to protect their corporate reputation by responding 
to government and ENGO expectations. Many of these companies are also subsidiaries of 
companies based in Europe or the US and are therefore expected to meet corporate PS 
policies which were in place well before the NPC. These companies tend to be driven by 
an institutional environment in their home countries which support and encourage CSR 
policies to a greater extent than in Australia. They also have to meet PS or EPR 
regulations for packaging in many parts of the world, particularly Europe, which means 
that product responsibility has already been institutionalised through corporate 
management systems. The knowledge and systems which these companies have 
developed to manage product–related environmental impacts are being transferred to local 
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subsidiaries, and in the process helping to institutionalise PS in the Australian packaging 
supply chain. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and conclusion 
Packaging is ubiquitous in developed economies. While ‘barely perceptible’ as a 
commodity in its own right it supports the distribution, sale and consumption of almost 
every other commodity, from industrial raw materials and components through to food, 
beverages and a multitude of other consumer products. It also generates social costs—
financial, environmental and aesthetic. From a life cycle perspective these are generated 
during the extraction or harvesting of raw materials, during manufacturing and 
distribution, and when packaging is finally discarded in landfill or as litter.  
ENGOs and local government associations in Australia have argued for over 30 years that 
packaging needs to be regulated to control its social costs. In particular, they want 
legislation that would force packaging manufacturers and their customers, the brand 
owners, to take greater responsible for the recovery of waste. In response, industry 
associations and their members have promoted product stewardship, the principle that 
companies should assume a certain amount of voluntary responsibility for the 
environmental impacts of packaging over its entire life cycle. They argue that corporate 
responsibility for packaging recovery at end-of-life is limited because this is the proper 
responsibility of local government.  
However, there are continuing debates in Australia about the effectiveness of PS in 
promoting corporate responsibility and reducing the impacts of packaging. The issue has 
particular urgency at the present time because packaging policy will be considered once 
again by the national ministerial council (EPHC) in November 2009. Following the mid-
term review of the NPC, government and industry representatives are proposing a 
continuation of the Covenant for an indefinite period. The potential benefits of 
complementary policy mechanisms, including CDL, are also being evaluated.   
This research has focused on corporate responsiveness to stakeholder concerns about the 
social impacts of packaging, within the broader context of debates about the packaging 
problem and policy solutions. The principal research question which guided the analysis 
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was: How and to what extent has product stewardship been institutionalised within the 
Australian packaging supply chain? 
Chapter 2 reviewed existing knowledge about product-related environmental policies, 
including PS and EPR, as well as related initiatives such as voluntary environmental 
agreements, DFE and CSR. The extensive literature on CSR provided a particularly useful 
framework for this analysis because it focused on questions that are relevant to the study 
of PS, including the nature and extent of corporate responsibility for social issues, the 
regulation of social impacts, corporate responsiveness and the evaluation of corporate 
social performance. The review identified significant differences between writers with a 
neo-liberal, managerial or institutional perspective and concluded that insights from 
managerial and institutional research could be usefully combined to develop an analytical 
framework for the remainder of the thesis.  
This framework, which was further developed in Chapter 3, is based on the assumption 
that corporate responsibility and responsiveness cannot be studied in isolation from the 
broader institutional environment within which companies operate. This includes the 
market economy, formal governance mechanisms, the normative role of industry 
associations in creating a new ‘industrial morality’ (Gunningham and Rees, 1997) and the 
expectations of stakeholders. The analytical framework involved a multilevel analysis of 
PS performance: 
• at a socio-political (macro) level where PS is being institutionalised through the 
interaction of the state, industry associations and ENGOs in discursive and policy 
processes; 
• at an industry sector (meso) level, where PS is being institutionalised through 
changes to corporate language, policy and practice;  
• at a company (micro) level, where competing interests and objectives for products 
are resolved by institutionalising PS in business strategies, structures and 
processes.    
Four interrelated factors were also identified to guide the analysis at each of these levels: 
• interest groups with an influence on the social construction and implementation of 
PS;  
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• packaging and PS discourses invoked by these groups to support their interests 
and policy beliefs;  
• policies and policy processes that translate these discourses into techniques of 
control;  
• company characteristics that mediate corporate responsiveness.  
The research findings and their implications for the primary research question are 
discussed below.  
Interest groups 
The analysis of interest groups focuses on the interests and policy beliefs of actors who 
influence the design and implementation of packaging policy and practice. These actors 
collectively make up the ‘organisational field’ within which PS is being institutionalised. 
In summary, it is argued that industry associations and companies have promoted self-
regulation through PS as a solution to ENGO and government concerns about the social 
impacts of packaging because, from their perspective, it is preferable to state regulation. It 
has been institutionalised in public policy through voluntary agreements—most recently 
the NPC—despite strong and consistent opposition from ENGOs and local government 
associations. However, its institutionalisation within the packaging supply chain has been 
influenced by power relationships and perceptions of corporate self-interest, which vary 
between industry sectors, companies as a whole and the functional groups within them. 
At a macro level, debates about the packaging problem and corporate responsibility were 
initiated in response to the introduction of non-refillable containers for milk, beer and soft 
drinks in the 1960s and 1970s. The benefits for beverage manufacturers, packaging 
suppliers and retailers were significant: non-refillable containers reduced costs and 
increased sales. The move was opposed by ENGOs and local government associations 
because it shifted waste management costs from industry to local government and created 
additional environmental impacts, and they argued for increased state regulation. 
However, beverage and packaging manufacturers, with the support of trade unions, 
promoted voluntary PS programs as an alternative to more regulated approaches such as 
CDL, which would have threatened industry profitability and employment levels. In the 
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late 1970s they created a new political actor—LRA/BIEC—which became an influential 
part of the policy process at a state and national level.   
The negotiation of the NPC in the 1990s, which built on voluntary initiatives by the 
beverage industry, brought new industry players into the organisational field. Most 
importantly, it involved industry associations and companies from the food and retail 
sectors, who tended to support a narrower definition of corporate responsibility for 
packaging than the beverage industry. Groups such as the Australian Supermarket Institute 
(ASI) participated in packaging policy debates as ‘rejectionists’ (McEachern, 1991). They 
originally opposed the NPC on the basis of their policy beliefs about the social control of 
business, the seriousness of the packaging problem and corporate responsibility. However, 
packaging and beverage industry associations—the ‘accommodationists’ (McEachern, 
1991)—eventually convinced them to support voluntary PS to avoid legislation. This is 
consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991a, p. 31) observation that ‘the acquisition 
and maintenance of power within organisational fields requires that dominant 
organisations continually enact strategies of control, most notably through either the 
socialisation of newcomers into a shared world view or via the support of the state and its 
judicial arm’. Another new political actor that emerged in 2004 during the negotiation of 
NPC Mark II—the Boomerang Alliance—increased the influence of ENGOs but was 
unable to shift policy outcomes in any substantial way. 
The institutionalisation of PS at a macro level was strongly influenced by the ‘institutional 
work’ practices (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) of industry associations with considerable 
lobbying power. The ability of other interests, such as ENGOs and local government to 
achieve state regulation, was limited by the federal system of government in Australia. 
The states have constitutional responsibility for environmental management and have been 
unable to agree with each other and the federal government on the need for a national 
regulatory approach. PS is now ‘taken for granted’ by most stakeholders, particularly in 
government and industry, as the basis for corporate social responsibility for packaging. 
At a meso level the research examined the interests and power of companies at each stage 
of the packaging supply chain: raw material suppliers, packaging manufacturers, 
packaging fillers (brand owners) and retailers. Each sector has an interest in packaging 
and an obligation under the NPC to implement PS where relevant to the nature of their 
 241 
operations. However, brand owners are particularly important to the success of the NPC 
because of their relative size and influence on design and consumption. Within this group, 
companies in the beverage industry have the strongest interest in self-regulation because 
they wish to avoid the direct financial costs associated with CDL. Retailers, particularly in 
the highly concentrated grocery market, also have a strong influence on packaging design 
because of their dual role as both retailer and brand owner. As retailers they can influence 
PS outcomes through their procurement policies, particularly for secondary (transport) 
packaging, while as brand owners they have direct control over both primary and 
secondary packaging.  
At a micro level, the focus is on the influence of internal groups and their stakeholders on 
corporate PS strategies. Functional groups, including marketing, product development, 
environment and corporate affairs, all have roles to play in developing or implementing 
PS. However, they have different levels of power and influence over packaging and 
environmental strategies, which are linked to their role in the company and their relations 
with external stakeholders. This research supports Mintzberg’s (1983) observation that 
corporate decision making is a political process involving coalitions of interest both inside 
and outside the organisation. People employed in the environment or corporate affairs 
groups within a company tend to focus on the expectations of government agencies 
(regulatory compliance), ENGOs and other non-commercial stakeholders. Some have a 
strong commitment to environmental objectives, but their primary goal is to protect the 
company’s reputation by meeting their perceived legal and social responsibilities. For 
most companies in the packaging supply chain, this means compliance with the NPC. 
However, the most salient stakeholder for corporate decision making about packaging is 
the customer, namely the brand owner (for packaging manufacturers), the retailer (for 
brand owners) and the consumer (for retailers). This means that the marketing group has 
more power over packaging decisions than the environment or product development 
groups. Stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell et al., 1997) suggests that customers are 
highly salient because they possess the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. The 
willingness and ability of packaging manufacturers to respond to PS is often limited by a 
lack of commitment from their customers—the brand owners—although there is some 
evidence from this research that the commitment of brand owners is increasing as a result 
of the NPC. Retailers remain relatively uncommitted and are driving changes to secondary 
 242 
packaging which increase rather than decrease the total amount of packaging material 
used for product distribution.  
Federal and state governments are also regarded as important stakeholders on PS issues 
but their influence on corporate decision making (relative to customers) is limited. They 
are legitimate and powerful stakeholders for a number of reasons, including their power to 
force brand owners to participate in the NPC through the NEPM. Non-brand owners also 
participate in the NPC because cooperation with governments is seen as important for 
corporate reputation. However, the overall influence of the NPC (and therefore 
government stakeholders) on corporate responsiveness appears to be limited because of a 
perception within industry that state governments are not committed to enforcing the 
NEPM. Therefore governments do not have a high level of ‘urgency’, i.e. their claims as 
stakeholders do not call for immediate action (Mitchell et al., 1997). Governments appear 
to have had stronger influence on decision making within beverage companies and their 
packaging suppliers because of regular proposals by politicians and government agencies 
to introduce CDL (most recently by the WA Government, the Family First Party and the 
Australian Senate, see Edwards, 2005; Fielding, 2008; SCECA, 2008).  
Packaging discourses 
The analysis of packaging discourses focuses attention on the way that actors group 
around particular story-lines which they use to define the policy problem and policy 
solutions (Hajer, 1995b). In summary, it is argued that the discursive struggle to define the 
packaging problem and policy solutions has largely been won by industry associations and 
companies, who have framed the problem in terms of ‘life cycle environmental impacts’ 
and support voluntary corporate ‘stewardship’ or shared responsibility for packaging. This 
discourse promotes only limited corporate responsibility for the collection and recycling 
of post-consumer waste. Instead it focuses on a company’s ‘sphere of influence’, 
including supply chain management, cleaner production and product design. Companies 
are therefore able to focus on PS strategies which improve efficiencies and reduce cost, 
while simultaneously promoting these initiatives to external stakeholders as socially 
responsible and to internal stakeholders as core business practice. This has supported the 
institutionalisation of PS in the packaging supply chain because, as Holm (1995, p. 63) 
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observed, the stability of an institution increases when it becomes embedded in ‘mutually 
reinforcing systems of practices, interests and ideas’.  
At a macro level industry associations and companies have achieved a number of victories 
in the battle to control perceptions of the packaging problem. Their first achievement, 
during the 1970s and 1980s, was to shift the focus away from non-refillable packaging—
the major concern of ENGOs—to the impacts of packaging on household waste and litter. 
On this basis they convinced state governments that the solution was to establish recycling 
and anti-litter programs rather than to re-establish refill systems for beverage containers. 
Their second achievement, during the 1990s, was to shift the problem once again, this 
time to the life cycle impacts of packaging, and to propose a solution based on ‘shared 
responsibility’. This established PS as the normative framework for the NPC and allowed 
companies to focus on supply chain and in-house impacts as well as waste at end-of-life. 
The life cycle approach meant that they had some responsibility to support kerbside 
collection and litter reduction programs, but in a support role to local government. As far 
as end-of-life impacts were concerned, industry groups successfully argued that their 
primary responsibility was to support reprocessing facilities and markets for recyclable 
materials, based on ‘market realities’ rather than ongoing subsidies. 
A number of discursive strategies were used by companies and industry associations to 
promote their interests and policy beliefs. They promoted ‘technological rationalism’ 
(Eden, 1999), often dismissing the arguments of ENGOs as ‘emotional’ and ‘uninformed’ 
while promoting their own position as rational and objective. They produced data to 
support the story-line that packaging only makes up a small percentage of waste and litter, 
and funded research on the behavioural aspects of littering to support the argument that 
litter is a ‘people problem’. They used the ‘life cycle’ metaphor to reposition the nature of 
the packaging problem away from end-of-life waste and towards those activities within 
the normal corporate sphere of influence.  
At a meso level the language of PS and shared responsibility is reflected in corporate 
communications. Almost all of the companies that were evaluated have expressed a public 
commitment to PS, albeit with some sectoral differences. The language of packaging 
manufacturers and brand owners, particularly those in the beverage industry, closely 
follows that of the NPC. For example, it includes references to PS, a life cycle approach 
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and shared responsibility. This reflects the strong position taken by industry associations 
in these sectors in support of PS and the NPC. However, some of the language used by 
retailers reveals a more limited interpretation of PS, with greater emphasis on the 
management of in-house waste. This is consistent with the strategy adopted by ASI in 
policy negotiations. The association tried (unsuccessfully) to limit the involvement of 
retailers in the NPC and, since its demise, other retail associations have played almost no 
role in promoting the NPC. 
Another feature of many corporate statements is the implication that PS is a logical and 
natural extension of existing sustainability and environmental programs. This is most 
evident for the two companies in the chemical industry, Orica and Qenos, who discussed 
their NPC commitments under the broader banner of product safety and risk management. 
This supports Coupland’s (2003) observation that companies try to construct a socially 
responsible identity by presenting what they do as uncontroversial. The PS discourse is 
also consistent with weak concepts of ‘ecological modernisation’ (Christoff, 2002; 
Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995b) because it assumes that the environmental impacts of 
packaging can be addressed without any fundamental change to the socio-economic 
system. It promotes PS as an extension of ‘business as usual’ rather than something new 
and challenging. As a result it has been relatively easy for industry associations to 
promote PS to companies as the preferred alternative to state regulation. 
At a micro level it is clear that NPC coordinators are promoting PS to internal 
stakeholders by linking it to business objectives such as efficiency, cost reduction, 
reputation, legal compliance, secure raw materials and market development. For example, 
vertically integrated packaging manufacturers have established recycling businesses to 
provide an additional supply of raw materials, while brand owners and packaging 
manufacturers undertake lightweighting of packaging to reduce raw material and supply 
chain costs. Most interviewees from industry appear to regard PS strategies as consistent 
with business improvement goals and a source of innovation and efficiency. Companies 
with strong corporate sustainability or CSR policies also use these to support the 
implementation of PS internally as being consistent with corporate values and global 
commitments.  
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Policies and policy processes 
Policy analysis focuses attention on the institutionalisation of PS through the design and 
implementation of ‘techniques of control’ (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000). In 
summary, it is argued that packaging and beverage industry associations acted as 
‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (Holm, 1995) in driving the development of voluntary PS 
agreements in preference to CDL or other forms of state regulation. PS was ultimately 
embedded within the NPC and became the framework for corporate action. Most of the 
case study companies are making some systemic changes to the way they manage the life 
cycle environmental impacts of packaging, most notably through the integration of 
environmental requirements in design and procurement policies, but the pace of change 
may be insufficient to satisfy some stakeholder groups. Companies are focusing on 
initiatives which help to achieve their core business objectives, such as cost efficiency. 
This is consistent with many writers on CSR who argue—albeit from very different 
perspectives—that companies should, or do, only implement social policies which support 
long-term profit maximisation.  
At a macro level, two policy coalitions emerged in the 1970s to try to influence public 
policies on packaging waste. The first of these—the ‘self-regulation’ coalition led by 
industry groups—had the most influence because of its economic power and the resources 
that it was able to allocate to lobbying and voluntary PS initiatives. The second 
coalition—the ‘state regulation’ coalition of ENGOs and local government groups—had 
less influence, particularly in a policy climate which favoured deregulation. ENGOs were 
deliberately excluded from the policy network which negotiated the NPC. As predicted by 
Matthews (1988) this was because they were less willing to cooperate with industry and 
government groups to achieve a consensus outcome and less critical to policy 
implementation than those in the self-regulation coalition. They were also not as well 
organised and did not have access to the same level of resources as the industry 
associations. The advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1991) provided important 
insights into the policy conflict because it focused attention on the beliefs of groups as 
well as their power and interests. However, these coalitions operated more like the 
‘discourse coalitions’ described by Hajer (1995a; cited in Fischer, 2003). Coalitions were 
very informal, and any collaboration on policy proposals, when it occurred, was ad hoc 
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and did not necessarily involve all of the identified ‘members’. Rather, members shared a 
commitment to common story-lines about the packaging problem, policy solutions and 
corporate responsibility. ENGOs and most local government associations have always 
believed that the post-consumer management of packaging is an industry responsibility 
which they should be forced to accept through legislation. Industry associations, on the 
other hand, have argued that local government has a legal responsibility for waste 
management. One of the current challenges for industry interests is the fact that ENGOs, 
some local government groups (particularly in NSW) and some state and federal 
government politicians remain convinced that the voluntary approach is not working and 
continue to lobby for a national CDL scheme. These views are based on policy beliefs 
which are deeply entrenched and are unlikely to shift, regardless of the results of the mid-
term review of the NPC (which were generally positive) and any final decision on 
extending the covenant beyond 2010.  
At a meso level, the evaluation of case studies suggests that companies in the supply chain 
are responsive to PS but their actions can be categorised as ‘compliant’ rather than 
‘progressive’ or ‘proactive’. They are generally meeting the minimum NPC requirements 
and ‘best practice’ environmental management standards and are starting to take a life 
cycle approach to the environmental management of products and packaging. 
Responsiveness is highest in operational areas such as supply chain management and 
cleaner production, and in activities such as product recovery, voluntary environmental 
programs and communication which involve liaison and collaboration with external 
stakeholders in government and the community. However, responsiveness to litter 
management is particularly poor, despite the fact that this issue is a high priority for 
ENGOs and local government associations and one of the main reasons why these groups 
support CDL. The average responsiveness score for DFE was also relatively low and most 
of the examples provided by companies involved lightweighting or recycled content. This 
is consistent with the emphasis in corporate packaging discourses on efficiency and cost 
reduction strategies. It also supports the view that companies only pursue social goals that 
are consistent with financial goals (Pava and Krausz, 1995). Very few companies are 
implementing environmental marketing strategies that would change the way they position 
their products and their company. However, the approach being taken by most 
companies—a more efficient approach to ‘business-as-usual’—and the ‘invisibility’ of 
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efficiency gains to most consumers and ENGOs, may cause problems for industry 
associations trying to convince stakeholders that the NPC is achieving real environmental 
improvements. As one government representative noted, companies may be changing their 
packaging but this is not obvious when you walk down a supermarket aisle. There also 
appears to be a significant gap for many companies between their rhetoric about PS and 
environmental responsibility and their actual implementation of PS policies and practices, 
which may damage the credibility of the NPC as an effective policy tool.  
By examining policy processes at a company level it is possible to gain a deeper insight 
into the way that environmental strategies, particularly for product development, are being 
institutionalised within firms. PS presents some important challenges for companies 
because it has implications for almost every part of the business. Whereas it was once 
regarded as a responsibility of the environment or corporate affairs functions, many 
companies are now allocating responsibility throughout the organisation. This is clearly 
still a ‘work in progress’ for many companies, with programs under way to inform and 
educate staff about corporate objectives and their role in implementing PS. It is being 
supported by the integration of PS policy within existing business systems, for example 
new product development (NPD) procedures. This is particularly important given that PS 
strategies such as ‘design for recycling’ may add to packaging costs.  
One response to dilemmas around competing packaging objectives is to ensure that 
corporate policies, including NPC commitments, are understood by all staff and that there 
are systems in place to ensure that they are followed. Another is to institutionalise PS 
through strategies that aim to satisfy multiple stakeholders and competing organisational 
goals simultaneously. While some companies may be practising ‘organisational 
hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 2002) by trying to satisfy some stakeholders with words and some 
with action, most companies appear to be selecting strategies that contribute to business 
and environmental objectives at the same time. For example, they tend to focus on 
packaging design strategies that reduce costs, for example through lightweighting or 
improved transport efficiencies, and thereby satisfy the expectations of customers and 
financial market analysts while also promoting the environmental benefits of these 
outcomes in environmental and NPC reports. These strategies do have significant 
environmental benefits—other research has shown that minimisation of packaging and 
maximising transport efficiencies are two of the most effective actions that can be taken to 
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improve the environmental impacts of packaging113. The challenge for governments and 
the NPCC is to ensure that companies implement efficiency strategies to the extent that 
they can, while also addressing ENGO and local government demands for increased 
recycling. 
Company characteristics 
The analysis of company characteristics focuses attention on industry sector, company 
size, location and other factors which mediate the responsiveness of firms within the same 
organisational field (Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Hoffman, 2001). This is useful in trying to 
understand why some companies in the packaging supply chain are more responsive than 
others. In summary, it is argued that the most responsive companies have been those that 
are highly visible because of their size and their history of engagement with government 
and ENGO stakeholders. These companies can be divided into two overlapping groups: 
• those involved in the manufacture of beverages and beverage packaging, such as 
Foster’s, Coca-Cola Amatil and Amcor, who have a long-standing commitment to 
voluntary PS programs because of stakeholder campaigns to extend CDL beyond 
South Australia;  
• large transnational corporations with well known brands, such as McDonald’s, 
Unilever and Kimberley-Clark, who have developed strong CSR or sustainability 
policies that influence their operations in Australia. 
Less responsive companies have included retailers and brand owners who have not been 
exposed to significant stakeholder pressure in the past, particularly on product-related 
environmental issues, but are now starting to take action. Some of these companies, such 
as Woolworths and Coles, are establishing comprehensive environmental programs for the 
first time, while others are expanding operational environmental programs to include 
impacts ‘up stream’ and ‘down stream’ in the product life cycle. 
At a macro level, the analysis of packaging discourses and public policy processes helps 
to explain why manufacturers of beverages such as soft drinks and beer and their 
                                                     
113 Parker (2008) concluded from a review of LCA studies that minimising packaging, using 
renewable energy and maximimising transport efficiencies are more effective strategies than 
recycling. This is because recycling, while worthwhile, uses energy for collection and reprocessing 
and generates waste.  
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packaging suppliers have been particularly proactive. After CDL was introduced into SA 
in the early 1970s and other states appeared willing to follow suit, these companies 
worked hard to demonstrate that they could manage the environmental impacts of non-
refillable packaging without the need for legislation. Initially they established collection 
and reprocessing facilities for post-consumer packaging and developed voluntary 
agreements with state governments, and later became strong advocates for the NPC. Their 
responsiveness to PS was actively encouraged by industry associations such as LRA/BIEC 
and PCA, which were strongly opposed to legislative solutions. As kerbside recycling 
became institutionalised as the solution to packaging waste in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, manufacturers of other beverages (such as milk and juice) and their packaging 
suppliers were also targeted by governments and ENGOs to participate in national and 
state waste reduction agreements. Finally, the NPC targeted the packaging supply chain as 
a whole, and companies in the food, consumer products and retail sectors began to 
develop PS policies and action plans for the first time.    
The economic value of packaging materials also supported the responsiveness of beverage 
companies and their packaging suppliers. The primary materials used for beverages in the 
1970s and 1980s were glass and aluminium, both of which had a commercial value to 
manufacturers. Recycling programs for single-use bottles and cans were initially 
established under pressure from governments and ENGOs, but they continued, at least in 
part, because of their economic benefit. The responsiveness of companies manufacturing 
packaging from other materials, such as plastics and liquidpaperboard, was constrained by 
the lower cost of these materials, which meant that they had little or no value as raw 
materials for manufacturing. In their case, pressure from stakeholder groups was the only 
reason that they became involved in recycling. 
The progressive involvement of companies and their industry associations in packaging 
policy negotiations and voluntary agreements is reflected in the results of the industry-
wide (meso level) evaluation of PS performance. Packaging manufacturers and brand 
owners, particularly those in the beverage industry, have been the most responsive to PS 
and retailers the least responsive. The institutionalisation of PS within beverage 
manufacturers and their packaging suppliers, which began in the 1970s, is reflected in 
much higher responsiveness scores than those for other sectors and the supply chain as a 
whole. Retailers were not exposed to any significant ENGO or government scrutiny until 
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the 1990s, when these stakeholders started to demand that they reduce the environmental 
impacts of shopping bags and join the NPC.  
At a micro level, the extent to which companies have institutionalised PS through policies 
and practices appears to be influenced by the location of the corporate head office, 
company size and public profile. Global companies based in the US and Europe have been 
the most responsive, possibly due to the stronger tradition of voluntary social 
responsibility in these regions than in Australia. Comments made by interviewees about 
their PS activities suggest that the higher responsiveness of American and European 
companies is also due to other factors linked to their status as transnational corporations, 
such as: 
• their size and high profile which makes them more vulnerable to criticism by 
governments and ENGOs; 
• their exposure to packaging regulations and stakeholder expectations in a number 
of countries around the world, and not just Australia;  
• the support they receive from their corporate head offices, which have had a 
longer history of involvement in PS than their Australian-based subsidiaries. 
Because of their size, high profile and history of engagement with governments and NGOs 
on social issues, many of these companies also have CSR or sustainability policies which 
already address product-related impacts. A formal commitment to PS is consistent with 
these policies and can be built relatively easily into relevant management systems, such as 
those for supply chain management and sustainability reporting. 
Overall conclusions 
The primary research question for the thesis was: How and to what extent has product 
stewardship been institutionalised within the Australian packaging supply chain? In 
summary, companies in all sectors of the supply chain are starting to institutionalise PS by 
changing their policies and practices in order to minimise the environmental impacts of 
packaging. This is occurring through a process of ‘coercive isomorphism’, which is the 
result of political influence and changing cultural expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991b). While the initial focus of government and corporate policies was on the impacts 
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of packaging in the waste stream, the NPC has broadened the policy debate and corporate 
responsibility to encompass the entire packaging life cycle. This shift in focus means that 
PS overlaps with other areas of conventional environmental management practice such as 
cleaner production and energy efficiency, and the NPC has prompted many companies to 
extend their environmental management programs into new areas or to make greater 
efforts to achieve environmental savings. However, the extent to which PS is being 
institutionalised in individual companies in response to changing public policies and 
stakeholder expectations is mediated by a range of company characteristics. The most 
important of these appears to be the level of exposure to government and ENGO scrutiny. 
This is strongly linked to industry sector—the beverage industry has been under the most 
pressure over the longest period of time because of the threat of CDL—as well as 
company size, public profile and head office location. Industry associations have played 
an important role in defining the PS institution as well as driving corporate 
responsiveness. 
Nevertheless, it is also clear that, while there are significant changes occurring in the way 
that companies manage the life cycle impacts of packaging, these changes are not having 
any significant impact on the total amount of packaging being consumed. Recycling rates 
are increasing, but this is largely due to NPCC and government investments in 
infrastructure and strong demand in export markets rather than the actions of companies 
themselves. Under the NPC companies have flexibility to choose how and when they 
implement PS. As a result of pressure from customers and financial markets to reduce 
costs and increase market share, most companies are trying to focus on strategies which 
achieve an environmental benefit without any negative impact on the marketability or cost 
of their products. In general the strategies being pursued are designed to achieve an 
environmental benefit by increasing the efficiency of transport or production rather than 
by making any fundamental changes to the way that packaging is designed, manufactured, 
consumed or recovered. This approach is likely to achieve incremental changes which will 
reduce the life cycle environmental impacts of packaging, but without meeting the 
expectations of some government stakeholders and ENGOs for more rapid and substantial 
reductions in packaging waste.   
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Implications for theory 
The analytical framework developed for the thesis challenged and extended existing 
conceptualisations of corporate social responsibility and responsiveness. Neo-liberal 
approaches, primarily those based on neo-classical economic theory, were rejected on the 
basis that they fail to explain corporate responsiveness to social issues, particularly where 
these responses do not generate any immediate financial benefit to the firm. They are also 
unable to explain how and why new institutions such as product stewardship are created. 
Economic theory would suggest that market based instruments such as an advance 
disposal fee, or other regulations designed to internalise social costs, would provide a 
more efficient solution to product-related environmental impacts. However, federal and 
state governments in Australia have generally supported self-regulation through voluntary 
agreements, supported by back up legislation (based on the ‘extended producer 
responsibility’ model) rather than MBIs or direct regulation.  
The framework builds on a long tradition of research and theoretical development on 
corporate social performance within a managerial liberal paradigm. The CSP model which 
was originally proposed by Carroll (1979) and applied to empirical research by Labatt 
(1991; 1997) is a useful framework for analysing corporate policies and practice, i.e. what 
companies are doing in response to a particular social issue. Stakeholder salience theory 
(Mitchell et al., 1997) has helped to explain why companies respond to social issues and 
how they prioritise the expectations of different stakeholder groups. However, stakeholder 
theory does not explain how social issues arise in the first place, or how organisations deal 
with competing stakeholder demands and different perceptions of stakeholder salience 
within the organisation. The other problem with the CSP framework and stakeholder 
theories is their silence on the institutional barriers inherent in a capitalist economy. 
Writers with an institutionalist perspective question the effectiveness of voluntary 
responsibility within a capitalist system, which appears to discourage initiatives that do 
not contribute to the corporate ‘bottom line’.  
The analytical framework developed for the thesis attempted to overcome these problems 
by combining insights from the CSP framework and stakeholder theory with those from 
new institutional organisational theory. Institutional theory focuses on the way that 
companies try to maintain legitimacy by working within established rules or customs. It 
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also provides a framework for understanding the way that companies interact with other 
stakeholders in an organisational field to influence the construction of a new institutional 
framework, in this case product stewardship. Additional insights were drawn from the 
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1991), discourse theory (e.g. Hajer, 1995b) and 
organisational theory (e.g. Mintzberg, 1983) to explore the dynamics of the 
institutionalising process in more detail.  
This approach contributes to a greater understanding of environmental responsiveness by 
extending policy considerations more explicitly to the importance of institutional 
frameworks and drivers. In summary, it suggests that an environmental problem and the 
implications for corporate social responsibility are defined, contested and redefined 
through an iterative process at several levels (Figure 28).  
Figure 28: An overview of the revised corporate social performance framework 
 
The highest of these is the socio-political networks within which corporate stakeholders 
(particularly governments, ENGOs and industry associations) engage in discursive 
struggle to define the nature of the problem and to identify appropriate policy solutions, 
and this process creates new standards of corporate behaviour that become 
institutionalised in everyday practice. These standards may become embedded within 
government regulations, voluntary agreements, codes of practice and corporate policy, and 
Institutional drivers and barriers 
• macro level (socio-political networks) 
• meso level (companies within industry 
sectors) 
• micro level (inside companies) 
The ‘environmental problem’ and 
its implications for corporate 
social responsibility
Corporate responsiveness 
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over time become accepted within industry as the ‘right thing to do’. The responsiveness 
of companies is mediated by a range of institutional factors that operate at both an 
industry and a corporate level. At an industry level companies are likely to be influenced 
by the level of government and public scrutiny of their activities, their history of 
involvement in the issue, economic drivers and barriers (such as the level of competition 
and economic conditions), their potential influence on the issue, and the policy position of 
key industry associations. The responsiveness of individual companies is also likely to be 
influenced by other corporate policies (such as a commitment to sustainability or CSR), 
company size, location of head office and type of ownership. 
This research examined the influence of actors, discourses, policy processes and company 
characteristics at each of these levels on the institutionalisation of PS within the Australian 
packaging supply chain. However, the same framework could be used to understand the 
way that other environmental issues are institutionalised through processes involving 
policy networks, industry sectors and firms. A summary of the key elements in the 
framework is provided in Table 32 and more detail is provided below.  
 
Table 32: Details of the corporate social performance framework 
Level of 
analysis  
Interest groups Discourses Policies and policy 
processes 
Company 
characteristics 
Macro: 
socio-
political 
networks  
Groups involved in 
policy processes – 
their interests and 
policy beliefs 
The story-lines 
used by groups to 
frame the policy 
problem and policy 
solutions 
The interaction of 
competing 
coalitions in public 
policy processes 
The influence and 
power of economic 
interests in public 
policy processes 
Meso: 
companies 
within 
industry 
sectors  
Industry sectors 
and associations – 
their economic and 
political interests 
The language used 
by companies and 
associations in 
different sectors to 
describe the policy 
problem and 
corporate 
responsibilities  
The policies and 
practices being 
implemented 
within different 
sectors to 
demonstrate 
responsiveness 
The influence of 
industry sector on 
corporate 
responsiveness 
Micro: 
inside 
companies   
Functional groups 
within individual 
companies – their 
roles and external 
stakeholders 
How the policy 
problem and 
corporate 
responsibilities are 
framed internally 
by linking them to 
other business 
policies and 
priorities 
Corporate policy 
processes and 
structural changes 
within firms that 
are helping to 
institutionalise 
corporate 
responsibility  
The influence of 
company size, 
public visibility, 
location, ownership 
and corporate 
culture on 
responsiveness 
 255 
Macro level analysis 
This is the level at which the problem is defined and policy solutions are developed 
through discursive and policy processes.  
Models of corporate social performance within a managerial paradigm refer to the social 
issues that help to shape corporate social responsibilities (e.g. Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991). 
There is some acknowledgement that these issues are often unclear and can change over 
time (e.g. Swanson and Niehoff, 2001) but there is very little discussion in this literature 
about the contested nature of social issues and the interests that shape them. Stakeholder 
theory can be used to identify the social issues most relevant to individual companies (e.g. 
Mitchell et al., 1997), but it fails to explain how social issues and stakeholder groups 
‘emerge from the interaction and negotiation of actors’ (Näsi et al., 1997, pp. 318-9). This 
is a significant gap in existing CSP models. 
The analytical framework developed for this research explicitly considers how a social 
issue becomes institutionalised in government policy and corporate practice. As outlined 
in Chapter 3, issues are not simply ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered (Bessant et al., 
2006). They are socially constructed through discourses between groups with different 
interests and policy beliefs. Policy and discourse analysis were used to understand how 
actors interacted to frame the ‘packaging problem’ and corporate responsibilities and to 
embed these in the NPC. It identified ‘advocacy coalitions’, the role that these played in 
policy debates, and their relative power in negotiations. It also examined the way that 
groups used particular story-lines about packaging, waste and corporate responsibility to 
influence policy outcomes.  
This type of analysis is critical in understanding how an environmental issue emerges and 
becomes a ‘corporate social issue’. It demonstrates, at least in an Australian context, how 
industry associations have been able to shape policy and stakeholder expectations to 
achieve outcomes which are less onerous and more acceptable to their members than 
policies proposed by other stakeholders. An important insight from new institutional 
organisational theory is that companies are not passive players in the construction of a 
new institution. Industry associations, in particular, play an important role in shaping the 
normative environment through ‘institutional work’ practices such as lobbying. This is 
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contrary to the conventional approach to CSR, which assumes that companies are reacting 
to, rather than helping to shape, social expectations. 
The ability of industry associations and business interests to influence environmental 
policy in Australia is also evident in other areas, such as greenhouse policy. Under the 
previous Liberal Government, industry associations representing the energy, mining and 
resource processing sectors and many of their member companies had privileged access to 
government policy makers and were able to delay ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Pearse, 2007). Under the current Labor Government, the same interests are successfully 
negotiating higher levels of compensation and other changes to the proposed emissions 
trading scheme to limit the potential impacts of a carbon price on competitiveness 
(Maiden, 2009).  
Meso level analysis 
The policy problem and corporate responsibilities are also debated, contested and 
reinterpreted within industry sectors. The research found that the responsiveness of 
companies to the packaging problem and the NPC varied depending on their position in 
the packaging supply chain. This was attributed to a range of factors, including: 
• the potential impact of regulations on companies in different sectors—the 
beverage industry and its packaging suppliers, for example, have more to lose 
from regulations such as CDL than other brand owners and retailers; 
• the ability of companies in different sectors to influence the environmental 
impacts of packaging—brand owners have more influence on packaging design 
than packaging suppliers, for example; 
• the role of the different industry associations in supporting or contesting the 
principle of product stewardship and the implications for corporate responsibility; 
and 
• the extent to which each sector has been exposed to public and government 
pressure to implement voluntary corporate responsibility programs for packaging. 
Research on corporate social performance from a managerial perspective has previously 
identified industry sector as one of the variables influencing corporate responsiveness, but 
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without providing any framework for understanding the institutional factors that drive or 
constrain performance within an industry sector. Industry associations influence the way 
that issues are institutionalised through their role in shaping public policy and through 
their influence on corporate policy and practice. The company representatives interviewed 
for this research did not regard industry associations as a significant stakeholder, but the 
macro level analysis in Chapter 4 highlighted their importance in shaping the institutional 
environment. This supports Gunningham and Rees (1997), who argued that industry self-
regulation only works when industry associations are effective in establishing a new form 
of ‘industrial morality’. The success of self-regulation has also been linked to the capacity 
within industry associations to provide political and technical information and to bind 
their members to agreements negotiated with the state (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989). An 
understanding of actors and processes at an industry level, and particularly the role of 
industry associations in shaping policy and guiding the responsiveness of member 
companies, could be used to design more effective environmental policies. For example, 
voluntary agreements (such as the NPC) could outline more explicitly the role of industry 
associations in encouraging and supporting implementation.   
Micro level analysis 
The policy problem and corporate responsibilities are also contested and reframed within 
companies.  
Conventional stakeholder theory and CSP models assume that organisations operate as a 
unified whole and that perceptions of stakeholder salience are common across the 
organisation. The framework that was developed for this research took a different 
approach. It builds on the approach taken by Hoffman (2001) to investigate the diffusion 
of environmental management practices within firms and research by Jones (1999) on 
corporate social responsibility. Both of these writers focused on internal groups or 
functions rather than the firm as a whole. It also draws on other research from 
organisational theory (e.g. Clegg, 1990; Mintzberg, 1983), which identified the 
importance of internal groups within the firm and their relative power.  
This approach provided additional insights into the way that PS is being institutionalised 
within companies. Companies do not have a single interest or objective when it comes to 
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environmental issues. Rather, each functional group—such as marketing, design, 
production, environment or procurement—has its own objectives and is influenced by 
particular internal and external stakeholders. Environmental strategies are determined 
through a political process involving negotiation between groups with different levels of 
power within the organisation. Stakeholder theory (particularly Mitchell et al., 1997) is 
relevant in trying to understand the responsiveness of a company to stakeholder 
expectations, but this needs to be applied to internal groups as well as the company as a 
whole. An understanding of functional groups, their interests, stakeholders and relative 
power within the organisation, can help to identify barriers to change within companies. 
Decisions about packaging design, for example, are driven by marketing. The 
environmental commitments made by a company at management level, for example by 
signing the NPC and submitting an action plan, will only be implemented if there are 
structures and policies in place to ensure that everyone in the firm—including 
marketing—are accountable for achieving outcomes.  
An understanding of the political processes operating within firms can inform 
environmental policy development by identifying the key decision makers that need to be 
engaged and made accountable. It can also be used by practitioners within firms to embed 
the environmental issue within corporate structures, policy and practice. Both of these 
issues are discussed further in the next section. 
Implications for policy and practice 
Public policy 
The research findings support the ‘Porter hypothesis’ (Porter and van de Linde, 1995a; 
1995b) that a well-designed environmental policy can help companies to generate product 
and process improvements that produce positive commercial and environmental 
outcomes. The NPC is encouraging companies to look for opportunities to improve 
efficiency and reduce waste in their operations, for example by eliminating unnecessary 
packaging and designing packaging to use less material. However, many of the company 
representatives who were interviewed for this research believe that governments and the 
NPCC are not providing enough support to companies, nor are they providing enough 
incentive for action through the enforcement of the NEPM.  
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One of the potential challenges of a largely voluntary scheme, such as the NPC, is that 
most companies will only pursue PS strategies to the extent that they support other 
business goals such as increased efficiency or profit. While there are some examples of 
companies in the packaging supply chain pursuing PS strategies that increase packaging 
costs, most of the actions that are publicly reported under the rubric of corporate social 
responsibility or environmental stewardship have a direct or indirect benefit for the 
corporate ‘bottom line’. The flexibility of the NPC and its voluntary nature mean that 
companies are not going to make any significant changes to their packaging unless there 
are sound business reasons for doing so. This is supported by other product policy 
evaluations which show that voluntary PS schemes appear to be less effective in 
promoting DFE and environmental innovation than those which impose more 
responsibility on manufacturers (e.g. Holmes, 1999; McKerlie et al., 2006; OECD, 2005; 
Quinn and Sinclair, 2006; Røine and Lee, 2006; van Rossem et al., 2006). 
The amount of packaging consumed in Australia is still increasing, albeit at a slower rate, 
and a large proportion of this is manufactured from non-recyclable materials. Recycling 
rates, while increasing, are also regarded by ENGOs and some local government 
associations as inadequate, and these groups continue to advocate CDL. While the 
difficulties involved in the development of a national regulatory approach in Australia’s 
federal system of government should not be ignored, it is important to note that the policy 
beliefs which underpin demands for CDL—that packaging waste is a significant 
environmental problem and that voluntary corporate responsibility will not achieve any 
satisfactory solution—have not changed since the early 1970s, despite numerous 
government inquiries that have recommended against CDL.  
This impasse needs to be resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. The NPC is 
achieving some important environmental outcomes and should be continued. However, 
there are policy strategies which could be implemented simultaneously to improve its 
effectiveness. First, this research has highlighted the fact that company representatives are 
frustrated with the lack of enforcement of the NEPM by state jurisdictions. A stakeholder 
survey conducted for the mid-term review of the covenant also found a high level of 
dissatisfaction with regulatory enforcement (Hyder Consulting, 2008b). Governments are 
using the NEPM to encourage companies to sign the covenant but not to enforce 
compliance with action plan and reporting requirements (NPCC, 2008d). This is despite 
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the fact that the NEPM is intended to be applied to brand owners who are not ‘fulfilling 
their obligations under the Covenant’ (NEPC, 2005, p. 7) and these obligations go beyond 
becoming a signatory. The NEPM was considered by most industry associations to be 
critical to the success of the NPC because of the need to prevent ‘free-loading’ on the 
voluntary scheme. However, the NEPM will only be effective if governments indicate 
their willingness to move up the ‘enforcement pyramid’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) 
when required. One of the barriers to enforcement is the federal system of government in 
Australia, which requires coordinated action by eight state and territory government 
jurisdictions as well as the NPCC. 
Second, there is a need for a complementary mechanism that provides companies with a 
greater financial incentive to reduce the environmental impacts of packaging. The analysis 
of interest groups within the firm for this research suggests that different policy 
mechanisms may be required to influence key functional groups. The NPC may be a 
sufficient driver for people in corporate affairs or environmental positions, but not for 
those involved in marketing or management. The EPHC (2008b) has asked the NPCC to 
‘prepare a framework for an extended Covenant beyond 2010 as well as other options for 
managing the environmental impacts of packaging ... [t]hese options may involve the use 
of complementary economic (or other) instruments’. Neo-classical environmental 
economists argue that market-based instruments are the most efficient and effective way 
of internalising environmental costs and changing corporate behaviour (e.g. Palmer and 
Walls, 2002; Porter, 2002). Market based instruments that change the price of packaging 
materials are more likely to influence marketing and management groups than policies 
(like the NPC) that rely on principles such as corporate social responsibility or stakeholder 
engagement.  
Contrary to the belief of some stakeholders, CDL does not appear to be the best solution. 
Redeemable deposits provide consumers with an incentive to return packaging for 
recycling and could therefore increase recovery rates, but a national CDL program would 
be problematic for a number of reasons: 
• Most CDL programs only apply to beverage packaging, which contributes around 
2.7% of waste to landfill, whereas packaging as a whole makes up around 10% 
(AFGC, 2008c). 
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• Kerbside collection systems, which are widely available in urban and regional 
centres in Australia, accept a much wider range of packaging and may be 
undermined by a second collection system for beverage containers. 
• CDL does not provide companies with any incentive to change the way they 
design packaging.  
Federal and state governments on both sides of politics have indicated over the past few 
decades that they are unwilling to introduce a packaging policy, like CDL, which is 
strongly opposed by business interests, including large manufacturers and retailers. CDL 
was also not supported by the EPHC-funded investigation of complementary mechanisms 
because of uncertainty about the costs and benefits (MMA and BDA, 2007). 
In contrast, an advance disposal fee (ADF) could be structured to reduce the amount of 
packaging, increase the amount of recyclable packaging and provide funding to expand 
the collection and recovery infrastructure. This was one of the short-listed options in the 
report to EPHC on complementary mechanisms (MMA and BDA, 2007). ADFs are used 
in various forms overseas to encourage extended producer responsibility for packaging. 
Under this type of scheme, a mandatory fee would be charged for every item of packaging 
sold. The fee could be calculated on the basis of both weight and recyclability, i.e. higher 
fees would apply to non-recyclable materials. This would provide a clear financial 
incentive for companies to eliminate unnecessary packaging, to reduce packaging weight 
and to switch from non-recyclable to recyclable packaging materials.  
The funds raised through an ADF could also be used to fund research and development 
and infrastructure grants to improve the collection, sorting and reprocessing of packaging 
materials. Research for the mid-term review of the NPC concluded that projects already 
funded with industry contributions are likely to increase recycling levels significantly 
(Covec, 2008). 
Finally, policy initiatives to encourage more ‘sustainable consumption’ of packaging 
could be explored. Environmental policies that target consumers rather than producers 
may be an effective way of addressing the impacts of globalised production–consumption 
chains and networks (Spaargaren and Mol, 2008). Interviews conducted for this research 
(Chapter 6) highlighted one of the challenges for packaging stewardship in Australia—the 
fact that local subsidiaries of transnational corporations often have little influence over 
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packaging design and its recyclability. The NPC is only one of the many drivers that make 
up a company’s legal, economic and social ‘licence to operate’ (Gunningham et al., 2003) 
in global markets, and is unlikely to be the most influential for a company based in 
Europe, the US or Asia. Targeting Australian consumers in their role as ‘consumer-
citizens’ (Spaargaren and Mol, 2008) may help to overcome this problem. The amount of 
packaging waste generated is the direct result of purchasing decisions made by consumers. 
Policies that might influence these decisions include eco-labelling and education to inform 
consumers about the environmental impacts of packaging including its recyclability. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, consumers are already concerned about issues such as packaging 
waste and litter but more effort is required to translate this concern into purchasing 
decisions that favour environmentally preferable packaging. However, while there is an 
opportunity to promote individual responsibility, consumers can only take action if they 
have the ability to choose more sustainable packaging, and this will depend on issues such 
as availability and affordability. For this reason, ‘ecological citizenship’ needs to be 
promoted within the context of collective action through the state and civil society to 
address structural barriers to participation (Melo-Escrihuela, 2008).  
Any redesign of packaging policy also needs to take into account the emergence of 
climate change as a high priority for governments at a national and global level (Garnaut, 
2008; IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2006). This is starting to be reflected in corporate packaging 
initiatives, such as the announcement by Tesco in the UK that it would put ‘carbon labels’ 
on all of their products to provide information on their carbon footprint from production 
through to consumption (Leahy, 2007)114. Like all other products, packaging uses energy 
and generates carbon dioxide, a common greenhouse gas (GHG), during the processing of 
raw materials, manufacturing, distribution and recycling. Organic materials such as 
biopolymers, paper and cardboard also break down in landfill and generate methane, 
another potent greenhouse gas. The renegotiation of the NPC should include a 
requirement for signatories to measure and reduce GHG emissions throughout the 
packaging life cycle. Recycling targets need to be based on a full understanding of the 
impact that recycling has on GHG emissions. Recycling should not be viewed as an 
                                                     
114 Extensive research on carbon labels is being undertaken by researchers at the Sustainable 
Consumption Institute, Manchester University, which was established with funding support from 
Tesco (SCI, 2008). 
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environmental objective in its own right; but rather as a strategy to achieve environmental 
objectives such as lower levels of pollution. In other words, recycling rates should be 
optimised rather than maximised to ensure that there is a net benefit in environmental 
terms. There needs to be consistency between the extended NPC and the federal 
government’s proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, which is a ‘cap and trade’ or 
emissions trading scheme (DCC, 2008). For example, emissions associated with waste 
management and recycling need to be included in the scheme to provide a financial 
incentive to companies to recycle or incorporate recycled materials in production115. This 
approach is consistent with ‘best practice’ in environmental policy, which considers the 
contribution of measures against multiple sustainability objectives (OECD, 2007). 
The findings of this research also have a number of implications for the design of any 
environmental policy intended to influence corporate behavior, regardless of the specific 
issue being addressed. First, companies are more likely to respond to a new policy if it can 
be used internally to achieve both environmental and business objectives. Most signatories 
to the NPC are pursuing policies that have commercial benefits in the short term (for 
example by reducing material costs) or in the long term (for example by supporting their 
corporate reputation and protecting their ‘licence to operate’). Policies need to be flexible 
enough to allow companies to select the strategies that are most likely to benefit their 
business. Wherever possible, government policy makers should also frame the objectives 
of a policy to reflect its business benefits as well as its environmental objectives and 
benefits. The NPC, for example, could be reframed as a business development program 
designed to: 
• reduce packaging costs at every stage of the supply chain by improving 
production, transport and handling efficiencies; 
• improve competitiveness in local and export  markets by responding to consumer 
interest in environmentally responsible packaging (and closing the gap between 
the interest expressed by consumers in market surveys and their actual purchasing 
behaviour); and 
                                                     
115 The Australian Council of Recyclers (ACOR), Amcor, Visy Recycling and the Waste 
Management Association of Australia (WMAA) have all argued that the emissions trading scheme 
may have a negative impact on recyclers compared to manufacturers of some virgin materials 
(Morton, 2008; WMAA, 2008). 
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• building corporate reputation and brand value by implementing and promoting 
environmental initiatives. 
Reframing an environmental policy or program as a business development tool would 
enhance rather than diminish its environmental effectiveness by encouraging greater 
commitment within firms. This can be achieved in a number of ways, including explicit 
promotion of the business benefits in all policy documents and the publication of 
corporate case studies that focus on real examples. A good example of the latter is 
provided by the Australian Government’s Energy Efficiency Opportunities (EEO) 
program116, which regularly publishes case studies and reports that promote the benefits 
of energy projects for cost saving, productivity, product quality, workplace safety and 
other business objectives117.  
However, it is unlikely that all companies will be able to benefit from an environmental 
policy. According to Hoffman (2002, p. 330), there will be winners and losers from 
climate change policy, for example, because companies ‘face different financial and 
technical realities based on their installed capital base, market competencies and strategic 
position in the political and social arenas’. Nevertheless, it is clear that when companies 
are required to look for improvement opportunities they often find them. Most of the 
company representatives interviewed for this research noted that many if not all of the 
strategies they were pursuing were achieving business as well as environmental benefits. 
The business benefits of the EEO program appear to be even more significant because of 
the potential to save relatively large amounts of money through energy efficiency 
improvements.  
Second, companies will only respond to policies where there is a real threat of 
enforcement. The effectiveness of the NPC appears to have been limited by an 
unwillingness of state governments to enforce the NEPM for non-performance as well as 
non-participation. A co-regulatory approach to policy that combines self-regulation with a 
regulatory back-up mechanism to discourage ‘free-riders’ has many benefits, including the 
                                                     
116 The EEO program requires large energy users to identify potential energy efficiency 
opportunities and to evaluate the commercial feasibility of these opportunities. 
117 Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (DRET), 
www.ret.gov.au/energy/efficiency/eeo/resmaterial/Pages/default.aspx (viewed 13 October 2009).  
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flexibility it provides for companies. However, governments need to be committed to 
enforcement.  
Third, a new behaviour will only be institutionalised when it becomes embedded within 
corporate policies and practices. Policy design needs to recognise how and where 
decisions are made within the firm and how these decisions can be influenced. Within a 
product manufacturing firm (brand owner), for example, decisions about packaging are 
made by the marketing group, and environmental and technical personnel may have 
limited influence on the product development process. The NPC requires all companies to 
implement the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (ECoPP), and this 
necessarily involves action by the marketing group. However, this requirement needs to be 
enforced to ensure that ECoPP is used for all packaging development and that the 
marketing group is accountable for the environmental impact of their decisions. The 
decision makers who need to be targeted by other environmental policy initiatives may be 
different. For example, energy use within a manufacturing firm is largely controlled by 
operational staff, i.e. management, production and maintenance personnel at site level.   
Policy makers therefore need to identify key decision makers within the firm, and to 
ensure that these groups and individuals are involved in implementation. Some of the 
mechanisms for this include: 
• engagement with senior management to ensure that the policy receives corporate 
support (e.g. by ensuring that reports to government are signed by the chief 
executive officer); and 
• a requirement for companies to implement and report on specific management 
practices, such as product design guidelines (as required under the NPC) or a 
process for identifying energy efficiency opportunities (as required under the EEO 
program). 
An alternative approach is to design a market based instrument (MBI) that ensures 
environmental costs are fully internalised in decision making. An ADF, if designed and 
implemented effectively, should ensure that packaging design decisions minimise 
packaging waste and optimise recyclability. Similarly, an emissions trading scheme, if 
designed and implemented effectively, should encourage energy efficiency improvements 
and a shift from fossil-based to renewable sources of energy. However, this research has 
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highlighted the need for an institutional approach to policy making which recognises the 
many drivers, in addition to cost, that influence corporate decisions. At a meso level these 
include the extent of government and public scrutiny of a particular issue (and regulatory 
threats) and the role of industry associations in guiding corporate responsiveness. At a 
micro level they include the presence or absence of corporate policies on sustainability 
and corporate social responsibility, the attitude of senior management to the proposed 
change, and the need to balance different, and sometimes competing, stakeholder 
expectations. The implication of this is that even with an effective MBI, complementary 
mechanisms may be required to support organisational change. These might include, for 
example: 
• support for training and other capacity building activities to assist ‘project 
champions’ to institutionalise the environmental issue within corporate policy and 
practice; and 
• an awards program that helps to institutionalise new standards for environmental 
‘best practice’ by recognising and promoting the achievements of industry 
leaders. 
Corporate policy and practice 
The thesis has analysed the way that environmental issues and strategies are interpreted 
and managed within firms. According to Ackerman (1973) a new social issue only 
becomes institutionalised when a company allocates appropriate resources to the problem 
and shifts responsibility from specialists to managerial and operational staff through 
changes in formal control systems. This research has investigated these processes in detail 
through a case study of product stewardship within the Australian packaging supply chain, 
but its findings are relevant to the promotion of other environmental issues within 
organisations. 
One of the main conclusions of the research is that PS strategies are decided through a 
political process involving a range of functional groups with different levels of power 
within the organisation. In making decisions about corporate strategy and specific 
activities, these groups try to balance the needs and expectations of different external 
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stakeholders including customers, governments and ENGOs. As a result of these 
processes, PS is being institutionalised within firms in three ways: 
• by reframing the packaging problem and PS within the context of other corporate 
policies and priorities; 
• by choosing to implement PS strategies that meet the needs of multiple internal 
and external stakeholders; and 
• by embedding PS within corporate structures and business processes. 
The packaging problem and PS are reframed and reinterpreted within companies 
according to their individual circumstances and priorities. NPC coordinators gain the 
support of key people within their organisation, and sometimes their customers, by 
reframing PS as something of value to the business. This is a rational approach, and one 
with implications for the promotion of other environmental or sustainability issues within 
firms. Each company needs to understand the implications of a particular issue or policy 
for their own business, and wherever possible, to choose strategies that will generate 
business and environmental benefits. An obvious example is the avoidance or 
lightweighting of packaging, which can simultaneously reduce manufacturing costs, 
satisfy customer demands for efficiency improvements, and reduce environmental impacts 
at every stage of the packaging life cycle. The pursuit of other environmental objectives, 
such as reduced greenhouse gas emissions, can also generate multiple business benefits118. 
The business benefits of an environmental policy or program therefore need to be 
understood and promoted by practitioners within firms. 
One of the difficulties for companies as they try to implement a PS or ‘life cycle 
management’ approach to packaging is the lack of clarity about what this actually requires 
in practice. PS provides an institutional framework for corporate responsibility, but the 
exact nature of this responsibility is often poorly defined. The NPC has been designed 
with so much flexibility that it is largely left to companies to determine when and how 
they respond. This is likely to be a particular problem for smaller companies, which may 
not have the support of a full-time environmental manager or access to the technical 
support provided by transnational corporations to local subsidiaries. The responsiveness 
                                                     
118 Many participants in the federal government’s EEO program, for example, have reduced costs, 
increased productivity or improved process control (DRET, 2007; 2008; 2009) 
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evaluation guidelines that were developed for this research (Table 23 in Chapter 5) could 
be adapted to provide a ‘how-to’ guide or checklist for PS coordinators within companies. 
However, the reality is that each company is unique and the ‘best’ or most appropriate 
strategies vary from company to company, even within the same sector. The NPC is based 
on a principle—product stewardship—and was deliberately designed to be non-
prescriptive. As a result, companies need to choose strategies based on their own 
individual circumstances.   
This research has highlighted a number of other steps that can be taken to institutionalise 
PS, and potentially any environmental issue, through changes to corporate structure and 
business processes. The most responsive companies have learnt that there are many 
challenges that need to be addressed, including the need to motivate and engage staff in 
core functions within the organisation. While ‘project champions’ (NPC coordinators) in 
environment and corporate affairs may have limited power to influence these other groups 
through direct persuasion, organisational change can be achieved through:  
• leadership provided by senior management; 
• appointment of a strong project champion; 
• allocation of responsibility to people in core business functions;  
• coordination provided by a cross-functional project team; and 
• management of the issue through existing business systems. 
Leadership from senior management is important for several reasons. It sends a message 
to other managers and operational staff that the issue is important and needs to be 
considered in decision making. It helps to ensure that adequate resources are provided for 
implementation; and that environmental impacts are measured, monitored and reported. 
The absence of such a management framework means that the project champion has very 
little authority to promote change within the organisation.  
The assessment of PS performance (Chapter 5) examined a number of management 
indicators, including the existence of a product-oriented environmental policy, objectives 
and targets; resources allocated to product stewardship; the inclusion of product impacts in 
an environmental management system; accounting for product-related performance and 
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impacts; and public reporting on product stewardship commitments and achievements. 
More generally, strong corporate leadership on an environmental issue is evident when:   
• the company’s environmental policy includes a commitment to address the issue; 
• the company has objectives, strategies and measurable targets to ensure that the 
policy is implemented, for example in a sustainability strategy or business plan; 
• there are sufficient human and financial resources allocated to implementation, 
for example at least one person with responsibility for coordination and an 
appropriate budget for projects; 
• there is an environmental management system which will ensure that the issue is 
systematically addressed in corporate policies and procedures; and 
• there are systems in place to collect the data that will enable performance to be 
measured and monitored (data on physical flows as well as financial costs and 
savings) . 
The appointment of a strong project champion is also critical to the successful 
implementation of an environmental policy or program. According to some of the 
company representatives interviewed for the thesis, it helps when this person is passionate 
about his or her role. As one person put it, ‘someone who will see this as their great 
calling in their career for the next couple of years’. It also helps when they have seniority. 
One interviewee was employed at an executive level to coordinate the company’s 
response to the NPC, and this enabled him to raise issues with senior management. The 
role of the internal champion varies depending on their position in the company and the 
resources available to support implementation, but for most NPC coordinators it includes 
the development of action plans and public reports in consultation with other key people 
in the organisation. They also tend to have a broad educative role. According to one 
interviewee, the role of a champion is to promote the issue, to teach people, and to ‘learn 
as much as they can and keep pumping information out there so that more and more 
people in the organisation are aware of it’.  
It is clear, however, that a passionate and hard-working project champion is not sufficient 
to achieve successful implementation. A complex issue like PS requires the involvement 
of different groups across the organisation, including marketing, production, procurement 
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and public affairs/environment. Responsibility for the issue therefore needs to be allocated 
to staff in all of the relevant functional groups within the organisation. Several 
interviewees observed that allocating responsibility for PS to one person in the 
environmental or public affairs group has been a barrier to change. This is because it 
encouraged people to see PS as an environmental issue rather than a business 
responsibility. The lesson for environmental management more generally is that after an 
issue has been identified as a priority, responsibility needs to be allocated across the 
organisation, and not just to a specialist within environment or public affairs.   
The need to involve different groups across the organisation has prompted some 
companies to establish a cross-functional team or committee to coordinate the preparation 
and implementation of their PS action plan. Ideally this committee includes senior 
management representatives from each of the relevant groups. One the companies 
evaluated for the thesis has a taskforce which includes the general manager of each 
division along with a technical manager, sales and marketing manager, process 
development manager and corporate environmental manager. Management of any 
environmental program by a cross-functional team has a number of benefits, including: 
• coordination of program activities; 
• engagement with all of the key groups involved in implementation, allowing them 
to contribute ideas and to share information with others; 
• providing all of the key groups with a sense of ownership and responsibility for 
program outcomes; and 
• providing a forum to monitor progress and identify any remedial actions required 
to meet goals and deadlines. 
Another important way to achieve ‘buy-in’ across the organisation is to ensure that the 
issue is embedded within existing business systems. For packaging this means ensuring 
that environmental issues are considered during the design process. Larger corporations 
tend to have a ‘gated’ NPD process, which means that a senior manager or committee is 
required to review the design at key stages or ‘gates’. The most progressive companies 
have integrated the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (ECoPP) within their 
NPD procedures to ensure that the code is always used to evaluate packaging. In one case, 
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a negative outcome (i.e. contrary to ECoPP) means that the packaging is elevated for 
review by a more senior manager. As one interviewee noted, this ‘takes out the conflict 
between personalities’ because the requirements are clearly outlined in procedures that 
have been approved by senior management. PS is also being embedded within other 
policies and procedures including environmental policies, environmental management 
systems and procurement guidelines.  
Many of these issues have been raised before, including the need to modify procedures to 
ensure that all managers have an incentive to be more responsive to social issues 
(Ackerman, 1973). More specifically on this issue, it has been suggested that design for 
environment needs to be formally integrated within environmental management systems 
and product development systems (e.g. Charter, 2001; Brezet and Rocha, 2001). The 
contribution of this research is to place these management solutions within the context of 
the political processes that influence corporate strategy. Companies have many different 
stakeholders and objectives, and their responsiveness to a particular issue (such as PS) will 
depend on the relative power of internal and external ‘influencers’ (Mintzberg, 1983). A 
better understanding of these processes will assist government policy makers and internal 
project champions to more effectively promote environmental issues as a corporate 
responsibility.  
Limitations of the research 
This research has a number of limitations. First, the case studies were deliberately biased 
towards the largest companies in each sector of the packaging supply chain. This decision 
was based on normative arguments about the progressive responsibility of firms (i.e. that 
responsibility increases with size) and the practical reality that the companies selected for 
analysis account for 90% of turnover in the packaging supply chain. It is therefore not 
possible to draw conclusions about the extent to which PS is being institutionalised within 
small to medium sized companies.    
Second, the evaluation of corporate responsiveness within industry sectors was based on 
analysis of documents published by the case study companies, including NPC reports, 
sustainability reports, annual reports and corporate web sites. One of the limitations of this 
approach is that these documents tend to be used for self-promotion and some of the 
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information on PS policies and practices may be exaggerated. On the other hand, some 
documents may not be comprehensive, i.e. they may not mention all of the relevant 
policies and practices. For example, if the NPC coordinator is located within the product 
development or marketing group they may not be aware of cleaner production initiatives 
being undertaken by the company or may not regard them as relevant to the NPC. Some 
companies do not publish sustainability or environmental reports. PS performance scores 
therefore reflect the quality of reporting as well as corporate responsiveness.  
Third, the rating system developed to evaluate corporate documents is based on an 
established approach (e.g. Labatt, 1991) and a detailed review of the environmental 
management literature, but it uses subjective evaluations and calculations. It would be 
difficult, however, to find any consensus on PS responsibilities and appropriate measures 
of performance. This problem was highlighted in earlier research (Lewis 2005) and in the 
analysis of discursive and policy processes in Chapter 4.  
Finally, the use of a quantitative rating tool may have additional limitations because of the 
small sample size selected for the research (thirty companies). While the industry-wide 
results provide good insights into the performance of the industry as a whole and 
individual sectors, further statistical analysis would be required to determine whether the 
results for some company characteristics (such as location of head office, company size 
and ownership) are statistically significant.  
Further research 
There are several avenues that could be explored for further research.  
To overcome some of the limitations outlined above, the PS indicators (Table 23) could be 
used for a more extensive, quantitative analysis of corporate responsiveness. A self-
administered questionnaire based on these indicators could be sent to all NPC coordinators 
to ensure wider coverage of small to medium sized companies. A larger survey would 
enable more detailed analysis of differences between companies based on company 
characteristics, including location of head office, size and ownership. A survey of NPC 
coordinators would also overcome some of the limitations of public documents, which 
may not be comprehensive or entirely accurate. Of course, the same limitations may apply 
to a survey, which relies on the knowledge and honesty of respondents.  
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More in-depth case studies could also be used to investigate institutionalising processes in 
more detail. One of the most important objectives of product responsibility policies, 
whether these are based on voluntary PS or a more regulated form of EPR, is to promote 
design for environment. DFE involves changes to the product development process to 
ensure that environmental issues are considered during design and procurement processes. 
The environmental outcomes that can be achieved through a conventional design process 
will be influenced not only by corporate policy, but also by the values, attitudes and 
knowledge of the individuals involved and their relative power in the organisation. 
Another critical issue is the perception that these individuals have about the salience of 
particular stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, governments and ENGOs. In-depth 
case studies of product development projects within a small number of companies would 
enable these issues to be explored in more detail. For example: 
• Are formal DFE policies and procedures actually implemented in practice?  
• What is the role and influence of marketing, packaging and environmental 
specialists in determining design outcomes? 
• To what extent are outcomes influenced by power relationships within the 
corporate structure, the perceived salience of external stakeholders, and the values 
and attitudes of individuals? 
This type of case study research could also be used to further develop stakeholder theory 
by linking external groups to ‘internal influencers’ within the company. Stakeholder 
salience theory (Mitchell et al., 1997) could be combined with organisational theories 
which focus on corporate structures and power (e.g. Mintzberg, 1983; Clegg, 1989) and 
competing ‘modes of rationality’ (Clegg, 1990).  
Another useful research direction would be to focus on the design and implementation of 
public policy for packaging. For example: 
• What is the most effective policy (or combination of policies) to promote 
packaging stewardship within firms?  
• How can a well-designed PS policy overcome barriers to efficiency within firms 
and therefore help to achieve ‘win–win’ outcomes? 
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This could build on research which strongly suggests that policy interventions can help to 
overcome barriers to efficiency within firms, such as inertia, imperfect information and 
inappropriate reward systems (e.g. Cabugueira, 2001; DeCanio, 1994; Paton, 2001; Porter 
and van de Linde, 1995a; Ramesohl and Kristof, 2002). Many of the industry 
representatives interviewed for this research argued that they would have liked to see 
more support for NPC implementation within firms from government agencies and the 
NPCC. Many lessons can be learnt from other environmental policy measures, particularly 
voluntary environmental agreements in Australia and elsewhere, to inform the design of 
an improved NPC and other product-related policies. 
Finally, the conclusion that companies and their associations help to shape stakeholder 
perceptions of corporate responsibility could be explored through further research on the 
discursive and policy processes that define corporate social responsibilities, and the extent 
to which these responsibilities reflect non-industry interests.
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Appendix 1: Interviews 
Code name Date of interview 
Company A 7/4/05 
Company B1 1/4/05 
Company B2 14/4/05 
Company C 31/8/05 
Company D 30/3/05 
Company J 25/2/08 
Company I 6/2/08 
Company G 28/10/05 
Company H 5/2/08 
Company K 4/3/08 
Company E 7/4/05 
Company L 14/2/08 
Company M 11/2/08 
Company N 11/2/08 
Company O 14/2/08 
State Government A 21/9/05 
State Government B 28/6/06 
State Government C 6/6/07 
State Government D 6/5/04 
State Government E 5/3/04 
State Government F 12/7/07 
State Government G 29/3/05 
Federal Government A 27/10/06 
Local Government A 6/2/04 
Local Government B 30/7/07 
ENGO A 18/5/04 
ENGO B 30/6/06 
ENGO C 30/4/04 
ENGO D 2/7/07 
Industry association A 21/9/05 
Industry association B 16/5/07 
Industry association C 10/5/07 
Industry association D 10/5/07 
Industry association E 22/9/05 
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Appendix 2: Company case studies 
The evaluation of corporate responsiveness in Chapter 6 was based on a review of 
documents published 1999–2005. Some of the companies have changed their ownership 
and name since 2005 and relevant details are provided in notes at the bottom of the table. 
Company by 
sector 
Sales revenue 
($m) (financial 
year) 
Corporate 
owner (as at 
December 
2005) 
Type of 
ownership 
Location of 
head office 
Packaging manufacturers 
Visy Industries 3,170.0 (6/04) Visy Industries Private (family 
owned) 
Australia 
Amcor Australasia 2,571.7 (6/05) Amcor Limited Public Australia 
Carter Holt 
Harvey* 
3,305.3 (12/04) Carter Holt 
Harvey 
Public New Zealand 
Huhtamaki 
Australia Pty Ltd 
208.3 (12/04) Huhtamäki Oyj  Public Finland 
ACI Operations Pty 
Ltd 
1,259.1 (12/04) Owens-Illinois, 
Inc. 
Public USA 
Retailers 
Bunnings Group 
Limited 
4,100.0 (6/05) Wesfarmers 
Limited 
Public Australia 
Coles Myer 
Limited** 
36,185.2 (7/05) Coles Myer 
Limited 
Public Australia 
David Jones 
Limited 
1,799.1 (6/05) David Jones 
Limited 
Public Australia 
Metcash Trading 
Limited 
6,993.7 (4/05) Metcash 
Trading Limited 
Public Australia 
Woolworths 
Limited 
31,352.0 (6/05) Woolworths 
Limited 
Public Australia 
Brand owners 
Bonlac Foods 
Limited 
712.6 (6/05) Fonterra 
 
Public New Zealand 
Cadbury 
Schweppes Limited 
2,155.0 (1/05) Cadbury 
Schweppes 
Limited 
Public UK 
Coca-Cola Amatil 4,149.6 (12/05) Coca-Cola 
Amatil 
Public Australia 
Dulux 520.6 (9/05) Orica Limited Public Australia 
Fisher & Paykel 
Appliances 
Australia Ltd 
953.1 (3/05) Fisher & Paykel 
Appliances  
Holdings 
Limited 
Public New Zealand 
Foster’s Group 3,972.3 (6/05) Foster’s Group Public Australia 
George Weston 
Foods Limited and 
AB Food & 
Beverages 
Australia Pty Ltd 
1,832.3 (12/04) Associated 
British Foods 
Plc 
Public UK 
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Company by 
sector 
Sales revenue 
($m) (financial 
year) 
Corporate 
owner (as at 
December 
2005) 
Type of 
ownership 
Location of 
head office 
Goodman Fielder 2,326.9 (6/05) Burns Philp and 
Company 
Public Australia 
Inghams 
Enterprises Pty 
Limited 
1,487.0 (7/05) Inghams 
Enterprises Pty 
Limited 
Private (family 
owned) 
Australia 
IBM Australia and 
New Zealand 
Limited 
3,753.6 (12/04) IBM 
Corporation 
Public USA 
Kimberly-Clark 
Holdings 
1,148.9 (12/04) Kimberley-
Clark 
Corporation 
 
Public USA 
Lion Nathan 
Australia 
1,143.5 (9/04) Lion Nathan 
Limited 
Public Australia 
McDonald’s 
Australia 
2,000.0 (6/05) McDonald’s 
Corporation 
Public but 70% 
of Australian 
stores are 
owned by 
franchisees 
USA 
Murray Goulburn 
Co-operative Co. 
Limited 
1,869.0 (6/05) Murray 
Goulburn Co-
operative Co. 
Limited 
Cooperative Australia 
National Foods*** 1,214.7 (6/04) San Miguel 
 
Public Philippines 
Nestlé Oceania 2,411.8 (12/04) Nestlé S.A. 
 
Public Switzerland 
Sugar Australia 350.0 (6/05) CSR Limited 
(75%) and 
Mackay Sugar 
Co-operative 
Association 
Limited (25%) 
Joint venture 
between a 
public 
corporation and 
a cooperative 
Australia 
Unilever Australia 
Ltd 
1,158.1 (12/04) Unilever Group Public Netherlands and 
UK 
Raw material suppliers 
Bluescope Steel  7,981.6 (6/05) Bluescope Steel Public Australia 
Qenos Pty Ltd 774.3 (12/04) Exxon Mobil 
(50%) and Orica 
(50%) 
Joint venture 
between 2 
public 
companies 
Australia and 
USA 
Total sales 
revenue 
132,859.3    
* By late 2005 Graeme Hart’s private company Rank Group (New Zealand) had purchased 
over 70% of Carter Holt Harvey (CHH) and the directors of the company recommended that 
shareholders sell their remaining shares to Rank Group (ABC News Online, 2005). Rank 
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Group assumed 100% of the company and it was de-listed from the Australian stock 
exchange in April 2006 (ABC News Online, 2006).  
** Coles Myer sold its Myer department stores in March 2006 to private companies Newbridge 
Capital and The Myer Family Company (Coles Myer Limited, 2006) and changed its name to 
Coles Group. In November 2007 it was acquired by public company Wesfarmers Limited 
(Coles Group, 2007). 
*** National Foods was acquired by Japanese brewery Kirin Holdings, a public company, in 
November 2007 (The New York Times, 2007). 
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Appendix 3: Product stewardship indicators 
(1) Product-oriented environmental policies, objectives and targets 
NPC Mark I makes little reference to corporate policy or strategy apart from stating that 
the packaging supply chain will ‘[i]mplement product stewardship policies and practices’ 
(ANZECC, 1999, p. 7).  However, the environmental management literature recognises 
the importance of corporate leadership in setting appropriate policies, objectives and 
targets. One of the requirements of AS/NZS ISO 14001, the international standard for 
environmental management systems (Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, 
2004, p. 4), is an environmental policy which ‘includes a commitment to comply with 
applicable legal requirements and with other requirements to which the organisation 
subscribes which relate to its environmental aspects’ and ‘provides the framework for 
setting and reviewing environmental objectives and targets’. According to Sadgrove 
(1992, p. 30), an environmental policy should include reference to products along the lines 
of ‘[w]e will aim to produce products/services that are useful or beneficial. Wherever 
possible, our products will be recyclable. We will not produce or sell products that harm 
people or the world.’ As discussed earlier, some companies specifically refer to the NPC 
or PS in their environmental policy.  
Ideally a commitment to PS should also be reflected in more specific objectives and 
targets in documents which are regularly updated, such as an environmental or business 
plan. Gray and Bebbington (2001) suggest that ‘specific targets, which should be 
transitory and developing, should be referred to in the [environmental] policy but not 
specified; that should be done in supporting documents’ (Gray and Bebbington, 2001, p. 
67, emphasis in original). For example, Kimberley-Clark Australia (2005, p. 5) has issued 
a series of corporate environmental performance standards to provide more detailed 
guidance on packaging objectives and targets. These include a standard on solid waste 
management and a ‘guidance note’ on packaging, which  states that ‘Kimberley-Clark’s 
worldwide operations will reduce the amount of transportation and final product 
packaging utilized by each of the Corporation’s businesses by at least ten percent by year-
end 2005, using 2000 packaging amounts as the baseline year’ .  
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(2) Resource allocation 
The NPC requires companies to ‘provide financial support for kerbside and other 
recycling systems’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 7). Covenant signatories must make annual 
contributions to the kerbside transitional fund, and these are calculated on the basis of 
company size and sector. Beyond this, the NPC requires each action plan to identify the 
‘major commitments, financial resources and arrangements that will be put in place [to] 
address all Covenant undertakings relevant to the signatory’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 10). 
Building an internal capability to implement PS requires the allocation of appropriate 
financial resources and assignment of responsibilities to staff members. The allocation of 
resources indicates that the company is serious about taking action, i.e. that it plans to go 
beyond ‘business-as-usual’. At a minimum, there needs to be someone within the 
company with allocated responsibility to coordinate PS activities, normally someone in 
corporate affairs or environment, and a budget for implementation. Responsibility for 
implementation should be spread across all business functions, with clear mechanisms for 
accountability. For example, National Foods has allocated responsibilities for NPC-related 
actions to site operations managers and the National Environmental Manager and these 
responsibilities have been included in job descriptions (National Foods Limited, 2004, p. 
14).  
(3) Product-oriented environment management system  
There is no requirement for an EMS in the NPC, although it does require companies to 
establish performance objectives and a reporting system (ANZECC, 1999). An EMS is a 
set of management processes and procedures which allows an organisation to ‘analyse, 
control and reduce the environmental impact of its operations and services to achieve cost 
savings, greater efficiency and oversight, and streamlined regulatory compliance’ 
(Schaltegger et al., 2003, p. 296). It is governed by voluntary standards such as ISO 
14001, which requires a company to establish an environmental policy, implementation 
plans, a monitoring and evaluation system and regular management reviews (Standards 
Australia and Standards New Zealand, 2004)119. According to ISO 14001 an EMS should 
                                                     
119 Another commonly used standard in Europe is the European Union’s Eco-management and 
Audit Scheme (EMAS). 
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cover the environmental impacts of ‘activities, products and services’, although most of 
the emphasis is on site-level impacts. Product-related requirements, for example DFE, are 
often not addressed, although Ammenberg and Sundin (2005b, p. 418) have concluded 
that, because many flows of material and energy are related to products, manufacturing 
companies which are certified to the standard should be required to have: 
• product-related language in their environmental policy; 
• identified issues in relation to products and product development processes as 
significant environmental aspects; 
• environmental objectives and/or targets concerning products;  
• procedures to ensure that product development is handled within the EMS. 
The lack of clarity in ISO 14001 and other EMS standards about the treatment of products 
and the perceived need to embed DFE within business systems has led to the development 
of models for a ‘product oriented environmental management system’ (POEMS), which is 
‘an environmental management system with a special focus on the continuous 
improvement of a product’s eco-efficiency (ecological and economic) along the life cycle, 
through the systematic integration of eco-design in the company’s strategies and practices’ 
(Rocha and Brezet, 1999, p. 32).  It was originally promoted by the Dutch Government 
through research and pilot studies in the late 1990s (Klinkers et al., 1999; Rocha and 
Brezet, 1999). Most of the POEMS models which have been proposed include the 
following steps (Ammenberg and Sundin, 2005a, pp. 407–8): 
• a review of the product portfolio from a life cycle perspective to identify 
environmental impacts and aspects, as well as DFE capabilities; 
• establishment of responsibilities and procedures including definition of roles and 
responsibilities for DFE, establishment of policies, objectives and targets, and 
revision of the policy development process; 
• development of DFE projects;  
• audit or evaluation, including revision of existing procedures and products aiming 
for continual improvement. 
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Product-oriented environmental management is a strategic extension of site-based 
environmental management and ideally should be integrated within an existing EMS 
rather than being run as a parallel system (Klinkers et al., 1999), as IBM has achieved: 
The corporation has taken a two-tiered approach to addressing the requirements of 
ISO 14001, both at the corporate level and also at the business unit level. At the 
corporate level, IBM has developed a list of significant environmental aspects 
applicable to IBM products, as well as objectives and targets for products 
addressing issues such as reuse and recyclability, upgradability, use of recycled 
materials, and improvements in energy efficiency. For IBM's major product lines, 
Product Environmental Team Leaders are responsible for determining what 
significant aspects are applicable to his/her product line ... The product lines in 
turn establish objectives and targets to support the corporate goals, as well as a 
management program to achieve the targets and objectives (IBM, n.d.). 
(4) Product-based accounting 
Environmental accounting systems identify, measure, analyse and interpret information 
about the environmental aspects of company activities, and may include monetary data 
such as environment-related costs and savings, and physical data such as use, flows and 
impacts of energy, water and materials (IFAC, 2005; Schaltegger et al., 2003). Their 
purpose is no different to conventional accounting systems: ‘Accountants gather data and 
provide purpose-oriented information for management as an aid to decision-making and as 
a basis for fulfilling accountability to external and internal stakeholders’ (Schaltegger et 
al., 2003, p. 251). Environmental accounting systems can be used to support internal 
decision making as well as reporting to external stakeholders.  
The NPC does not provide any detail on accounting beyond the requirement that action 
plans ‘[e]stablish measurable performance objectives and mechanisms to monitor their 
achievement’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 11) and that NPC annual reports should include 
information on performance against objectives. Clearly this process would be facilitated 
by some form of product-based accounting. Financial data could be collected on the costs 
of product-related environmental activities such as research and development, or support 
for external recycling and litter programs. Physical data could be collected on the types of 
packaging used and their environmental impacts such as embodied energy and post-
consumer waste. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2005, p. 33) 
recommends that packaging be measured as both a material input (packaging used to ship 
final goods) and a product output (packaged products). For example, Cadbury Schweppes 
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(2004) developed a basic packaging materials database for their Australian businesses 
with information on packaging type, recycled content and recyclability and has partly 
implemented a database system to record the weight of packaging used by the company 
each year. IBM (2004) has a global Master Packaged Product Database with information 
on the type and weight of packaging used, and PS objectives and targets are monitored 
through their EMS. 
More rigorous data collection is required under NPC Mark II (NPCC, 2005, p. 18) 
because companies have to report annually against key performance indicators (KPIs) 
such as the total weight of consumer packaging used each year, total weight of products 
packaged, energy and water used to produce packaging, recycled content and the total 
weight of ‘non-recyclable’ packaging sold.  
(5) Product stewardship reporting 
In recent years there has been growing pressure on companies to report on their 
environmental and social impacts in addition to financial performance. This is referred to 
as ‘triple bottom line’ or sustainability reporting. An important driver is expanding 
globalisation, which means that all parties—including corporations—are seeking new 
forms of accountability that credibly describe the consequences of business activities 
wherever, whenever, and however they occur (GRI, 2002). There are now several 
international standards for sustainability reporting, two of the most prominent being the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2002) guidelines and the AA1000 Assurance Standard 
produced by the UK-based Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability 
(AccountAbility). However, a recent survey of sustainability reporting in Australia found 
that only 23% of respondent companies researched for the project had produced a stand-
alone sustainability report or a sustainability section within an annual report or website, 
although the number of reports and the extent of external verification are increasing 
(Centre for Australian Ethical Research et al., 2004).   
Public reporting is an important element of the NPC. At a minimum, NPC signatories are 
required to report on PS activities through their annual reports to the NPCC, which were 
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originally published on the PCA’s website120. A PS report could also be included in a 
stand-alone document, or in a sustainability report, annual report or corporate website.  
(6) Environmental assessment of products 
Environmental assessment is important in providing benchmark data and helping to 
identify priorities for environmental design. Environmental impact databases, for example 
on the life cycle impacts of materials and processes, can be a valuable resource for design 
teams involved in DFE projects (Pujari et al., 2003). A method commonly used for more 
rigorous environmental evaluations is life cycle assessment (LCA). This is used to assess 
the environmental aspects and potential impacts associated with a product (Standards 
Australia and Standards New Zealand, 1997). LCA has been widely used in the packaging 
industry (e.g. Bovea et al., 2006; Boyden et al., 1991; Brachfeld et al., 2001; Lee and Xu, 
2004; Ross and Evans, 2003; Tellus Institute, 1992).  
While LCA is not specifically mentioned in the NPC it does state that signatories will, as 
appropriate, ‘conduct and facilitate research into environmental and life cycle issues 
involving the manufacture, distribution, recovery and/or disposal of packaging’ 
(ANZECC, 1999). The Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging (ECoPP) 
encourages designers to evaluate the environmental impacts of products over their total 
life cycle. One of the few Australian companies which regularly uses LCA to evaluate 
packaging designs is Orica. One of their ‘Challenge 2005’ targets for product stewardship 
was to conduct a ‘life cycle risk assessment’ for all major product groups which would 
‘review potential impacts of products from their origin to their disposal’ (Orica, 2004a, p. 
5). A division of Orica—Dulux—used LCA in 2003 to compare the environmental 
impacts of steel and polypropylene paint containers (Dulux, 2004, p. 4). 
(7) Research and development 
The NPC identifies research as one of the areas in which signatories should take action ‘as 
appropriate’. While suggesting that they should conduct and facilitate research into 
                                                     
120 Until 2007 all NPC action plans and annual reports for NPC Mark I were published on the 
PCA’s website at www.packcoun.com.au but they were removed following a redesign of the site. 
Since mid-2007 action plans and reports for NPC Mark II have been published on the new NPCC 
site at www.packagingCovenant.org.au/page.php?name=actionplans (viewed 17 September 2007). 
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‘environmental and life cycle issues involving the manufacture, distribution, recovery 
and/or disposal of packaging’ it also states that the research ‘should seek, among other 
things, to identify new end-uses for secondary materials that are essential for the 
sustainability of the recycling system’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 5). Elsewhere it is suggested 
that signatories ‘[c]ontribute to research and development into product design to achieve 
waste reduction’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 11).  
The DFE literature recognises the importance of research into new materials, 
technologies, and processes to identify opportunities for environmental product 
development (Rocha and Brezet, 1999). While the NPC focuses strongly on waste 
reduction and recycling, research could also be used to reduce environmental impacts in 
other parts of the life cycle, for example greenhouse gas emissions or waterborne wastes 
from the manufacturing process. For example, while Visy has an active research and 
development program which conducts research into issues such as the replacement of non-
recyclable waxed cardboard boxes with recyclable containers, they also look at issues 
which have impacts throughout the product life cycle, for example the replacement of 
heavy metal-based pigments in plastic packaging (Visy Industries, 2003). 
Research and development may need to be undertaken in conjunction with companies 
further up the supply chain (Klinkers et al., 1999). This approach is used in the Australian 
packaging supply chain. For example a  group of companies in different sectors is 
working together to improve the recyclability of polypropylene packaging (Polysearch, 
2005).   
(8) Design for Environment  
DFE is a critical component of PS because most of the environmental impacts of a product 
are ‘locked in’ at the design stage. This is when materials are selected and product 
performance, including efficiency and recyclability, is largely determined (Lewis et al., 
2001, pp. 12–13). DFE, also called ‘green design’ or ‘environmental new product 
development’, means that the designer has considered the environmental impacts of a 
product during the design process. A definition of DFE which is useful for the evaluation 
of corporate performance is provided by Pujari et al.(2003, p. 658). They define 
‘environmental new product development’ as ‘product development into which 
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environmental issues are explicitly integrated in order to create one of the least harmful 
products a firm has recently produced’. 
DFE differs from conventional new product development (NPD) processes in several 
ways, for example through considering customers’ environmental concerns, a focus on the 
physical product life cycle, a focus on post-consumer waste management, and evaluation 
of supply chain impacts (Pujari et al., 2003). To be effective, DFE needs to be integrated 
into a company’s NPD process. It also requires coordination among different functions of 
the company, including business development, purchasing and supplier management, 
product development, manufacturing, marketing and sales (Rocha and Brezet, 1999). 
DFE is referenced in the NPC in a number of ways. One of the areas in which signatories 
are required to take action (where appropriate, as not all signatories are directly involved 
in product development) is design: ‘In designing packaging, careful consideration will be 
given to its possible effect on the environment from manufacturer to end user as well as its 
recovery (including reuse and recycling) and/or final disposal’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 5). 
The ‘Industry strategy for sustainable recycling’ which forms part of the NPC (Schedule 
3) includes a commitment to develop ‘covenant friendly’ packaging based on an 
environmental checklist and the ECoPP. However, like many of the actions within the 
NPC, the implementation of ECoPP is suggested rather than required. The NPC states that 
the packaging supply chain will ‘[s]eek wider recognition and implementation by 
companies of the Environmental Code of Practice for Packaging’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 8).  
At a minimum, companies should be able to demonstrate that they use the ECoPP. More 
proactive companies have integrated ECoPP in the NPD process through formal policies 
and procedures which ensure that all products are designed with consideration for 
environmental impacts. For example, National Foods has developed its own Packaging 
Development Code of Practice, based on ECoPP, and environmental assessments are 
undertaken for all new products. Milk crates now contain some with recycled content and 
the company has switched to more recyclable plastics for some consumer packaging 
(National Foods Limited, 2005). 
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(9) Procurement  
PS requires a certain level of engagement and cooperation across the supply chain. This is 
recognised in the NPC, which states in the section on design that ‘[p]ackage designers 
should work with the packaging chain (from design to reuse) to ensure that opportunities 
for waste minimisation, secondary market creation and the reduction of litter are taken’ 
(ANZECC, 1999, p. 5, emphasis added). The NPC also suggests that signatories apply the 
principles of the covenant in ‘the purchase of raw materials’, the ‘purchase of packaged 
goods and paper’ and the ‘purchase of recycled materials’ (p. 6).  
An assessment of the environmental impacts and practices of suppliers is a logical first 
step outside the traditional boundaries of the firm for companies aiming to implement 
product-oriented environmental management (Klinkers et al., 1999). This activity, often 
called ‘environmental procurement’ or ‘sustainable procurement’, means that suppliers are 
assessed on environmental performance as well as quality, price, service and delivery. 
This is consistent with a broader shift in supply chain management beyond its traditional 
focus on purchasing and logistics to a broader focus on value creation throughout the 
entire product chain. Supply chain partners are starting to work together to reduce the 
costs of a product from manufacturing through to delivery of the product to the consumer 
(Klinkers et al., 1999). For example, waste reduction and resource efficiency strategies 
can add value and are becoming important elements of modern supply chain management 
(GEMI, 2004; Verghese and Lewis, 2007). Environmental procurement has also been 
promoted in Australia for many years through a number of government and industry 
initiatives (e.g. BRBA, 2001; DAS, 1992). 
The active involvement of suppliers is particularly important in delivering environmental 
outcomes in the NPD process (Pujari et al., 2003). Suppliers often have knowledge about 
‘best practice’ initiatives in other sectors or overseas and technical expertise which can be 
drawn on for material and product testing. Supply chain management for PS can be 
relatively informal—companies may collaborate with suppliers on joint projects or 
encourage them to reduce the environmental impacts of their products. More progressive 
companies are likely to have a documented environmental procurement policy or a ‘code 
of conduct’ which requires minimum standards of environmental performance from 
suppliers (NZBCSD, 2003). McDonald’s Australia has an environmental procurement 
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policy and suppliers are required to report on environmental initiatives in their quarterly 
business reviews. A number of collaborative research projects have been undertaken with 
suppliers to reduce product impacts (McDonald’s Australia Ltd, 2003).  
(10) Cleaner production  
Cleaner production involves ‘turning a waste into a product, avoiding making waste in the 
first place and, often, simply better housekeeping’ (Unglick, 1996, p. 83). Cleaner 
production policies have been promoted by state and federal governments in Australia 
since the 1980s and many companies have implemented it as an environmental 
management and cost-saving strategy (e.g. ANZECC, 1998; Dames and Moore, n.d.; 
Victorian EPA, 1997). While PS tends to emphasise the impacts of a product’s life cycle 
beyond the factory gate, i.e. in the supply chain and at end-of-life, cleaner production is an 
important tool in minimising the impacts of a product at the point of manufacture. It 
covers all forms of waste including solid, airborne, waterborne and hazardous waste 
streams. The NPC does not specifically mention cleaner production, although it does refer 
to production at several points. For example, it states that signatories should ‘make 
commitments to continuous improvement of environmental and waste minimisation 
outcomes in the production, use, sale and/or reprocessing and recovery of packaging 
materials’ (ANZECC, 1999, emphasis added).  
Corporate responsiveness to cleaner production can be demonstrated through a formal 
commitment, for example in a company’s environmental policy (Dames and Moore, n.d.). 
Lion Nathan’s environmental policy includes a commitment to ‘[i]mplementing 
environmental management programs—to reduce our environmental impacts, prevent 
pollution, reduce risk of harm to the environment and continually improve our 
performance’ (Lion Nathan, 2005, emphasis added). It can also be demonstrated through 
public reporting of cleaner production initiatives. More proactive companies tend to have 
a ‘zero waste’ goal which requires a commitment to both cleaner production and recycling 
of production waste, and can show that significant progress has been achieved.   
(11) Recycling of commercial and industrial waste 
Cleaner production tries to eliminate waste at source, but any waste which is generated 
during manufacturing and which cannot be reused in another process should ideally be 
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recycled. In a manufacturing facility this could include the recovery of wastes such as 
office paper, transport packaging which is used to deliver raw materials and other products 
to the site (pallets, stretch film, corrugated boxes etc.) and wastes from the production 
process. Waste is also generated by retailers, for example the transport packaging which is 
removed at distribution centres and retail outlets.   
State governments in Australia have promoted the reduction and recycling of commercial 
and industrial wastes through grants, education and recognition programs for many years 
(e.g. Sustainability Victoria, 2008). While the NPC does not mention recycling of in-
house solid waste, this is covered (like cleaner production) in the general references to the 
production process. Most companies could be expected to recycle materials which have 
good markets, such as corrugated cardboard and timber pallets. More proactive companies 
are likely to have ambitious waste reduction goals and to have found end-markets for most 
of their waste materials. For example, Foster’s collects and recycles paper, beverage 
packaging and batteries from their offices; recycles most of its manufacturing waste and 
incoming packaging at manufacturing plants; and is working with BIEC to develop 
markets for more difficult materials such as PET strapping (Foster’s Group, 2004a). 
(12) Environmental marketing strategies 
While the NPC does not mention environmental marketing beyond the use of product 
labelling, sales and marketing personnel have an important role to play in product-oriented 
environmental management (Klinkers et al., 1999). The marketing department tends to be 
actively involved in specifying products and their packaging and is also in direct contact 
with consumers. One of the main drivers for manufacturers to design environmentally 
improved products is the potential to increase sales by promoting a product’s 
environmental benefits. A narrow interpretation of environmental marketing is that it 
involves strategies aimed at increasing sales of products to a target group of consumers 
who have been identified as ‘environmentally aware’. During the late 1980s many 
companies tried to capitalise on growing environmental awareness by developing and 
promoting ‘green products’, often with dubious claims of environmental friendliness 
(Banerjee, 1999). This resulted in the development of guidelines, standards and codes 
designed to stop the use of false or misleading environmental claims (e.g. ACCC, 1999; 
ICC, 2001; Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, 2000).  
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Environmental marketing involves labelling, advertising and other forms of external 
communication, but the marketing department can also get involved at a more strategic 
level in business decisions about corporate values, product mix and product design to 
ensure that environmental objectives are integrated across all business functions 
(Banerjee, 1999). As discussed above, Visy is an example of a company which is trying to 
position itself as a leader in product stewardship and corporate responsibility. An 
extensive television advertising campaign promoted both the recyclability of their 
packaging and their capacity to collect and recycle it at the end of its life under the slogan 
‘we make it, we take it’ (Visy Industries, 2003, p. 2). 
(13) Product labelling 
An important element of any marketing campaign is the communication of important 
information to consumers. This may include information on the environmental attributes 
of the product. Environmental labelling on products usually takes one of two forms, both 
of which are covered by international standards: 
? self-declared environmental claims (Standards Australia and Standards New 
Zealand, 2000);  
? third-party certified environmental claims (ISO, 1999). 
The NPC requires signatories, in their action plans, to ‘provide examples of labelling / 
provision of information to provide the general community with details about waste 
minimisation, reuse, recycling and litter information’ (ANZECC, 1999, p. 11). The most 
common environmental claims on packaging are ‘self-declared statements’ (i.e. not 
certified by a third party) about recyclability, recycled content or correct disposal, often 
accompanied by recycling or anti-litter symbols. More detailed information may refer to 
the fibre or bleaching processes used for the manufacture of paper (e.g. ‘sourced from 
sustainably managed forests’ or ‘chlorine-free bleaching’) or provide specific advice to 
consumers on how to recycle. Some examples are provided in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29:  Examples of environmental labels 
‘Mobius loop’ symbol of recyclability 
Source: Standards Australia and Standards 
New Zealand (1999) 
 
 
 
  
 
‘Mobius loop’ symbol of recycled content 
Source: Standards Australia and Standards 
New Zealand (1999) 
 
 
 
Plastics identification code 
Source: PACIA (2003) 
 
 
 
 
‘Tidyman’ anti-litter logo 
Source: 
http://www.litter.vic.gov.au/www/html/1320-
tidyman-logo.asp, viewed 1 September 2008 
 
 
 
 
A review of international environmental labelling schemes concluded that they were 
effective in promoting sales of environmentally preferable products, or in encouraging 
manufacturers to address environmental issues in the design of products (AELA, 2004). 
There are third party schemes which certify that a product or package conforms to a 
particular environmental performance standard (often called environmental labelling 
schemes or ‘eco-labels’). The Australian eco-labelling scheme does not have a standard 
for packaging but other standards may apply, for example those for ‘recycled paper 
products’ or ‘compostable biopolymers’ (GECA, n.d.). Another relevant program is the 
Forest Stewardship Council’s certification of forestry practices used for the manufacture 
of paper packaging (FSC, 1996). 
(14) Product recovery 
The NPC emphasised the life cycle environmental management of packaging and paper 
products (ANZECC, 1999) but one of the most significant environmental issues for 
packaging is the waste generated at end-of-life. The negotiation of the Kerbside Schedule 
to the NPC proved to be a long and contentious process, which finally resulted in an 
agreement that local government was responsible for the costs of kerbside collection. The 
packaging supply chain as a whole agreed to (ANZECC, 1999, Schedule 3): 
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• contribute to the kerbside transitional fund to fund improvements to kerbside 
collection systems and market development for recyclable materials; 
• provide facilities for the reprocessing of packaging materials which would be 
purchased from local government at market rates (i.e. not subsidised); 
• support the development of secondary markets for recycled materials;  
• improve the recyclability of packaging. 
Key stakeholders, including ENGOs, local government and many state governments, 
expect the packaging supply chain to take greater responsibility for the recovery and 
reprocessing of packaging waste. The most commonly used system for the recovery of 
packaging in Australia is material recycling121. The packaging is collected either through 
household kerbside collection systems organised by councils, or by commercial operators 
collecting industrial waste.  The minimum expectation for all companies in the packaging 
supply chain is that they contribute to the kerbside transitional fund and label products to 
encourage recycling by consumers. Many of the largest packaging manufacturers are also 
directly involved in the collection and reprocessing of packaging materials. For example, 
Visy Recycling operates kerbside collection and sorting facilities and reprocesses paper, 
while Owens-Illinois (previously ACI Glass) contracts Visy to sort collected glass into 
different colours which they then use to make new containers. Many raw material 
suppliers, packaging manufacturers and brand owners have also provided financial 
support to industry-wide recycling and litter control programs through associations such 
as BIEC, the Steel Can Recycling Council and the Aluminium Can Group.  
(15) Litter management 
A survey of packaging stakeholders in 2003 found that the most commonly mentioned 
problem with packaging was litter and its impacts on wildlife and visual amenity (Lewis, 
2005). As the analysis of packaging discourses in Chapter 4 revealed, litter is of concern 
to many industry stakeholders, particularly ENGOs and local government. However, litter 
is rarely mentioned in the NPC apart from a reference to product labelling on correct 
                                                     
121 The other system which is commonly used in other parts of the world, particularly Europe and 
Japan, is incineration of mixed domestic waste with energy recovery. 
 293 
disposal. The ECoPP also includes the statement that ‘[t]he packaging 
designer/manufacturer and filler should jointly assess the possibility of the packaging 
being littered’ (AIG et al., 1997, p. 7) 
The minimum expectation of companies is therefore that they include information for 
consumers on appropriate disposal, for example through the use of a recognisable anti-
litter logo (e.g. the ‘Tidyman’ logo in Figure 28). More progressive companies contribute 
funding to anti-litter education and clean-up programs and should be able to demonstrate 
that they have redesigned packaging to reduce its impacts in the litter stream. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, beverage manufacturers and their packaging suppliers have funded anti-litter 
campaigns since the late 1970s through LRA and later BIEC. McDonald’s currently 
sponsor the activities of Clean Up Australia and regularly clean up litter in the vicinity of 
their stores (McDonald’s Australia Ltd, 2003). Metcash offers its retail customers a 
degradable plastic bag which breaks down faster than conventional polymers (Metcash, 
2005) and is therefore designed to have a lower impact in the litter stream.  
(16) Participation in voluntary environmental programs 
Participation in voluntary environmental programs is an indicator of a company’s 
commitment to PS, i.e. its willingness to go ‘beyond compliance’ in reducing the life 
cycle environmental impacts of its products. Within Australia packaging manufacturers 
are expected to become a signatory to the ‘voluntary’ NPC and submit regular action plans 
and annual reports on progress. Indicators of responsiveness include the year that a 
company signed the covenant—some companies signed the covenant at its inception in 
1999 whereas others signed up much later into its five-year term—and compliance with 
reporting requirements. An evaluation of the NPC found that many companies failed to 
submit reports on time (Nolan-ITU, 2004, p. 14).  
Other voluntary environmental programs during the evaluation period included: 
• recycling and litter control programs run by industry associations such as 
BIEC, PACIA and AFGC; 
 294 
• the federal government’s Greenhouse Challenge program122  
• the Victorian Government’s Waste Wise program123;  
• the Buy Recycled Business Alliance124;  
• the plastic and chemical industries’ Responsible Care program. 
(17) Consultation and communication with stakeholders 
NPC Mark I required all signatories to ‘[c]o-ordinate education and promotion programs 
and establish an accessible communications framework to facilitate information collation 
and dissemination’ while the list of options for signatories listed in Schedule 1 included 
‘[u]ndertake education and community awareness programs’(ANZECC, 1999, p. 6). 
However, an effective and meaningful commitment to PS can only be developed through 
engagement with key stakeholders, which goes beyond education and information 
dissemination. Proactive companies are those which consult with stakeholders about their 
perceptions and expectations and take these views into account when developing product-
related strategies. For example, Amcor surveyed some key stakeholder groups in 2002 to 
identify their concerns in relation to environmental issues, and the dialogue was expanded 
in 2003 to incorporate co-workers and more customers. One of the key environmental 
issues raised by Amcor’s stakeholders was the impacts of the company’s products after 
they have been used (Amcor Limited, 2004b, p. 8). During the review of NPC Mark I, one 
non-government organisation stated that ‘there has been no engagement of non-industry 
stakeholders at all; NGOs or consumers. There should be a requirement in action plan 
development for community and worker consultation’ (Nolan-ITU, 2004, p. 34). 
 
                                                     
122 Now called ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus’, signatories agree to voluntarily work with the 
Australian Greenhouse Office to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(DEWHA, 2008).  
123 EcoRecycle Victoria (now Sustainability Victoria) runs a voluntary program called ‘Waste 
Wise’ in which companies can voluntarily commit to a waste reduction and recycling program 
(Sustainability Victoria, 2008). 
124 Members of the Buy Recycled Business Alliance (BRBA) commit to purchase and use recycled 
products and materials (BRBA, 2008). 
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Appendix 4: Framing corporate responsibility for packaging  
Key words used by companies in their public statements (NPC action plans and reports, 
corporate annual reports, environment or sustainability reports, and websites) to describe their 
corporate responsibilities for packaging. 
Company Product stewardship Sustainability  
Responsible 
Care  CSR 
Packaging manufacturers 
Visy Industries ? ?   
Amcor Australasia ? ?   
Carter Holt Harvey ? ?   
Huhtamaki Australia Pty Ltd ? ?   
ACI  ?    
Retailers 
Bunnings Group Limited ? ?   
Coles Myer Limited ?    
David Jones Limited     
Metcash Trading Limited ?    
Woolworths Limited ?    
Brand owners 
Bonlac Foods Limited     
Cadbury Schweppes Limited ?   ? 
Coca-Cola Amatil ?   ? 
Dulux ? ? ?  
Fisher & Paykel Appliances Australia Ltd ?    
Foster’s Group ? ?   
George Weston Foods Limited     
Goodman Fielder ?    
Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited ?    
IBM Australia and New Zealand Limited ?    
Kimberly-Clark Holdings  ?   
Lion Nathan Australia ? ?   
McDonald’s Australia     
Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co. Limited ?    
National Foods ?    
Nestlé Oceania ?    
Sugar Australia ?    
Unilever Australia Ltd  ?   
Raw material suppliers 
Bluescope Steel  ?    
Qenos Pty Ltd ?  ?  
Total number 24 10 2 2 
Source: Evaluation of company reports 
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Appendix 5: Results of the product stewardship evaluation 
Management Product development Sector and company 
PS policy Resource 
allocation 
EMS Product-
based 
accounting 
Public 
reporting  
Average 
score 
Environmental 
assessment  
R&D Design for 
environment 
Procurement Average 
score 
PACKAGING 
MANUFACTURERS 1.4 1.2 1.7 0.9 1.5 1.3 0.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.2 
1. Visy Industries 3.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.8 1.0 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.1 
2. Amcor Australasia 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.0 2.0 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 
3. Carter Holt Harvey 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 0.8 
4. Huhtamaki Australia Pty 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 
5. ACI Operations Pty Ltd 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 
RETAILERS 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 
6. Woolworths 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.8 
7. Coles Myer Limited 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.5 0.6 
8. Metcash Trading Limited 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.8 
9. David Jones Limited 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 
10. Bunnings Group 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.4 
BRAND OWNERS 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.4 
11. Nestlé Oceania 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.7 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 
12. Bonlac Foods Limited 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.3 
13. Goodman Fielder 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 
14. Sugar Australia 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 
15. Cadbury Schweppes 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 2.1 
16. National Foods 1.5 2.5 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.7 2.0 1.0 2.5 1.5 1.8 
17. Coca-Cola Amatil 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.3 
18. Foster’s Group 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.3 
19. McDonald’s Australia 1.0 2.0 0.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 0.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 
20. George Weston Foods 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.0 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.9 
21. Lion Nathan 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 
22. Murray Goulburn Co- 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
23. Kimberly-Clark 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 
24. Unilever 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.5 0.5 1.3 2.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.3 
25. Inghams Enterprises 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.9 
26. IBM 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 2.3 
27. Fisher & Paykel 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 2.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 
28 Dulux 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.8 
RAW MATERIAL 1.5 0.8 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.4 
29. Bluescope Steel  1.5 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.4 
30. Qenos Holdings 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 
INDUSTRY AVERAGE 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 
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Appendix 5 (cont.): Results of the product stewardship evaluation 
Operations Marketing Corporate affairs/environment 
Sector and company Cleaner 
production Recycling  
Average 
score 
Marketing 
strategies 
Product  
labelling 
Average 
score 
Product 
recovery 
Litter  
management 
Voluntary 
programs Communication 
Average 
score 
AVERAGE 
PACKAGING 
MANUFACTURERS 1.9 1.4 1.7 1.0 0.5 0.8 2.6 0.9 2.6 2.0 2.0 1.4 
1. Visy Industries 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0 
2. Amcor Australasia 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 3.0 2.6 1.8 
3. Carter Holt Harvey 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 
4. Huhtamaki Australia Pty 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.0 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.2 
5. ACI Operations Pty Ltd 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.5 3.0 1.5 2.1 1.2 
RETAILERS 1.0 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.8 
6. Woolworths 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 
7. Coles Myer Limited 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 0.9 
8. Metcash Trading Limited 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 1.0 2.0 1.1 0.8 
9. David Jones Limited 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.4 
10. Bunnings Group Limited 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 
BRAND OWNERS 1.6 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.7 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 
11. Nestlé Oceania 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.3 1.9 
12. Bonlac Foods Limited 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 0.7 
13. Goodman Fielder 1.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.6 0.7 
14. Sugar Australia 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 
15. Cadbury Schweppes 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 3.0 1.5 2.0 1.7 
16. National Foods 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.6 1.6 
17. Coca-Cola Amatil 1.0 2.5 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.4 
18. Foster's Group 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 1.8 
19. McDonald’s Australia 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.4 1.4 
20. George Weston Foods 1.5 2.0 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.2 
21. Lion Nathan 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.7 
22. Murray Goulburn Co- 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.6 
23. Kimberly-Clark Holdings 2.5 3.0 2.8 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.0 3.0 0.5 1.1 2.0 
24. Unilever 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 0.9 1.0 
25. Inghams Enterprises 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.0 
26. IBM 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 3.0 0.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 
27. Fisher & Paykel 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 
28 Dulux 2.5 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.4 
RAW MATERIAL 1.8 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 2.0 0.0 2.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 
29. Bluescope Steel  2.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.3 2.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 
30. Qenos Holdings 1.5 1.0 1.3 0.0 0.5 0.3 2.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 1.5 0.9 
INDUSTRY AVERAGE 1.6 1.4 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.7 0.6 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 
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Appendix 6: Average responsiveness score by size (sales 
revenue) 
 
 Companies by sales category Sales revenue ($m)  Average score 
> $4 billion     
Coles Myer Limited 36185.2 0.9 
Woolworths 31352.0 1.1 
Bluescope Steel  7981.6 1.1 
Metcash Trading Limited 6993.7 0.8 
Coca-Cola Amatil 4149.6 1.4 
Bunnings Group Limited 4100.0 0.7 
Average   1.0 
$3–4 billion     
Foster’s Group 3972.3 1.8 
IBM 3753.6 2.2 
Carter Holt Harvey 3305.3 1.0 
Visy Industries 3170.0 2.0 
Average   1.8 
$2–3 billion     
Amcor Australasia 2571.7 1.8 
Nestlè Oceania 2411.8 1.9 
Goodman Fielder 2326.9 0.7 
Cadbury Schweppes 2155.0 1.7 
Average   1.5 
$1–2 billion     
McDonald’s Australia 2000.0 1.4 
Murray Goulburn Co-operative 1869.0 0.6 
George Weston Foods Limited 1832.3 1.2 
David Jones Limited 1799.1 0.4 
Inghams Enterprises 1487.0 1.0 
ACI Operations Pty Ltd 1259.1 1.2 
National Foods 1214.7 1.6 
Unilever 1158.1 1.0 
Kimberly-Clark Holdings 1148.9 2.0 
Lion Nathan 1143.5 1.7 
Average   1.2 
Less than $1b     
Fisher and Paykel Appliances 953.1 0.9 
Qenos Holdings 774.3 0.9 
Bonlac Foods Limited 712.6 0.7 
Dulux 520.6 1.4 
Sugar Australia 350.0 0.8 
Huhtamaki Australia Pty Ltd 208.3 1.2 
Average   1.0 
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Appendix 7: Average responsiveness scores by type of 
ownership 
Company Average score 
Public corporations   
ACI Operations Pty Ltd 1.2 
Amcor Australasia 1.8 
Bluescope Steel  1.1 
Bonlac Foods Limited 0.7 
Bunnings Group Limited 0.7 
Cadbury Schweppes Limited 1.7 
Coca-Cola Amatil 1.4 
Coles Myer Limited 0.9 
Dulux 1.4 
David Jones Limited 0.4 
Carter Holt Harvey 1.0 
Fisher & Paykel Appliances Australia Ltd 0.9 
Goodman Fielder 0.7 
George Weston Foods Limited 1.2 
Huhtamaki Australia Pty Ltd 1.2 
IBM Australia and New Zealand Limited 2.2 
Kimberly-Clark Australia 2.0 
Metcash Trading Limited Australasia 0.8 
Nestlé Oceania 1.9 
Foster's Group 1.8 
Lion Nathan Australia 1.7 
National Foods 1.6 
Unilever Australia Ltd 1.0 
Woolworths Limited 1.1 
Average 1.3 
Privately owned   
Inghams Enterprises Pty Limited 1.0 
Visy Industries 2.0 
Average 1.5 
Other (joint venture, cooperative, 
franchises)   
McDonald's Australia 1.4 
Qenos Pty Ltd 0.9 
Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co. Limited 0.6 
Sugar Australia 0.8 
Average 0.9 
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Appendix 8: Glossary 
 
Biopolymer A plastic manufactured from a renewable source, such as corn or 
cellulose. 
Brand owner A company that sells a packaged product under their own brand, 
including most product manufacturers and retailers who sell 
‘own brand’ products. The Australian NEPM for Used 
Packaging defines a brand owner as the Australian owner of the 
trade mark under which a product is sold, the first person to sell 
an imported product, or the supplier of packaging used in-store 
(e.g. for plastic bags) (NEPC, 1999). 
Contract fillers A company that manufactures products for other brand owners, 
for example many food and beverage companies now 
manufacture products for retailers. These products are sold under 
the retailer’s rather than the manufacturer’s brand. 
Design for 
environment (DFE) 
A product design process which explicitly considers, and tries to 
minimise, the environmental impacts of the product. 
Down counting The retailers’ policy of demanding that brand owners supply a 
smaller number of items in each box. 
Extended producer 
responsibility (EPR) 
The principle that manufacturers have financial or physical 
responsibility for the management of products at the end of their 
useful life, i.e. when they become a ‘waste’ product. 
High density 
polyethylene (HDPE) 
A type of plastic used to manufacture packaging, e.g. milk and 
detergent bottles. 
Liquidpaperboard A packaging material made of paper with a coating of low 
density polyethylene (LDPE), used to make milk and juice 
cartons.  
Own brands Brands owned by retailers. Retailers enter into a contract with 
existing manufacturers to develop and manufacture products and 
by doing so avoid the need to pay a premium for well-known 
brands. This is one strategy being pursued by retailers to reduce 
consumer prices and enhance profitability. 
Packaging supply 
chain 
All of the industry sectors involved in making, using or selling 
packaging, including raw material suppliers, packaging 
manufacturers, manufacturers of products which are distributed 
or sold in packaging, and retailers. 
Packaging supplier A manufacturer or importer that supplies packaging to product 
manufacturers (brand owners) or retailers. 
Packaging raw 
material supplier 
A manufacturer or importer that supplies raw materials, such as 
plastics, aluminium, rolled steel, liquidpaperboard, paper, 
cardboard, inks, pigments or adhesives, to packaging 
manufacturers. 
Polyethylene 
terephthalate (PET) 
A type of plastic used to manufacture packaging, e.g. soft drink 
bottles. 
Polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) 
A type of plastic used to manufacture packaging, e.g. cordial 
bottles with handles. 
Post-consumer waste Packaging material generated by households or by commercial, 
industrial or institutional facilities in their role as end-users of 
the product (Based on NPCC, 2005, p. v). It excludes industrial 
waste generated during the manufacture of packaging, e.g. 
plastic or paper off-cuts. 
Primary packaging Packaging which is used to contain a product until the product is 
consumed (e.g., bottle, closure) (Saphire, 1994). 
Product stewardship 
(PS) 
The principle that a company assumes responsibility for the life 
cycle environmental impacts of its products, particularly at end- 
of-life, although this responsibility is shared with other 
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stakeholders including suppliers, customers and local 
government. 
Retailer Any company that sells packaged products to consumers, 
including supermarkets, department stores, hardware stores and 
fast-food restaurants. 
Secondary packaging Transport, distribution or logistical packaging is used to ship 
goods from their point of origin, such as a farm or factory, to 
their destination. It often includes boxes, crates, pallets or 
cushioning material (e.g. expanded polystyrene) (Saphire, 1994). 
Shelf-ready 
packaging 
Shippers which do not need to be completed unpacked by the 
retailer. The shipper is designed to be partially unwrapped, for 
example by removing a shrink film over-wrap from a corrugated 
cardboard tray, and placed directly on the supermarket shelf. The 
aim is to reduce the retailer’s labour costs in the store. 
State government(s) Australia has six state governments (New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania) 
and two territory governments (the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory). The powers of the states are 
protected in the Australian Constitution, whereas territories are 
subject to greater federal government control. For simplicity, the 
term ‘state government(s)’ is used in this thesis to refer to both 
states and territories. 
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Appendix 9: Papers by the author 
 
Lewis, H. 2005, 'Defining product stewardship and sustainability in the Australian packaging 
industry', Environmental Science & Policy, 8, 2005, 45-55. 
 
—— 2006, 'Product stewardship for CSR', in Jonker, J. and de Witte, M. (eds), Management 
models for corporate social responsibility, Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, 197-206. 
 
Verghese, K. and Lewis, H. 2007, 'Environmental innovation in industrial packaging: a 
supply chain approach', International Journal of Production Research, 45, 18, 4381-
401. 
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